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Event Notification Report for November 9, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
11/08/2005 - 11/09/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


42004 42115 42118 42121 42124 42125 42127 42128 42129

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42004
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVE DEES
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 09/21/2005
Notification Time: 02:37 [ET]
Event Date: 09/20/2005
Event Time: 22:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN COMMENCED DUE TO INOPERABILITY OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL CONTAINMENT SUMP ISOLATION VALVES

"At 2240 09/20/2005 an engineering evaluation concluded that the Residual Heat Removal Containment Sump Isolation Valves were inoperable based on their inability to open against a higher differential pressure than had been previously evaluated. Historically Wolf Creek has operated with the Component Cooling Water isolated to the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers. If the pumps started during accident conditions there is a potential that the pump heat generated could cause system pressure to increase to the suction relief valve setting of 450 psig. Testing of the valves has shown that they are capable of opening with 207 psid across the valve.

"Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 2240 9/20/2005 due to the inoperability of both Residual Heat Removal trains. Power reduction was commenced at 2340. Component Cooling Water was aligned to the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers at 0004 9/21/2005 restoring operability of the Residual Heat Removal trains. At 0017 9/21/2005 actions were commenced to restore power to 100%.

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) Technical Specification required shut down (4 hour) and 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function (8 hour).

"The NRC Resident has been contacted."

*** UPDATE AT 15:39 EST ON 11/08/05 FROM DEES TO KNOKE ***

"Evaluation of the Residual Heat Removal Containment Sump Isolation Valves concluded that the valves were operable and the Residual Heat Removal trains were capable of fulfilling their safety function. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Whitten).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 42115
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIEN STRIZZI
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/03/2005
Notification Time: 17:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/03/2005
Event Time: 17:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

SAFEGUARDS REPORT

Discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow access to a controlled access area. Compensatory measure have been initiated. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

*** UPDATE AT 11:47 EST ON 11/08/05 FROM EWERS TO KNOKE ***

"This is a retraction to a notification made in accordance with 10CFR73.71 on November 3, 2005, regarding a security safeguards breach of a vital area at Millstone 2, (NRC Event No. 42115). Upon further investigation and review, it has been determined that there was no breach of the security barrier in that the required barriers were visually inspected and found to be intact. Therefore, this event has been determined to be not reportable in accordance with 10CFR73.71." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Miller)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42118
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PROTECHNICS
Region: 4
City: KILGORE State: TX
County:
License #: L03835
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: D. RAY JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/04/2005
Notification Time: 12:33 [ET]
Event Date: 11/04/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
JIM WHITNEY (TAS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
LINDA HOWELL (R4) (IAT)
MEXICO (E-MAIL) ()
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST/MISSING SHIPMENT

"On Monday, October 31, 2005 a shipment of RAM was packaged in Albuquerque, NM by Spectrotech, Svcs. And offered for ground shipment to Kilgore, TX. There were 7 packages, 4 fiberboard boxes and 3 twenty gallon drums, the latter being yellow III, TI=5.0. When the shipment arrived at Kilgore, TX subsite #004 on the RAML03835, Thursday afternoon November 3, 2005, two vials of liquid (Antimony) Sb-124 with 40mCi/each were missing along with the inner shipping container, an ammo box. A tamper seal on the 20 gallon drum was still intact, but this type did not contain a unique serial number. The inventory at Spectrotech has been verified as correct and video surveillance indicates that the materials were packaged and offered for shipment to Conway shipping for ground service. The corporate RSO reported the missing material to the answering service at 1830 hrs, Thursday, 11/03/05. Sb-124 is used for sub-surface field studies in the oil and gas industry. All parties are continuing the investigation."

Texas Incident Number: I-8275
Texas Report Number: TX-05-42118

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General Information or Other Event Number: 42121
Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Region: 4
City: SALT LAKE CITY State: UT
County:
License #: UT1800001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 11/05/2005
Notification Time: 16:18 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2005
Event Time: 12:50 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/07/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - MISSING Am-241 SOURCE

The University of Utah moved its Radiation Health Department between buildings. An Am-241 source on a disk in a glass vial was last inventoried and leak checked on May 12, 2005 i.e. prior to the move. The inventory on November 3, 2005 (Thursday) found one source missing. The sources are kept in a locked room and stored in a locked pig. The university is performing an inventory on November 5, 2005 (Saturday) and may perform additional inventories. This information will be placed in NMED on Monday, November 7, 2005.

Source: Am-241, 477 milliCuries

* * * UPDATE AT 19:37 ON 11/5/2005 FROM GALLOWAY TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The Source is model # SWA-259, purchased January 1977 and is the size of a nickel.

* * * UPDATE AT 13:18 ON 11/7/2005 FROM GALLOWAY TO KNOKE * * *

Received notification from the licensee that a Radiation Safety Analyst found the missing Am-241 source at 11:07 MST on 11/07/05. An updated description was given as 1.5 inches long and wrapped in a sheet of lead. The RSO was present when the source was found.

Notified R4DO (Shaffer), NMSS (Morell), and TAS email (Perez).


Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 42124
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: ROGER, ATKINSON, MCBEE & ASSOC.
Region: 4
City: TEMPE State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 7-406
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY V. GOODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 11/07/2005
Notification Time: 18:04 [ET]
Event Date: 11/04/2005
Event Time: 23:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MARK SHAFFER (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
MEXICO (CNSNS) ()

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"At approximately 8:00 AM November 7, 2005, the Agency was informed that the Licensee had a pickup truck stolen with a Troxler Model 3430 gauge, SN 28101. The theft occurred at approximately 11:00 PM November 4, 2005. The truck is a silver 2002 Nissan. The Troxler gauge was locked in a 16 gauge steel box with a hardened and anti-theft designed lock and hasp. The steel box is bolted to the frame of the truck. The truck license number is Arizona 997MWT. The gauge contains 8 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi Am:Be-241.

"Mesa PD is investigating and has issued report number 2005-308-1094

"The Licensee is offering a $500.00 reward for the recovery of the truck and sources. A press release is to be made.

"The Agency continues to look for the source."

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42125
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BUD HINCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 11/08/2005
Notification Time: 07:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2005
Event Time: 03:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BUS UNDERVOLTAGE

At 03:58 on 11-08-05, D.C. Cook Unit 2 experienced an automatic, reactor trip due to Reactor Coolant Pump Bus Undervoltage. The cause of the reactor trip its under investigation. This requires a 4-hour report under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

"All four reactor coolant pumps have remained running.

"The Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Rump (TDAFP) started automatically due to low-low levels in at least two steam generators which is expected for a reactor trip from 100% power. The 'B' train Emergency Diesel Generator (2AB EDG) automatically started and loaded "B" train emergency bus T21A. These automatic actuations of the reactor protection system, TDAFP start, and 2A13 EDG start require an 8-hour report under I OCFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

"'B' train emergency bus T21B was declared inoperable after it failed to be energized automatically on the start of the 2AB EDG. The cause of this failure is under investigation.

"The 'A' train Emergency Diesel Generator (2CD EDG) had been inoperable for scheduled maintenance during the time of the event. It was restored to operable status at 06:06."

All control rods fully inserted. Steam generators are discharging steam to the main condenser using steam dumps.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42127
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: J.J. HUTTO
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/08/2005
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2005
Event Time: 13:07 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005
Emergency Class: ALERT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2DO)
MJ ROSS-LEE (NRR)
THOMAS BLOUNT (IRD)
PLISCO (R2)
McCREE (R2)
CLIVER (USDA)
CONTLEDGE (DHS)
BISCO (FEMA)
PAULEY (DOE)
THREATT (EPA)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

ALERT DECLARED DUE TO LOSS OF MAIN CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATOR PANELS

"An Alert was declared at 13:19 CST for Unit 2 due to a loss of all main control board (MCB) annunciator capability. I&C [instrumentation & controls] personnel were working on a light bulb which tripped a breaker thus losing all MCB annunciator capability. The condition was recognized and an Alert was declared. The deficiency was corrected and the breaker supplying the annunciator system was reclosed, restoring all annunciator capabilities. The total time without annunciator capability was 14 minutes. The Alert was terminated at 13:39 CST. Unit 1 [was not affected by this event and] is currently Mode 1, 100%." Unit 2 is currently defueled.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector along with State, local, and other government agencies. The licensee will be issuing a press release. Notified NRR Jim Dyer. External notifications also included HHS (Miller).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42128
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: C. BITTEMILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/08/2005
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMPLOYEE REFUSED TO TAKE A RANDOM DRUG TEST.

On 11/08/05 at 1000 CST a licensed employee was selected for a random drug test. The employee refused to take the drug test. The employee last Friday tendered his resignation and his last day of work was supposed to be 11/11/05. Upon refusing to take the drug test his plant access was denied and he moved up his last day of work to today, 11/08/05. Licensee will write a condition report and review his past work. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The NRC Resident Inspector was informed of this report by the licensee.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 42129
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RYAN RODE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 11/08/2005
Notification Time: 17:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/08/2005
Event Time: 08:44 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOHN MADERA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

DESIGN BASIS FOR LONG TERM COOLING NOT CORRECTLY MODELED

"While investigating an issue related to containment coatings and their potential to clog the containment sump strainers, errors were discovered in the calculations that were used as the basis for responding to GL98-04. The errors involved the improper application of a correlation that was used to derive head loss across a screen that was assessed to be partially fouled with debris and the incorrect application of the results to a partially submerged screen that would be susceptible to air intrusion. Further investigation revealed that the flow path for a partially blocked strainer was not correctly modeled for the containment sump strainer and containment sump valve (SI-850A&B). The SI-850 valves have a rising disk and are located inside and at the bottom of the containment sump strainer. These errors in the modeling fidelity potentially impact the analytical basis for demonstrating compliance with the acceptance criteria in 10 CFR 50.46 (b)(5), Long-term Cooling.

"Immediate actions - Operability analyses were performed. These operability analyses demonstrated that adequate NPSH would be available to the ECCS pumps to ensure long-term cooling.

"Long-term action - The containment sump strainer will be modified, as committed to in Point Beach letter NRC 2005-0109, "Nuclear Management Company Response to Generic Letter 2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, for Point Beach Nuclear Plant," dated September 1, 2005. This modification will result in a larger strainer surface area and a greater clearance in the vicinity of the SI-850 valves. These modifications will be supported by design analysis and testing that will demonstrate the strainers comply with the long-term cooling capability requirement of 10 CFR 50.46 (b)(5)."


The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Friday, March 30, 2012