Event Notification Report for September 19, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/18/2002 - 09/19/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39152 39196 39197 39198 39199 39200
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39152 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/25/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:45[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/24/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PETE SENA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GAS VOIDING IN ECCS PIPING |
| |
| "At 0425 hrs on 8/24/2002, a gas void was identified in Emergency Core |
| Cooling System (ECCS) piping at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. |
| 2 that exceeded the gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet. A gas void |
| which exceeds .872 cubic feet could potentially disable a single High Head |
| Safety Injection (HHSI) pump if ingested. The gas void was located in the |
| 'B' train piping which would be used (only) following the |
| transfer-to-recirculation phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). |
| Technical Specification Action 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.d was entered for 'B' ECCS |
| train not being operable. The piping where the void was located leads to a |
| common HHSI pump suction header which connects to both trains' HHSI pumps. |
| |
| "At 1345 hrs on 8/24/2002, an isolation valve (2SIS-MOV863B) was |
| de-energized closed. De-energizing this isolation valve prevents the gas |
| void traveling to the common HHSI suction header during |
| transfer-to-recirculation flow. This was done as a general precaution to |
| strengthen the operable 'A' HHSI train during the ongoing gas void |
| generation investigation since this gas void generation process was not yet |
| fully understood. |
| |
| "At 1638 hrs on 8/24/2002 it was calculated that the actual gas void volume |
| in the 'B' train piping was 1.3 cubic feet. It was also identified that the |
| previously established gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet was |
| incorrect and the applicable gas void volume limit was .319 cubic feet. With |
| an evaluation of the new gas void limit, it was concluded at 2000 hrs that |
| BVPS Unit No. 2 had been vulnerable to a degradation of both trains' HHSI |
| pumps between 0425 and 1345. This would be possible since the gas void could |
| potentially have split in half (0.65 cubic feet) and migrated during |
| post-LOCA transfer-to-recirculation flow through the common HHSI suction |
| header. Each half-sized void could enter each train's HHSI pump, potentially |
| affecting both trains of HHSI pumps (.65 cubic feet would exceed the limit |
| of .319 cubic feet for each pump). This is reportable pursuant to |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as being in an unanalyzed condition that |
| significantly degraded plant safety. This is also reportable pursuant to |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could |
| have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to |
| mitigate consequences of an accident. |
| |
| "Currently with 2SIS-M0V863B de-energized closed, the gas void can not |
| travel to the 'A' train HHSI pump. Actions are being initiated to eliminate |
| this gas void. BVPS Unit No. 2 remains in Tech Specification Action 3.5.2.a |
| and 3.5.2.d for one ECCS subsystem inoperable. The investigation of the gas |
| void generation process is continuing." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| ***RETRACTION KEN TIEFENTHAL TO MIKE NORRIS 9/18/02 1743 EDT*** |
| |
| "Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 retracts the notification |
| made on 08/25/2002 at 00:45 hrs regarding the event reported under 10 CFR |
| 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) [ENS #39152]. |
| |
| "Subsequent analysis of the event identified that the gas void previously |
| located in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at BVPS Unit No. |
| 2 would not have rendered either train's High Head Safety Injection (HHSI) |
| pump incapable of performing its intended safety function. A detailed |
| evaluation of the void size and the exact piping arrangement concluded that |
| for an analyzed void size of 3 cu. ft. (which bounds the as-found void), the |
| void fraction reaching the HHSI pump would have been 5% or less. At this |
| level of void fraction, a HHSI pump at BVPS Unit No. 2 would have continued |
| to operate and pass flow through the discharge lines to the RCS during the |
| short duration when the void was present. The small temporary degradation in |
| flow would also not have adversely affected any transient in progress. |
| Therefore, the HHSI pumps would have been able to pass the void and continue |
| to perform its safety function if the ECCS had been called upon to operate. |
| |
| "Given that both trains of HHSI were able to perform their safety functions, |
| this void was not a condition that significantly degraded plant safety and |
| did not prevent the ECCS system from being able to fulfill its safety |
| function." |
| |
| The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, notified R1DO |
| (Kinneman). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 39196 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ANDERSON ENGINEERING |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
|LICENSEE: ANDERSON ENGINEERING |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:12[EDT]|
| CITY: Joplin REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 09/18/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: MO |EVENT TIME: 07:30[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 24-20063-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MARK RING R3 |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SIEGFRIED TARNOWIECKYI | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BLO1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CPN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM THE BACK OF A PICKUP TRICK. |
| |
