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Event Notification Report for July 16, 2003






                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

                              Operations Center



                              Event Reports For

                           07/15/2003 - 07/16/2003



                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **



39854  39987  39989  39996  39997  39998  



!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39854       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: HARRIS                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:53[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/16/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:56[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN YADUSKY                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/15/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ERIC THOMAS                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ROBERT HAAG          R2      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          N       0        Hot Standby      |0        Hot Standby      |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| "On 5/16/03 with the reactor shutdown in MODE 3, an unplanned actuation of   |

| Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system occurred during testing of the 'B' Main     |

| Feed Pump (MFP).  A trip of an uncoupled MFP generated a signal to start     |

| both motor-driven AFW pumps during testing following maintenance.  The 'A'   |

| motor-driven AFW pump was already in service, so the 'B' AFW pump started on |

| receipt of the signal.  Feed to the steam generators was always available,   |

| even without the additional actuation of the AFW system.  The purpose of the |

| actuation of AFW following a trip of the main feed system is to ensure       |

| adequate flow to the steam generator.  In this case, the main feed pump was  |

| being tested and was not being used to provide flow to the steam generator.  |

| Therefore the actuation was not required to provide any safety function.     |

| The 'B' motor-driven AFW pump was secured within approximately two minutes   |

| because the additional flow was not required.  This condition is being       |

| reported as an unplanned system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR          |

| 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).                                                          |

|                                                                              |

| "10 CFR 50.72 requires an 8-hour report for, 'Any event or condition that    |

| results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph         |

| (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section except when the actuation results from and is  |

| part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'  In     |

| this case, the AFW pump start signal due to trip of the last running MFP is  |

| only applicable in MODES 1 and 2, and is not required in the current MODE of |

| plant operation (MODE 3).                                                    |

|                                                                              |

| "The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."                                   |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| * * * UPDATE ON 7/15/03 @ 1044 BY YADUSKY TO  LAURA * * *  RETRACTION        |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the reported event did  |

| not meet the definition of a valid signal. Therefore, the reporting          |

| criterion contained in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was not applicable.  Per    |

| NUREG 1022, Revision 2 (Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73),  |

| "Valid actuations are those actuations that result from `valid signals' . .  |

| . That are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters    |

| satisfying the requirements for initiation of the safety function of the     |

| system."                                                                     |

|                                                                              |

| Because the AFW actuation signal was not initiated in response to an actual  |

| loss of the last running MFP (the motor was disconnected from the pump and   |

| no MFP was in operation), the actuation was not valid; therefore, the event  |

| is not reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv). In addition, because the       |

| invalid signal was received after the safety function had already been       |

| completed (the alternate train of AFW was operating at the time of the       |

| uncoupled motor trip), the event is not reportable per 10 CFR                |

| 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)(2)(ii).                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |

|                                                                              |

| NRC notified REG 2 RDO.                                                      |

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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39987       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/10/2003|

|    UNIT:  [] [2] [3]                STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:03[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        07/09/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:00[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RON WIGGINS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/15/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  HOWIE CROUCH                 +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CHRIS MILLER         R3      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|                                                   |                          |

|2     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |

|3     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| CONTROL ROOM HVAC REFRIGERATION AND CONDENSING UNIT TRIPPED DURING           |

| SURVEILLANCE TEST                                                            |

|                                                                              |

| "At 2200 hours on July 9, 2003, the B Control Room HVAC Refrigeration and    |

| Condensing Unit (RCU) tripped and would not stay running during surveillance |

| testing.  The RCU is a single train system and therefore is reportable per   |

| SAF 1.8 and LS-AA-1400, Event Reporting Guidelines Section 3.2.7.  The RCU   |

| is required to operate during a design basis accident to remove heat from    |

| the Main Control Room.  The Air Filtration Unit (AFU) of CREVS [Control Room |

| Emergency Ventilation System] remains operable.  This places both units in a |

| 30 day LCORA [Limiting Condition for Operation Required Action] per Tech     |

| Spec 3.7.5 Required Action A.1."                                             |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                        |

|                                                                              |

| * * * Retraction  on  07/15/03 at 1924 EDT by Dennis Francis taken by        |

| MacKinnon * * *                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| "On July 9, 2003, an ENS notification was made regarding the 'B' Control     |

| Room HVAC Refrigeration and Condensing Unit Inoperability.  The (event) was  |

| reported as a condition that would have prevent the fulfillment of a safety  |

| function.  However, after a review of the actual circumstances it was        |

| determined that the system did not trip as was believed at the time of the   |

| notification.  The system was thought to have tripped because a trip         |

| indicator light for the refrigeration compressor in the main control room    |

| was illuminated.  The breaker was inspected and no adverse condition         |

| observed.  Further investigation revealed that the trip indicator was        |

| illuminated due to the local control switch being in the AUTO-AFTER-START    |

| position.  Therefore when the compressor would not cycle off due to          |

| temperature, the trip indicator would illuminate.  Even though the condition |

| does not (affect) operability, it does indicate a false trip indication.     |

| Then normal position for this switch is AUTO-AFTER-STOP.  In this position   |

| the amber trip light indicator will not illuminate when the compressor turns |

| off to low temperature in the main control room.                             |

|                                                                              |

| "The switch position of AUTO-AFTER-START did not affect the ability of the   |

| system to perform its safety function. Therefore the ENS notification (Ref.  |

| EN # 39987) is being retracted."  NRC R3DO (RIEMER) notified.                |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the        |

