| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
03/14/2005 - 03/16/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41308 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TOLUNAY-WONG ENGINEERS, INC.
Region: 4
City: Houston State: TX
County:
License #: L04848-000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 01/05/2005
Notification Time: 09:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
MEXICO (FAXED) ()
TAS DUTY OFFICER ()
| Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"The gauge was locked and secured to the technician's company pickup truck. The technician had taken the gauge to his residence for storage.. The technician discovered the gauge was missing from the truck and determined that the lock securing the wire rope cable which secured the transport case had been cut. The gauge and transport case along with other tools from the vehicle are missing. A police report was filed with the Houston Police Department. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3430, Serial No. 31792, containing two sealed sources: Cs-137, nominal 8 millicuries, Serial No 750-6702, and Am-241/Be, nominal 40 millicuries, Serial No. 47-1785. The Licensee issued a memorandum on January 3, 2005 to all personnel regarding gauge storage and transport procedures.
"Licensee is planning to offer a reward and will publicize through the local media."
Texas Incident ID No: I-8196
* * * UPDATE FROM TEXAS (K. VERSER) TO M. RIPLEY 1654 EST 03/15/05 * * *
The State provided, via email, details of interviews held with the licensee along with a listing of proposed corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this and similar incidents. Contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for details.
Notified R4 DO (T. Farnholtz) and NMSS EO (G. Janosko) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41329 | Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH DUNCAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 01/13/2005
Notification Time: 13:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2005
Event Time: 05:04 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS AND ENS
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"At approximately 05:04 CST on 01/13/2005, CaIlaway Plant became aware of a partial loss of commercial out-going offsite communication ability and the ENS, HPN, and ERDS lines. Contact [capability] was established with the NRC Operations Center via commercial phone lines. Internal and in-coming [commercial] communications are not affected and a number out-going lines are available for emergency use. Callaway is currently reassigning available out-going lines to emergency facilities. Backup communication methods to offsite State and Local agencies remains available. ENS communication will be conducted via commercial phone lines to the NRC Operations Center.
"At approximately 05:30 CST Callaway was notified that the communications failure was the result of a severed fiber optic cable at an unknown location. At approximately 09:45 CST Callaway was informed that approximately 4000 feet of fiber optic cable was lost when a bridge near St. Louis, MO., collapsed due to flood waters. At this time there is no estimate for the completion of repairs, but the condition is expected to last up to one week due to inaccessibility resulting from rising flood waters."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local government agencies.
* * * UPDATE ON 03/15/05 @ 1711 BY JUSTIN HILLER TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
The licensee received confirmation at 11:21 CST on 3/15/2005 that permanent repairs were completed to fiber optic lines supporting offsite communications including ENS, HPN and ERDS lines at 06:00 CST on 03/13/2005. This repair replaces a temporary repair established at approximately 14:24 CST on 1/13/2005, and includes the preventive measure of burying the lines below the river bed to prevent subsequent washouts. In addition, the original notification is being corrected to reflect that the fiber optic lines were washed-out from beneath the bridge as opposed to the bridge having collapsed as was originally reported to the licensee.
The NRC Resident Inspector was updated.
Notified Reg 4 RDO Farnholtz |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41473 | Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 03/09/2005
Notification Time: 09:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2005
Event Time: 05:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text PRESSURIZER HEATER SLEEVE LEAKAGE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"ANO (Arkansas Nuclear One) Unit 2 shutdown on 3/9/05 at approximately 0038 [CST] to begin the 2R17 refueling outage. While performing the Mode 3 Hot Shutdown Walk down on ANO Unit 2, evidence of leakage was discovered around three (3) pressurizer heater sleeves. The amount of leakage was minor since no indication of moisture was present and the build up of boric acid was minimal. Investigations are underway as to the repair of the affected nozzles."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 03/12/05 @ 2255 BY JAMES CRABILL TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
" ANO Unit 2 shutdown on 3-9-05 at approximately 0038 to begin the 2R17 refueling outage. While performing the Mode 3 Hot Shutdown Walk down on ANO Unit 2, evidence of leakage was discovered around three (3) pressurizer Heater Sleeves. The amount of leakage was minor since no indication of moisture was present and the build up of boric acid was minimal. Investigations are underway as to the repair of the affected nozzles.