| At 0730 CT 09/18/02 an employee of Anderson Engineering found that a CPN |
| moisture density gauge which had been chained to the back of his 1992, |
| open-bed, Ford Pickup truck was missing. The gauge was in its case at the |
| time that it was stolen. The last time he saw the CPN gauge was at 1500 |
| hours CT on 09/17/02 when he parked his pickup truck in the back of his |
| house. He discovered that the CPN gauge had been stolen when he got up this |
| morning and went to his truck to go to work. The caller stated that it is |
| company policy that the gauge be dropped off and stored at the main office |
| before the worker goes home. |
| |
| The Model number of the stolen CPN moisture density gauge is MC-1-DR and the |
| serial number of the gauge is MD01205992. The gauge contains 10 millicuries |
| of Cesium-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241/Be. |
| |
| The licensee will notify the Joplin, MO Police Department and informed them |
| that one of their CPN moisture density gauges has been stolen. The |
| licensee notified NRC Region 3 (Cassandra Frazier) of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39197 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:34[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 07/21/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL FORD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |VERN HODGE NRR |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NOTIFICATION UNDER 10 CFR PART 21 FOR LEAKING FUEL PUMP ON FAIRBANKS MORSE |
| EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE |
| |
| The following are the contents of a facsimile: |
| |
| "This initial notification addresses the reporting requirements of 10 CFR |
| 21.21(d)(3)(i) and provides preliminary information applicable to 10 CFR |
| 21.21 (d)(4). |
| |
| 1. Name and address of the individual informing the Commission. |
| |
| G.M. Dugger |
| Vice President Operations |
| Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. |
| Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station |
| 600 Rocky Hill Road |
| Plymouth, MA 02360 |
| |
| 2. Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component |
| supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which |
| fails to comply or contains a defect. |
| |
| Facility Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station |
| |
| Component Fuel Injector Pump for ALCo (Fairbanks Morse), |
| model 251 F, Emergency Diesel Generator, Part Number 23200127, Serial Number |
| 9611071 |
| |
| 3. Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the |
| basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. |
| |
| Supplier Coltec Industries |
| Fairbanks Morse Engine Division |
| 701 White Avenue |
| Beloit, WI 53511-5492 |
| |
| 4. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard, which is |
| created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. |
| |
| The fuel injector pump was found to be leaking excessively through a |
| nameplate rivet hole that had been drilled through-wall in the pump body. |
| The drilled hole allowed fuel to leak through the pump body. |
| |
| This fuel injector pump was being installed on a safety-related emergency |
| diesel generator. It was through visual observation of the pump during the |
| post work test that the fuel leak through the nameplate rivet hole was |
| detected. If the leak had not been identified during the post work test, the |
| leak could have gone unnoticed during subsequent emergency diesel generator |
| operation. The failure of the fuel injector pump could have adversely |
| impacted emergency diesel generator operation and prevented the emergency |
| diesel generator from being able the supply all of the necessary accident |
| loads. |
| |
| 5. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was |
| obtained. |
| |
| The defect was discovered during post work testing on July 19, 2002 while |
| the emergency diesel generator was tagged out of service for the overhaul |
| that installed the subject fuel injector pump. A determination that the |
| defect could create a substantial safety hazard was completed on September |
| 12, 2002. |
| |
| In accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 (a)(3) and Pilgrim Station procedure, the |
| Pilgrim Site Vice President was notified of the conclusion. The notification |
| was made on September 17, 2002. |
| |
| 6. In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to |
| comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied |
| for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to |
| the regulations of this part. |
| |
| At Pilgrim Station, there are two emergency diesel generators and one |
| Station Blackout Diesel Generator (SBODG). There are 18 fuel injector pumps |
| installed on each emergency diesel generator and 12 fuel injector pumps on |
| the SBODG. Except for the defective fuel injector pump that was installed |
| while the emergency diesel generator was tagged out service for overhaul, |
| none of the fuel injector pumps installed on either emergency diesel |
| generator or the SBODG have exhibited a similar leak (through-wall rivet |
| hole leak in the pump body). |
| |
| 7. The corrective action, which has been taken, is being, or will be taken; |
| the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and |
| the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. |
| |
| The fuel injector pump that contained the through-wall rivet hole in the |
| pump body was removed from the emergency diesel generator and was replaced |
| with a spare fuel pump. The spare fuel pump was visually inspected for leak |
| tightness when the emergency diesel generator was post work tested after the |
| defective pump was replaced. The emergency diesel generator post work |
| testing was completed With satisfactory results and returned to operable |
| status on July 21, 2002. |
| |
| The defective pump was not retained. |
| |
| There are currently no (zero) fuel injector pumps located in the Pilgrim |
| Station warehouse. |
| |
| 8. Any device related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, |
| activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to |
| purchasers or licensees. |
| |
| Pilgrim Station discussed the condition of the defective pump on September |
| 16, 2002, with the pump supplier. The supplier acknowledges modifying the |
| mounting of the nameplate label to the pump prior to supply. Pilgrim Station |
| has not supplied any spare fuel injector pumps to a purchaser or other |
| licensee." |
| |
| |
| The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39198 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:19[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/18/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:28[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDREW OHRABLO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| "This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(V). |
| |
| "On September 18, 2002 at 14:28 HPCI declared INOPERABLE due to placing the |
| Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump [control switch] To Pull-to-lock. This prevents the |
| HPCI Turbine from automatically starting. The Auxiliary Lube Oil pump |
| [control switch] was taken to pull-to-lock in accordance with station |
| operating procedures due to receiving a HPCI Gland Steam Exhauster Condenser |
| Hotwell high level alarm that did not clear due to failure of the Gland Seal |
| Condenser Condensate pump to automatically start. |
| |
| "NRC Senior Resident has been informed of the HPCI inoperability." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39199 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/17/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:52[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAN MARKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/17/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 98 Power Operation |98 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 99.6 Power Operation |99.6 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HEAT BALANCE CALCULATION ERROR ON REACTOR POWER |
| |
| "The following event description is based on information currently |
| available. It through subsequent reviews of this event, additional |
| information is identified that Is pertinent to this event or alters the |
| information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be |
| made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. |
| |
| "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 are evaluating the |
| potential that the Maximum Power Level of 3876 megawatts thermal (100% |
| power), specified in Operating License Condition 2.C(1) may have been |
| exceeded in the past due to an unconservative value of reactor coolant pump |
| (RCP) heat in the secondary calorimetric calculation since initial plant |
| operation. The value of total energy input due to RCP operation used in the |
| calorimetric is 29.53 megawatts (MW) in Unit 1, 29.61 MW in Unit 2 and |
| 31.88 MW In Unit 3. Conservative engineering calculation of actual RCP heat |
| input based on electrical load is as low as 24.72 MW. Similarly, |
| conservative engineering calculation of actual RCP heat input based on fluid |
| power (pump differential pressure) is as low as 22.86 MW. Thus, the |
| calorimetric error may be as large as (31.88-22.86) 9.02 MW or approximately |
| 0.23%. |
| |
| "The error could have resulted in core power levels above the Operating |
| License limit of 3876 MW thermal. Due to current operating limitations on |
| reactor coolant system hot leg temperature, none of the Palo Verde units are |
| presently exceeding the licensed power limit. Unit 1 is at approximately 99% |
| power (3837 MW thermal, 39 MW margin). Unit 2 is at approximately 98% power |
| (3798 MW thermal, 78 MW margin). Unit 3 is at approximately 99.6% power |
| (3861 MW thermal, 15 MW margin) |
| |
| "This report is being made because a review of historical operating data may |
| reveal that the Maximum Power Level was exceeded. |
| |
| "The Palo Verde safety analyses bound a power level of 102%, thus the Units |
| remain within the safety analyses. As a compensatory measure, the station |
| has established an administrative limit of 99.75% power pending resolution |
| of this issue. |
| |
| "No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no |
| structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of |
| discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that |
| rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components |
| with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result in the |
| release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the |
| safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39200 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: RIVER BEND REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/19/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:41[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 09/18/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:25[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DON CHASE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/19/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO AUTOMATIC REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION |
| |
| "A reactor scram occurred at River Bend Station @ 2025 on 09/18/02. The |
| plant was operating at 100% reactor power at the time of the scram. The |
| plant systems performed as required post scram. Reactor pressure and water |
| level are stable with reactor level being controlled by the reactor core |
| isolation cooling system. This event is being reported pursuant to l0 CFR |
| 50.72 (b)(2)(LV) B (1) a reactor protection system (RPS) scram while |
| critical (a 4 hour report) and a manual actuation of the reactor core |
| isolation cooling system (RCIC) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(IV) B (5). |
| The cause of the scram is still under investigation." |
| |
| The licensee reported that all control rods fully inserted during the scram |
| and that there was no indication of SRV actuation during the event. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021