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Event Notification Report for March 28, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
03/25/2005 - 03/28/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41238 41386 41525 41526 41527 41528 41530 41531

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41238
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: NUCLEAR SOURCES & SERVICES INC (NSSI)
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L-02991
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN VERSER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 12/02/2004
Notification Time: 16:00 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2004
Event Time: 11:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
GARY JANOSKO (NMSS)

Event Text

PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION FROM SEALED SOURCE RUPTURE

The following information was received via facsimile from the Texas Department of State Health Services Radiation Branch:

"A contamination incident occurred at NSSI the morning of December 1, 2004. The incident involved the breaching of a sealed source as it was being removed from a device. The source involved was a 50 mCi Am-241Be source that was a part of a water salinity test device.

"The NSR-N source is inside an 8 inches long aluminum tube of about 1.5 inches diameter and is held in the center of the tube by two concentric tubes inserted from each end of the primary tube and pinned in place. The aluminum tube also contains a neutron detector to measure the backscatter neutrons when measuring the water in the device. In preparation for disposal of the source, the neutron tube is removed and discarded and the aluminum tube holding the source is removed from the water device.

"At the time of the incident, two persons were involved: The person operating the saw and the health physics monitor. A third person was in the machine shop area and about 4 feet away doing other work.

"The source rupture was noted immediately and health physics support was called to the area. Health physics personnel conducted initial surveys and removed the three personnel from the area. The involved personnel were surveyed out of the area, suited in PPE [personal protected equipment] and were escorted to the hot lab shower area. Nose wipes were collected for assay and each of the personnel showered to remove contamination and surveyed. (Water from this shower is captured in a tank for recovery and treatment.) After completing the release surveys, the involved personnel were released and sent home. "

The Texas Department of Health was contacted by the Headquarters Operations Center and added the following information. The source was apparently mispositioned in the tube and was cut by a band saw during the extraction process. Two of the individuals that were contaminated had nasal smears of 0.1 and 0.2 nanocuries. The third individual did not have any indication of contamination in the nasal smear. The contaminated individuals are scheduled to receive whole body counts.

*** UPDATE FROM K. VERSER TO J. KNOKE AT 15:03 ON 3/35/05 ***

The following was emailed as an update to Event 41238:

"Decontamination efforts are performed and coordinated by specialized team and monitored each week by DSHS staff. To date some 50 pallets of materials and equipment has been removed from the warehouse. These items were surveyed by agency staff with using alpha scintillation and taking random swipes. More than 90% of these items have been decontaminated with the remainder being shipped for disposal at appropriate facilities. An order impounding all sources of the model involved in the event have been impounded in place since December 10, 2004. All 50mCi Am/Be sources have been properly inventoried and ten of them were allowed to be sent to another licensee for removal and inventory. These were individually identified in the presence of agency staff. No contamination has been found outside of the warehouse and airborne activity inside is far below permissible levels and is being monitored with continuous air monitors (CAM)s. All that remains is a small, heavily contaminated area and that should be cleaned up in a couple of weeks. NSSI will survey and perform final decontamination of the building after which, Agency staff will perform a thorough survey to verify decontamination is adequate."

Notified R4DO (Pick) and NMSS (Gillen)

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 41386
Facility: FT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: ERICK MATZKE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/08/2005
Notification Time: 16:45 [ET]
Event Date: 02/08/2005
Event Time: 09:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

STEAM-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) PUMP DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO DESIGN ISSUE

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"At 0920 [hrs.] CST, on February 8, 2005, Fort Calhoun Station declared the steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump (FW-10) inoperable due to discovery of a design problem with the pump turbine. The station entered the appropriate technical specification action statement at that time. The pertinent action statements for auxiliary feedwater ([T.S.] 2.5.1) read as follows:

"B (Action statement): With one AFW train inoperable for reasons other than condition A, restore the AFW train to OPERABLE status within 24 hours.

"C (Action statement: If the required action and associated completion times of condition A or B are not met, then the unit shall be placed in MODE 2 in 6 hours, in MODE 3 in the next 6 hours, and less than 300 [degrees] F without reliance on the steam generators for decay heat removal within the next 18 hours.

"A change to the design basis is in progress to allow the pump to be made operable within 24 hours."

The design problem is due to the AFW pump drains. The manufacturer states that the drain lines must drain below the level of the AFW turbine. The current configuration is that the drains are aligned to the condenser which is approximately 18 feet above the elevation of the AFW turbine. This is not a problem during normal AFW turbine operation as the condenser would most likely be in service. However, the condenser cannot be relied upon during all accident conditions that require AFW actuation.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

*** RETRACTION - E. MATZKE TO J. KNOKE AT 11:44 EST ON 03/27/05 ***

The licensee faxed the following retraction:

"Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) has conducted a thorough engineering evaluation of the effects on water in the turbine exhaust housing of the steam driven feedwater pump (FW-10). It was concluded that FW-10 was able to perform its design function based on the results of the evaluation. FW-10 was determined to be operable as required during past plant operation whether or not condenser vacuum was available.

