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Event Notification Report for July 16, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/15/2004 - 07/16/2004

** EVENT NUMBERS **


40863 40864 40866 40873 40874 40875

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40863
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: N/A State: TX
County: PECOS
License #: L01833-000042
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 07/12/2004
Notification Time: 09:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/10/2004
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
TRISH HOLAHAN (NMSS)

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON DOSE TO THE PUBLIC FROM EXPOSED SEALED SOURCE

"Full investigation has been started by Schlumberger. Many details missing from initial notification. Crew using a CAPSTAR rig, without a floor were working a well site in Pecos County, Texas, from the Midland office (Subsite 042). During the evening of probably 07/09/2004 the rig was moved to a new site. When setup for work it was determined by the well loggers that a sealed 1.7 curie Cs-137 source was missing from their tool. They went back to the last site and discovered the source in a pile of mud that was located 10-15 feet from the rig location. It is suspected that the source was missing for 24-36 hours. Suspect dose to the public to the rig crew/roustabouts. The logging crew was badged. No estimates are currently available. A Schlumberger management team has been dispatched from Houston (Subsite 000) to assess dose and investigate this incident. Investigation is ongoing."

TX Incident No.: I-8141

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40864
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: COMPUTALOG WIRELINE SERVICE, INC.
Region: 4
City: BRYAN MOUND STRATEGIC PET RES State: TX
County: BRAZORIA
License #: L04286-018
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR.
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/12/2004
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2004
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING LOST WELL LOGGING SOURCE

"After performing services to determine the oil/water contact interface and the gas/oil interface levels the wireline with the source was being retracted. The wireline was attached to 1 11/16" tool in the salt dome. During retraction, the source evidently got hung on entry to the hole to the surface. It is felt that the crew was inattentive or possibly did not use proper procedure. The 'stuck' source broke loose of the wireline at the established weak point of connection between the tool and the wireline. Retrieval of the source is deemed unrecoverable. This is the second incident of this type in the same field. The source is a Gulf Nuclear, Model CSV-F74, Cs-137, 100 millicurie source. The probable depth of this source is estimated at approximately 4,000 feet. Investigation on site continues. A written report will be submitted to this Agency [Texas Department of Health]."

Texas Incident No.: I-8142

Event Location: Bryan Mound Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Brazoria County, Texas, Well # BM 104B

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General Information or Other Event Number: 40866
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: STACEY AND WITBECK
Region: 4
City: SAN JOSE State: CA
County:
License #: 7113-43
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/13/2004
Notification Time: 18:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/13/2004
Event Time: 14:40 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
CNSNS- MEXICO (FAX)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

At 1440 PDT on 7/13/04, the California Radiologic Health Branch was notified by the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer for Stacey and Witbeck that their one and only gauge was stolen along with some other goods from a Conex box, container car, which was located at a construction site at Bascomb and SW Expressway in San Jose. The stolen gauge was a Troxler 3440, Serial Number 750-8909 containing 9 millicuries Cs-137 and 44 millicuries Am-241. The gauge was in a locked construction site in a locked Conex box. Bolt cutters and a torch were used to open the Conex box.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 40873
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 07/14/2004
Notification Time: 23:45 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2004
Event Time: 13:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)

Event Text

CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR (BULLETIN 91-01) REPORT

"At 1300 [CDT] on 7/14/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a cylinder, which was to be washed, was determined to contain heel material. The cylinder had been filled a single time with natural material at Honeywell (2/2001) since its last wash in 8/1999. An examination of the associated Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NCM&A) data and cylinder card indicated that the only other filling was in 9/1982 with depleted material at C-315. The cylinder was fed to the cascade in 9/2003 at C-337-A.

"A total of 4 gas over solid samples were taken of the cylinder and all indicated that the cylinder contains material. Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 085 and Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis 400-012 establish double contingency to ensure that a fissile cylinder is not washed in the non-fissile cylinder wash facility.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 04-2756; PGDP Event Report No. PAD 2004-019; Responsible Division: Operations.

"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
"NMC&A showed this cylinder contained a heel of around 8 lbs. Gas over solid sampling determined this non-fissile cylinder contained fissile material and could not be washed. Although the cylinder was not washed, an unlikely failure occurred that allowed fissile material to enter a cylinder controlled as non-fissile.

"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS:
"The process condition relied upon for double contingency for this scenario is enrichment.

"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OR CONTROL SYSTEMS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
"The first leg of double contingency relies on a gas over solid sample of the cylinder to demonstrate that the cylinder contains non-fissile material prior to washing.

"The second leg of double contingency relies on an argument that back- or cross-feeding at C-337A is unlikely to result in a significant amount of fissile material to be transferred to the cylinder. Since fissile material was found in the cylinder after it was fed at C-337A, this unlikely argument appears to have failed. However, the cylinder was not washed, maintaining this parameter.

"Although the parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter and one of the controls (unlikely argument) failed. Therefore double contingency was not maintained.

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
"1. Correct NMC&A database for this cylinder to show the correct assay in the cylinder and that the cylinder is fissile."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40874
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN HAUTALA
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/15/2004
Notification Time: 17:17 [ET]
Event Date: 07/14/2004
Event Time: 16:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N N 0 Hot Standby 0 Hot Standby
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ALL THREE UNITS EXCEEDED THE MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL SPECIFIED IN THEIR OPERATING LICENSE

"Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 determined that the Maximum Power Level specified in Operating License Condition 2.C(1) was exceeded in the past due to a nonconservative feedwater flow input in the secondary calorimetric calculation since installation of ultrasonic feedwater flow measurement (UFM) instrumentation in Units 1 and 3 in 1999 and 2000 in Unit 2. On 06/09/2004, the vendor (Caldon) notified Palo Verde via a letter that there may be an error of up to one to one and one-half percent in the flow measurement. As a compensatory measure, all three units reduced power and removed the UFM from service. Feedwater flow venturis are used for measurement with the UFM out of service. Engineering evaluation concluded on 07/14/2004 the maximum Palo Verde specific calorimetric error was approximately 38.76 Mw in Units 1 and 3 and 39.90 MW in Unit 2 or approximately 1 %.

The error resulted in core power levels above the Operating License limit of 3876 MW thermal in Units 1 and 3 and the Operating License limit of 3990 MW thermal In Unit 2 while the UFM was in service.

This report is being made because a review of historical operating data revealed that the Maximum Power Level was exceeded.

The Palo Verde safety analyses bound a power level of 102%. Power level did not exceed the safety analysis.

No ESF actuations occurred and none were required as a result of the miscalibration. There were no other structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were Involved. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 40875
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: PAUL ABBOTT
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 07/15/2004
Notification Time: 22:18 [ET]
Event Date: 07/15/2004
Event Time: 19:44 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
JOHN HANNON (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 M/R Y 8 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

MANUAL TRIP FROM 8% POWER DUE TO LOWERING WATER LEVEL ON 23 STEAM GENERATOR

During plant start up, a manual Reactor trip was initiated in response to lowering water level on 23 Steam Generator. All systems responded as required. All control rods fully inserted and no ECCS actuated or relief valves lifted. Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (21 and 22) started as expected on the low level signals from 23 Steam Generator. The steam driven auxiliary feed (23) pump was not required to start and remained in standby. Decay heat is being removed via the main steam dump system to the main condenser. The reactor is currently at normal operating temperature and pressure. No major equipment was unavailable at the time of the trip. No personnel injuries occurred as a result of this event. The cause of the low steam generator level is being investigated.


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with Lower Alloway Creek Township. The States of New Jersey and Delaware will be notified.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021