| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/13/2005 - 05/16/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41685 | Rep Org: MISSISSIPPI DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: THOMAS WOOD PRESERVING
Region: 1
City: State: MS
County:
License #: GL-266
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOBBY SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/10/2005
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 04/07/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER
The State provided the following information via email:
"During an inspection at Thomas Wood Preserving on April 7, 2005, it was determined that a generally licensed device, Asoma Model LCA x-ray fluorescence analyzer, Serial No. 466, containing 30 millicuries of Curium-244, was missing. The plant manager of the treatment plant stated that the device had been returned to Spectro Analytical, the device distributor, several years ago. [The Division of Radiation Health] DRH contacted Spectro Analytical on May 2, 2005, and learned that they had never received the device from the company. The plant manager stated that he would continue looking for the device and inform DRH if it was located. It is assumed that the treatment plant purchased a new fluorescence analyzer and the other device was put in storage and/or misplaced. Thomas Wood Preserving, holder of General License No. GL-266 was cited violations for failure to secure radioactive material from authorized removal and failure to report the lost device to the Agency. The licensee is also required to provide a written report to DRH in accordance with State Regulations. It is not known when the device was lost or the event occurred." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41690 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 4
City: PHARR State: TX
County:
License #: L00197-109
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FREE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 05/11/2005
Notification Time: 16:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2005
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
PEREZ (E-MAIL) (TAS)
CNSNS-MEXICO (FAX) ()
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"Gauge was stolen from back of pick up [truck]. It had been secured by chain and lock through handle of gauge to bed of truck. [The gauge] appears to have been stolen while parked behind field office location in strip shopping center in Pharr, Texas. Discovered missing on arrival at Area office where gauge is stored when not in use. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3430, S/N 26742. It contains 8 mCi Cs-137, s/n 75-9877, and 40 mCi Am-241-Be s/n 23217."
Texas Incident I-8230 |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41691 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: NINYO AND MOORE GEOTECHNICAL
Region: 4
City: TEMECULA State: CA
County:
License #: 5073-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DONELLE KRAJEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/11/2005
Notification Time: 18:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/10/2005
Event Time: [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
PEREZ (email) (TAS)
CNSNS - MEXICO (Fax) ()
| Event Text CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER GAUGE
The State provided the following information via email:
"[The] licensee called to report [that] one of their Troxler 3430 gauges (serial number 33503- 8 mCi Cs-137 / 40 mCi Am 241/Be) was missing from their temporary storage site at a storage facility in Temecula. The gauge was reported to be locked in the storage facility, in a locked cage, inside a locked storage box at around 1000 on May 10, 2005. A second gauge user noticed the other gauge was not in the storage box when he locked his gauge in the box yesterday. The second gauge user was able to contact the first gauge user this morning at 0630. The first gauge user confirmed the gauge had been locked in the storage box yesterday and it should have been there. There was no evidence of forced entry and the gauge user states he did lock the gauge in the storage area yesterday. A report was filed with the Riverside Sheriff/Temecula Police (TE0513033). The RSO will forward the gauge users statement regarding this incident. For corrective action the RSO plans to have a counseling session with the gauge user immediately and will give additional training regarding gauge security and emergency procedures within the next month." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41692 | Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: WESLEY HELD | Notification Date: 05/12/2005
Notification Time: 11:22 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2005
Event Time: 04:11 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF EMERGENCY BUS E1
"On May 12, 2005, at 0411 hours, electrical power was lost to the 4160 VAC Emergency Bus E1. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 was inoperable for maintenance at the time of the electrical power loss. This power loss to Emergency Bus E1 affected both Units 1 and 2.
Unit 1
"The loss of power to E1 resulted in Division 1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) actuations. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Traversing In-core Probe, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), and Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, as well as the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation) and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System train B. The actuations of PCIVs and Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System train B started and functioned successfully.
"Loss of power to E1 also resulted in entry into LCO 3.0.3 (i.e., be in Mode 2 within 7 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 37 hours) due to all required reactor coolant leakage detection instrumentation/systems being inoperable.
"At 0440 hours, it was discovered that all three Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) subsystems became inoperable due to failure of the control building air compressors and Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was entered. At 0515 hours, it was determined that both Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystems became inoperable when the dampers drifted shut. At 0546 hours, a control building air compressor was started and the control room air conditioning and CREV subsystems were returned to operable status.
"Operators initiated a plant shutdown for Unit 1, as required by Technical Specifications at 0948 hours.
Unit 2
"Conditions and activities associated with the Control Room AC and CREV systems apply to Unit 2 as well as Unit 1.
