| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/15/2004 - 01/16/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40343 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 11/20/2003
Notification Time: 11:19 [ET]
Event Date: 11/20/2003
Event Time: 09:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE
At 0925, while performing the HPCI time to rated flow surveillance, operators discovered the HPCI flow controller to be operating sluggishly in the automatic mode. The surveillance was stopped and HPCI was declared inoperable.
The licensee entered a 24-hour LCO per Technical Specification 3.5.5.2 due to Torus Cooling being in service on RHR loop "A". The licensee is now in a 14-day LCO as a result of securing Torus Cooling and restoring RHR LPCI loop "A". Troubleshooting was performed with I&C prior to securing HPCI. I&C is pursuing controller restoration to operability.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 01/15/04 @ 1035 BY DAVID HALLONQUIST TO C GOULD * * * RETRACTION
BASIS FOR RETRACTION:
NRC Notification 40343 was conservatively made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73 were met pending the evaluation of an atypical condition observed with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Flow Controller while performing scheduled preventative maintenance testing for the HPCI System. After the off-site vendor lab completed testing the circuit board, the HPCI Flow Controller performed sluggishly, and it was determined that the initial NRC Notification was not required.
During surveillance testing on 11/20/03, the HPCI System was started and met or exceeded the Technical Specification minimum requirements designed to demonstrate HPCI System Operability. While testing the specific components of the system, the HPCI Flow Controller was observed to be behaving erratically. Although the HPCI System was still capable of performing its required design safety function, the Shift Manager declared the system inoperable with a concern that further degradation of the flow controller "could have" prevented the HPCI System from performing its design safety function.
Troubleshooting determined that the amplifier circuit board for the controller was not performing as expected. This board was subsequently replaced with one from stock and tested satisfactorily before declaring HPCI fully operational. The faulty amplifier circuit board was sent to an off-site vendor lab for testing and analysis.
The vendor determined that the problem was due a capacitor failure on the board. The capacitor was removed, and the board was re-tested to determine the extent of the effect that this condition would have on the HPCI System performance. This testing revealed the same indications and system response that was initially observed by Vermont Yankee personnel during testing and troubleshooting. Therefore, it has been concluded that with the preventative maintenance system's surveillance as-found condition, the HPCI System was capable of performing its design safety function, and the flow controller's performance would not have degraded any further as a result of this condition.
Therefore ENS Event Number 40343, made on 11/20/03, is being retracted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
Reg 1 RDO( Holody) was informed. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40435 | Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW OHRABLO
HQ OPS Officer: ERIC THOMAS | Notification Date: 01/10/2004
Notification Time: 13:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 05:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ACCIDENT MITIGATION - CREFS INOPERABLE
This Notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D).
On January 8, 2004 at 17:35 CST with the Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) inoperable for planned maintenance, CREFS failed post work testing due to system flow being higher than that allowed by technical specifications. It was originally believed that the failure was connected with the planned maintenance because the system flow rate was initially within the specifications during surveillance testing the previous day.
Following system troubleshooting, at 05:00 CST on January 10, 2004, it was determined that the cause of the high flow rates was indeterminate. Based on this evaluation, it could not be determined whether the CREFS failure was independent of planned maintenance or not. Additionally, it is not immediately clear if the high flow condition would result in a loss of safety function. It was therefore conservatively determined that the condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as a failure of a single train system which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
CREFS flow rates are currently within specifications, but the system will remain inoperable until the proper surveillances have been completed.
The senior NRC Resident has been notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 1/15/04 AT 1729 HOURS EST FROM JAMES DEDIC TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The licensee retracted this event and provided the following information:
"On January 10, 2004, Cooper Nuclear Station [CNS] made an eight hour event notification report to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72.(b)(3)(v)(D), failure of a single train system which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. In particular, testing to restore the Control Room Emergency Filter System (CREFS) to operable status following planned maintenance indicated the flow rate was greater than that allowed by Technical Specifications. It was not known whether the high flow condition would result in a loss of safety function. Flow rate was restored to within Technical Specification Limits and CREFS was returned to operable status on January 11, 2004 at 1803 hours
"Subsequent evaluation determined:
"1. the high flow condition did not impact the system safety functions to maintain the Control Room at a positive pressure with respect to adjoining areas or to isolate the outside air intake on relevant Group isolation signals.
"2. the CREFS safety function to limit the radiation exposure to Control Room personnel during any one of the postulated design basis events to within regulatory limits (10CFR50, Appendix A, GDC 19) was maintained during the high flow condition.
"3. the design functions of CREFS for the CNS toxic hazards assessment and Fire Protection Program requirements were not affected by the CREFS high flow.
