Event Notification Report for March 31, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/30/2006 - 03/31/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
4246342464424574245942556
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42463
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRETT NICHOLS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BARRETT NICHOLS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 22:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 22:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 22:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 22:20 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE AFW TURBINE
During post maintenance testing of the Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine driven pump, pump problems were discovered related to the turbine governor and pump bearings. The turbine driven pump is inoperable and can not be made operable within the Technical Specification LCO Action time limit of 72 hours. The unit will be commencing a reactor shutdown to Mode 4 and perform maintenance to correct the problems.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, and the Local Waterford Dispatch.
During post maintenance testing of the Auxiliary Feedwater Terry Turbine driven pump, pump problems were discovered related to the turbine governor and pump bearings. The turbine driven pump is inoperable and can not be made operable within the Technical Specification LCO Action time limit of 72 hours. The unit will be commencing a reactor shutdown to Mode 4 and perform maintenance to correct the problems.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, and the Local Waterford Dispatch.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42464
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: GEOTECH LAB INC
Region: 1
City: COLUMBIA State: MD
County:
License #: MD-27-075-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB NELSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: GEOTECH LAB INC
Region: 1
City: COLUMBIA State: MD
County:
License #: MD-27-075-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB NELSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/01/2006
Notification Time: 00:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2006
Notification Time: 00:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 16:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/01/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: DAMAGED TROXLER
A Troxler moisture density gauge was left unattended at a site in Clinton, Maryland and was run over by a bulldozer. The Troxler was broken in two parts. No external contamination was detected and the source was in the shielded position. Troxler Model 3430, serial #23881.
Sources:
8 milliCurie Cs-137
40 milliCurie Am-241:Be
A Troxler moisture density gauge was left unattended at a site in Clinton, Maryland and was run over by a bulldozer. The Troxler was broken in two parts. No external contamination was detected and the source was in the shielded position. Troxler Model 3430, serial #23881.
Sources:
8 milliCurie Cs-137
40 milliCurie Am-241:Be
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42457
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF ATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF ATKINS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 13:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 14:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 13:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOW TRITIUM CONCENTRATION LEVELS FOUND NEAR UNDERGROUND PIPING
"Followup information to the February 15, 2006, notification (ENS #42339 [at Braidwood]) involving the discovery of elevated levels of tritium in several vacuum breaker vaults located along the discharge piping to the Rock River. At that time we indicated we planned to install monitoring wells along this pipeline to determine if tritium has migrated from these vaults.
"Fifteen shallow test wells and eight deeper, more permanent wells were drilled on company property to obtain water samples. Of the 23 wells, two had measurable levels of tritium, however they were well below the Environmental Protection Agency's standard for drinking water (20,000 picocuries per liter).
"These elevated levels pose no health or safety hazard to the employees or public. Investigation into the source of the elevated tritium levels continues.
"A press release is planned for the afternoon of March 31, 2006 regarding the results obtained from these monitoring wells."
Incident reported according to 10 CFR 50.72 (c)(2) and the licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Followup information to the February 15, 2006, notification (ENS #42339 [at Braidwood]) involving the discovery of elevated levels of tritium in several vacuum breaker vaults located along the discharge piping to the Rock River. At that time we indicated we planned to install monitoring wells along this pipeline to determine if tritium has migrated from these vaults.
"Fifteen shallow test wells and eight deeper, more permanent wells were drilled on company property to obtain water samples. Of the 23 wells, two had measurable levels of tritium, however they were well below the Environmental Protection Agency's standard for drinking water (20,000 picocuries per liter).
"These elevated levels pose no health or safety hazard to the employees or public. Investigation into the source of the elevated tritium levels continues.
"A press release is planned for the afternoon of March 31, 2006 regarding the results obtained from these monitoring wells."
Incident reported according to 10 CFR 50.72 (c)(2) and the licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42459
Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE TAGGERT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE TAGGERT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 11:50 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2006
Notification Time: 16:01 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 11:50 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/31/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
DALE POWERS (R4)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DEFECTIVE RHR CHECK VALVE
"In accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1), Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) is hereby notifying the NRC of a defective component received from Flowserve, Flow Control Division, in Raleigh, NC, but not installed at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The component is an 8-inch tilting disk check valve that was procured for installation in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System during the Unit 2 refueling outage (2R13) scheduled to begin on 04/17/06.
"On 03/02/06, the defect was identified at DCPP during post-receipt bench testing and involved incorrect disc dimensions that caused the disc to stick in the valve bonnet (i.e., in the open position). This would have prevented the valve from performing its intended safety function of closing to prevent pump-to-pump interaction when both RHR pumps are running. (These check valves were installed in response to NRC Bulletin 88-04, 'Potential Safety Related Pump Loss.') Failure of this check valve, had it been installed, could have resulted in the loss of one RHR train on Unit 2, which could impact the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
" On 03/08/06, PG&E notified Flowserve of the defect via Supplier Audit Finding Report #060670010 and requested corrective actions be taken.
