United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated with Events > Event Notification Reports > 2005 > September 28

Event Notification Report for September 28, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/27/2005 - 09/28/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41948 42007 42009 42020 42021

To top of page
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 41948
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: FRANCIS CLIFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 08/25/2005
Notification Time: 20:39 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2005
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION INOPERABLE DUE TO FLOW OSCILLATIONS

"This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b) (3) (v) due to the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system being declared inoperable. HPCI was declared inoperable on 8/25/05 at 1630 EST due to oscillations at below rated flow during the scheduled operability testing. HPCI was restored to standby line-up when testing was completed and remains available for use. This event is an eight hour notification. Efforts are on going to determine the cause of the oscillations on the Flow Controller. This event had no adverse effect to the health and safety of the public.

"The resident NRC inspector has been notified of this event."

* * * RETRACTION FROM D. NOYES TO W. GOTT AT 1711 ON 09/27/05 * * *

"This follow-up notification is being made to retract the notification made to the NRC Operations Center on 8/25/05 at 2039 hours (notification #41948).

"The initial report was made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) due to the HPCI system being declared inoperable. The system was declared inoperable due to oscillations in turbine speed, pump discharge pressure, and pump flow during a quarterly surveillance test of the HPCI pump.

"Further investigation and evaluation of this has been performed. The cause of the noted oscillations was the position of a hand operated valve that is located in the HPCI system full flow test line. The hand operated valve is located downstream of an in-series motor operated valve that automatically closes if an automatic HPCI system initiation signal occurs. The full flow test line is not part of the HPCI injection pathway to the reactor vessel. As a result, the position of this valve would not have impacted the ability of the system to perform its design function. After adjusting the position of the hand operated valve, the surveillance test of the HPCI pump was completed with satisfactory results.

"The evaluation has determined that the HPCI system was capable of performing the designed safety function. Therefore, the HPCI system was not inoperable and event notification #41948 is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (C. Cahill)

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42007
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: BERLOGER GEO TECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: PLEASANTON State: CA
County:
License #: 2821
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWARD GLOOR
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/22/2005
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 09/16/2005
Event Time: 08:45 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/22/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
TOMAS HERRERA (NMSS)
LANCE ENGLISH (TAS)
MEXICAN GOVT REP ()

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"Notification received from Governor's Office of Emergency Services at 8:40 a.m. regarding report of a stolen moisture density gauge. The RSO reported the theft of the gauge was noticed at 7:00 a.m. today. The cables were cut from the security device in his truck. It is unclear if the truck was located at a worksite or residence. The gauge is a HSI1500EZ unit - Cs-137 10 mCi [milliCurie] & Am-241 40 mCi model. The Tracy police have been notified."

California NMED # XCA-787

Less than the quantity of a IAEA Category 3 source.

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42009
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: RIVERSIDE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION DEPT.
Region: 4
City: LA QUINTA State: CA
County:
License #: 1630-33
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK M. GOTTLIEB
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/22/2005
Notification Time: 19:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/22/2005
Event Time: 14:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
LANCE ENGLISH (TAS)
MEXICAN GOVT REP ()

Event Text

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: MISSING/STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The Riverside County gauge operator at the Jefferson Street Bridge Construction site located in La Quinta, CA was called to a meeting with the on-site construction inspector. The gauge operator placed a Troxler Model # 3440 moisture density gauge unsecured into the back of his open bed pickup truck with its tail gate down. The gauge handle was not locked, not in its case and not placed in a metal shipping case attached to the bed of the pickup truck. The gauge operator did not placed a cover over the gauge. He drove 1.75 miles to where he met with the on-site construction inspector and a water district official. He talked with them between 8 to 10 minutes. After he completed talking with them he found that the gauge was not in the back of the pickup truck. It either fell out of the back of the pickup truck or it was stolen while he was talking. Three different people retraced the route that he had taken several times without finding the gauge. A police report was made with the La Quinta Police, report number 0509-4479. The Riverside County Transportation Department was instructed to make a press release and offer a $500 reward for the missing gauge. Also the press release instructs people not to touch the gauge and to call the police if they find the gauge.

The Troxler gauge contains 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241/Be. The gauge was last leak checked in June of 2005.


Less than the quantity of a IAEA Category 3 source.