Reporting Requirements Met by this Notification
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(1), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications, applies to Unit 1.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (i.e., Control Room AC and CREV), applies to both Units 1 and 2.
"10 CFR 50.73(a)(i), invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system, applies to Unit 1.
INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION
"Currently Unit 2 is operating at steady state with Unit 1 being shut down. Specified systems actuated as designed. No adverse impact to the control room environment occurred during the period (i.e., one hour and 35 minutes) the affected ventilation system was inoperable. The other redundant emergency busses are operable. Prior to the event reactor coolant leakage level for Unit 1 was well within operating limits. The actions as required by the applicable Technical Specifications have been established.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
"Activities are currently under way to determine the cause of the E1 power loss and restore electrical power to Emergency Bus E1. Causes and actions to preclude recurrence will be addressed in accordance with the corrective action program and provided to the NRC in the associated licensee event report."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 05/13/05 @ 0952 BY LEONARD BELLER TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
"On May 12, 2005, at 0411 hours, electrical power was lost to the 4160 VAC Emergency Bus E1. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 was inoperable for maintenance at the time of the electrical power loss. This power loss to Emergency Bus E1 affected both Units 1 and 2. A non-emergency notification (Event Number 41692) was made to the NRC Operations Center at 112:2 hours. This follow-up notification discusses plant recovery from the Emergency Bus E1 power loss.
"Unit 1
"Loss of power to E1 resulted in entry, into LCO 3.0.3 (i.e., be in Mode 2 within 7 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 39 hours) due to all required reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation being inoperable. Operators initiated a plant shutdown for Unit 1, as required by Technical Specifications at 0948 hours. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was requested from the NRC to waive compliance with the shutdown requirements associated with RCS leakage detection instrumentation in order to provide more time for an orderly plant shutdown. In lieu of the RCS leakage detection shutdown requirements (i.e., be in Mode 2 by 1111 hours), Unit 1 would adhere to the shutdown requirements associated with loss of Emergency Bus E1 (i.e.,, be in Mode 3 by May 13, 2005, at 0011 hours). The requested NOED was verbally granted by the NRC on May 12, 2005 at 1050 hours, so shutdown activities for Unit 1 continued versus the insertion of a manual reactor scram, with the unit at approximately 65 percent of rated thermal power.
"Power was restored to Emergency Bus E1 and the LCO associated with RCS leakage detection instrumentation was exited on May 12, 2005 at 1740 hours. The LCO associated with loss of power to Emergency Bus E1 was exited at 2015 hours.
"Unit 2
"The LCO associated with loss of power to Emergency Bus E1 also applied to Unit 2, and was exited at 2015 hours,
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Emergency Diesel Generator 1 was made available, but not operable, on May 13, 2005, at 0117 hours."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Reg 2 RDO (Moorman) was notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41698 | Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: TOM COBBLEDICK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 05/13/2005
Notification Time: 16:04 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2005
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
ANNE MARIE STONE (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION - ELECTRICAL CONTAINMENT PENETRATION
"On March 23, 2005, with the plant at 100% power, an issue was discovered questioning the design of an approximately 3-inch diameter module of containment electrical penetration (PBP5D) used to feed a non-safety related lighting panel (L49E1) inside the containment building. Specifically, it was identified that this penetration module was protected from overcurrent by a single 30-amp breaker (BF503). Action was taken at that time to open the supply breakers de-energizing the lighting panel to prevent any potential fault on the subject penetration module while the issue was being evaluated.
"Evaluations were initiated to determine the potential for the containment electrical penetration module to be thermally or mechanically damaged by a postulated fault. During this evaluation, no weak link upstream of the penetration module could be found that could be credited for preventing a fault in the penetration module in the event of a random failure of the breaker. The next breaker upstream of this circuit is too large to provide adequate overcurrent protection if the 30-amp breaker fails to open. Furthermore, it could not be shown that the electrical penetration module could withstand the maximum possible fault current while maintaining its containment integrity function. Therefore, it is now assumed that this postulated fault current could have damaged the penetration module to the extent that it would no longer have performed its containment integrity function.
"This condition is being reported within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Specifically, it was discovered that a system required to meet the single failure criterion does not do so."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41700 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DENNIS MAY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 05/15/2005
Notification Time: 02:44 [ET]
Event Date: 05/15/2005
Event Time: 01:18 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/15/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
FRANK GILLESPIE (NRR)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF ONSITE FATALITY
"Event Description: Security Officer fatality onsite - apparent heart attack.
"Action Taken: Called local ambulance company (Rescue, Inc.). Additional security personnel performed CPR."
The licensee stated that the Security Officer was on break at the time of the fatality. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the State of Vermont. | |