| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
11/19/2004 - 11/22/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 41202 | Rep Org: NV DIV OF RAD HEALTH
Licensee: KRAZAN & ASSOCIATES, INC.
Region: 4
City: RENO State: NV
County:
License #: CA 4247-10
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STAN MARSHALL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON | Notification Date: 11/16/2004
Notification Time: 12:55 [ET]
Event Date: 11/14/2004
Event Time: 03:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/16/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
JOE FOSTER (TAS)
| Event Text STATE OF NEVADA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT: TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN.
On November 16, 2004, Krazan & Associates, Inc., California Radioactive Material License # 4247-10, reported to the Nevada Health Division Radiological Health Section that one of their Troxler Moisture Density Gauges (Model # 3430, serial # 21922) was stolen. The gauge was stolen on November 14, 2004, between 0330 am and 0700 am PST from a job site in Reno, Nevada. Reno, Nevada Police Department was notified.
Cause & contributing factors: Security measures defeated.
Troxler Moisture Density Gauge Model # 3430 contains 9 millicuries of cesium-137 and 44 millicuries of Am:Be.
State of Nevada Event Report ID No. NV-04-009. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41209 | Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JON BRAISTED
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 08:07 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON MAIN GENERATOR TRIP
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"1. SYSTEMS AFFECTED: Reactor trip, Aux feed water actuation.
"2. ACTUATIONS AND THEIR INITIATING SIGNALS: Reactor trip - Loss of Load Turbine Trip, Aux Feed Water (AFW) - 21% [on the narrow range indication] in Steam Generators.
"3. CAUSES: Reactor tripped due to an undetermined cause in the main generator end of the secondary plant. AFW started as expected on EFAS [Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal] at 21% from a trip at 100%.
"4. EFFECT OF EVENT ON PLANT: Plant is stable at 545F [and] 2250 [psi] hot standby conditions and will remain here until cause determination made as to cause of trip.
"5. ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED: Maintain hot standby conditions for post trip review.
"CONTINUATION SHEET: 1) Remain in Mode 3 for cause determination post-trip review to provide actual mode required. 2) Estimate restart date pending cause determination and any repairs required. 3) All rods inserted, no primary or secondary reliefs lifted, electrical grid stable, all safety systems performed as expected, no effect on Unit 3. Electrical power supplied from offsite power."
Decay heat removal is via steam dump to condenser.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 41211 | Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 3
City: ROCK ISLAND State: IL
County:
License #: 12-00722-06
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GIZICKI
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 15:08 [ET]
Event Date: 11/17/2004
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(1) - UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION
| Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
| Event Text UNPLANNED CONTAMINATION DUE TO A BROKEN M1A1 COLLIMATOR
During an exercise conducted in May 2004 at Camp Shelby, MS an M1A1 Collimator, NSN 1240-00-332-1780, containing 10 Curies Tritium was removed from service, i.e., possibly broken, and double-bagged for storage. The device was subsequently transported from Camp Shelby to Shelbyville, TN and ultimately forwarded to the Combined Support Maintenance Shop of the TN National Guard located in Smyrna, TN for repair. A routine pre-maintenance wet swipe test indicated contamination levels as high as 619,094 disintegrations/min using a liquid scintillation meter. This corresponds to an activity of 0.27 microcuries. Two TN National Guard staff have submitted samples for bioassay. The results will be available on Monday, 11/22. Radiation surveys conducted at the Shelbyville and Smyrna, TN storage locations were negative.
The device is currently double-bagged in the low level rad waste storage area of the Combined Support Maintenance Shop awaiting disposal. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41212 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 19:01 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 16:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
| Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO A STEAM LEAK ON AN INSTRUMENT ISOLATION VALVE INSIDE CONTAINMENT
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On November 9, 2004, NMC personnel performed a containment entry for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2 to locate and identify the source of a secondary steam leak. A leak was suspected due to increased pumping of the Unit 2 containment sump 'A'. A steam leak was identified on the body of valve 2MS-465D. This valve is an isolation valve for main steam flow transmitter 2FT-465. For containment isolation considerations, the main steam system is considered to be a closed system inside containment. The steam leak discovered on 2MS-465D cannot be isolated from containment penetration P-1, the main steam line penetration. Accordingly, we declared Technical Specification Condition 3.6.3.C not met. (This condition is applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system) and entered TSAC [Technical Specification Action Condition] C.1. The required action for this condition is to isolate the affected penetration flow path with a completion time of 72 hours. In order to repair this valve wall leak, it will be necessary to shutdown and cooldown PBNP Unit 2. Accordingly, at 1622 CST we initiated a reactor shutdown of PBNP Unit 2. Since we anticipate that we would be unable to [meet] the allowed completion time for this TSAC, we have determined that this reactor shutdown is required by the Technical Specifications and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(2)(i)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 41213 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROBERT DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 11/20/2004
Notification Time: 14:56 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2004
Event Time: 11:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) - ECCS INJECTION
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
GENE IMBRO (NRR)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text UNEXPECTED AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING WITH SI INJECTION
"On 11/20/2004 at 1140 EST during the performance of 14421-2 'Solid State Protection System And Reactor Trip Breaker Train B Operability Test' an automatic Reactor Trip occurred and a Safety Injection occurred a short time thereafter. The Reactor Trip was caused by an error made in the performance of the 14421-2 procedure. The operator working with a peer checker mistakenly placed the 'A' train multiplexer test switch in the 'A + B' position instead of the 'B' train one. The 'B' train multiplexer test switch was still in the inhibit position. When the 'A' Train multiplexer switch went through the inhibit position, it caused the second general warning which tripped the reactor. The Safety Injection is believed to have been caused by a failure of the loop 2 Reactor Coolant Average Temperature which impacted the Steam Dump control system. The Steam Dumps did not close as expected during the Reactor Trip response and Pressurizer pressure lowered below the Safety Injection System setpoint and a Safety Injection was actuated.
"All systems operated as expected during the Safety Injection and Reactor Trip. All the Control Rods fully inserted on the Reactor Trip. The Main Steam Lines were isolated by the operator due to the lower than expected decrease of the Reactor Coolant System Average Temperature. Both Motor Driven AFW pumps started as expected as did the Turbine Driven AFW pump. All ECCS pumps started as expected on the Safety Injection. The Containment Coolers all started in low speed on the Safety Injection as expected. Both Diesel Generators started on the Safety Injection actuation. The Containment Isolation systems isolated containment as expected. During the recovery from the Safety Injection pressurizer level did reach 100%, but the Pressurizer PORVs were not required to open to control Pressurizer pressure."
Unit 2 is currently stable in mode 3 removing decay heat via the Atmospheric Steam Dumps.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | |