| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/04/2004 - 05/05/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 40717 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: ISOTOPE PRODUCTS LABORATORY
Region: 4
City: LOS ANGELES State: CA
County:
License #: 1509-19-CA
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KATHLEEN KAUFMAN
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE | Notification Date: 04/30/2004
Notification Time: 15:04 [ET]
Event Date: 04/29/2004
Event Time: 17:17 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 04/30/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text A STATE OF CALIFORNIA LICENSEE CADMIUM-109 SOURCES LOST IN BRAZIL
At 1717 PDT on 04/29/04, the CA Licensee, Isotope Products Laboratory, Valencia, CA, Radiation Safety Officer notified a CA Radiation Control Program Officer by voicemail that a transport container containing several sealed sources totaling 50 millicuries of Cadmium-109 was shipped from Burbank, CA to Chile. The shipment was transported by air on Lan Chile Airlines from Los Angles International Airport to Chile. However, the aircraft landed in Brazil and the package was offloaded at the Brazilian airport. The Brazilian Customs Agents at the Brazilian Airport are on strike and the package is thought to be in a warehouse at the airport (location unknown). Lan Chile Airlines notified the International Air Transport Association. The transport container contains a sealed source comprised of several sealed sources in a ring configuration; the ring being only a holder for the sealed sources. The source is used for X-ray fluorescence.
The RSO plans to provide information on the packaging and labeling, transport index, surface reading, shipper, date/time shipped from Isotope Products Laboratory, leak tests, contact name/phone number at Lan Chile Airlines, Brazil Airport location, number of sources and activity of each source, time/date when package was determined to be missing and by whom.
There has been no press/media involvement. CA does not consider this event to be a threat to health and safety.
The licensee was notified of this event at 1510 PDT on 04/29/04. CA received the voicemail at 1100 PDT on 04/30/04.
CA plans to issue a written report to the NRC within 30 days.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED AT 1842 EDT ON 04/30/04 FROM KAUFMAN TO JOLLIFFE * * *
The licensee reported to CA that the Brazilian Customs have the package in their possession.
Notified R4DO Charles Marschall and NMSS EO Patricia Holahan. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40722 | Rep Org: TES CONSULTANTS
Licensee: TES CONSULTANTS
Region: 3
City: FARMINGTON HILLS State: MI
County:
License #: 21-32150-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NICK HUCHINSON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/04/2004
Notification Time: 13:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2004
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
INFORMATION ONLY
| Person (Organization):
CHRISTINE LIPA (R3)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
At approximately 0800 EDT on 05/04/04, an equipment operator backed an excavator over a Troxler density gauge model 3430, Serial No. 29858, containing an 8 millicurie Cs-137 and a 40 millicurie Am-241:Be source. The exterior cover of the gauge was damaged, the source rod was bent and stuck in the exposed position at the time the incident occurred. The technician removed personnel from the area and contacted the local Hazmat fire department which placed the damaged gauge in a steel drum. The licensee is in possession of the steel drum containing the damaged gauge and has plans to return it to the manufacturer for disposal. The licensee believes that based on the structure of the damaged gauge, there was no source leakage and they are in process of performing personnel exposure calculations as warranted. The licensee contacted Region 3 and will submit a written report of this incident, as required. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40723 | Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: ERIC WALKER
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/04/2004
Notification Time: 14:10 [ET]
Event Date: 05/03/2004
Event Time: 16:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
THOMAS ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text CRITICALITY CONTROL 24-HOUR (BULLETIN 91-01) REPORT
"At 1600 on 5-03-04, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of a violation of SRI 5.4.1 of NCSE 052. The oil seals and bearing housing for the C-310 cell 6 stage 2B pump failed allowing significant quantities of oil to be accessible for entry to the cascade through a failed process seal in violation of SRI 5.4.1 in NCSE 052. Also, greater than 3.7 gallons (5.1 [measured]) of oil was found inside the pump casing in violation of the unlikely arguments which limit the amount of oil that will enter the process side of the pump.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
While the moderation parameter of 3.7 gallons of oil was exceeded, NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
"POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:
In order for a criticality to occur, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be in the pump and greater than 3.7 gallons of oil would have to enter the process side of the cell and moderate the uranium deposit in a critical configuration.
"CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):
The pump contains less than the [DELETED] 235U process limit at an enrichment of less than 5.5 wt %235U.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The first leg of double contingency relies on the oil seals and bearing housing to limit the amount of oil that may be accessible for entry to a failed process seal to less than 3.7 gallons. This SRI failed; therefore double contingency was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on shutting down the affected equipment as soon as practical after discovery of a catastrophic process seal failure to make it unlikely to continue to operate for any appreciable length of time with wet air inleakage. Since the cell was shut down in accordance with control 3.2.2, but significant wet air inleakage continued for a period of time which allowed greater than 3.7 gallons of oil to enter the process side of the pump, the unlikely argument was violated. Since greater than 3.7 gallons of oil entered the process side of the cell, double contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained.
