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Event Notification Report for January 27, 2005

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/26/2005 - 01/27/2005

** EVENT NUMBERS **


41349 41351 41357 41359

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41349
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY
Region: 4
City: TAFT State: CA
County:
License #: 0144-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: C. J. SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 01/21/2005
Notification Time: 20:15 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2005
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - WELL LOGGING SOURCES STUCK IN WELL BORE

"Licensee reported to Radiologic Health Branch-Granada Hills (RHB-GH) that on 1/14/05 two well-logging sealed sources became stuck in a well bore at a depth below 5,800 feet. The sources involved are a 1.7 Curie Cs-137, GSR-J, source and a 16 Curie Am-241/Be, NSR-F, source. For the last week the 'fishing' company, Baker Hughes, has been attempting to retrieve the sources. They will continue to do so over the weekend but, if [this is] not successful, the sources will be deemed irretrievable. This occurred on the 'Oxy Elk Hills' well site, about 10-15 miles northeast of Taft, CA, North of Hwy 119. The well is designated '16A-32SRD1.' The rig is designated 'Nabors 472.' If deemed irretrievable the well will likely be sealed in place with a cement plug. Licensee will provide update after weekend and follow with written report."

* * * UPDATE FROM SALGADO TO RIPLEY 1355 ET 01/24/05 VIA FACSIMILE * * *

The correct well designation is 316A-32S RD-1.

Notified R4 DO (Runyan) and NMSS EO (Gersey).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 41351
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: COLORADO SPRINGS State: CO
County:
License #: 392-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/24/2005
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A PHARMACY SPILL OF SAMARIUM-153

The following information was submitted by the licensee to the State of Colorado in an email dated 1/21/05 at 1137 hours:

"On 1-20-05 at approximately 10:00 Cardinal Health, location 48 (Colorado Springs, CO, License number 392-03) had a Sm-153 spill. Approximately 72 mCi of Sm-153 was spilled on the floor next to the main drawing station in the Lab. Our pharmacist was transferring a vial from the Berlex lead vial shield to our tungsten vial shield when the vial got away from him hitting the floor and breaking. The Pharmacist immediately notified the RSO and they started the decontamination process to minimize the risk of cross contamination into other areas of the lab. The area was segregated and the decontamination process was started. Radiacwash was used to decontaminate the area and all contaminated wipes, shoes, and associated materials were bag[ged] and placed with the Sm-153 waste. After initial decontamination was completed the area was surveyed and readings of 200 Mr/hr were obtained at the surface of the floor. Subsequent rounds of decontamination provided a reading of 50 Mr/hr. After we covered the area with padding and lead the exposure readings went down to 0.2 Mr/hr. Wipes were conducted of areas outside of the lead shielding on the floor and were found to be at background levels. We had a brief staff meeting of the pharmacists to access and evaluate the situation and to go over the proper procedures for transfer and dispensing of Sm-153 so that this incident would not be repeated. The corporate office was notified.

"The material will be allowed to decay for several days, at which point a determination of the levels of impurity contamination will be assessed. The floor will be removed, if needed, to reduce the exposure rate to acceptable levels.

"On 01-21-05 the Radiation Management unit of the State of Colorado, Department of Public Health was notified under section 4.52.2.2 (2) of the state regulations. A written response will be forwarded to the state within 30 days."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41357
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHARLES ELBERFELD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/26/2005
Notification Time: 09:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/13/2004
Event Time: 16:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee:

"On December 13, 2004, at 1615 hours, during clearance restoration activities following 24V DC battery maintenance, Battery 22B-1 output breaker located on 24/48V DC Distribution Panel 22B, Circuit 5 was inadvertently opened resulting in the invalid actuation of the Unit 1 logic associated with the 24V DC bus. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, the Reactor Building Ventilation System Isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of both Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and Reactor Building Ventilation System Isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System trains A and B started and functioned successfully. After verification of the expected equipment responses, the breaker was reset, the actuation logic was reset, and the equipment/systems were returned to the status required by plant conditions.

"Discussion of the causes and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the corrective action program in action request 145898. The [NRC] resident inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 41359
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: FRANK SOENS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/26/2005
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/26/2005
Event Time: 15:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/26/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM COOK (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL FOR CARBON DIOXIDE MIGRATION INTO 4160/460 VOLT SWITCHGEAR ROOMS

"An Engineering Evaluation was initiated to assess the potential for CO2 [carbon dioxide] migration in the event of a CO2 fire suppression system discharge in the Salem Unit 1 and 2 - 4160 volt or 460 volt Switchgear Rooms or Lower Electrical Penetration Areas. The results presented in the evaluation conservatively identified that when CO2 systems are discharged, CO2 migration can result in concentrations in some adjacent areas that would require the use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) for entry, or in some cases should be restricted to transit activities only.

"Some of these adjacent areas are required to be accessible by operators to perform manual actions in the plant to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. Based on the time line established in the Salem Manual Action Feasibility Studies for operator actions in the response to a fire in a Switchgear Room, the ability to shutdown the plant in the event of a fire concurrent with a CO2 discharge could be impacted.

"The immediate action is to isolate the CO2 system and implement the necessary compensatory measure for the inoperable CO2 system as delineated within Station Fire protection program. With the CO2 systems isolated, the ability to safely shutdown the plant in the event of a fire in these areas is restored. Additional actions are being evaluated at this time to restore the CO2 system.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and Salem Unit 2 License Condition 2.I. No ESF, ECCS or safety related equipment has been impacted by this condition. Both Units remain at 100% power. There were no personnel injuries associated with this condition."

Lower Alloway Creek Township and the State of New Jersey will be notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

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Friday, March 30, 2012