"The conclusion was based on four points:
1. The preparer's experience with a multi-stage turbine that was started with water up to the centerline of the rotor and sustained no damage.
2. OPPD's strong evidence that FW-10 has been operated multiple times with some water in the casing.
3. A simple conservative analysis of the forces on a turbine blade when operated in a water submerged condition. The blade stresses were determined to be well below allowables for the loading condition presented with the blade moving through the static water volume during a startup event.
4. In addition, inspection of the turbine in 1998 and 2005 does not show any adverse indications of stress or wear.

"Therefore this notification is being retracted.."

The plant is presently in a scheduled refueling outage. The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41525
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD DESANCTIS
HQ OPS Officer: WESLEY HELD
Notification Date: 03/25/2005
Notification Time: 01:53 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2005
Event Time: 20:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT EXCEEDING DESIGN BASIS

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):

"This is an 8-hour notification being made to report exceeding the design basis for the reactor coolant leakage outside of containment. The event is being reported under paragraph (b)(3)(v) of 10CFR50.72. An event or condition that could have prevented mitigating the consequences of an accident.

"On 03/24/05 at 2015 operators discovered that a closed manual discharge valve for the positive displacement charging pump was leaking through allowing Reactor Coolant System to leak back to the refueling water storage tank. The leakage was 0.34 gallons per minute. This leakage is greater than the UFSAR limit for ECCS leakage outside containment.

"With leakage greater than the UFSAR allowed limits (greater than 3800 cc/hr), GDC-19 limits for control room habitability cannot be assured.

"Actions were taken and the leakage was stopped at 2040. The affected positive displacement charging pump is not a safety related pump and is not required for accident mitigation; however it is in the ECCS recirculation flow path during the cold leg injection phase of the accident mitigation.

"The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this event."

The licensee will be notifying local authorities. The licensee reported that the event had no impact on Unit 1.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 41526
Rep Org: GEO-TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC
Licensee: GEO-TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC
Region: 1
City: STERLING State: VA
County:
License #: 19-30479-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: TED UPSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/25/2005
Notification Time: 16:18 [ET]
Event Date: 03/25/2005
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/25/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS)

Event Text

TROXLER GAUGE REPORTED STOLEN

Geo-Technology Associates, Inc. (GTA) reported the theft of a Troxler gauge, Model 3411, Serial # 15742. The source strength of this gauge is 8 milliCi of Cs-137 and 40 milliCi of Am-241. A contract employee was last seen with the gauge when he signed out for the device at GTA's office on the morning of 3/24/05. He was supposed to have gone to a construction job site in Gainesville, VA, and then return to GTA's office that evening with the Troxler gauge. It is unknown at this time if he reported to the jobsite or returned to the office.

An employee of GTA came into the office about 07:00 on 03/25/05 and discovered the Troxler gauge missing. Normally a worker returns equipment (Troxler gauge) to the office at the end of each workday. The GTA employee reported the possible theft to the Loudoun County Sheriff in VA.


*** UPDATE FROM T. UPSON TO J. KNOKE AT 19:30 ON 03/25/05 ***

An employee of GTA called to report the Troxler gauge was returned to GTA's office sometime between 17:00 and 18:00 on 03/25/05. It was assumed to be the contract employee who originally signed out for the gauge had returned it since it was found inside the locked office of GTA. No visible damage to the device was detected. GTA indicated that early next week a decision would be made on whether or not they will rescind the sheriff's report of a stolen Troxler gauge.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41527
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: HOPE BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/25/2005
Notification Time: 22:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/26/2005
Event Time: 03:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 99 Power Operation

Event Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE ESW TRAIN.

The following information was faxed by the licensee:

"At 0300, 3/23/05, 72-hour Technical Specification Action 3.7.8.A was entered when a pinhole leak was discovered in 'B' Essential Service Water (ESW). Subsequent ultrasonic testing (UT) determined that approximately seven linear feet of piping in the 'B' ESW train was affected and required replacement. UT testing was satisfactorily performed on the 'A' ESW train to ensure a similar problem did not exist.

