Event Notification Report for September 30, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/29/2002 - 09/30/2002
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39346
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: San Diego State: CA
County:
License #: CA 2290-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Licensee: SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
Region: 4
City: San Diego State: CA
County:
License #: CA 2290-37
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGER
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG
Notification Date: 11/06/2002
Notification Time: 00:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2002
Notification Time: 00:25 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
DON COOL (NMSS)
CHARLES MARSCHALL (R4)
DON COOL (NMSS)
TWO SEALED CESIUM SOURCES INADVERTENTLY SHIPPED WITH VEHICLES
" SAIC [Science Applications International Corp.] sold two Mobile VACIS trucks to the Department of the Army-SECOM. The Mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) is a truck-mounted gamma-ray imaging system designed to non-intrusively inspect the contents of trucks, containers, cargo and passenger vehicles for explosive devices and/or contraband.
"Each Mobile VACIS truck contains one 1.6 Ci Cs-137 sealed source. The trucks were to be shipped first, then the Cs-137 sealed sources were to be shipped later. However on September 30, 2002, the trucks were shipped with the sealed sources inside by mistake without the proper DOT paperwork and marking/labeling. This mistake was not discovered until November 5, 2002, when SAIC prepared to ship the sources. They then discovered that the sources were inside the trucks that had been shipped previously. The trucks were shipped first to Houston by ground and then overseas by ocean carrier. The two shipping companies involved are US Freight and Saudi Arabia Shipping. SAIC has faxed all DOT shipping information to the carrier. The shipment is not due to arrive in port until November 15, 2002. The company plans to have a representative meet the shipment when it arrives at port.
"According to SAIC, the sources are in type A containers that are locked. SAIC has the key in their possession- without this key the sources cannot be removed. The highest reading on the truck found during the package survey prior to shipment was 50 microR/hour."
The State of California has notified NRC Region 4 (Linda McLean) of this event.
" SAIC [Science Applications International Corp.] sold two Mobile VACIS trucks to the Department of the Army-SECOM. The Mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS) is a truck-mounted gamma-ray imaging system designed to non-intrusively inspect the contents of trucks, containers, cargo and passenger vehicles for explosive devices and/or contraband.
"Each Mobile VACIS truck contains one 1.6 Ci Cs-137 sealed source. The trucks were to be shipped first, then the Cs-137 sealed sources were to be shipped later. However on September 30, 2002, the trucks were shipped with the sealed sources inside by mistake without the proper DOT paperwork and marking/labeling. This mistake was not discovered until November 5, 2002, when SAIC prepared to ship the sources. They then discovered that the sources were inside the trucks that had been shipped previously. The trucks were shipped first to Houston by ground and then overseas by ocean carrier. The two shipping companies involved are US Freight and Saudi Arabia Shipping. SAIC has faxed all DOT shipping information to the carrier. The shipment is not due to arrive in port until November 15, 2002. The company plans to have a representative meet the shipment when it arrives at port.
"According to SAIC, the sources are in type A containers that are locked. SAIC has the key in their possession- without this key the sources cannot be removed. The highest reading on the truck found during the package survey prior to shipment was 50 microR/hour."
The State of California has notified NRC Region 4 (Linda McLean) of this event.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 39232
Rep Org: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Licensee: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 4
City: SAN JOSE State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON S. POST (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Licensee: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
Region: 4
City: SAN JOSE State: CA
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JASON S. POST (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 09/30/2002
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2002
Notification Time: 17:06 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2002
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JAY HENSON (R2)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
VERN HODGE (NRR)
JAY HENSON (R2)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
PART 21.21 REPORT REGARDING MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE OUT OF SERVICE
"This letter provides final notification of a Reportable Condition under 10CFR 21.21(d), as committed in the Reference letter. It was previously submitted as a Reportable Condition for Brunswick Units 1 & 2 and as a 60 Day Interim Report per §21.21 (a)(2) for other plants that may be determined to be affected.
"The evaluation has been completed and it has been determined that in addition to Brunswick 1 & 2, this is a Reportable Condition for Duane Arnold, FitzPatrick, Hatch 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Perry 1 and Pilgrim. The basis for this conclusion is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) analyses for these plants to justify operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one Main Steam line Isolation Valve (MSIV) Out of Service (OOS) (i.e., one steam line isolated) did not adequately address the long term impact of increased flow induced vibration on the remaining open MSIVs. Without a supporting bases, it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would be able to perform their required safety function following extended operation at greater than 75% of current rated power with one steam line isolated. This could possibly result in offsite doses in excess of 10CFR 100.11 limits.
"The actual impact of this condition would only be of concern if MSIV operability had not been demonstrated following extended plant operation at greater than 75% of current rated power with one MSIV OOS, or if a plant was currently in extended operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one MSIV OOS.
"All other plants which have an MSIV OOS analysis provided by GE were either limited to 75% of rated power, or the impact of long term operation on the open MSIVs was adequately evaluated for the power level specified in the analysis.
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"The Main Steam Line Valve Out-of-Service analysis for:
Utility Plant Name
Carolina Power & Light Brunswick 1 and 2
Nuclear Management Co. Duane Arnold
Entergy Nuclear Northeast FitzPatrick, Pilgrim
Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 2
Constellation Nuclear Nine Mile Point 2
First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. Perry 1
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"GE Nuclear Energy, San Jose, California
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:
"The MSIV OOS analysis performed by GE evaluated plant operation at greater than 75% of rated power with three active steam lines and one steam line isolated. The GE analysis for the affected plants did not address the effect of potential long-term flow induced vibration degradation on the open MSIVs, including the effect on the MSIV air operated controls. Without adequate justification, it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would close following extended operation with one MSIV OOS at greater than 75% of current rated power.
"If it is postulated that the plant operated for an extended period in the MSIV OOS condition and then a main steam line break were to occur in one of the three operational steam lines, then there is the potential that MSIVs would not close to terminate the release from a steam line break either from a common mode failure of both MSIVs, in the broken line, or failure of one MSIV due to the high flow induced vibration and the other MSIV as the design basis single failure. This condition would result in an un-terminated release, which would exceed the existing 10 CFR 100 radiation release limits.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
"June 24, 2002
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or failure to comply, the number and locations of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:
"A defect has been confirmed to exist in analysis provided by GE for Brunswick 1 and 2, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Hatch 2, Nine Mile Point 2, and Perry 1.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the, individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action (note, these are actions specifically associated with the identified Reportable Condition):
"GE has communicated to the affected plants the 75% power limitation when operating with one MSIV OOS.
"GE has revised existing internal engineering and program processes to explicitly screen any limiting configurations/conditions for current and future MSIV OOS evaluations.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:
"GE recommends limiting operation to 75% of current rated power when operating with one MSIV OOS, unless there is an adequate justification to support extended operation at a higher power level."
"This letter provides final notification of a Reportable Condition under 10CFR 21.21(d), as committed in the Reference letter. It was previously submitted as a Reportable Condition for Brunswick Units 1 & 2 and as a 60 Day Interim Report per §21.21 (a)(2) for other plants that may be determined to be affected.
"The evaluation has been completed and it has been determined that in addition to Brunswick 1 & 2, this is a Reportable Condition for Duane Arnold, FitzPatrick, Hatch 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Perry 1 and Pilgrim. The basis for this conclusion is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) analyses for these plants to justify operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one Main Steam line Isolation Valve (MSIV) Out of Service (OOS) (i.e., one steam line isolated) did not adequately address the long term impact of increased flow induced vibration on the remaining open MSIVs. Without a supporting bases, it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would be able to perform their required safety function following extended operation at greater than 75% of current rated power with one steam line isolated. This could possibly result in offsite doses in excess of 10CFR 100.11 limits.
"The actual impact of this condition would only be of concern if MSIV operability had not been demonstrated following extended plant operation at greater than 75% of current rated power with one MSIV OOS, or if a plant was currently in extended operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one MSIV OOS.
