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Event Notification Report for July 21, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/20/2005 - 07/21/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41849 41855 41856 41857 41858

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41849
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: PETRA GEOTECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: YAKAIPA State: CA
County:
License #: 2933-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. GREGOR
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/18/2005
Notification Time: 12:52 [ET]
Event Date: 07/18/2005
Event Time: 08:30 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/18/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
TAS (EMAIL) ()
MEXICO (CNSNS) ()

Event Text

CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NUCLEAR GAUGES

The State provided the following information via email:

"At 0830 on July 18, 2005, [NAME DELETED], RSO for the licensee called to report that two model MC-3 gauges (each containing nominally 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241) were stolen from the secured temporary job storage site in Yucaipa, CA . There were three gauges at this site, but the model MC-1 gauge (an older gauge) was not taken. The licensee last saw these gauges when the job-site was shut down for the weekend, approximately 1700 on July 15, 2005. This morning [07/18/05], in preparation for returning to work, it was noted that two gauges were missing at approximately 0630-0700 hours [PDT]. The RSO is in transit to the job-site, to meet the local police, and will provide more details as he gets them. The licensee intends to post a reward in the Press-Enterprise newspaper in the Riverside area."

State 5010 Report No.: 071805

* * * UPDATE FROM STATE (GREGOR) TO M. RIPLEY 1839 EDT 07/18/05 * * *

The State provided the following information via email:

" The window in which the gauges were stolen was 7/16-18/05 instead of 7/15-18/05 as indicated on our form. Also, we have been informed that there was other construction equipment stolen in addition to the two gauges. We have been informed in the past by law enforcement in the area that there is a ring who apparently raids construction sites stealing construction materials for resale in Mexico. Don't know if this is the situation in this case."

Notified R4 DO (L. Smith), NMSS EO (Dan Gillen), TAS and Mexico CNSNS (email)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 41855
Rep Org: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Licensee: DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Region: 1
City: BILOXI State: MS
County:
License #: 03-23853-01VA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL SIMMONS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/19/2005
Notification Time: 18:22 [ET]
Event Date: 07/19/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)

Event Text

RADIOACTIVE PACKAGE WITH REMOVABLE SURFACE CONTAMINATION EXCEEDING A LIMIT

"Licensee: Department of Veterans Affairs, National Health Physics Program License # 03-23853-01VA
"Permittee: VA Gulf Coast Veterans Health Care System, Biloxi, Mississippi

"Date of event: July 19, 2005, about 1000 CDT
"Date and Time NHPP notified: July 19, 2005, 1700 CDT

"A radioactive package was received from the commercial radiopharmacy at about 1000 hours CDT. The nuclear medicine technologist followed routine procedures for opening radioactive packages and performed a wipe test on the outside of the package. The wipe test results were 13,000 dpm / 300 cm2. Slight contamination was located on the inside of the package. The technologist immediately notified the radiopharmacy of the contamination. The radiopharmacy is Cox Nuclear Pharmacy in Biloxi, MS.

"NHPP representatives will follow-up with the permittee on July 20, 2005. A copy of this text has been sent to Kevin Null, NRC Region III

"Event Number: 41855"

**** RETRACTION ON 07/20/05 AT 1010 EDT FROM GARY WILLIAMS TO MACKINNON ****

"The basis for retracting the event is that the package had approximately 49 DPM per cm2 removable radioactive contamination on the outside, which is less than the reporting requirement under 49 CFR 173.443.

"This retraction was coordinated with NRC Region III." R3DO (Patrick Louden), R1DO (Rich Conte) and NMSS EO (Michele Burgess) notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41856
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STALZER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/20/2005
Notification Time: 12:47 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2005
Event Time: 04:51 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

MINIMUM RECIRCULATION VALVES WILL NOT AUTOMATICALLY OPEN IN LOCAL OPERATING MODE

"While performing a test start of P-38A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump utilizing the local control station, it was discovered that AF-4007, the mini-recirculation valve for P-38A would not automatically open in the local mode of operation. The mini-recirculation valve provides a minimum flow path for pump operation to prevent pump damage. After this condition was discovered, a review of procedures associated with initiating safe shutdown via local operation disclosed that the procedure did not address manually opening the mini-recirculation valve prior to local pump start. As a result, pump damage could occur due to no flow though the pump prior to aligning a flow path into a steam generator. This condition is also applicable to AF-4014, the mini-recirculation valve for P-38B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.