"The evaluation concluded the safety function of the CREFS during the high flow condition was maintained. Therefore, CNS is retracting this 10CFR50.72 Event Notification."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Jeffery Clark) |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40439 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SABIA, INC
Region: 4
City: SAN DIEGO State: CA
County:
License #: 6663
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. Gregor
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 06:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/07/2004
Event Time: [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
Jeffrey Clark (R4)
Roberto Torres (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LACK OF POSTING AND ACCESS RESTRICTIONS TO RADIATION AREA
"During an inspection of the licensee facility by RHB [State] on 1/7/04, a potential radiation problem was indicated by a high neutron radiation level above a shield assembly used to store Cf-252 neutron sources. Directly above the shield, the neutron dose rate was measured as approximately 5 rem/hr using a rem-ball. This area was not controlled as a high radiation area, nor were controls effective at the time of the inspection to preclude unrestricted access to the room. On the roof, directly above the shield assembly, the neutron dose rate was measured as approximately 25 mrem/hr, in an area of approximately 1 square foot. The roof area was not controlled as a restricted area. (Both neutron measurements were made by the licensee because of the lack of neutron survey instrumentation by the RHB inspector.) The licensee was directed to remeasure the neutron dose rate on the roof because it was inconsistent with the room dose rate, to add shielding to reduce the roof dose rates, and to provide high radiation area controls to the room containing the stored neutron sources. The second measurement of the roof dose rate found 250-260 mrem/hr in the highest area (approximately 1 square foot). The licensee representative reported he had incorrectly read the instrument scale during the previous measurement. Polyethylene sheets and a container of hydrogenous material were placed on the top of the shield assembly to act as temporary neutron shielding. This reduced the neutron dose rate directly above the shield assembly to 8-10 mrem/hr, and the roof dose rate to less than 2 mrem/hr. Locks were installed on the doors accessing the laboratory area where the Cf-252 sources are stored.
"The licensee is in the process of constructing a permanent safe storage inside of this shield assembly, with additional shielding to conservatively ensure that individuals in unrestricted areas won't exceed 100 mrem/year dose (and unrestricted area dose rates will be less than 2 mrem in any hour). The shielding design will ensure that the shielding cannot be removed by an unauthorized person and accidentally recreate the high radiation area and unrestricted area dose rate problems. This construction is expected to be completed by 1/15/04.
"The state (RHB) will continue to investigate this matter to evaluate the potential for exposures to personnel as a result of the elevated dose rates and lack of access controls. No personnel overexposures, worker or public, are known to have occurred at this time." |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 40445 | Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORP
Region: 4
City: OILDALE State: CA
County:
License #: 0144-15
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 23:10 [ET]
Event Date: 01/10/2004
Event Time: 18:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
Jeffrey Clark (R4)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE
On 01/12/04, the State of California received a report from Schlumberger Technology of an incident that occurred about 1800 PST on 01/10/04. A 1.3 curie Cs-137 source fell off of its tool. A rig hand picked up the source with his fingertips thinking it was the base of a lightbulb. A Schlumberger crew member told the worker to leave it on the deck. The source was recovered with the source handling tool, and returned it to the shielded container.
Touching exposure was estimated to be 20 mrem with calculations based on maximum touching time of 10 seconds. Whole body exposure was estimated to be 2.9 mrem with calculation exposure based on beginning at 6 feet from the source and closest distance at 2.5 feet for maximum of 2 minutes. The source has exposure characteristics of 2 mrem/hr at 200 inches (min) from shielded (dovetail) end, and 2 mrem/hr at 680 inches (max) from the non-shielded end. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40449 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 01/15/2004
Notification Time: 13:03 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2004
Event Time: 19:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION OF ACCIDENT INVOLVING 2 TRUCKS CARRYING EMPTY NEW FUEL SHIPPING CONTAINERS
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"On 1/14/2004 at 19:56 hours, the Shift Manager was notified by the Clinton County, PA Emergency Management Agency of vehicle accident involving trucks that were carrying a shipment from Susquehanna. The trucks were carrying empty shipping boxes from a shipment of new fuel that had previously been delivered to Susquehanna. These empty boxes were being shipped in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation regulations [49CFR173.428 Empty Class 7 (Rad Mat)].