"On 03/13/06, Flowserve concluded that the defect was caused by disc design error and test procedure error.
"On 03/16/06, Flowserve initiated Quality Problem Corrective Action Plan #169, in which they concluded a Part 21 evaluation was not required.
"On 03/31/06, PG&E Vice President, Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director, [deleted], determined that the defect met 10 CFR 21.21 reporting requirements.
"PG&E initiated purchase of the 600 lb, stainless steel check valve on 06/02/05, and does not know whether any others have been manufactured by Flowserve. The valve was manufactured in accordance with Vendor Assembly Drawing W9023267 and ASME Section III, Subsection NC, 1989 Edition.
"PG&E subsequently repaired the check valve in accordance with instructions provided in a Flowserve letter to PG&E, dated 03/16/06. The valve has passed inspection and bench testing and will be installed during 2R13."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"In accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(d)(1), Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) is hereby notifying the NRC of a defective component received from Flowserve, Flow Control Division, in Raleigh, NC, but not installed at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The component is an 8-inch tilting disk check valve that was procured for installation in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System during the Unit 2 refueling outage (2R13) scheduled to begin on 04/17/06.
"On 03/02/06, the defect was identified at DCPP during post-receipt bench testing and involved incorrect disc dimensions that caused the disc to stick in the valve bonnet (i.e., in the open position). This would have prevented the valve from performing its intended safety function of closing to prevent pump-to-pump interaction when both RHR pumps are running. (These check valves were installed in response to NRC Bulletin 88-04, 'Potential Safety Related Pump Loss.') Failure of this check valve, had it been installed, could have resulted in the loss of one RHR train on Unit 2, which could impact the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
" On 03/08/06, PG&E notified Flowserve of the defect via Supplier Audit Finding Report #060670010 and requested corrective actions be taken.
"On 03/13/06, Flowserve concluded that the defect was caused by disc design error and test procedure error.
"On 03/16/06, Flowserve initiated Quality Problem Corrective Action Plan #169, in which they concluded a Part 21 evaluation was not required.
"On 03/31/06, PG&E Vice President, Diablo Canyon Operations and Station Director, [deleted], determined that the defect met 10 CFR 21.21 reporting requirements.
"PG&E initiated purchase of the 600 lb, stainless steel check valve on 06/02/05, and does not know whether any others have been manufactured by Flowserve. The valve was manufactured in accordance with Vendor Assembly Drawing W9023267 and ASME Section III, Subsection NC, 1989 Edition.
"PG&E subsequently repaired the check valve in accordance with instructions provided in a Flowserve letter to PG&E, dated 03/16/06. The valve has passed inspection and bench testing and will be installed during 2R13."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42556
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: 21ST CENTURY ONCOLOGY
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #: 2667-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK SEIDENSTRICKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: 21ST CENTURY ONCOLOGY
Region: 1
City: CORAL SPRINGS State: FL
County:
License #: 2667-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK SEIDENSTRICKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 05/05/2006
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2006
Notification Time: 13:49 [ET]
Event Date: 03/31/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
TIM HARRIS (NMSS)
RONALD BELLAMY (R1)
TIM HARRIS (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
An 80 year old white female undergoing a Mammosite Brachytherapy (Nuclear Tron V2 model 31662) procedure utilizing Ir-192 source received less than 30% of the prescribed dose of 3400 centi-gray (cGy) (accumulated dose). An incorrect figure was entered into the computer causing the source to stay back 6 cm from the intended position and hence dosing an unintended area of approximately 2 cm with 3 times the prescribed dose of 10,000 cGy. The treatment was given 2 times a day for five days from March 31 to April 7, 2006. The patient saw the attending physician for follow-up on May 2, 2006. The physician discovered the patients skin abnormally red. He contacted the Medical Physicist who investigated and discovered the input error. The physician, patient and the patients family were notified. The patient is well and is being treated for erythema.
Florida Incident number: FL 06-062
An 80 year old white female undergoing a Mammosite Brachytherapy (Nuclear Tron V2 model 31662) procedure utilizing Ir-192 source received less than 30% of the prescribed dose of 3400 centi-gray (cGy) (accumulated dose). An incorrect figure was entered into the computer causing the source to stay back 6 cm from the intended position and hence dosing an unintended area of approximately 2 cm with 3 times the prescribed dose of 10,000 cGy. The treatment was given 2 times a day for five days from March 31 to April 7, 2006. The patient saw the attending physician for follow-up on May 2, 2006. The physician discovered the patients skin abnormally red. He contacted the Medical Physicist who investigated and discovered the input error. The physician, patient and the patients family were notified. The patient is well and is being treated for erythema.
Florida Incident number: FL 06-062