U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 07/15/2004 - 07/16/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40863 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION Region: 4 City: N/A State: TX County: PECOS License #: L01833-000042 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 07/12/2004 Notification Time: 09:29 [ET] Event Date: 07/10/2004 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/12/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): DALE POWERS (R4) TRISH HOLAHAN (NMSS) | Event Text TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON DOSE TO THE PUBLIC FROM EXPOSED SEALED SOURCE "Full investigation has been started by Schlumberger. Many details missing from initial notification. Crew using a CAPSTAR rig, without a floor were working a well site in Pecos County, Texas, from the Midland office (Subsite 042). During the evening of probably 07/09/2004 the rig was moved to a new site. When setup for work it was determined by the well loggers that a sealed 1.7 curie Cs-137 source was missing from their tool. They went back to the last site and discovered the source in a pile of mud that was located 10-15 feet from the rig location. It is suspected that the source was missing for 24-36 hours. Suspect dose to the public to the rig crew/roustabouts. The logging crew was badged. No estimates are currently available. A Schlumberger management team has been dispatched from Houston (Subsite 000) to assess dose and investigate this incident. Investigation is ongoing." TX Incident No.: I-8141 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40864 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Licensee: COMPUTALOG WIRELINE SERVICE, INC. Region: 4 City: BRYAN MOUND STRATEGIC PET RES State: TX County: BRAZORIA License #: L04286-018 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR. HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 07/12/2004 Notification Time: 14:38 [ET] Event Date: 07/06/2004 Event Time: [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/12/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): DALE POWERS (R4) SCOTT MOORE (NMSS) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING LOST WELL LOGGING SOURCE "After performing services to determine the oil/water contact interface and the gas/oil interface levels the wireline with the source was being retracted. The wireline was attached to 1 11/16" tool in the salt dome. During retraction, the source evidently got hung on entry to the hole to the surface. It is felt that the crew was inattentive or possibly did not use proper procedure. The 'stuck' source broke loose of the wireline at the established weak point of connection between the tool and the wireline. Retrieval of the source is deemed unrecoverable. This is the second incident of this type in the same field. The source is a Gulf Nuclear, Model CSV-F74, Cs-137, 100 millicurie source. The probable depth of this source is estimated at approximately 4,000 feet. Investigation on site continues. A written report will be submitted to this Agency [Texas Department of Health]." Texas Incident No.: I-8142 Event Location: Bryan Mound Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Brazoria County, Texas, Well # BM 104B | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40866 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM Licensee: STACEY AND WITBECK Region: 4 City: SAN JOSE State: CA County: License #: 7113-43 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 07/13/2004 Notification Time: 18:30 [ET] Event Date: 07/13/2004 Event Time: 14:40 [PDT] Last Update Date: 07/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE | Person (Organization): DALE POWERS (R4) C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS) CNSNS- MEXICO (FAX) | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE At 1440 PDT on 7/13/04, the California Radiologic Health Branch was notified by the Assistant Radiation Safety Officer for Stacey and Witbeck that their one and only gauge was stolen along with some other goods from a Conex box, container car, which was located at a construction site at Bascomb and SW Expressway in San Jose. The stolen gauge was a Troxler 3440, Serial Number 750-8909 containing 9 millicuries Cs-137 and 44 millicuries Am-241. The gauge was in a locked construction site in a locked Conex box. Bolt cutters and a torch were used to open the Conex box. | Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40873 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 Region: 2 City: PADUCAH State: KY County: McCRACKEN License #: GDP-1 Agreement: Y Docket: 0707001 NRC Notified By: TOM WHITE HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 07/14/2004 Notification Time: 23:45 [ET] Event Date: 07/14/2004 Event Time: 13:00 [CDT] Last Update Date: 07/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: RESPONSE-BULLETIN | Person (Organization): BRIAN BONSER (R2) C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS) | Event Text CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR (BULLETIN 91-01) REPORT "At 1300 [CDT] on 7/14/04, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that a cylinder, which was to be washed, was determined to contain heel material. The cylinder had been filled a single time with natural material at Honeywell (2/2001) since its last wash in 8/1999. An examination of the associated Nuclear Material Control and Accountability (NCM&A) data and cylinder card indicated that the only other filling was in 9/1982 with depleted material at C-315. The cylinder was fed to the cascade in 9/2003 at C-337-A. "A total of 4 gas over solid samples were taken of the cylinder and all indicated that the cylinder contains material. Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation 085 and Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis 400-012 establish double contingency to ensure that a fissile cylinder is not washed in the non-fissile cylinder wash facility. "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. "PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR 04-2756; PGDP Event Report No. PAD 2004-019; Responsible Division: Operations. "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: "NMC&A showed this cylinder contained a heel of around 8 lbs. Gas over solid sampling determined this non-fissile cylinder contained fissile material and could not be washed. Although the cylinder was not washed, an unlikely failure occurred that allowed fissile material to enter a cylinder controlled as non-fissile. "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: "The process condition relied upon for double contingency for this scenario is enrichment. "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL OR CONTROL SYSTEMS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: "The first leg of double contingency relies on a gas over solid sample of the cylinder to demonstrate that the cylinder contains non-fissile material prior to washing. "The second leg of double contingency relies on an argument that back- or cross-feeding at C-337A is unlikely to result in a significant amount of fissile material to be transferred to the cylinder. Since fissile material was found in the cylinder after it was fed at C-337A, this unlikely argument appears to have failed. However, the cylinder was not washed, maintaining this parameter. "Although the parameter was maintained, double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter and one of the controls (unlikely argument) failed. Therefore double contingency was not maintained. "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: "1. Correct NMC&A database for this cylinder to show the correct assay in the cylinder and that the cylinder is fissile." | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40874 | Facility: PALO VERDE Region: 4 State: AZ Unit: [1] [2] [3] RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE NRC Notified By: DAN HAUTALA HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 07/15/2004 Notification Time: 17:17 [ET] Event Date: 07/14/2004 Event Time: 16:30 [MST] Last Update Date: 07/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | Person (Organization): DALE POWERS (R4) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ALL THREE UNITS EXCEEDED THE MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL SPECIFIED IN THEIR OPERATING LICENSE "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 determined that the Maximum Power Level specified in Operating License Condition 2.C(1) was exceeded in the past due to a nonconservative feedwater flow input in the secondary calorimetric calculation since installation of ultrasonic feedwater flow measurement (UFM) instrumentation in Units 1 and 3 in 1999 and 2000 in Unit 2. On 06/09/2004, the vendor (Caldon) notified Palo Verde via a letter that there may be an error of up to one to one and one-half percent in the flow measurement. As a compensatory measure, all three units reduced power and removed the UFM from service. Feedwater flow venturis are used for measurement with the UFM out of service. Engineering evaluation concluded on 07/14/2004 the maximum Palo Verde specific calorimetric error was approximately 38.76 Mw in Units 1 and 3 and 39.90 MW in Unit 2 or approximately 1 %. The error resulted in core power levels above the Operating License limit of 3876 MW thermal in Units 1 and 3 and the Operating License limit of 3990 MW thermal In Unit 2 while the UFM was in service. This report is being made because a review of historical operating data revealed that the Maximum Power Level was exceeded. The Palo Verde safety analyses bound a power level of 102%. Power level did not exceed the safety analysis. No ESF actuations occurred and none were required as a result of the miscalibration. There were no other structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were Involved. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40875 | Facility: SALEM Region: 1 State: NJ Unit: [ ] [2] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP NRC Notified By: PAUL ABBOTT HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD | Notification Date: 07/15/2004 Notification Time: 22:18 [ET] Event Date: 07/15/2004 Event Time: 19:44 [EDT] Last Update Date: 07/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION | Person (Organization): GLENN MEYER (R1) JOHN HANNON (NRR) | Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | 2 | M/R | Y | 8 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby | Event Text MANUAL TRIP FROM 8% POWER DUE TO LOWERING WATER LEVEL ON 23 STEAM GENERATOR During plant start up, a manual Reactor trip was initiated in response to lowering water level on 23 Steam Generator. All systems responded as required. All control rods fully inserted and no ECCS actuated or relief valves lifted. Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps (21 and 22) started as expected on the low level signals from 23 Steam Generator. The steam driven auxiliary feed (23) pump was not required to start and remained in standby. Decay heat is being removed via the main steam dump system to the main condenser. The reactor is currently at normal operating temperature and pressure. No major equipment was unavailable at the time of the trip. No personnel injuries occurred as a result of this event. The cause of the low steam generator level is being investigated. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with Lower Alloway Creek Township. The States of New Jersey and Delaware will be notified. | |