| licensee.                                                                    |

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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39989       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| REP ORG:  LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/10/2003|

|LICENSEE:  MONSANTO CHEMICAL PLANT              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:55[EDT]|

|    CITY:  LULING                   REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        06/29/2003|

|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  LA |EVENT TIME:             [CDT]|

|LICENSE#:  LA-2216-L01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/11/2003|

|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+

|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|                                                |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |

|                                                |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |

+------------------------------------------------+TIM MCGINTY          IRO     |

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE HENRY                   |                             |

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BILL GOTT                    |                             |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE                                                       |

|                                                                              |

| Mike Henry from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality reported   |

| the potential personnel over-exposure due to a loss of control of a 1 Curie  |

| Cesium-137 source that came out of a damaged Berthold level gauge (Model #   |

| LB7442).  The event occurred at the Monsanto Chemical Plant in Luling, LA.   |

| The gauge was damaged on 06/29/03 causing the source to come out of its      |

| shield.  The source was then carried to a planner's desk where it remained   |

| until discovery on 07/10/03.  The owner of the desk spent approximately 50   |

| to 60 hours in the proximity of his desk during this time.  When the source  |

| was discovered, the building was evacuated and secured.  Medical personnel   |

| at Monsanto have contacted the Radiological Emergency Assistance Center, Oak |

| Ridge, TN.  Preliminarily, the licensee estimates that the planner may have  |

| received a whole body dose of 25 Rem and the person that carried the source  |

| may have received 1800 Rem to the hand.  Others may have also been exposed.  |

| No one has shown signs of sickness or erythema (redness of the skin).  A     |

| Berthold representative is scheduled to arrive on 07/11/03 to secure the     |

| source.  Mr. Henry will be traveling to the site to obtain additional        |

| information.  The State is not requesting NRC assistance at this time.       |

|                                                                              |

| A Commissioners' Assistants brief was held at 1900 EDT 07/10/03.             |

|                                                                              |

| * * * * UPDATE FROM MIKE HENRY TO NRC CONFERENCE CALL 1620 EDT ON 07/11/03   |

| * * * *                                                                      |

|                                                                              |

| Mr. Henry provided the following information based on his visit to the       |

| Monsanto plant this morning, 07/11/03.  A manufacturer's representative for  |

| Berthold arrived at the plant and retrieved the source around 0300 CDT       |

| 07/11/03.  Currently the source is in a shielded pig at the plant site.      |

|                                                                              |

| Blood tests were performed for seven individuals which were favorable with   |

| no cell changes noted.  These blood tests will be repeated periodically.  It |

| was determined that the planner who returned after days off to occupy the    |

| desk where the source had been previously left received 39.1 Rem over the    |

| calculated 44.7 hours that he occupied the desk during the 10-day period     |

| involved.  This determination was based on an analysis of his schedule and   |

| work habits and on the emissivity of the source.  Further dose calculations  |

| will be made.  The Monsanto company physician is in contact with REAC        |

| (Radiological Emergency Assistance Center) in Oak Ridge, TN and has          |

| requested their assistance in having a cytogenetic blood study performed for |

| the planner.                                                                 |

|                                                                              |

| Preliminarily, it appears that vibration of the centrifuge unit upon which   |

| the gauge was mounted may have caused a failure which allowed the source     |

| holder with attached source to fall from the gauge.  Surveys of the relevant |

| areas and smears taken on the source indicate that no source leakage         |

| occurred.                                                                    |

|                                                                              |

| Notified R4DO (K. Kennedy), NMSS EO (S. Frant)                               |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39996       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/15/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:29[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        07/15/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:40[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK ROBBINS                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/15/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |KENNETH RIEMER       R3      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP                                                       |

|                                                                              |

| "On 07/15/03 at 1340hrs [CDT], the Unit 1 reactor automatically tripped from |

| 100% power upon loss of G-06 rod drive motor-generator (MG) set.  Automatic  |

| transfer of the G-06 MG set to G-07 MG set did not occur.  Automatic         |

| initiation of the auxiliary feedwater occurred.  The cause of the failure of |

| the G-06 rod drive MG set is being investigated.  All systems operated as    |

| expected."                                                                   |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| G-06 rod drive MG set was carrying the load and running in parallel with rod |

| drive MG set G-07 when it started to smoke.  Rod drive MG set G-06 did not   |

| automatically transfer its load to rod drive MG set G-07.  No fire was seen  |

| and rod drive MG set G-06 was electrically secured.  All rods fully inserted |

| into the core. The first out annunciator for the reactor trip was            |

| overtemperature delta temperature trip.  The Turbine Driven and both Motor   |

| Driven Auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as expected.          |

