Event Notification Report for July 25, 2005

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING FIRE DAMAGED GAUGES

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"Fire broke out in the Coker 1 unit at Citgo. The FA201A and 201B vessel structures (24,000 cu. Ft.) holding Coker feed (heavy black oil) product were impacted by the fire / heat from fire. Each of the above-mentioned vessels have three nuclear gauges (Am-241 / Be, 500mCi activity) attached in linear formation to them. The gauges are used for product level measurements. Three of the six total number of gauges sustained fire / heat from fire that impacted the functioning of the housing of devices, specifically the shutters. According to Citgo licensee:

"1) Of the three shutters impacted, two cannot be closed (and therefore, unlocked) and remain open as they usually are during regular production, the third could be closed but not locked.

"2) All six gauges are scheduled to be removed by the manufacturer for maintenance, repair, etc. as needed.

"3) The gauges are Kay-Ray (Thermo Measure Tech) brands.

"4) The three gauges with functional impact are: Gauge Housing - all are model number 7100B; Sealed Source model number MRL2723C and serial numbers -- 17235, 26053, and S95M2201."

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY FAILURE IN SWITCHYARD

"At 1525 the plant experienced a load reject generator trip due to a catastrophic failure in the 345 Kv switchyard. A reactor scram occurred as a result. The degraded AC power system prevented a fast transfer from occurring. Degraded bus voltage caused the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to start. A residual bus transfer restored power to the 4 Kv busses. The [main steam isolation valves] (MSIVs) closed on a low-low reactor water level of 82.5 inches. [Reactor Core Isolation Cooling] and [High Pressure Coolant Injection] (HPCI) also started on the low-low reactor vessel water level.

"The [Safety Relief Valves] were cycled twice for pressure control. OT 3100 Reactor Scram procedure was executed. EOP-3 was entered due to elevated torus water temperature and both loops of [Residual Heat Removal] (RHR) are in torus cooling. Water level has restored and is being maintained by feedwater. The MSIVs have been reopened and the scram reset. EDGs were secured."

The plant is currently shutdown and stable with all control rods fully inserted. Decay heat removal is being accomplished with HPCI in pressure control mode. The licensee is transitioning to feeding with normal feedwater and steam exhausting through drains. Both trains of RHR are providing torus cooling. Electric power is being provided by offsite power. The licensee is currently investigating the event in the switchyard.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will issue a press release.

* * * UPDATED ON 07/29/05 BY MACKINNON * * *

Corrected incorrect entry for Scram Code from N (N/A) to A/R (Automatic/with Rod Motion). R1DO (Glenn Meyer) notified.

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS INVENTORY DISCOVERS A FUEL PIN MISSING

" As a result of NRC Bulletin 2005-01 "Material Control and Accounting at Reactors and Wet Spent Fuel Storage Facilities", Oconee has been conducting an inventory of Special Nuclear Materials (SNM), other than complete fuel assemblies, stored in the spent fuel pools at Oconee. One canister, documented as containing 383 fuel pins, was found to actually contain 382 fuel pins. At this time it is uncertain if this is a record keeping error or an actual "lost" pin.

"Initial Safety Significance:
"The inventory process for other canisters is not complete, and it is possible that the pin may be in another container. These containers being inventoried have been stored underwater in the spent fuel pool for years. The affected canister was filled in 1982. Oconee has no reason to believe that this pin or any other SNM has been stolen or unlawfully diverted. For reference, one fuel assembly contains 208 fuel pins.

"Corrective Action(s):
"The inventory process is continuing. This notification is being trade per 10 CFR 74.11."

The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.


****** RETRACTION on 08/16/05 at 1537 EDT by Stephen C. Newman to MacKinnon *****

"On July 17, 2005 at 1838 [ET] Oconee reported that during an inventory of Special Nuclear Material (SNM), other than complete fuel assemblies stored in the spend fuel pools at Oconee, one canister, documented as containing 383 fuel pins, was found to actually contain 382 fuel pins. At that time it was uncertain if this is a record keeping error or an actual "lost" pin. Further investigation has located the suspect fuel pin in a different canister; consequently, this issue no longer meets the reporting requirements as previously stated and this report is being retracted.

"Initial Safety Significance: There is no initial safety significance.

"Corrective Action(s): No additional corrective actions planned at this time."

R2DO (C. Julian), NMSS EO (M. Burgess) and IRD Manger (M. Leach) notified.

NRC resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION EVENT DUE TO FILTER FAILURE

"An unplanned contamination event occurred on 25 July 2005. This is a reportable event in accordance with 10 CFR 40.60 sub paragraph (1) based on additional radiological controls being required for more than 24 hours. The additional control imposed was the requirement to wear air purifying respirators in the Feed Materials Building. The location of the event was the Feed Materials Building. The Feed Materials Building is where milled uranium oxide material is converted to uranium hexafluoride. Located on the sixth floor, the Ash Vacuum Cleaner filters failed which allowed spar and dust filter fines containing uranium to exit the discharge from the Ash Vacuum Cleaner. Due to the proximity of the Ash Vacuum Cleaner discharge and the inlet to the building ventilation, some the material was picked up by the ventilation system and distributed throughout the Feed Materials Building. A dust plume was noted coming from the discharge line of the Ash Vacuum Cleaner at approximately 0918. At approximately the same time, personnel in the building noted dust being emitted from the building ventilation system registers. The Ash Vacuum Cleaner was secured at approximately 0920. Personnel recognized the potential for airborne radioactivity and immediately required respiratory protection for all personnel in the building. Special bioassay samples were required for 19 people who were present in the building during the occurrence. The results of the special bioassays indicated no uptake of radioactivity by the personnel sampled. Fixed air samplers analyzed after the event on all floor indicated air activity in the range of 5x10 E-11microcuries/ml to 60x10 E-11microcuries/ml. Air samples and contamination surveys performed downwind were background levels. Cleanup of the granular material in the Feed Material Building commenced immediately.

"The isotope release was U-238, the chemical form is UF4, and the physical form is granular."

The Feed Materials Building has now been cleaned of contamination that was due to this event. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2 (Hartland), NRC HQ (Raddatz) and NRC Regional Inspector (Gibson).