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Event Notification Report for February 26, 2002

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/25/2002 - 02/26/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38722  38723  38724  38725  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38722       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/25/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:25[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        02/25/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:15[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STONE                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/25/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       95       Power Operation  |95       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS) OUT OF SERVICE                        |
|                                                                              |
| The SPDS was removed from service for the purpose of implementing a          |
| modification to replace the system.  The primary means of monitoring the     |
| critical parameters remains available to the operating crew and they will    |
| continue to be able to perform the necessary actions regarding emergency     |
| assessment.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38723       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/25/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:00[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        02/25/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT BOESCH                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/25/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)   POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)   POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)   POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       81       Power Operation  |81       Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INABILITY TO MAINTAIN TEMPERATURES IN RELAY AND SWITCHGEAR ROOMS DUE
TO      |
| CONTROL STRUCTURE HVAC SYSTEM INOPERABILITY                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following is a portion of the facsimile from the Licensee:               |
|                                                                              |
| "During review of the station deficiency report the following reportable     |
| condition was identified [at approximately 1400].  At 1855 on 2/22/02 while  |
| placing the 'B' Control Structure Chiller handswitch from "auto" to "start", |
| the chiller tripped due to a trip of the Ventilation Supply Fan breaker. The |
| breaker was able to be reset and the Chiller was restored after 6 minutes.   |
| The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was already inoperable with post           |
| maintenance testing in progress. With the loss of Control Structure HVAC     |
| System the ability to maintain temperatures in various spaces including      |
| Relay rooms and Emergency Switchgear rooms was lost. The failure requires an |
| 8 hr ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."               |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector was notified.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   38724       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  VA NATIONAL HP PROGRAM               |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/25/2002|
|LICENSEE:  VETERANS ADMIN MEDICAL CTR           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:10[EST]|
|    CITY:  BIRMINGHAM               REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        02/25/2002|
|  COUNTY:  JEFFERSON                 STATE:  AL |EVENT TIME:        14:15[CST]|
|LICENSE#:  01-00643-02           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/25/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+TIM MCGINTY          IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GARY WILLIAMS                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  GERRY WAIG                   |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAA1 20.1906(d)(1)        SURFACE CONTAM LEVELS |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RECEIPT OF A PACKAGE WITH A CONTAMINATED LABEL                               |
|                                                                              |
| A thallium 201 transport container (metal "ammo" box) was found to be        |
| contaminated with Technetium-99m upon arrival at the VA Medical Center in    |
| Birmingham, AL from a vendor in Birmingham, AL. The removable contamination  |
| was 969 DPM/cm� (limit =222 DPM/cm�) and identified as coming from a         |
| magnetic sticker affixed to the box. The vendor, a commercial radiopharmacy, |
| was notified, and the licensee planned to notify the State of Alabama. The   |
| licensee indicated that a similar event occurred at this hospital about 2    |
| years ago.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38725       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/25/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:30[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/25/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:30[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/25/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |KENNETH RIEMER       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |E. WILLIAM BRACH     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM E. WHITE                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-Hour Report)                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1530 [CDT], on 02-25-32, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was        |
| notified that the adjacent system post-removal NDA or visual inspection was  |
| not performed as required by GEN-10 for the accumulator in C-310.  The       |
| post-removal NDA for the adjacent system is required to be performed within  |
| 24 hours of the equipment being removed.  The post-removal NDA measurement   |
| is used to independently verify the mass of any potential adjacent system    |
| deposit is less than an always-safe mass and can be characterized as         |
| Uncomplicated Handling (UH), The pre-removal NDA indicated a UH deposit in   |
| the adjacent system."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The post-removal NDA measurement was subsequently performed which confirmed |
| the adjacent system to be UH."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "In summary, actions required by the NCSA were not completed within the time |
| frame specified."                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."         |
|                                                                              |
| "PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-02-1040; PGDP Event Report No.  |
| PAD-2002-009, Event Worksheet [38725]."                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Responsible Division:  Operations"                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:"                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency was not maintained because the independent verification  |
| of mass In the adjacent system was not performed within 24 hours of          |
| equipment removal.  The control relied upon for independent verification of  |
| less than an always-safe mass was violated.  However, a second independent   |
| post-removal NDA result confirmed an always-safe mass."                      |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:"                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the pre-removal NDA would have   |
| to be in error and a uranium deposit would have to exceed the always-safe    |
| mass of approximately 30 pounds at 5.5 wt. %235 U.  The deposit within the   |
| adjacent system would then need to become moderated through wet air          |
| in-leakage or introduction of moderator from a sprinkler activation, RCW     |
| leak, etc."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.:"    |
|                                                                              |
| "The controlled parameter is mass."                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):"                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The adjacent equipment post-removal NDA indicated <15 pounds of U with an   |
| assay of 5.27% with <325 grams of U235."                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:"                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency for the adjacent system of the equipment removed relies  |
| on the control of mass by two independent verifications.  The mass process   |
| condition is controlled by two independent verification of an always-safe    |
| mass using NDA or visual inspections."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is established by the requirement to    |
| perform a pre-removal NDA measurement to ensure the adjacent system contains |
| lass than an always-safe mass prior to making the first cut.  The            |
| pre-removal NDA was performed and showed less than an always-safe mass.      |
| This control was maintained."                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is established by the independent      |
| verification of less than an always-safe mass by a post-removal NDA          |
| measurement or visual inspection performed on the adjacent system within 24  |
| hours of equipment removal.  The post-removal NDA or visual inspection was   |
| not performed within the required time frame.  Therefore, neither the        |
| control nor the process condition was maintained."                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The post-removal NDA measurement or visual inspection on the adjacent       |
| system was not performed within the required 24-hour time limit.  Therefore, |
| double contingency was not maintained."                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS            
 |
| IMPLEMENTED:"                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Post-removal NDA has been completed with the results indicating the         |
| adjacent piping is Uncomplicated Handling (UH)."                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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