Event Notification Report for August 02, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/01/2005 - 08/02/2005
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41903
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: PRECISION ENERGY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-4413-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: PRECISION ENERGY SERVICES
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-4413-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE HENRY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 08/08/2005
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2005
Notification Time: 15:22 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/08/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK WELL LOGGING SOURCE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On August 2, 2005, Precision Energy Services had a 2 Curie source of Cs-137 and a 20 Curie source of Am/Be 241 get stuck down hole at a depth of 11,300 feet. The well depth is 12,000 feet. Precision Energy Services is trying to retrieve the well logging tool that has the two radioactive sources in it."
The well is offshore in Louisiana waters. State lease #18076, Well #1.
LA Event Report ID: LA050007
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"On August 2, 2005, Precision Energy Services had a 2 Curie source of Cs-137 and a 20 Curie source of Am/Be 241 get stuck down hole at a depth of 11,300 feet. The well depth is 12,000 feet. Precision Energy Services is trying to retrieve the well logging tool that has the two radioactive sources in it."
The well is offshore in Louisiana waters. State lease #18076, Well #1.
LA Event Report ID: LA050007
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41886
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE NORRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/02/2005
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 08:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2005
Notification Time: 14:42 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 08:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/29/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
DALE POWERS (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ECCS SYSTEMS INOPERABLE DUE TO EXCESSIVE REACTOR EQUIPMENT COOLING SYSTEM LEAKAGE
"This notification is being made pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(v)[D- Accident Mitigation] as a loss of safety function due to unplanned inoperability of HPCI and both Low Pressure ECCS systems caused by inoperability of both REC subsystems.
"At 08:40 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] declared both REC (Reactor Equipment Cooling) subsystems inoperable due to excessive leakage from REC system. CNS was in the process of tagging out the north east quad fan coil unit (FCU) for planned maintenance to replace an REC drain valve on the FCU. After commencing draining the FCU, the building operator noted excessive leakage at the drain. A check of REC system out-leakage determined that allowable REC leakage limits had been exceeded. Both REC subsystems were subsequently declared inoperable. REC is a support system for HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems; therefore HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems were declared inoperable.
"At 09:08, the REC drain valve was closed terminating the REC system leakage. REC, HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems were subsequently declared operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE FROM E. McCUTCHEN TO J. KNOKE AT 15:35 EDT ON 09/29/05 ***
" This notification is being made to retract Event Notification 41886 that reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of HPCI and both Low Pressure ECCS systems caused by inoperability of both REC (Reactor Equipment Cooling) subsystems. Upon further evaluation, CNS determined that ECCS safety functions were not lost. The evaluation provided reasonable assurance that initiation of Service Water Backup system to ECCS area coolers would have maintained the ability of ECCS to perform their safety functions if the REC Surge Tank had reached its low level alarm."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The unit is operating at 100% / Mode 1. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg)
"This notification is being made pursuant to 50.72(b)(3)(v)[D- Accident Mitigation] as a loss of safety function due to unplanned inoperability of HPCI and both Low Pressure ECCS systems caused by inoperability of both REC subsystems.
"At 08:40 CDT, Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] declared both REC (Reactor Equipment Cooling) subsystems inoperable due to excessive leakage from REC system. CNS was in the process of tagging out the north east quad fan coil unit (FCU) for planned maintenance to replace an REC drain valve on the FCU. After commencing draining the FCU, the building operator noted excessive leakage at the drain. A check of REC system out-leakage determined that allowable REC leakage limits had been exceeded. Both REC subsystems were subsequently declared inoperable. REC is a support system for HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems; therefore HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems were declared inoperable.
