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Event Notification Report for March 16, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/15/2004 - 03/16/2004

EVENT NUMBERS
4059240594

!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 40592
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KIETH DROWN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/16/2004
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2004
Event Time: 10:42 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/18/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
JOSE CALVO (NRR)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
CABLE SEPARATION CRITERIA NOT MET

"At 1042 hours on March 16, 2003, Operations determined that a field condition did not meet cable separation criteria. This condition represented an unanalyzed condition potentially reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) since the event might represent a significant degradation of plant safety. The cable separation discrepancy, identified during a walk down, was a misplaced portion of non-safety cables from one safety channel into another safety channel. The non-safety cables are assorted low energy instrumentation cables (generally associated with fire protection and radiation monitoring or retired) and an ac power supply cable to a charcoal filter fan plenum drain line pump. The drain line pump power cable created the potential for a significant degradation of plant safety due to a potential for damage to cables of safety related components in the channels. The safety related cables in the two channels included power cables for two of three Component Cooling Water pumps, two Containment Spray pumps, and power cables to four motor control centers.

"Immediate corrective action was taken at 1044 hours to de-energize the power cable to the drain line pump and subsequent action was taken, at about 1100 hours, to re-establish separation by moving the cables back to a single channel. Electrical feeds to all required safeguard loads were maintained at all times. An evaluation is being performed to further identify the cables in the two channels, and to evaluate the significance of the cable separation discrepancy. The extent of condition will be evaluated as part of the corrective action process."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 1329 EST ON 3/18/04 FROM BRIAN ROKES TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"Indian Point Unit 2 is withdrawing the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on March 16, 2004, at 1702 hours (EN Log No. 40592). The notification on March 16, reported an unanalyzed condition that might represent a significant degradation of plant safety, as a result of discovery of a plant condition that did not meet cable separation criteria, and therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). A walk-down discovered several cables that traversed two cable channels containing cables for redundant safeguards equipment. All but one of the misplaced cables were low energy instrumentation cables. One of misplaced cables was a power cable for the charcoal filter fan plenum drain line pump. The power cable for the drain line pump created the potential for a significant degradation of plant safety due to a potential for damage to cables of safety related components in the two separate safety channels. Immediate corrective action was taken at 1044 hours, to de-energize the power cable to the drain line pump. At approximately 1100 hours re-establishment of separation was completed by moving the cables back to a single channel.

"Subsequently, Engineering evaluated the condition and determined the power cable for the charcoal filter fan plenum drain line pump is designed and protected such that faults originating on this cable or its associated load will be quickly interrupted prior to the onset of damage so that safety related cables in its proximity and along its route will be protected from such damage. The method of protection involving double safety related fuses has been shown to provide the necessary enhanced electrical isolation consistent with the Indian Point Unit 2 design criteria. Therefore, engineering concluded the as-found condition did not represent a significant degradation of plant safety."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Gray) and NRR (Reis).


General Information or Other
Event Number: 40594
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: LOMA LINDA MEDICAL CENTER
Region: 4
City: LOMA LINDA   State: CA
County:
License #: 0060-36
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: C. J. SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/17/2004
Notification Time: 16:37 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/17/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
HAROLD GRAY (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING SR-90 EYE APPLICATOR SOURCE

"Licensee reported to Radiologic Health Branch-Granada Hills (RHB-GH) that it had discovered one of its Sr-90 eye applicator sources (Model Manning #357, SIN pending) missing yesterday [03/16/04] from its sealed source storage C-container where it had been stored for the last ten years. The actual eye applicator was kept in its own box provided by the manufacturer. The discovery was made when the RSO was conducting a routine check for leak test/inventory purposes. This source was reportedly last accounted for about July 2003. The original assay date for the source was 8/22/79 at 31.7 millicuries (Reported to be about 17 millicuries now).

"The source was stored in a locked and alarmed C-container used exclusively for radioactive material storage. A fence around it is also locked. There was no sign of a break-in. However, the licensee reported that in May 2002 there was a break-in to this storage container. The same source was at that time removed from the C-container by the intruder apparently and was later found in an outside barrel so it was recovered. Incidentally, some uranyl nitrate (or acetate?) in microcurie quantities was stolen then, too.

"The licensee will continue searching to determine the likely disposition of the missing source. RHB-GH suggested they notify their security people. The licensee will be providing a written report."