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Event Notification Report for March 1, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
02/28/2006 - 03/01/2006

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42328 42368 42371 42373 42377

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42328
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE DEES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 02/10/2006
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 02/10/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FAILURE TO MEET THE FITNESS FOR DUTY TESTING REQUIREMENTS

"10 CFR26.24 describes the chemical and drug testing programs for persons subject to this part. 10 CFR26.24(2) states that 'Random testing must be conducted at an annual rate equal to at least 50 percent of the workforce.' On 2/10/06 at 0830, Wolf Creek determined that the random testing rate was 49.41 percent for calendar year 2005, which is below 50 percent. 10 CFR26.73 states that notification to the NRC Operations Center must be made by telephone within 24 hours."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM L. TAYLOR TO J. KNOKE AT 16:22 ON 2/28/2006 * * *

This event is being retracted. A manual verification of the 2005 data was conducted. It confirmed that the random test rate for 2005 exceeded 50%, therefore this event is not reportable per 10 CFR 26.73.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (J. Whitten)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42368
Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH / FLOWOOD
Region: 1
City: FLOWOOD State: MS
County:
License #: MS-493-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: B.J. SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/23/2006
Notification Time: 12:17 [ET]
Event Date: 02/20/2006
Event Time: 06:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

DELIVERY VEHICLE ACCIDENT WITH UNIT DOSE SHIPPING CONTAINERS ONBOARD

The State provided the following information via email:

"Received notification on 2-20-06 at 8:00 AM from Cardinal Health Nuclear Pharmacy that one of their delivery vehicles had hit a bridge on Hwy 61 North of Vicksburg, MS, near Cary, MS, located in Sharkey County. The RSO stated that the bridge was covered in ice due to the freezing rain weather conditions. The driver apparently lost control of the pick-up and hit the bridge. The truck rolled over. The camper shell came off in the accident and the unit dose shipping containers were scattered on the roadway. The RSO stated that the driver had stated that the unit doses appeared OK and not leaking. The RSO stated that the driver had removed all the shipping containers from the roadway and secured them at the accident scene. The RSO stated that he had a survey meter with him and was en route to the wreck site. He stated that he would notify DRH if he needed assistance, but thought he would be able to handle situation.

"The isotopes involved were Tc-99m, I-131, and F-18. The activity is 75 mCi of FDG (Fluorodeoxyglucose); 12 mCi of I-131; 475 mCi of bulk Tc-99m; 100 mCi/unit doses of Tc-99m.

"DRH did not respond to job site. RSO called DRH and stated the shipping containers were secured and not damaged. He said he checked the unit doses for leakage and did not detect any contamination. All doses and shipping containers were put in RSO's vehicle and returned to Flowood facility. RSO stated that after he returned to Flowood facility, he wiped all containers and did not detect an removable contamination."


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42371
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NEWFIELD EXPLORATION COMPANY
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: LA7561-101A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARTHUR TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/23/2006
Notification Time: 18:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/23/2006
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

STUCK NEUTRON GENERATOR WELL LOGGING SOURCE

The State provided the following information via email:

A neutron generator well logging source is stuck at 11,000 feet in a well in the Gulf Of Mexico. The location is : long 91degrees 37 min 48.490 sec, and Lat 28 degrees 36 min 26.849 sec. It is in the Gulf of Mexico, Eugene Island.

The company is continuing to try and retrieve the stuck source.

The radioisotope is H3, but the State does not know the activity level.

Texas Incident No: I-8307

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42373
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: MERRVEL ENGINEERING
Region: 4
City: LIVERMORE State: CA
County:
License #: 3646
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 02/24/2006
Notification Time: 01:15 [ET]
Event Date: 02/17/2006
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/24/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - ABANDONED GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"Based on a July 05 inspection and notification from RML licensing it was determined that Merrvel Engineering had not paid their annual fees and had abandoned their facility.

"Based on a 2/17/06 visit to the Engineering Office, it was noted that Merrvel Engineering had been evicted based on the Notice Posted on the front door. RHB contacted the Oakland Police and spoke with an [DELETED] who provided the name of the building owner. RHB contacted the building owner, [DELETED] and set up a time to gain entry to the facility and determine of there were any gauges present. On 2/22/06, RHB visited the facility and met owner at the facility to see if [DELETED] may have left any RAM at this facility. A quick survey indicated that RAM was present in a locked and posted cabinet at the rear of the facility. [DELETED], the owner and party that the property had reverted to, after the 14 day eviction proceedings, removed the hinges from the cabinet and a locked CPN gauge case was observed. According to the case placard, the gauge contained 10 mCi of cesium 137 and 50 mCi of americium 241 on 05/14/84. The serial number of the gauge is M14115815. After removal of the gauge surveys of the facility using a Ludlum Model 19 survey meter indicated that no other gauges were present at this facility. All other readings were background or 9 microrem/hr. A copy of the RHB business card was left with [DELETED] who indicated he would tape it to the door, in case [DELETED], came by and had questions. The inspector noted that [DELETED] had abandoned the facility and had not taken his tools, computers, or equipment. So it is suspected that at some point [DELETED] may contact [DELETED] or RHB regarding the Moisture Gauge. The inspector impounded the gauge because it had been abandoned and will transport the gauge to CPN or storage until release by RHB. RHB will continue to try and locate [DELETED] to retrieve back fees and to determine if he possesses any other portable gauges."

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 42377
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: JAMES TORTORELLI
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/28/2006
Notification Time: 15:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2006
Event Time: 17:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
CHARLES MILLER (NMSS)
MICHAEL MARKLEY (NMSS)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - DEFECT IN A PORT REDUCER

"Honeywell, Metropolis Facility (MTW) mechanics were installing a new BS&B manufactured rupture disc, corresponding safety head, and port reducer on the inlet of the relief valve on the Alternate Primary Cold Trap, E-600. The disc and head were part of an approved change. The safety heads (disc holders) have a port between the disc and relief valve to install a tell-tale indicator. This safety head was for a 1-1/2 in. disc. The normal port size of in. pipe (normal O.D. = 0.84 in.) was reduced to in. pipe (normal O.D. = 0.54 in.) to allow clearance between the safety head fasteners and the companion flange studs. To facilitate the site requirements of in. pipe size and the clearance needs of the manufacturer, the port reducer was fabricated from a single piece of metal, in this case Monel. MTW had already welded a in. Hex valve to the port and the mechanics had installed the head / disc / port reducer / valve assembly onto the piping. As the tell-tale gauge was installed, the port reducer broke into two pieces. The break was at the machined reduction in the outer diameter.

"On inspection a fabrication flaw was found in the port reducer. The large end of the port reducer has an I.D. of 0.55 inches and the small end has an O.D. of 0.54 inches, machined down from the O.D. of 0.84 at the large end. The small O.D. section was specified to be 2.00 inches long. It was improperly machined approximately 2.63 inches long so that the 0.55 I.D. came within a very small distance of the 0.54 O.D. When the gauge was being hand tightened, the port reducer broke at this thin wall point.

"MTW reverted to the previous design and all port reducers were collected for investigation.

"The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (J. Pelchat)."

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Friday, March 30, 2012