"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010.
"NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE CONTINGENCY:
Double Contingency
Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls on moderation.
"The first leg of double contingency relies on the oil seals and bearing housing to limit the amount of oil that may be accessible for entry to a failed process seal to less than 3.7 gallons. This SRI failed; therefore double contingency was not maintained.
"The second leg of double contingency relies on shutting down the affected equipment as soon as practical after discovery of a catastrophic process seal failure to make it unlikely to continue to operate for any appreciable length of time with wet air inleakage. Since the cell was shut down in accordance with control 3.2.2 but significant wet air inleakage continued for a time period which allowed greater than 3.7 gallons of oil to enter the process side of the pump, the unlikely argument was violated. Since greater than 3.7 gallons of oil entered the process side of the cell, double contingency was not maintained.
"Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double contingency was not maintained. The NCS parameter of moderation was not maintained.
"Potential Critical Pathways:
In order for a criticality to occur, greater than a critical mass of uranium would have to be in the pump and greater than 3.7 gallons of oil would have to enter the process side of the cell and moderate the uranium deposit in a critical configuration.
"Safety Significance:
While the moderation parameter of 3.7 gallons of oil was exceeded, NDA measurements showed the pump contained less than a safe mass of uranium and double contingency has been established under NCSA GEN-010. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40724 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: RANDY TODD
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA | Notification Date: 05/04/2004
Notification Time: 19:08 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2004
Event Time: 16:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
KERRY LANDIS (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNANALYZED CONDITION AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF CONTAINMENT SAFETY FUNCTION
"NOTE: Oconee Unit 2 is DEFUELED (No Mode) in a refueling outage.
"Oconee has discovered a new scenario where the double ended guillotine rupture addressed by IE Bulletin 80-04 is not the worst case with respect to containment pressure following a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB). Therefore this scenario is being reporting as an Unanalyzed Condition and a potential loss of the containment safety function. This new scenario involves a range of MSLB break sizes smaller than the double ended guillotine rupture addressed by IE Bulletin 80-04, with the break located inside containment, and with a concurrent Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP).
"This event scenario is still being evaluated but it appears to result in containment pressures in excess of the 59 psig limit discussed in the UFSAR. Preliminary results indicate that pressure would not exceed the containment 'ultimate capacity' of 144 psig.
"Analysis has shown that the Steam Generator tube stresses remain within acceptable limits for this event scenario so that no additional RCS leakage would occur. As a result, the offsite dose for this scenario is bounded by previous scenarios for a MSLB outside containment.
"Background
The AFIS (Automatic Feedwater Isolation System) Circuitry required by Tech Specs 3.3.11, 3.3.12, and 3.3.13 is intended to isolate Feedwater from the steam generators in the event of a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) by closing the Feedwater Control Valves and preventing operation of the Emergency Feedwater Pumps. Tech Spec 3.7.3 requires the Feedwater Control Valves to be operable and provides an 8 hour Allowed Outage Time (AOT) if they are not. If the AOT is exceeded, the affected unit must be in Mode 3 within an additional 12 hours. The Feedwater Control Valves are air operated and fail as-is on loss of Instrument Air. Low MS pressure causes AFIS to signal the valves to close. Emergency Feedwater Pumps are interlocked based on rate of MS pressure drop.
"Scenario:
ONS identified a new scenario involving a MSLB smaller than the double ended guillotine rupture addressed by IE Bulletin 80-04, located inside containment, and occurring concurrent with a LOOP.
"In this scenario, the LOOP results in the loss of power to the permanently installed plant instrument air compressors, so that instrument air pressure would begin to decay. The smaller MSLB break size slows the rate of pressure loss from the affected MS line. Break sizes exist such that by the time the MS system pressure decays to the AFIS actuation setpoint, instrument air pressure might become inadequate to close the Feedwater Control Valves. Also, the low rate of change of MS pressure might not satisfy the AFIS rate based setpoint for actuating the EFW pump interlock. If the control valves remain open or if the EFW pumps are allowed to operate, additional inventory would reach the steam generators and flash to steam. Since the scenario requires the break to be located inside containment, this would result in increased containment pressures.
"Initial Safety Significance:
The Main Steam Line Break inside containment is a low probability event. Also, although the MSLB scenario includes the assumption of some primary to secondary leakage, the analysis shows that Steam Generator tube stresses remain within acceptable limits for these break sizes, so that no additional RCS leakage would occur. As a result, the offsite dose for this scenario is still bounded by the scenario for a break outside containment. Therefore this event is not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public.
"Corrective Action(s):
A diesel compressor connected to the Instrument Air header has been placed in operation to assure a source of instrument air in the event of a LOOP. Additional actions for permanent resolution are being evaluated."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | |