Event Notification Report for June 11, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/10/2002 - 06/11/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38975 38976 38977 38978
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38975 |
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| REP ORG: ROTORK CONTROLS, INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2002|
|LICENSEE: ROTORK CONTROLS, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:11[EDT]|
| CITY: ROCHESTER REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 06/10/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: NY |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/10/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |VERN HODGE NRR |
| | |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KAREN BLACK | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PART 21 ON ROTORK NA1 ACTUATOR |
| |
| The name of the manufacturer is Rotork Controls, Inc. The defective |
| components the Rotork NA1 type electric Valve Actuators fitted with an |
| Add-on-Pak 1 (AOP1) Assembly which was manufactured between 1978 and October |
| 2001 and have a safety function used for end of travel indication. The |
| problem is that moulded components within the AOP1 assembly cannot be |
| confirmed to the same specifications as those originally tested and |
| qualified at Wyle in 1978. No list of affected plants was available at this |
| time. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38976 |
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| REP ORG: STATE OF MONTANA - RSO |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2002|
|LICENSEE: ROCKY MOUNTAIN LABRATORIES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:04[EDT]|
| CITY: HAMILTON REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/28/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: MT |EVENT TIME: 08:30[MDT]|
|LICENSE#: 25-01202-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/28/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |ANTHONY GODY R4 |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DIANNE HUHTANEN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA | |
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|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BLO1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOST/MISSING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AT ROCKY MOUNTAIN LABS |
| |
| The Montana State RSO reported that Rocky Mountain Laboratories located in |
| Hamilton, Montana is missing approximately 12 millicuries of Sulfur-35. |
| This material is a low energy beta emitter which is used for biological |
| research including protein mapping. The material was in the form of pellets |
| and was in the bottom of microfuge tubes which were wrapped in a double bag. |
| The bag was last seen in building 1, room 102, on May 24, 2002 at 17:00. |
| The material was discovered missing at 8:00 am on May 28, 2002. A search |
| was conducted and also waste streams were checked. |
| |
| The State of Montana notified the NRC Region IV (Christy Maier). |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38977 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/10/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:55[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/09/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 23:55[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/10/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JAMES CREED R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |THOMAS ESSIG NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEN BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA | |
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|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROLS AT PADUCAH PLANT |
| |
| "At 0045 CDT, on 6-10-02 The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| that a violation of criticality controls had been discovered in the C-337 |
| process building. C-337 Unit #2 Cell #2 was isolated from the cascade and in |
| the process of being evacuated without an independent verification that a |
| known R-114 coolant leak did not exist, in violation of NCSA CAS-002. The |
| building Front Line Manager checked documentation to see if any other |
| evolutions had taken place without completing this verification. C-337 Unit |
| #1 Cell #2 was also discovered isolated and evacuated to a UF6 negative |
| without an independent verification that a known R-114 coolant leak did not |
| exist, in violation of NCSA CAS-002. The purpose of this check is to |
| determine actions when transitioning to different moderation controls, i.e. |
| removal of fluorinating environment to R-114 and RCW controls. The subject |
| independent verification and coolant sampling were subsequently performed |
| with successful results. These actions re-established double contingency |
| within four hours of the time of discovery. Due to the loss of double |
| contingency and the re-establishment of NCS controls, this event is being |
| report as a 24-Hr. Event Report. The NRC Resident inspector has been |
| notified of this event. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Significant R-114 leaks to process gas systems should |
| be readily apparent, however no checks for leaks were performed. Both |
| controls were violated and double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED: In order for a criticality to |
| occur, an R-114 leak to the process gas system would have to occur. In |
| addition, the R-114 would have to contain an unacceptable amount of moisture |
| and the moisture would have to be absorbed in a deposit of unsafe mass. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency is maintained by implementing two |
| controls on moderation. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(s) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is |
| based on ensuring wet R-114 coolant does not moderate existing uranium |
| deposits. NCSA CAS.002 requires that prior to the initial evacuation of UF6, |
| a check be made to determine if a known R-114 to process leak exists. This |
| check was not performed and the control was violated. Until the check was |
| performed successfully, the process condition was not maintained and double |
| contingency was not maintained. The second leg of double contingency is |
| based on independent verification that a known R-114 leak into the process |
| gas system does not exist. This independent check was not performed |
| violating the control. Until the check was independently performed |
| successfully, the process condition was not maintained and double |
| contingency was not maintained. Since double contingency is based on two |
| controls on one parameter and both controls were violated, double |
| contingency was not maintained." |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38978 |
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| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/11/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:26[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/10/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICH LOWERY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/11/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANTHONY GODY R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| BUS GROUND ON HOUSE SERVICE TRANSFORMER 4160V VITAL BUS TRANSFORMER
|
| |
| At 2120 CT Ft. Calhoun Station control room received an alarm indicating a |
| T1A3 4160V Bus Ground on house service transformer 4160V vital bus 1A3 |
| transformer. Licensee referenced ARP and plant AOP's 31 and 32, for all |
| 4160V buses fed from 22KV and Loss of 4160V bus power. Subsequent securing |
| of possible 4160V bus loads did not isolate the ground. Subsequently |
| transferred 4160V bus 1A3 feed from 4160V transformer T1A3 to 22KV |
| Transformer T1A1. Alarm and ground indications went away upon transfer. |
| Per Technical Specification 2.7.(2) b Nuclear Regulatory Commission |
| Operations Control Center shall be notified within 4 hours of transformer |
| inoperability. System Engineering and Electrical Support Staff are on site |
| investigating. Plant is in a severe thunderstorm warning until 2300 CT. |
| Diesel operability has been verified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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