"All other plants which have an MSIV OOS analysis provided by GE were either limited to 75% of rated power, or the impact of long term operation on the open MSIVs was adequately evaluated for the power level specified in the analysis.
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"The Main Steam Line Valve Out-of-Service analysis for:
Utility Plant Name
Carolina Power & Light Brunswick 1 and 2
Nuclear Management Co. Duane Arnold
Entergy Nuclear Northeast FitzPatrick, Pilgrim
Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 2
Constellation Nuclear Nine Mile Point 2
First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. Perry 1
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:
"GE Nuclear Energy, San Jose, California
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:
"The MSIV OOS analysis performed by GE evaluated plant operation at greater than 75% of rated power with three active steam lines and one steam line isolated. The GE analysis for the affected plants did not address the effect of potential long-term flow induced vibration degradation on the open MSIVs, including the effect on the MSIV air operated controls. Without adequate justification, it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would close following extended operation with one MSIV OOS at greater than 75% of current rated power.
"If it is postulated that the plant operated for an extended period in the MSIV OOS condition and then a main steam line break were to occur in one of the three operational steam lines, then there is the potential that MSIVs would not close to terminate the release from a steam line break either from a common mode failure of both MSIVs, in the broken line, or failure of one MSIV due to the high flow induced vibration and the other MSIV as the design basis single failure. This condition would result in an un-terminated release, which would exceed the existing 10 CFR 100 radiation release limits.
"(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:
"June 24, 2002
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or failure to comply, the number and locations of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:
"A defect has been confirmed to exist in analysis provided by GE for Brunswick 1 and 2, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Hatch 2, Nine Mile Point 2, and Perry 1.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the, individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action (note, these are actions specifically associated with the identified Reportable Condition):
"GE has communicated to the affected plants the 75% power limitation when operating with one MSIV OOS.
"GE has revised existing internal engineering and program processes to explicitly screen any limiting configurations/conditions for current and future MSIV OOS evaluations.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:
"GE recommends limiting operation to 75% of current rated power when operating with one MSIV OOS, unless there is an adequate justification to support extended operation at a higher power level."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 39233
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BOESCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ROBERT BOESCH
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE NORRIS
Notification Date: 09/30/2002
Notification Time: 23:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2002
Event Time: 22:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2002
Notification Time: 23:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/30/2002
Event Time: 22:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/30/2002
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
GLENN MEYER (R1)
GLENN MEYER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 70 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON MAIN TURBINE TRIP DUE TO LOW CONDENSER VACUUM
"Susquehanna Unit 2 experienced a automatic reactor SCRAM on a Main Turbine trip due to low condenser vacuum. The unit experienced a momentary loss of 2D130 (120 V AC power). The loss caused the offgas system to isolate, a runback on the A Reactor Recirc Pump and a scoop tube lock on the B reactor Recirc Pump. Efforts to re-establish the offgas system were unsuccessful. Following the SCRAM, reactor water level dropped to approx. -0.2", and was recovered by the Feedwater System. The offgas system and Condenser vacuum were restored shortly after the SCRAM to maintain the condenser available for heat removal. There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to containment.
"This event is an Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation when the reactor is critical, and is reportable as a four hour ENS Notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"Susquehanna Unit 2 experienced a automatic reactor SCRAM on a Main Turbine trip due to low condenser vacuum. The unit experienced a momentary loss of 2D130 (120 V AC power). The loss caused the offgas system to isolate, a runback on the A Reactor Recirc Pump and a scoop tube lock on the B reactor Recirc Pump. Efforts to re-establish the offgas system were unsuccessful. Following the SCRAM, reactor water level dropped to approx. -0.2", and was recovered by the Feedwater System. The offgas system and Condenser vacuum were restored shortly after the SCRAM to maintain the condenser available for heat removal. There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to containment.
"This event is an Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation when the reactor is critical, and is reportable as a four hour ENS Notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)."
The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.