"Update on 3/12/2005 @ 2140: During the followup inspection performed on 3-12-2005, eight pressurizer heater nozzles had evidence of boric acid leakage at the annulus between the nozzle and pressurizer. One plug was also discovered with evidence of boric acid leakage. The nozzle at this location was plugged during the late 1980's."
The reactor is presently in cold shutdown.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM J. CRABILL TO M. RIPLEY 2220 EST 03/15/05 * * *
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"Following decontamination activities performed on 3-15-2005, 1 [one] additional pressurizer heater nozzle had evidence of leakage at the annulus between the nozzle and pressurizer."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (T. Farnholtz) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41474 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: SEQUIN State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN VERSER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/09/2005
Notification Time: 11:18 [ET]
Event Date: 11/30/2004
Event Time: 10:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/09/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE - RECOVERED RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services [DSHS]:
At approximately 10:00 am, November 30, 2004 a tractor-trailer alarmed radiation monitors with a load of scrap steel at Commercial Metals Austin [CMC - Austin] scrap yard. Earth Tech, Inc. in San Antonio was notified by ThermoMeasuretech for help with a possible source. Commercial Metals confirmed the load triggered a scale-mounted radiation detector at SMI- Texas, Sequin, TX and the [CMC - Austin] driver had returned the load to Commercial Metals-Austin.
Earth Tech contacted [CMC - Austin] warehouse manager and noted that he had indeed isolated the source from the load and that he had roped off a 2 mR/hr barrier around the affected area. He stated that he needed additional instrumentation as his Ludlum model 19 was reading off-scale.
Personnel from the Earth Tech office in San Antonio were deployed with a SAMS unit and a Ludlum model 9. They arrived at [CMC - Austin] at 1:30 pm. Searching through a small amount of soil, an actual source was revealed. The source was found to be a metallic foil disk approximately 1.5 cm. in diameter. The source emissions were found to be nonisotropic, reading high levels on one side and low levels on the other. Once the source was identified and separated from the soil, the SAMS was utilized to identify the radioisotope. The SAMS identified two low-energy photo peaks and identified the source as cadmium-109. However, the spectrum showed an unusually large amount of high-end tailing with a continuum shape similar to that found from sources of high-energy x-rays. The source was shielded and transported to ThermoMeasuretech for further investigation. It was initially presumed the source was possibly an activated foil.
DSHS records for this incident showed the source was 120 microCuries of Cd-109. When CMC was called on 3/8/05 to follow up on the incident, they stated that the source had been later identified as 1 milliCurie of Sr-90. This amount of Sr-90 required immediate notification.
Texas Incident No. I-8187
Due to personnel changes at the Texas Department of State Health Services and Commercial Metals in late 2004, the initial report to the NRC was delayed. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41478 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: TULANE UNIVERSITY
Region: 4
City: NEW ORLEANS State: LA
County:
License #: LA-004-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOSEPH NOBLE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/10/2005
Notification Time: 10:18 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2005
Event Time: [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was provided by the licensee to the State of Louisiana (licensee text in quotes):
"The following incident took place on 1/26/05 in the Tulane Hospital/Clinic Nuclear Medicine area.
" A patient was to be administered 5[milliCuries] of I-131 for a total body scan in order to look for thyroid metastases. Due to an error in transcription of the order, a student technologist injected a 27 [millicuries] Tc-99m MDP bone scan. The resulting Effective Dose Equivalents were 0.675 rad to the bone and 0.189 rad to the total body.
"The patient was notified of the error and the correct radiopharmaceutical later administered. The senior technologist was reprimanded by the Radiology Department Head for not properly supervising the procedure."
The physician was notified.
