Event Notification Report for November 02, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/01/2005 - 11/02/2005
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42112
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: CASCADE TESTING LABORATORY, INC
Region: 4
City: EDMONDS State: WA
County:
License #: WN-L057-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: CASCADE TESTING LABORATORY, INC
Region: 4
City: EDMONDS State: WA
County:
License #: WN-L057-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/02/2005
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2005
Notification Time: 14:30 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 12/05/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
CANADA (CNSC)
TAS
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
CANADA (CNSC)
TAS
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"A portable gauge licensee reported a Troxler Electronics Model 3411 portable moisture/density gauge, serial number 16176 was stolen when the transport vehicle was stolen. The transport vehicle is a 1989 Honda CRX and was parked at the gauge user's residence at the time of the theft. The Licensee reported the gauge was stolen between the hours of 10:00 PM Monday, November 1, 2005 and 7:00 AM Tuesday, November 2, 2005. A police report has been filed by the licensee with the Edmonds police department.
"No media attention to date.
"Isotope and Activity involved: 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-241:Be and a 0.296 GBq (8 mCi) Cs-137 source. Source serial numbers: Cs-137 (50-5267), Am-241Be (47-11584).
"Disposition/recovery: The police have been notified of the theft, the gauge has not yet been recovered.
"Gauge was last leak tested on October 5, 2005. Analysis was done by Troxler and found to be acceptable.
"The licensee reported that all the proper levels of security were being used at the time the vehicle was stolen with two locked cables or chains."
Washington Event report # WA-05-061
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM STATE (SCROGGS) VIA EMAIL TO ROTTON AT 1854 EST ON 12/05/05 * * *
"The Licensee reported that the vehicle stolen on November 2, 2005 was recovered at 7:30 PM that day. The gauge in the vehicle was not damaged and the security cables securing the gauge to the vehicle were intact. The licensee also reported that an attempt was made to remove the security cables.
"The licensee must perform a new leak test on the gauge to verify that the gauge is in proper condition prior to being used in the field."
Notified R4DO (Kennedy), NMSS EO (Pierson), Canada (CNSC), TAS (Hahn via email).
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The State provided the following information via email:
"A portable gauge licensee reported a Troxler Electronics Model 3411 portable moisture/density gauge, serial number 16176 was stolen when the transport vehicle was stolen. The transport vehicle is a 1989 Honda CRX and was parked at the gauge user's residence at the time of the theft. The Licensee reported the gauge was stolen between the hours of 10:00 PM Monday, November 1, 2005 and 7:00 AM Tuesday, November 2, 2005. A police report has been filed by the licensee with the Edmonds police department.
"No media attention to date.
"Isotope and Activity involved: 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-241:Be and a 0.296 GBq (8 mCi) Cs-137 source. Source serial numbers: Cs-137 (50-5267), Am-241Be (47-11584).
"Disposition/recovery: The police have been notified of the theft, the gauge has not yet been recovered.
"Gauge was last leak tested on October 5, 2005. Analysis was done by Troxler and found to be acceptable.
"The licensee reported that all the proper levels of security were being used at the time the vehicle was stolen with two locked cables or chains."
Washington Event report # WA-05-061
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED FROM STATE (SCROGGS) VIA EMAIL TO ROTTON AT 1854 EST ON 12/05/05 * * *
"The Licensee reported that the vehicle stolen on November 2, 2005 was recovered at 7:30 PM that day. The gauge in the vehicle was not damaged and the security cables securing the gauge to the vehicle were intact. The licensee also reported that an attempt was made to remove the security cables.
"The licensee must perform a new leak test on the gauge to verify that the gauge is in proper condition prior to being used in the field."
Notified R4DO (Kennedy), NMSS EO (Pierson), Canada (CNSC), TAS (Hahn via email).
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42113
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: R. H. SCHEIDE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: R. H. SCHEIDE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/03/2005
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2005
Event Time: 21:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2005
Notification Time: 11:35 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2005
Event Time: 21:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/03/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
CONTRACT SUPERVISOR TESTED POSITIVE FOR THE PRESENCE OF ALCOHOL DURING A RANDOM DRUG TEST
A contract supervisor tested positive for the presence of alcohol during administration of the Random Drug Testing Program. The individual's unescorted access authorization was terminated, his badge was confiscated, and appropriate management notifications were made.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee
Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details
A contract supervisor tested positive for the presence of alcohol during administration of the Random Drug Testing Program. The individual's unescorted access authorization was terminated, his badge was confiscated, and appropriate management notifications were made.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee
Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for details
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42235
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/28/2005
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2005
Event Time: 19:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2005
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 11/02/2005
Event Time: 19:01 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/28/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R1)
MARVIN SYKES (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SIGNAL AFFECTING CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide the NRC with information pertaining to an invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 3 actuation signal that affected containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On 11/02/05 with the reactor shutdown for a refueling outage, an invalid PCIS Group 3 actuation occurred while cycling a breaker during a tagging clearance activity. The invalid actuation occurred when the circuit was de-energized. This is an expected result of opening the breaker.
"The PCIS functioned successfully providing a complete Group 3 isolation.
"The train actuation was complete. Both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System started as designed. The PCIS Group 3 isolation involves valves in the following systems:
Drywell Air Purge and Vent
Drywell and Suppression Chamber Main Exhaust
Suppression Chamber Purge and Vent
Containment Air Compressor Suction Valve
Exhaust to Standby Gas Treatment
Containment Purge Supply and Makeup
Containment Air Sampling
Air Dilution Subsystem Valves
Vent Subsystem Valves
Containment Air Dilution Vent System"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to provide the NRC with information pertaining to an invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 3 actuation signal that affected containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On 11/02/05 with the reactor shutdown for a refueling outage, an invalid PCIS Group 3 actuation occurred while cycling a breaker during a tagging clearance activity. The invalid actuation occurred when the circuit was de-energized. This is an expected result of opening the breaker.
"The PCIS functioned successfully providing a complete Group 3 isolation.
"The train actuation was complete. Both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment System started as designed. The PCIS Group 3 isolation involves valves in the following systems:
Drywell Air Purge and Vent
Drywell and Suppression Chamber Main Exhaust
Suppression Chamber Purge and Vent
Containment Air Compressor Suction Valve
Exhaust to Standby Gas Treatment
Containment Purge Supply and Makeup
Containment Air Sampling
Air Dilution Subsystem Valves
Vent Subsystem Valves
Containment Air Dilution Vent System"
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.