"P-38A and P-38B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps would only be used in a safe shutdown local control condition if steam generator level could not be maintained using the normal means of 1P-29 and 2P-29 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.

"The station has taken compensatory actions to brief the operators about the condition. Additionally, temporary procedure changes are in progress to direct the operator to manually open each Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump's associated mini-recirculation valve prior to a local start of the P-38A or P-38B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.

"The associated mini-recirculation valve will operate when P-38A or P-38B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is started from the control room. Follow up testing has verified P-38A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump operability."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 41857
Facility: HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
RX Type: URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PRODUCTION
Comments: UF6 CONVERSION (DRY PROCESS)
Region: 2
City: METROPOLIS State: IL
County: MASSAC
License #: SUB-526
Agreement: Y
Docket: 04003392
NRC Notified By: DAREN MAYS
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 07/20/2005
Notification Time: 16:43 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
ELMO COLLINS (NMSS)
PETER WILSON (IRD)

Event Text

PART 21 NOTIFICATION OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ANSI AND QA MANUAL REQUIREMENTS

The following report was submitted by the licensee via facsimile:

"1. During review of quality records for installation of valves in Uranium Hexafluoride cylinders it was determined that this site was not in compliance with ANSI N 14.1 - 1971/2001, 'Uranium Hexafluoride Packaging for Transport.' Specifically, personnel were not recording the torque during valve installation as required by paragraph 6.12.6 of ANSI N 14.1 and Section 10 of Honeywell UF6 Cylinder Quality Assurance Manual. The ANSI standard specifies both a torque and minimum thread engagement for the valves. Even though both parameters are required by the Honeywell procedure this site was using only the thread engagement for determination of proper valve installation. The issue was identified on July 15, 2005. No full cylinders with questionable valve installation have been shipped since this date. All recipients of cylinders pertaining to this matter were notified of the compliance issue on July 20, 2005. Currently there have been no reports of issues related to valves installed by MTW Honeywell.

"2. Since identification of the problem the following additional actions have been taken:

"a. Honeywell has started a review to determine the correlation between thread engagement and torque. Thus far, fourteen cylinders have had valves installed to the proper thread engagement. In every case thus far the thread engagement has correlated with the torque specified by the ANSI standard within the required range of - 200 to 400 ft-lbs. Twenty six more cylinders will have valves installed to the required thread engagement and the torque will be verified. This statistical sample size gives a 99% confidence level of representing the total Honeywell population of Uranium Hexafluoride cylinders in service. Honeywell Metropolis presently has approximately 900 Uranium Hexafluoride cylinders in service. In addition Honeywell has changed approximately 106 valves in recipient cylinders and they will be notified of the cylinder numbers and the issue concerning valve torque.

"b. In accordance with the ANSI N 14.1 standard cylinders have been and will continue to be pressure tested to 100 psig after valve installation to assure the valve and valve joint do not leak.

"c. A technical evaluation was made concerning the failure mode if the valves were significantly over-torqued. This evaluation concluded that failure of the valve would occur prior to failure of the cylinder fitting and that failure would be obvious upon visual inspection. As noted previously there have been no reported issues related to valves installed by Honeywell. The probability of valves being significantly under torqued while achieving proper thread engagement appears to be very remote.

"d. Only six personnel are presently authorized to perform valve installations and have been re-trained to ensure they understand and comply with the applicable procedures. In addition as a temporary measure direct supervision will be provided to assure compliance with Honeywell procedures that meet ANSI N 14.1 requirements.

"3. Based on the above review and actions Honeywell does not consider that a safety hazard exists with the transport and use of cylinders on which valve replacement was performed by Honeywell."

The licensee has notified Region 2 (J. Hanson, D. Hartland and J. Sharkey).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41858
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CRAIG INGOLD
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 07/20/2005
Notification Time: 22:17 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2005
Event Time: 19:17 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/20/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

EMERGENCY SIRENS FAILED FOR ONE HOUR

"At 2017 CDST on July 20, 2005, it was determined that greater than 25% of Braidwood Station Emergency Sirens, which are maintained by others, had been failed for one hour. The initial failure occurred at 1917 CDST on July 20, 2005, and was apparently caused by storm activity in the area. At 2041 CDST on July 20, 2005, Braidwood Station was notified by the Corporate Emergency Planning organization that the number of failed Emergency sirens was less than 25% of the total number of sirens, and that sirens were in the process of being restored at that time.

"This notification is required by 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012