The State of Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality will be conducting their own investigation. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41481 | Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: F.R. ALEMAN & ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #: 2637-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 03/10/2005
Notification Time: 19:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2005
Event Time: 16:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/10/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
MOHAMED SHANBAKY (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
| Event Text STOLEN TROXLER GUAGE
The licensee had a Troxler gauge model 3400 serial # 31101 with 8 millicuries Cs - 137 and 40 millicuries Am - 241:Be stolen from their storage building on their parking lot in Miami. The theft was considered a general burglary and was given a Miami Dade police report number of 7088G-D. No reward notice has yet been made. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41485 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: CONAM MMP INSPECTION INC
Region: 4
City: LONG BEACH State: CA
County:
License #: 4832-19
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: C J SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 03/12/2005
Notification Time: 01:14 [ET]
Event Date: 03/10/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE DURING RADIOGRAPHY
Initial report made by licensee to the State of California at 1330 PST on 03/11/05 via voicemail:
While performing radiography at the BP Refinery located in Carson, CA, a radiography camera source was not fully retracted while disconnecting the guide tube. The camera was an INC Model IR100 Serial #4043, which contains a 90 Curie Iridium-192 source. After performing several operations of the radiography camera (approximately 10 shots) the radiographer approached the camera without his survey instruments. After disconnecting the guide tube, it became apparent to the radiographer and his assistant that there was a problem since their survey instruments were off scale, and when the radiography crew checked their pocket reading dosimeters, they were off scale also. The radiographer used pliers to force the source into the shielded position and secure the camera. The licensee estimates that the radiographer received 1800 millirem whole body, 212 Rem to the hands, and the assistant received 2766 millirem whole body. There are no reported physical manifestations from the exposure at this time. The corporate RSO is flying to the scene of the incident to reenact the events for their investigation. The personal dosimetry for both operators has been sent for processing. The camera will be sent to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair. The State of California will be conducting their own investigation into the event.
* * * UPDATE FROM CALIFORNIA (SALGADO) TO M. RIPLEY AT 1510 EST ON 03/14/05 * * *
The following information was obtained from the State via facsimile (State text in quotes):
"3/14/05, 1030 [PST]: Update, licensee is reporting that dosimetry for involved individuals has been processed with results as follow: radiographer shows 1.6 rem, whole body. Assistant shows 2.7 rem, whole body. No physical manifestations displayed at this time. Preliminary written report from licensee pending."
No further information available at this time on refinements to the extremity dose estimates. Notified R4 DO (T. Farnholtz) and NMSS EO (T. Essig). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 41488 | Rep Org: DC DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION
Licensee: DC DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 082355701L
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LAWRENCE CHUNG
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 03/14/2005
Notification Time: 13:13 [ET]
Event Date: 03/01/2005
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
| Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
TAS ()
| Event Text DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPORTED A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS FOUND MISSING DURING INVENTORY
The licensee reported that during inventory an old (20 years old) Troxler gauge model 3411-B serial # 7520 was found missing from its case which was stored in the storage area at their office. This gauge had not been used for a number of years since it was broken. It contains 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241-Be. The last inventory was 12/06/04 and at that time it is believed the device was in the case, but they are not sure the case was opened to verify. They are continuing the search and have reported it to the DC Police Dept (report # 029650). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41489 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF ERDMANN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/14/2005
Notification Time: 13:38 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2005
Event Time: 10:17 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE SPILL
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"This is a 4-hour notification to report a sodium hypochlorite spill from a pipe flange elbow on the permanent sodium hypochlorite tank to the ground at Salem generating station. The spill was over an excavation trench that was filled with rain water. The trench was being pumped to the nearest manhole. Maintenance personnel noticed a 2 drops per second sodium hypochlorite leak from the elbow. The operations shift manager made a 15-minute report to the State of New Jersey to report the spill. The sodium hypochlorite tank was out of service at the time undergoing corrective maintenance. The spill has been contained. Chemistry samples are being taken to determine if any reportable quantities were pumped to the nearest manhole. There was no effect on plant operation since the tank was out of service. Actions include follow up samples and if necessary remediation of the ground soil. There was no one injured during the event."