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

**** UPDATE ON 09/27/05 AT 1928 EDT FROM MARK M. GOTTLIEB TO BILL GOTT *****

The activity of the Cs-137 is 9 millicuries instead of 8 millicuries and the activity of the Am-241/Be is 44 millicuries instead of 40 millicuries.

R4DO (B. Spitzberg), NMSS (Bill Reamer) notified. E-mailed to Mexican Govt Rep and NRC TAS.

To top of page
Power Reactor Event Number: 42020
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STALZER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/27/2005
Notification Time: 17:15 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
DAVID HILLS (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown 0 Cold Shutdown
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POSTULATED FAULTS HAVE ELECTRICAL CURRENT IN EXCESS OF THE MAXIMUM LISTED INTERRUPTING RATINGS.

"NMC (Nuclear Management Company) has identified certain equipment in the PBNP electrical distribution system that will not assure, under certain conditions, interruption of a three phase bolted fault short circuit. These postulated faults have electrical current in excess of the maximum listed interrupting ratings for designated circuit breakers and associated bus bar bracing. This condition affects the 13.8 kV, 4.16 kV, and 480 V power panels, motor control centers (MCCs), and switchgear. Although the probability of bolted faults is considered low, the Point Beach bolted fault analysis is based on the worst case assumption of three phases firmly tied together and grounded. A postulated bolted fault itself would only impact equipment in a single safety train. However, the PBNP Appendix R analysis relies on breaker coordination and fault current interruption to prevent loss of safe shutdown equipment due to common enclosure/power supply associated circuit concerns. The degraded breaker coordination resulting from a bolted fault condition does not satisfy the requirements of the Appendix R safe shutdown analysis.

"This condition is reportable because the PBNP Appendix R analysis is based on the occurrence of a single fire in a single fire area. The postulated condition could result in a loss of safe shutdown equipment functionality beyond that previously analyzed.

"Compensatory measures (i.e., fire rounds - 6 times per day) have been implemented for cases where the unprotected cable length was routed beyond the original fire area. As part of the long-term corrective action, transformer tap setting changes to reduce bus voltages are being evaluated."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

To top of page
General Information or Other Event Number: 42021
Rep Org: WYLE LABORATORIES
Licensee: BUSSMANN
Region: 1
City: HUNTSVILLE State: AL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRUCE BATEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 09/27/2005
Notification Time: 17:39 [ET]
Event Date: 09/23/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
DAVID HILLS (R3)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
TABATABAI (faxed) (NRR)

Event Text

MATERIAL DEFECT REPORT

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"Pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, this letter notifies the NRC of the existence of a possible defect in Bussmann KWN-R fuses.

"The defect is a poor solder connection of the fuse link assembly to the rejection ferrule. The defect applies potentially to all KWN-R fuses.

"An evaluation was performed and determined that this defect can create a substantial safety hazard or contribute to circumstances that would exceed safety limits as defined in the technical specifications of a license issued pursuant to 10CFR50. Safety-related circuits that include fuses with this defect may not be able to perform their safety-related function as required during a design basis event. Therefore, this potential defect is reportable per 10 CFR Part 21.

"DESCRIPTION OF ANOMALY:
The customer reports that the fuse lost electrical continuity while in service. The customer cut the fuse open and found the fuse element intact and a lack of electrical continuity across the soldered connection of the element to the rejection ferrule of the fuse. According to the customer, the fuse had been in service since 3/31/05 carrying 2 - 3 amperes, and there were no overcurrent events which caused the fuse to open.

"DISPOSITION - COMMENTS - RECOMMENDATIONS:
The customer returned the fuse to Wyle for failure analysis. Wyle forwarded the fuse to the manufacturer for evaluation. The manufacturer found a poor solder connection on the rejection cap. Apparently the cap did not get hot enough to reflow solder during the manufacturing process. The manufacturer stated the issue could be isolated to this particular fuse due to placing it in an incorrect bin, but the issue may extend to other fuses due to a process problem. Based on the evaluation, a potential defect exists in other KWN-R fuses.

"As a screening test to ensure a good soldered connection, the manufacturer recommends performing a Current Carrying Capacity Test for 30 minutes at 110% of rated current after warm up at 100% of rated current.

"This anomaly impacts qualification of KWN-R fuses. Only KWN-R fuses that pass the 110% Current Carrying Capacity Test are qualified."

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012