"On 1/15/2004 at 10:20 hours, additional information was provided to the control room indicating that this accident could cause increased public interest due to the severity of the accident. The two tractor trailers involved in the shipment were amongst the vehicles in the accident. One of the truck drivers was seriously injured. The trucks were severely damaged. Clinton County, PA, Emergency Management Agency was called to the scene by initial responders as well as the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection. Both surveyed the boxes and found no indication of radiation/contamination. The shipping boxes and vehicles are being held by the towing company until the shipping company can provide replacement vehicles."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Other Nuclear Material | Event Number: 40450 | Rep Org: PA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Licensee:
Region: 1
City: PHILADELPHIA State: PA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: HENRY SCHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 01/15/2004
Notification Time: 13:13 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2004
Event Time: 12:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
ROERTO TORRES (NMSS)
| Event Text DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
At 1313 EST on 01/15/04, Henry Schultz, PA Department of Transportation, reported that at 1245 EST on 01/15/04 a bulldozer ran over a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge (Model #3440, Serial #27356) at a construction site on Interstate-95 in North Eastern Philadelphia. The gauge is presently in the soil at the construction site with the handle broken off. The area around the gauge has been cordoned off. The Construction Nuclear Operator, who normally operates the gauge, is on the scene. The caller planned to contact the local Fire or Police Department to request that a local HAZMAT Team respond to the scene to perform a survey of the damaged instrument to determine if it is leaking and determine how to handle the damaged gauge and possibly the surrounding soil. The caller is also planning to notify the PA Emergency Management Agency and the U.S. National Response Center. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40451 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/15/2004
Notification Time: 23:39 [ET]
Event Date: 01/15/2004
Event Time: 18:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/15/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text POTENTIAL GAS BINDING OF CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"During routine 31-day ECCS [Emergency Core Cooling System] venting per SR [Surveillance Requirement] 3.5.2.3 on January 7, 2004, a higher than normal amount of gas was vented from a location on a line off the common suction line for both charging pumps (NV pumps) for Unit 1. The amount of gas vented was not initially considered to be an operability concern. As a conservative measure the frequency of venting was increased from monthly to weekly. Follow-up venting on January 14 indicated the amount of gas vented from this location had increased. Gas was also collecting at a second location at a high point in the NV system. The second location was near the normally-closed valve 1ND-28A. 1ND-28A completes the lineup for 'piggy-back' flow from the Train 'A' decay heat removal system (ND) into the NV system. The type of gas from both locations was determined to be hydrogen. The increased presence of gas was considered a potential operability concern and an operability evaluation was initiated. Venting was increased to once per shift. The source of the hydrogen gas intrusion is unknown and is being investigated. On January 15 at 1850 [EST] it was determined that the amount of gas discovered on January 14 at both locations was greater than what is bounded by current analysis to ensure gas binding of both NV pumps would not have occurred.
"Since January 14, subsequent venting at the first location (NV pump common suction line) has resulted in gas volumes within the analysis limits. The amount of gas at the second location (Train 'A' piggy-back tie in) initially decreased but increased again on January 15. As a result, the power was removed from 1ND-28A to prevent the transfer of gas into the NV pump suction line. This action results in Unit 1 Train 'A' of ECCS being inoperable and entry into TS [Technical Specification] 3.5.2 Action A1 on January 15 at 1857[hrs]. Train 'B' of ECCS is considered currently operable with 1ND-28A closed and continued increased venting.
"Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
This places Unit 1 in a 72-hr Limiting Condition for Operation [LCO]. Unit 2 is not affected. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40452 | Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: JAMES BAPTIST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH | Notification Date: 01/16/2004
Notification Time: 02:01 [ET]
Event Date: 01/16/2004
Event Time: 00:20 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/16/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO BOTH TRAINS OF SAFETY INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"Inspections of the 'A' SI [Safety Injection] Pump lube oil cooler today per PMP [Plant Maintenance Procedure] 33-01 revealed silt and lake weed accumulation at tube pass inlets. Calculation C11423 Rev. 0, Addendum A was recently performed to determine service water flow and temperature requirements for the safety injection pump lube oil coolers. The calculation provides the required service water flow rate based on number of tubes blocked and SW [Service Water] temperature. At 1640 [hrs][CST], 1/15/04, it was reported that a visual inspection was performed on the 'A' SI Pump HX [Heat Exchanger] tube inlet and 17 of 20 tubes were found to be blocked. The flow for the 'A' HX was 3 - 3.8 gpm and after cleaning elevated to 5.95 - 6.05 gpm. This concern prompted an investigation into 'B' SI Pump HX and a flow test was performed at 1951 [hrs] on 1/15/04. The results from this test was no flow from 17 of the 20 tubes as seen from the outlet of the HX and a similar flow rate as seen in HX 'A'. The determination was made that this had potentially made both trains of SI Pump HX inoperable and that this needed to be reported under GNP 11.08.04 -'Reportability Determinations'. The Calculation (C11423) used data that was contradictory to current Surveillance Procedure acceptance criteria and used values that may not be indicative of post accident conditions. In a teleconference with Senior Plant Management, it was determined that future operability of the SI Pump lube oil HX cannot be verified and that both trains would be declared inoperable at time 0020 [hrs] [on] 1/16/04. This is in contradiction with the plant Technical Specification,3.3.b Emergency Core Cooling, and placed the plant in the standard shutdown sequence."
The plant shutdown will commence at 0120 hrs CST.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. | |