The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41492 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/14/2005
Notification Time: 19:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2005
Event Time: 11:25 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/14/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT
A non-licensed employee was determined to be under the influence of illegal drugs during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41496 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: HAROLD PROKASH
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 03/15/2005
Notification Time: 22:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2005
Event Time: 16:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text KEWAUNEE PLANT DESIGN FOR FLOODING EVENTS MAY NOT MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF PIPING SYSTEM FAILURES
The following was provided by the licensee:
"While reviewing Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) memorandum regarding Task Interface Agreement (TIA), TIA 2001-02,'Design Basis Assumptions For Non-Seismic Piping Failures at Prairie Island Plant,' Kewaunee staff determined that the Kewaunee plant design for flooding events may not mitigate the consequences of piping system failures. As a minimum, and as a consequence of assuming failure of non-seismically qualified piping systems as prescribed in the TIA, water has been assumed to collect in the turbine building from a circulating water system piping failure that would result in substantial damage to Engineered Safeguards (ESF) and Safe Shutdown (SS) plant equipment, most notably electrical equipment. As a consequence of high water level in the turbine building, water could flow into the ESF equipment rooms that contain the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, Emergency Diesel Generators and both the 480 volt and 4160 volt electrical switchgear. Water is assumed to flow into the equipment rooms by way of leakage past non-water-tight doors and the plant's unchecked floor-drain system. The expected water levels In the safeguards and electrical equipment rooms are assumed to increase to the point of causing multiple trains of both ESF and SS equipment to be unavailable to safely shutdown the plant."
"Kewaunee's primary mitigation strategy to combat flooding events is to recognize the event and initiate manual actions to open doors/ barriers. Opening the barriers to flooding directs the water out of the turbine building through the safeguards equipment rooms and returns it to the lake. Normally the manual actions would be expected to be performed before water level accumulates to a point of causing equipment damage. However, under the seismic failure assumptions, water levels are assumed to accumulate faster than the plant's ability to identify and react in order to assure protection of equipment required to initiate and complete a safe plant shutdown.
"Coincidental to the condition being reported, the plant had recently implemented additional precautionary measures to combat internal flooding events that lesson the significance of the condition being reported. Temporary pumping equipment, temporary sandbag barriers and additional personnel have been staged to minimize the consequences of previously questioned flooding events. Furthermore, a number of plant equipment design changes are being processed to further improve Kewaunee's defenses against internal flooding events. However, given the event being reported, the full scope of any additional actions is still to be determined."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41497 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: TIM GAFFNEY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 03/15/2005
Notification Time: 23:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2005
Event Time: 18:51 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS DUE TO CAUSTIC SPILL
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On March 15, 2005 at approximately 18:51 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station informed another government agency, the EPA/DOT National Response Center, of a caustic spill, related to the protection of the environment. Notification was also made to the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality and the Arizona Department of Public Safety (State Police). No news release is planned or expected.
"A commercial tanker truck was transferring caustic sodium hydroxide at Unit 1 when a drip was observed from the transfer hose at approximately 16:54 MST. The spill was limited to approximately one quart outside of the spill containment berm. The evolution was terminated and the tanker truck was driven out of the Protected Area.
"A drip trail was later discovered at approximately 18:00 along the path of the truck out of the Protected Area, including a puddle of approximately 3 gallons in the sally port (access point). The truck was returning to Phoenix, AZ. The spill quantity on-site is not estimated to have approached a reportable quantity (1,000 pounds), but due to the evidence that the truck was leaking while in transit to Phoenix, the Palo Verde Hazardous Materials Emergency Coordinator conservatively elected to make the government notifications. Additionally, Palo Verde notified the trucking company which ultimately located the truck upon its return to the company yard. No leak existed at that time, suggesting the leakage was limited to the caustic that remained in the truck's discharge pipe after the transfer was stopped.
"There was no impact to control room habitability and no safety systems, including essential ventilation, were actuated or required. The spill did not hamper site personnel in the performance of duties necessary for the safe operation of the nuclear power plant.
"The NRC Resident inspector was notified of the chemical spill and this ENS notification." | |