| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
08/23/2005 - 08/24/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 41798 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 06/26/2005
Notification Time: 14:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2005
Event Time: 04:17 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EDG INOPERABLE DUE TO LOOSE ELECTRICAL CONNECTION
"On June 25, 2005, at about 1335 PDT, during a test of Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 3G003, Emergency Supply Fan 3A276 did not start. SCE's investigation found a loose electrical connection at the thermal overload auxiliary switch contact for that fan. A similar condition was found on Emergency Supply Fan 3A277. SCE declared 3G003 inoperable and initiated a common cause investigation required by the EDG Technical Specifications. SCE tightened the affected electrical connections and after successfully start testing 3G003, declared 3G003 operable at 0406 PDT on June 26, 2005.
"On June 26, 2005, at about 0417 PDT, SCE found similar loose connections for EDG 3G002. Components affected were the EDG radiator fan and an EDG Emergency Supply Fan. Because SCE could not conclusively determine if the loose connections would have caused 3G002 to be inoperable, SCE conservatively declared 3G002 inoperable. (SCE currently plans to start test the Unit 2 EDGs today to confirm the Unit 2 EDGs remain operable.)
"Because it appears that both Unit 3 EDGs could have been inoperable at the same time, SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
"At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 99 percent power and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC Resident Inspectors about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report."
* * * RETRACTION FROM LICENSEE (HOLT) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 1850 EDT ON 8/23/05 * * *
"On June 26, 2005, SCE reported to the NRC that both Unit 3 emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) were conservatively declared inoperable at the same time. SCE reported that occurrence to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for the loss of a safety function.
"SCE has since determined that both EDGs were operable in the as found condition and that a report to the NRC was not required and SCE is retracting that report.
"For EDG 3G003, even though one of two emergency supply fans did not function, SCE confirmed by calculation that the remaining emergency supply fan was sufficient. That is, 3G003 was capable of performing its specified safety function with only one emergency supply fan operating. For EDG 3G002, the electrical connections that were reported to be 'loose' did not prevent circuit continuity and did not degrade the operability of the EDG. 3G002, therefore remained operable.
"Because the EDGs were operable, no report was required. SCE is retracting the June 26, 2005 report. SCE will, however, submit a voluntary licensee event report to document this event and inform the NRC of the corrective actions taken.
"At the time of this phone call, Unit 2 was operating at about 99 percent power and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this retraction and will provide them with a copy of this report."
R4DO (Smith) was notified. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41930 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNKNOWN
Region: 3
City: Dayton State: OH
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 08/18/2005
Notification Time: 12:19 [ET]
Event Date: 08/15/2005
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SOURCE OF UNKNOWN ORIGIN FOUND IN RAILCAR
The State provided the following information via email:
"On 8/15/05 a sealed source was discovered on a rail car in Norfolk and Southern rail yard in Dayton, Ohio. Rail car was parked on spur line adjacent to a scrap yard. Source was discovered when rail car was being moved. Dayton HAZMAT unit was called who, in turn, notified the ODH Bureau of Radiation Protection. Bureau staff member responded to site and found source to be made of stainless steel and aluminum, 4" diameter and 18" long. Labeled as a GL device with the following information: Thermo System, Inc. St. Paul, Minn, Kr-85, 10 mCi, June 1974, Model # 8054, SN 31112. Dose rate at contact with the source was 0.8 milliR/hr and 12 microR/hr at 3 feet, as measured with Ludlum model 19 microR survey instrument. Source was stored overnight in locked trailer at rail yard. Source was taken for disposal by a disposal contractor on 8/16/05. Bureau has been unable to date to trace source back to original owner or determine how the source came to be on the rail car."
This event involves material that is less than IAEA Category 3 sources. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Ohio Report Number OH2005-092 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41940 | Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [3] [ ]
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PHILIP PAUTLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 08/23/2005
Notification Time: 13:37 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2005
Event Time: 06:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF POWER TO TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC)
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is an 8-hour Non-Emergency Report due to the loss of emergency assessment capability. This report documents the loss of power to the Peach Bottom Technical Support Center (TSC). The loss of power was due to an apparent fault of the Normal power supply, which occurred at 0613 on 08/23/05. The Alternate power supply to the TSC was secured for planned maintenance activities. The restoration of the Alternate power supply to the TSC is in progress. The Peach Bottom NRC Resident was notified."
No work was being preformed on the normal power feed to the TSC when power was lost to the TSC. Normal power has been restored to the TSC but power has not been restored to the TSC compressors (breaker problem). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41941 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HAUTALA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 08/23/2005
Notification Time: 19:01 [ET]
Event Date: 08/23/2005
Event Time: 13:49 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/23/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | | 3 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text TWO EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On August 23, 2005 at approximately 13:49 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Preparedness Department identified a siren (#42) inoperable due to a failed battery charger. At approximately 14:00 a faxed notice was found indicating siren #15 had failed its response check. The fax was sent approximately at 07:00 but was not noticed till later since out of service siren notifications are generally made via phone or e-mail. Upon investigation, siren #15 was found inoperable due to a circuit board failure. Siren #15 is estimated to impact approximately 144 members of population in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) within 5 miles, and siren #42 is estimated to impact 496 members of the population in the EPZ, beyond 5 miles but within 10 miles. Palo Verde's reporting criterion is a loss of capability to inform greater than 5% of the population within 5 miles and 10% of the population beyond 5 miles but within 10 miles. This call is being placed due to the relatively large segment of the population affected and the uncertainty of the length of time that will be needed to restore the siren to operable condition. The Palo Verde Emergency Plan (section 6.6.2.1) has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area(s) when sirens are inoperable.
"There are no events in progress that require siren operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the siren failure and this ENS call." | |