| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
01/13/2004 - 01/14/2004 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 40372 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DON BRADLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 12/03/2003
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/03/2003
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BACKWARD INSTALLATION OF CONTAINMENT LOOP SEAL PENETRATION VACUUM BREAKERS
"Vacuum breakers 1WL980 and 2WL980 are installed backwards. In their current orientation, the valves will not lift from their seats to break a siphon into the corresponding unit's Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank (VUCDT).
"The VUCDT input line is a 6-Inch pipe. There is a loop seal between the outboard containment isolation valve and the VUCDT. Since the VUCDT is vented to the auxiliary building environment, the purpose of the loop seal is to provide a barrier between the containment atmosphere and the auxiliary building atmosphere during normal unit operations. The purpose of the vacuum breaker is to prevent siphoning water out of the loop seal. In its current configuration, the vacuum breaker will not open. The loop seal is not needed to provide a barrier between the containment atmosphere and the auxiliary building atmosphere during a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) because valves 1(2)WL867A and 1(2)WL869B will close on a Phase B containment isolation signal on high-high containment pressure (3.2 psig in containment, accounting for instrument error). During certain small break LOCAs, however, a high-high containment isolation signal may not occur, since pressure might not reach the setpoint. In this scenario, the loop seal is needed to isolate the containment atmosphere from the auxiliary building atmosphere.
"Given the size of the VUCDT inlet piping, the only mechanism that could form a siphon out of the loop seal is a large flow of water that would push the air out of the top of the loop seal. In this instance, a siphon could form and pull water out of the low point of the loop seal. If this were to occur, a vent path from the containment atmosphere to the auxiliary building atmosphere would be open. However, during normal operation, there is not sufficient flow into the tank to make this a plausible scenario.
"For a large break LOCA, containment pressure would rise quickly to the high-high setpoint; then the inoperable VUCDT loop seal would be isolated by its containment isolation valves. For smaller LOCAs, particularly, for a rod ejection accident resulting in a LOCA, containment pressure would rise slowly- from 2.81 psig (the pressure at which the loop seal isolation function would fail), until 3.2 psig (the maximum high-high containment pressure setpoint, accounting for instrument error), the inoperable loop seal would represent a containment leak path. The rod ejection accident does result in a high level of fuel clad failure; therefore, the unisolated containment leak path represents a source of release to the environment until such time as the high-high containment pressure setpoint is reached (if it is reached). The dose consequences associated with this potential leak path have not been evaluated.
"Upon discovery of the incorrectly installed vacuum breakers, the containment isolation valves associated with this penetration flow path were closed to isolate the path. The Unit 2 loop seal configuration has since been modified to correct this situation. The Unit 1 loop seal configuration will be modified prior to the completion of the current end of cycle 14 refueling outage."
The incorrect installation of the vacuum breakers was identified on 11/03/03, and it is being investigated on how long this condition has existed. It is possible that it has existed since construction.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, state and local regulatory agencies.
*****RETRACTED ON 1/8/03 AT 1615 FROM COY TO LAURA*****
"The subject EN was made on 12/3/03. Following additional review by the licensee, this event was determined to not meet the reportability requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The event was determined to not result in a degraded or unanalyzed condition, as the consequences of the event were determined to be bounded by transients currently analyzed and described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). In addition, the event did not represent a failure of structures, systems, or components utilized to control the release of radiological material or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee is therefore retracting the subject EN."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (P. Fredrickson) |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 40440 | Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
Region: 2
City: COLUMBIA State: SC
County: RICHLAND
License #: SNM-1107
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001151
NRC Notified By: CARL SNYDER
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2004
Event Time: 15:45 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
| Event Text 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL
"Reason for Notification: Thirteen polypaks of uranium powder were dumped into a bulk container without a documented visual inspection of the bulk container. A visual inspection is performed prior to introducing SNM into a bulk container.
"Upon recognizing that the documentation was missing, the operator confirmed that a visual inspection had been performed prior to introducing SNM, but had not been documented. The operator then re-inspected the bulk container and found no trace of moderator. The powder dumped into the container was previously documented to contain leas than 0.3 weight percent moisture.
"Double Contingency Protection: Double contingency protection for the ADU Bulk Blending System is assured by preventing moderator from entering a bulk container. Empty bulk containers are inspected for the presence of moderator prior to introducing SNM. Failure to document the inspection left less than previously documented double contingency protection for the system. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification.
"Summary of Activity: Bulk blending operations were discontinued. Training was performed for each shift prior to resuming operations.
"Conclusions: Less than previously documented double contingency protection remained. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a significant incident in accordance with governing procedures. A causal analysis will be performed." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40441 | Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID WALSH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 14:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text CONTRACT EMPLOYEE FITNESS FOR DUTY
A contract employee tested positive for illegal drugs during Pre-Access testing for unescorted access. The employee's access to the plant was denied. Contact the HOO for additional details.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40442 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GARY BRINSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF COMMUNICATION AND EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
The ENS phones in the control room were discovered inoperable at 1312 EST on 01/13/04. Control room staff then notified EP personnel of a possible problem with the ENS phone lines. EP personnel investigated and determined that the ENS phone system as well as other Federal Telecommunication System lines were not operating on site. Information Resources (IR) is investigating.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40443 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRISS THORNELL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 17:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 13:55 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2004 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text LOSS OF COMMUNICATION AND EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM
"General FTS Failure recognized by abnormal ring (long drawn out ring) coming from ENS. System operation verification performed after ring noted. At this time it was realized all lines had no dial tones and were inoperable. In addition to the ENS other FTS phones/lines inoperable noted were the MCL, HPN, PMCL, RSCL, and possibly the LAN line, ERDS 1 and 2. (ERDS, and LAN line not operability tested)."
"ENS Failure- Discovered at 12:55 CST it was inoperable and reportable per FNP-0-EIP-8.0 (non emergency report) para. 12.6.2 at 13:55 CST. Plant Commercial lines not effected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 40444 | Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PETE ORPHANOS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 01/13/2004
Notification Time: 20:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2004
Event Time: 19:21 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/14/2004 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
DANIEL HOLODY (R1)
STUART RICHARDS (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRO)
ED MCDONALD (DHS)
TED SULLIVAN (FEMA)
HUB MILLER (RA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO EXPLOSION WITHIN PROTECTED AREA BOUNDARY
Explosion occurred in a non-safety related transformer at 1908 EST 0n 01/13/04. The transformer became deenergized as a result of the explosion. Licensee declared an Unusual Event at 1921 EST on 01/13/04 due to an explosion resulting in visible damage to a non-safety related transformer in the Turbine Enclosure building. There was no fire or injured personnel, and the site did not require any off site assistance. The transformer explosion resulted in the loss of power to some 480 VAC non-safety related loads (most significant was a non-safeguard DC battery charger). The explosion has not severely impacted Unit 1 operations. The transformer has been inspected, and it appears that the explosion was internal to the transformer and due to an electrical malfunction. Security personnel conducted thorough walk downs of all areas and had no concerns.
NRC Management determined that this event did not require entry into the Monitoring Phase of Normal Mode of Incident Response at 2040 on 01/13/04.
The licensee notified the state and local emergency management agencies and notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM PETE ORPHANOS (VIA FACSIMILE) TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 0221 EST ON 1/14/04 * * *
"Notification of reduction in classification status from Unusual Event.
"Failure of non-safeguards electrical supply determined to be due to cable fault. Plant remains stable at 100% power. No additional equipment damage identified. Blocking and repair planning in progress."
The unusual event was terminated by the licensee at 2151 hrs. EST on 1/13/04.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and County authorities. A media press release will be issued in the morning. | |