| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/27/2004 - 05/28/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40642 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM HUFFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 04:02 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 01:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
| Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION FOR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"At 0030 [ET] during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the associated Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 0130. The Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown. Therefore, this condition is reportable for Unit 2 under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Unit 1 is in Mode 5 and therefore not impacted. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 0223."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2.
"Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (R. Conte) |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40646 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RONALD FRY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN | Notification Date: 04/05/2004
Notification Time: 18:19 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2004
Event Time: 11:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION FOR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"At 1040 hrs during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the 'E' (Substituting for 'A') and 'C' Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 1140 hrs. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 1206 hrs. Unit 1 is in Mode 5 requiring only 2 diesel generators operable, therefore not impacted by the Loss of Power instrumentation inoperability.
"Also during the surveillance, two pump start timers failed to meet the required acceptance criteria. The 'A' ESW Pump timer actuated at 47.86 seconds (criteria; 36 sec. to 44 sec) and the 'C' ESW Pump timer actuated at 50.38 seconds (criteria: 39.6 sec. to 48.4 sec). With failure of the timers, proper loading on the Diesel Generators is not assured, and they were declared inoperable until the associated pump control breakers were opened. The 'E' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1448 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'A' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'E' Diesel Generator was returned to operable at 1453 hrs when the DC Knife switches for the 'A' ESW pump were open. The 'C' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1524 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'C' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'C' Diesel Generator was restored to operable at 1706 hrs after supported systems were realigned to prevent further loss of safety function and the DC Knife switches for the 'C' ESW pump were open.
"The Susquehanna safety analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown the plant. Therefore with only two operable Diesel Generators, the condition requires an 8 hr ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)and (vi)."
All times referenced above are EDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM R. FRY TO M. RIPLEY 1419 ET ON 05/27/04 * * * *
"The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2.
"Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R1DO (R. Conte) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40778 | Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: GLENN HUTTON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/27/2004
Notification Time: 01:21 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2004
Event Time: 00:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | A/R | Y | 2 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM WHILE PERFORMING SCHEDULED SHUTDOWN
"During a reactor shutdown for scheduled maintenance, a full reactor scram was generated from the Nuclear Instrumentation System.
"IRMs [Intermediate Range Monitoring detectors] 13, 14 and 18 spiked causing scram signals in both RPS [Reactor Protection Systems].
"All systems functioned properly post scram, all operator actions were correct. Holding reactor pressure at 900 psig to perform leakage inspection. Following [the leakage] inspection [operations intend] to proceed to cold shutdown."
All control rods inserted fully into the core and excess decay heat is currently being diverted to the main condenser, as necessary.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40779 | Facility: HADDAM NECK
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN CAMPBELL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 05/27/2004
Notification Time: 10:57 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2004
Event Time: 10:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
20.1906(d)(1) - SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS > LIMITS
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
ROBERTO TORRES (NMSS)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Decommissioned | 0 | Decommissioned | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE DUE TO EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION FOUND ON CONTAINER SHIPPED BY LICENSEE
The following information was received by the licensee via facsimile:
"Contamination levels in excess of USDOT [U.S. Department of Transportation] and Barnwell [South Carolina] limits found on a shipment when it reached its destination. (Sea Land Container).
"No personnel contaminations were reported."
The licensee was informed by Barnwell of the contamination event. Apparently, the temperature difference between Connecticut and South Carolina caused condensation to form inside the Sea Land container. The condensation puddled inside the container and then leaked out onto the trailer bed. Contamination was found by Barnwell personnel upon receipt of the trailer.
The licensee informed the State of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection representative on site and NRC Region 1 (John Wray). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40780 | Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICH DESANCTIS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 05/27/2004
Notification Time: 13:15 [ET]
Event Date: 05/27/2004
Event Time: 06:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/27/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text AUTOMATIC SAFETY INJECTION FUNCTION INADVERTANTLY BLOCKED
"This 8-hour notification is being made to report that in Mode 4, during the start-up of Salem Unit 2, the Automatic Safety Injection function was identified blocked. At 0140 hours on 5/27/04, Salem Unit 2 transitioned from Mode 5 to Mode 4. In Mode 4, Automatic Safety Injection is required per Technical Specification 3.3.2.1. At 0630 hours on 5/27/04, it was discovered that both trains of the Automatic Safety Injection logic were blocked. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered. At 0635, Automatic Safety Injection was reinstated to both trains of Safety Injection and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. Salem Unit 2 is currently in Mode 4 with reactor coolant temperature at 320 degrees and reactor coolant pressure at 320 psig. The Reactor Coolant System is being cooled by the 21 Residual Heat Removal loop. During the time period that Automatic Safety Injection was blocked, the required ECCS Pump was available in compliance with Technical Specification 3.5.3. Additionally, the following equipment status existed: 21 Reactor Coolant Pump was cleared and tagged for an oil leak repair, and 22BF19 Main Feed Regulating Valve was cleared and tagged closed for positioner repairs.
"There were no personnel injuries or radiological occurrences associated with this event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |