Event Notification Report for August 06, 2002

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON STOLEN GAUGE

"Gauge operator went to dinner around 20:30 on 08-06-02 and confirmed seeing the CPN model MC-3 gauge locked in its case and chained and locked to the bed of his truck parked outside his hotel room. At 21:30 the operator returned to the truck to get some cigarettes and discovered that the gauge had been stolen. The chain had been cut with bolt cutters and the lock was still intact. The operator stated that the case the gauge was contained in also was locked. He immediately contacted the RSO, emergency management and the local police."

The licensee also reported the gauge was a moisture density gauge, CPN Model MC-3 and contained 11 millicuries of CS-137 and 50 millicuries of AM-241. The theft occurred in the parking lot of the Super 8 Motel located at 200 Mercantile Drive, Winston-Salem, NC 27105. NC Incident Number: 02-28.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIRE IN DUST COLLECTION SYSTEM

"A fire occurred at approximately 5:30 am on 8/6/02 in the Torit Dust Collection System. The fire burned in this system for approximately 5 minutes until extinguished by the temperature activated fire suppression system. This dust collection system filters air from a number of processing system rooms, including the Wastewater Evaporator Room. It consists of a series of 24 cartridges in an enclosed filtration system. The fire was confined to this system.

"There was no additional exposure to plant personnel. It is not expected that any releases occurred that exceeded regulatory limits. The isotope of concern is depleted uranium in aerosol particulate sized form. Air samples taken in the Wastewater Evaporator Room during the event resulted in an air concentration of approximately 1E-14 microcuries/cubic centimeter of depleted uranium in aerosol form (micron sized particles).

"The Wastewater Evaporator System and dust collection system are shut down until the damage from the fire can be evaluated and repaired. The filters in the dust collection system will be extracted and counted for radioactivity as soon as the extent of damage is evaluated and the systems can be opened. The sample filters in the affected stack have been extracted and counted. Preliminary counting of the stack filters demonstrate that a release had not occurred. Final results from filtration counting will not be available for approximately 48 hours to allow for the decay of radon."

LICENSEE DISCOVERED A POST-FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTION THAT MAY NOT BE MET

"On August 6, 2002, conditions were discovered where a postulated fire could cause the pressurizer to blow down to the pressurizer relief tank (PRT). Wolf Creek is in Mode 1, at 100% power.

"During reviews associated with post-fire safe shutdown reanalysis work, Wolf Creek personnel discovered that power and control cables for a pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) and its associated motor operated block valve are routed in electrical raceways with no horizontal separation. The two valves are in the same electrical separation group but are redundant in their post-fire safe shutdown function to prevent reactor coolant system (RCS) blowdown to the PRT. Further investigation determined that the power and control cables in the opposite separation group have the same configuration. This does not meet our commitments to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.lll.G as reflected in our approved Fire Protection Plan.

"During a fire in the plant, it is the function of PORV valves and block valves to provide a barrier to blowing down the RCS into the PRT. A fire in any of the affected fire areas in which the circuits are routed has the potential to damage cables in a manner that cause a the PORV to spuriously open (due to a hot short), and to damage cables in a manner that causes the block valve to not respond to a close signal (due to an open circuit or a hot short). This would cause a non-isolable RCS blowdown to the PRT.

"Based on the guidance provided in NUREG 1022 Revision 2, this situation meets the criterion of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an 8-hour ENS notification, as it relates to being in an unanalyzed condition.

"The licensee has implemented a 1-hour fire watch and is developing compensatory measures.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

* * * RETRACTED AT 1544 EDT ON 10/3/02 BY STEVEN HENRY TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"Wolf Creek has reevaluated the routing of the cables for the PORV and its associated block valve using the guidance contained in Generic Letter 86-10 and in NUREG 1022 Revision 2, and has determined that this condition is not reportable. The reevaluation shows that the reactor core will never be uncovered even if the PORV were to remain open and that a diverse means is available via the deenergization of a dc bus to close the PORV in the event of a fire. A fire initiated spurious opening of the PORV will not result in a condition that significantly degrades plant safety. This is based on the plant design, low probability of occurrence and actions to mitigate this event. Therefore, per NUREG 1022, this condition is not an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and is not required to be reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Kriss Kennedy).

TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE DAMAGED

During a paving job at the intersection of Route 95 and Route 7 in Fairfield, CT, a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge, Model # 3411B, Serial #16237, was run over by an asphalt roller. The gauge contains 8 millicuries of cesium 137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241/Be. The damaged Troxler Gauge was removed from the asphalt and placed in a secure container. The area was isolated and surveyed for contamination. No contamination was identified. The licensee notified the Connecticut Department of Transportation and NRC Region 1 of the event.

MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION DUE TO EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS

A patient receiving brachytherapy treatment received partial treatment due to a fault error message for the guidance intervascular brachytherapy system. This resulted in the wire being withdrawn too soon and the patient only receiving 76 centigrays when the prescribed treatment was 2000 centigrays. The patient and physician were notified and the patient was retreated. NRC Region I was notified by the licensee on 8/6/02 by voice mail.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO BOTH RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER SUBSYSTEMS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.


"Initiated plant shutdown in accordance with Tech Spec 3.7.1, Required Action E.1 due to required actions and associated completion times not meet (met) for both Residual Heat Removal Service Water subsystems being inoperable. Per Tech Specs, plant is required to be in Mode 3 by 1933 hours today (8/6/2002) and in Mode 4 by 1933 hours on 8/7/2002. Plant shutdown was commenced at 0753 hours today.

"This report is being made under 50.72(b)(2)(I), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by plant's Technical Specifications."

All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee will reduce reactor power down to between 10 to 15 percent power then manually scram the reactor.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.

See event # 39111 for background information.