| Currently the licensee is using one train of main feedwater to maintain      |

| proper steam generator water level.  All emergency core cooling systems and  |

| the emergency diesel generators are fully operable if needed.  The           |

| electrical grid is stable.                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39997       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/15/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:35[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        07/15/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:15[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL SCHAEFER             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/15/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |LINDA SMITH          R4      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |

|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| 22 OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS INOPERABLE                                       |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| "South Texas Project is making this eight hour notification IAW 50.72 (b)    |

| (3) (xiii) for "Loss of Offsite Response Capability".  Currently due to      |

| local power outages 10 sirens are available and 22 sirens are not available. |

| Compensatory actions are in place to alert the public if necessary.  There   |

| are three compensatory actions: local law enforcement officials are prepared |

| to respond to areas where the sirens are not available to alert the public,  |

| a community alert network is in place to activate a phone tree to local      |

| residents and tone alert radios with residents.  Power restoration and       |

| recovery actions are in progress."   State and local officials will be       |

| notified of this event by the licensee.                                      |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was  notified of this event by the licensee.      |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   39998       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/15/2003|

|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EDT]|

| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        07/15/2003|

|           COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL                  |EVENT TIME:        16:00[EDT]|

|                                                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/15/2003|

|    CITY:  COLUMBIA                 REGION:  2  +-----------------------------+

|  COUNTY:  RICHLAND                  STATE:  SC |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|LICENSE#:  SNM-1107              AGREEMENT:  Y  |JOHN PELCHAT         R2      |

|  DOCKET:  07001151                             |ROBERT PIERSON       NMSS    |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID WILLIAMS               |                             |

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| TEMPORARY PROCEDURE TO COMPACT AIR FILTER PAPER NCS FUNCTION WAS NOT         |

| REVIEWED OR APPROVED                                                         |

|                                                                              |

| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                      |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| "Time and Date of Event                                                      |

| 23 Jan 2003 - 19 Mar 2003                                                    |

|                                                                              |

| "Reason for Notification                                                     |

|                                                                              |

| "On January 23rd 2003, the process engineer generated a temporary procedure  |

| to compact air filter paper, and did not place the NCS function on review or |

| approval.  The temporary procedure was approved and the process was          |

| performed, in violation of the bounding assumptions of the LLRW ISA (compact |

| filter paper was the end product).  The process engineer later placed the    |

| same process in a formal operating procedure that was reviewed by NCS.  On   |

| February 20th, the NCS  reviewer withheld approval of the formal operating   |

| procedure since the "proposed" process would violate the bounding            |

| assumptions of the ISA and, therefore, require further analysis and an ISA   |

| license annex revision before approval could be given.  The NCS engineer     |

| informed the process engineer that such analysis was necessary and it was    |

| placed in the NCS work queue.  The process engineer did not inform the NCS   |

| engineer that the process had already been performed.  When starting the     |

| safety analysis on June 30th 2003, the NCS engineer found records of         |

| completed filter paper and subsequent investigation revealed the temporary   |

| procedure on July 1, 2003.  The temporary procedure had been retired on      |

| March 19th, although drums of compacted filter media continued to be created |

| in the item control system into at least April 2003.                         |

|                                                                              |

| "Double Contingency Protection                                               |

|                                                                              |

| "The compaction unit is authorized to be used for volume reduction of        |

| noncombustible material that was previously determined to be free of gross   |

| contamination in the originating area, and verified to be free of gross      |

| contamination by the URRS operator before being placed into the compactor.   |

| A criticality would be possible only if an excessive accumulation of uranium |

| occurred with sufficient moderating materials.                               |

|                                                                              |

| "The compactor system was operated outside there documented safety basis     |

| stated in the ISA. A 24- hour notification, therefore, is being issued.      |

|                                                                              |

| "As Found Condition                                                          |

|                                                                              |

| "Drums contained a range of grams U-235 values from near zero to             |

| approximately 50 grams U-235. These low gram U-235 values reflect the low    |

| Uranium loading in the filter media.  The filter paper media is removed from |

| the filters and "tapped" to remove "loose" material, but is not considered   |

| to be "free of gross contamination" due to ability to retain imbedded        |

| material.                                                                    |

|                                                                              |

| "Summary of Activity                                                         |

|                                                                              |

| "1. The process had already been stopped when discovered.                    |

| "2. The content of each drum was reviewed and found to contain less than 50g |

| U-235.                                                                       |

| "3. Selected drums were opened and visually inspected.  All were in a safe   |

| condition.                                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| "Conclusions                                                                 |

|                                                                              |

| "1. Much less than a safe mass was involved.                                 |

| "2. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the     |

| public in jeopardy.                                                          |

| "No exposure to hazardous material was involved.                             |

| "3. The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety     |

| significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.                |

| "4. Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis.   |

| "5. A causal analysis will be performed."                                    |

|                                                                              |

|                                                                              |

| The certificate holder informed NRC Region 2 (M. Crespo) of this event.      |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+