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Event Notification Report for December 29, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/28/2005 - 12/29/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42225 42227 42233 42235

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42225
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: WE ENERGIES
Region: 3
City: PORT WASHINGTON State: WI
County:
License #: GL 707237
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/23/2005
Notification Time: 10:31 [ET]
Event Date: 12/23/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3)
SANDY WASTLER (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (E-MAIL) (TAS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - LOSS OF TRITIUM SIGNS

"In 2004 the Port Washington Power Plant (PWPP) was demolished in preparation for the construction of a new gas-fired plant. Before demolishing began, 56 exit signs containing Tritium (H-3) were taken down, boxed up and planned for return to Isolite through a contractor. The signs were accounted for in December of 2004 but during the 4th quarter of 2005 WE Energies identified that there was no accounting for the signs disposal. An investigation began and WE Energies spoke with their contractors and sub-contractors. No paperwork was found for the disposal and it appears they were sent to a landfill with the general trash.

"Due to the length of time since disposal, the signs are assumed to be in the landfill buried under general trash. No search of the landfill will be conducted.

"WE Energies has taken four steps to identify and properly manage their exit signs. They are:
1. Conduct a full inventory for exit signs at all WE Energies sites.
2. Develop a procedure for the use, control, handling and disposal or their exit signs.
3. Begin replacing their exist signs containing H-3 with signs not containing H-3.
4. Implement a training program for management on the proper use and control of their exit signs.

"WI DHFS is meeting with WE Energies in January to discuss this incident."

Additional information on the signs is not available at this time. This information will be discussed at the January 2006 meeting. The State of Wisconsin estimates that the signs contained 20-30 Curies each. This equates to a total activity of (56x30) 1680 Curies of tritium.

Wisconsin Event Report ID: 32

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42227
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: HNTB CORP
Region: 1
City: GAINESVILLE State: FL
County:
License #: 3387-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVEN FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/26/2005
Notification Time: 11:33 [ET]
Event Date: 12/26/2005
Event Time: 08:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/27/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
LARRY CAMPER (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (EMAIL) (TAS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

Licensee reported that a model 3440 Troxler moisture density gauge containing 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am/Be-241 was stolen from a trailer located next to a highway construction site in Lakeland, FL. The gauge was located in the locked trailer, and the gauge was locked in the transportation case with the source in the stored position. The site was surrounded by a chain link fence and the trailer was pried open. Also stolen were vehicles and equipment. Lakeland Police have been notified.

The licensee noticed the theft at 0830 12/26/2005. A reward will be offered.

Troxler Serial Number 33567
Cs-137 Source #750-9252
Am/Be-241 Source #47-15619

Lakeland Police Report Number 2005-100863

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY STATE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1035 EST ON 12/27/05 * * *

The State provided the following information via email:

"Licensee reported that their worksite had been vandalized on December 25. Many items plus a contractor's vehicle were stolen. Incident was reported to this office [Florida Bureau of Radiation Control] on 1130 December 26. On December 27, licensee reported that police had discovered the stolen vehicle with the gauge at Providence & Griffin road, less than two miles from the worksite. Gauge was still locked in case and that there was no damage to case/gauge. The licensee has taken possession of the gauge and will perform a leak test. Florida continues it's investigation.

FL Incident Number: FL05-183

Notified R1DO (Sykes) and NMSS EO (Holahan), and TAS (Whitney via E-mail)

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42233
Rep Org: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS
Licensee: ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS
Region: 3
City: CHANHASSEN State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID ROBERTS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 12/27/2005
Notification Time: 18:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/27/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R1)
MARK LESSER (R2)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)
CORNELIUS HOLDEN (NRR)
OMID TABATABAI (fax) (NRR)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION FOR ROSEMOUNT TRANSMITTERS

The Supplier provided this notification via facsimile and is summarized below:

A multi-meter used in the calibration of certain pressure instruments went out of calibration between 10/10/2005 and 11/18/2005. These instruments may not conform to the published accuracy specification of +/- 0.25% of calibrated span. Rosemont Nuclear Instruments, Inc (RNII) successfully recalibrated all affected transmitters that had not yet shipped from its facility. The instruments affected by this failure are:

"(a) certain Model 1152 gage and differential pressure transmitters with model codes beginning with 1152GP, 1152DP, or 1152HP, inclusive of pressure measuring range codes 3, 4, 5, and 6 (the range code is the 7th position in the model string); and

"(b) certain Model 1153 Series B and 1153 Series D gage and differential pressure transmitters with model codes beginning with 1153GB, 1153DB, 1153HB, 1153GD, 1153DD, or 1153HD inclusive of pressure measuring range codes 3, 4, 5, and 6 (the range code is the 7th position in the model string); and

"(c) certain Model 1154 and 1154 Series H gage and differential pressure transmitters with model codes beginning with 1154GP, 1154DP, 1154HP, 1154DH, or 1154HH inclusive of pressure measuring range codes 4, 5, and 6 (the range code is the 7th position in the model string).

"The end user must determine the impact of this potential non-conformance on its plant operations and safety and take action as deemed necessary. If an affected pressure transmitter has been successfully calibrated after receipt from RNII or will be calibrated prior to installation, no further action should be required."

* * * UPDATE FROM ROSEMOUNT NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS (D. ROBERTS) TO M. RIPLEY AT 0927 ET 12/28/05 * * *

Rosemount provided the following information via facsimile:

"Yesterday, Rosemount Nuclear Instruments, Inc. (RNII) submitted a notification under 10 CFR Part 21. The submission to the NRC did not include Attachment A, which lists all of the affected U.S. licensees. This fax includes the letter and the attachment. RNII has initiated communication with its customers. The notification letter and attachment A have been sent to each of the affected customers."

Attachment A provides Purchase Order Numbers, Model Numbers, Serial Numbers, and Calibration Dates for instruments provided to the following affected licensees: Dominion Generation, First Energy Corporation, Progress Energy Carolinas, Georgia Power Co., and Southern Nuclear Operating Co.

Notified R1 DO (M. Sykes), R2 DO (M. Lesser), R3 DO (D. Hills), R4 DO (J. Clark), NRR (C. Holden and O. Tabatabai)

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42235
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/28/2005
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2005
Event Time: 19:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide the NRC with information pertaining to an invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 3 actuation signal that affected containment isolation valves in more than one system.

"On 11/02/05 with the reactor shutdown for a refueling outage, an invalid PCIS Group 3 actuation occurred while cycling a breaker during a tagging clearance activity. The invalid actuation occurred when the circuit was de-energized. This is an expected result of opening the breaker.

"The PCIS functioned successfully providing a complete Group 3 isolation.

"The train actuation was complete. Both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System started as designed. The PCIS Group 3 isolation involves valves in the following systems:
Drywell Air Purge and Vent
Drywell and Suppression Chamber Main Exhaust
Suppression Chamber Purge and Vent
Containment Air Compressor Suction Valve
Exhaust to Standby Gas Treatment
Containment Purge Supply and Makeup
Containment Air Sampling
Air Dilution Subsystem Valves
Vent Subsystem Valves
Containment Air Dilution Vent System"

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012