"'B' ESW train piping replacement was performed in accordance with planned work documents, however at 2100, 3/25/05 all necessary repairs and retests had not been completed. Although only 66 hours had expired since entering 72-hour Technical Specification Action 3.7.8.A, Callaway Plant proactively decided to commence a reactor plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification Action 3.7.8.B for an inoperable 'B' Essential Service Water train. Once entered, Technical Specification Action 3.7.8.B requires the reactor plant to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours and Mode 5 within 36 hours.

"The Licensee notified the NRC resident inspector."

The licensee will perform other maintenance activities during this outage. All systems functioned as required.

* * * UPDATE FROM F. BIERMANN TO W. GOTT AT 0411 ON 03/27/05 * * *

The licensee completed repairs on the B ESW system and exited the LCO at 0249 on 03/27/05.

Notified R4DO (Pick).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41528
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID KARST
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/26/2005
Notification Time: 02:43 [ET]
Event Date: 03/24/2005
Event Time: 15:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/26/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling Shutdown 0 Refueling Shutdown

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATING TO THE INTEGRITY OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR EXHAUST STACKS DURING A TORNADO

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):

"While evaluating the capability of the plant to withstand a tornado it was identified that the Diesel Generator Exhaust Stacks may not maintain their design structural integrity. This would place the plant in an unanalyzed condition, however expert engineering judgment is that the damage to the Emergency Diesel Generator Exhausts would not reduce the capacity below that required to ensure decay heat removal. Currently the plant is in refueling shutdown and the Emergency Diesel Generators are not required to be operable per Technical Specifications. This condition will be corrected prior to plant startup. Power is still being supplied to the plant from the Reserve and Tertiary Auxiliary Transformers. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) and further review of the reporting criteria identified that if there is any doubt, this condition should be reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"At the request of the Plant Manager at approximately 2100 on 3/25/05, the Shift Manger and Shift Technical Advisor independently reviewed the reporting criteria. Based on the statement in NUREG 1022, Rev 2, when applying engineering judgment and there is doubt regarding whether to report or not, the commission's policy is that the licensees should make the report, it was decided to report per 10CFR50.72."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41530
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ART BREADY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2005
Notification Time: 00:35 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2005
Event Time: 22:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Startup 0 Startup

Event Text

PLANT SHUTDOWN TO REPAIR SMALL REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):

"While in OPCON 2 with the Main Turbine secured, Hope Creek personnel performed a Primary Containment entry to determine the source of slightly elevated unidentified leakage. This leakage has slowly trended up since plant start-up in February to approximately 0.73 gpm. With the current unidentified leak rate at 0.436 gpm, personnel identified a steam leak from an insulated decontamination port, sealed via a bolted flange, within the isolable boundary of the 'B' Reactor Recirculation pump. This was the only source of reactor coolant system leakage identified although some minor leakage (totaling approximately 250ml/min) from two drywell recirculation fans was also identified. This is a voluntary/courtesy Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification that Hope Creek is proceeding to Cold Shutdown to precisely identify and repair the leakage source. At the time of this notification, Hope Creek Generating Station is in OPCON 3 with plant cooldown in process."

The licensee reported this event under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) as a 4-Hour Non-Emergency Voluntary notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and the licensee plans to notify LAC Township.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41531
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TOM OSELAND
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/28/2005
Notification Time: 01:12 [ET]
Event Date: 03/27/2005
Event Time: 19:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/28/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 85 Power Operation 85 Power Operation

Event Text

ELECTRICAL SAFETY BUS TRIP DURING QUAD CITIES UNIT 1 REFUELING OUTAGE

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):

"At 1930, Unit 1 experienced a loss of 480 VAC busses 18 and 19. This caused a loss of power to the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) and the CREVS Air Conditioning System (CREVS AC). This event also caused a loss of power to the U1 equipment that was supporting the Alternate Decay Heat Removal (ADHR) mode of operation.

"Power was restored to Bus 19 at 2001 and Bus 18 at 2013. The restoration of Bus 18 also restored power to CREVS and CREVS AC. All systems supporting ADHR were restored by 2015. At the time of the occurrence, the estimated time to boil without decay heat removal capability was 571 minutes. All isolations and actuations occurred as expected. The cause of the bus trips is being investigated.

"This Event is being reported under 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B) and 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D)."

The licensee stated at the time of the event, Busses 18 and 19 were cross-tied and the feeder breaker to Bus 18 tripped open. The breaker was changed out and power to Busses 18 and 19 restored. The cause of the Bus 18 feeder breaker trip has not yet been determined.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM THE LICENSEE (OSELAND) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 0312 EST ON 3/28/05 * * *

The licensee stated that the Alternate Decay Heat Removal pumps from Unit 2 remained in service so that all decay heat removal was not lost. The Unit 1 primary coolant system temperature increase during the 45 minute duration of this event was approximately 1 degree.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 30, 2012