"At 09:08, the REC drain valve was closed terminating the REC system leakage. REC, HPCI, RCIC, and all Low Pressure ECCS systems were subsequently declared operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE FROM E. McCUTCHEN TO J. KNOKE AT 15:35 EDT ON 09/29/05 ***
" This notification is being made to retract Event Notification 41886 that reported a loss of safety function due to the unplanned inoperability of HPCI and both Low Pressure ECCS systems caused by inoperability of both REC (Reactor Equipment Cooling) subsystems. Upon further evaluation, CNS determined that ECCS safety functions were not lost. The evaluation provided reasonable assurance that initiation of Service Water Backup system to ECCS area coolers would have maintained the ability of ECCS to perform their safety functions if the REC Surge Tank had reached its low level alarm."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The unit is operating at 100% / Mode 1. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41888
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/02/2005
Notification Time: 21:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2005
Notification Time: 21:43 [ET]
Event Date: 08/02/2005
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL PART 21 ISSUE WITH STRUTHERS-DUNN RELAYS
"On 8/2/2005 Duke Energy Corporation was informed by the manufacturer of Struthers-Dunn relay, part number 219BBXP, of a manufacturing defect with the subject relay. Duke contacted the manufacturer as follow up to recent relay failures of this type. There has not been a Part 21 notification to date. The defect is in the relay coil. Some coils that were made in China over an approximate 18-month period did not have their coil core annealed. The annealing step in the manufacturing process was apparently skipped. The missed annealing step results in the relay coil potentially drawing almost twice its rated current. As a result, the coil can fail after an extended period of time in the energized state. Potentially affected relays of this type were purchased commercial grade and dedicated by Duke Energy Corporation for use in safety related applications. This relay type is utilized in valves in the Catawba Nuclear Service Water System. An investigation is in progress as to whether the relays in service at Catawba have the date code to indicate they have the manufacturing defect. Duke is also investigating if this relay type is in service at the other Duke nuclear units. This manufacturing defect may be reportable under 10 CFR 21 if other utilities purchased identical relays and dedicated them for use in safety related applications.
"The following is a summary of information obtained from Struthers-Dunn concerning the affected relays:
(1) Relays manufactured between January 2003 and June 2004 (date codes 0301B through 0424B on the cover).
(2) Any 219 series relay with 120 AC and 240 AC coils.
(3) 'Made in China' marked on the cover.
(4) Also 'Made in USA' marked on the cover with a 'B' in the date code could be affected.
" The Catawba NRC senior resident inspector has been notified."
The relays used in the Catawba Nuclear Service Water System are normally energized.
The licensee will be notifying the North Carolina and South Carolina Warning Points and York, Gaston and Mecklenburg County agencies.
"On 8/2/2005 Duke Energy Corporation was informed by the manufacturer of Struthers-Dunn relay, part number 219BBXP, of a manufacturing defect with the subject relay. Duke contacted the manufacturer as follow up to recent relay failures of this type. There has not been a Part 21 notification to date. The defect is in the relay coil. Some coils that were made in China over an approximate 18-month period did not have their coil core annealed. The annealing step in the manufacturing process was apparently skipped. The missed annealing step results in the relay coil potentially drawing almost twice its rated current. As a result, the coil can fail after an extended period of time in the energized state. Potentially affected relays of this type were purchased commercial grade and dedicated by Duke Energy Corporation for use in safety related applications. This relay type is utilized in valves in the Catawba Nuclear Service Water System. An investigation is in progress as to whether the relays in service at Catawba have the date code to indicate they have the manufacturing defect. Duke is also investigating if this relay type is in service at the other Duke nuclear units. This manufacturing defect may be reportable under 10 CFR 21 if other utilities purchased identical relays and dedicated them for use in safety related applications.
"The following is a summary of information obtained from Struthers-Dunn concerning the affected relays:
(1) Relays manufactured between January 2003 and June 2004 (date codes 0301B through 0424B on the cover).
(2) Any 219 series relay with 120 AC and 240 AC coils.
(3) 'Made in China' marked on the cover.
(4) Also 'Made in USA' marked on the cover with a 'B' in the date code could be affected.
" The Catawba NRC senior resident inspector has been notified."
The relays used in the Catawba Nuclear Service Water System are normally energized.
The licensee will be notifying the North Carolina and South Carolina Warning Points and York, Gaston and Mecklenburg County agencies.