Event Notification Report for January 28, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/25/2002 - 01/28/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38649 38650 38651 38652 38653 38654
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38649 |
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| FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/25/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:06[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/25/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:54[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAMON RITTER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/25/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|HFIT 26.73 FITNESS FOR DUTY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FITNESS FOR DUTY REPORT |
| |
| A non-licensed supervisor tested above the limit for blood alcohol content |
| during a random test. The individual's site access has been suspended and |
| the licensee is conducting a review of the individual's recent work. The NRC |
| resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38650 |
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/25/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:36[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 12/28/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:01[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC OLSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/25/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 60-DAY OPTIONAL REPORT PURSUANT TO 10CFR50.73(a)(1) |
| |
| "On 12/28/01, the plant was in a cold shutdown condition with the RHR system |
| in the shutdown cooling mode. The reactor head vent valves were open. |
| |
| "At 1701 hours a reactor water level indication spike (notching) occurred on |
| the 'B' narrow range reactor water level instrumentation (e.g. instrument |
| rack C-2206). The event occurred when Reactor Recirculation Pump 'B' was |
| started. This resulted in Reactor Pressure Vessel pressure lowering due to |
| condensing of vapor in the Reactor Vessel. The spiking was due to gasses |
| coming out of solution in the reference leg associated with the 'B' narrow |
| range instruments. The specific source of the gas is still under |
| investigation. No spike was noted on the 'A' narrow range reactor water |
| level instrumentation (e.g. instrument rack C-2205). The Group I isolation |
| resulted in the closure of the Reactor Water Sample valves (AQ-44 and |
| AQ-45). The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) were already closed due to |
| plant conditions. |
| |
| "The Group I isolation was the result of a false high water level signal(s) |
| from analog trip system trip units LS-263-58A-2 (to PCIS Channel A2) and |
| LS-263-58B-2 (to PCIS Channel B2) while the reactor mode switch was in the |
| REFUEL position (not RUN). A Group I isolation is designed to occur if a |
| high water level condition occurs when the reactor mode switch is not in the |
| RUN position. These trip units receive signals from reactor water level |
| transmitters LT-263-58A (instrument rack 2206A) and LT-263-58B (instrument |
| rack 2206A) that are associated with condensing chamber 12B. |
| |
| "The Group I isolation signal was not valid because a reactor water level |
| increase of about 20" did not actually occur. Thus, even though the Group I |
| isolation signal was not planned, the isolation signal was invalid." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this report by the licensee. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38651 |
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| REP ORG: AUTOMATIC VALVE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/25/2002|
|LICENSEE: AUTOMATIC VALVE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EST]|
| CITY: NOVI REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 01/25/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/25/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
| |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN ARMSTRONG (fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PART 21 REPORT |
| |
| "On 11-14-2001 [an employee] of Exelon Power Labs called and reported that |
| (2) U0203FBBR-AA valves had been sent to their lab from Exelon - Limerick |
| for evaluation with the complaint that the valves were leaking in the |
| energized position. The valve is being used in the normally closed mode at |
| an inlet pressure of 74 psig. Further, according to [the employee], there |
| are additional U0203FBBR-AA valves at Limerick that are exhibiting the same |
| problem. |
| |
| "On 11-29-2001 one valve was returned to Automatic Valve for further |
| evaluation. At inlet pressures of 74 & 125 PSIG it was determined that the |
| valve did not reset after the solenoid was de-energized. It did not reset |
| until the inlet pressure was reduced to approximately 40 psig respectively. |
| |
| "When tested in the normally open mode - pressure to port 1 [...], there was |
| leakage at exhaust port 3 when the solenoid was energized but the valve |
| immediately reset at its maximum rated inlet pressure of 125 psig when the |
| solenoid was de-energized. |
| |
| "When the valve was disassembled a permanent set in the rubber in the top |
| plunger seal was found that conformed to the shape of the top seat in the |
| solenoid plunger guide. This deformation is normal and is not a concern. |
| |
| "The plunger was then dissected for additional analysis. It was determined |
| that the top seat was 0.020" below the top surface of the plunger or 0.007" |
| below the maximum design standard of 0.013". |
| |
| "With the top seat 0.020 below the top surface of the plunger, the top seal |
| was touching the top orifice but was not compressing the internal spring and |
| hence not creating a good seal. Consequently, there was severe leakage out |
| of exhaust port 3 which is 0.125 in diameter. This severe leakage created a |
| pressure differential across the top of the plunger, and thus a force |
| tending to hold the plunger in place. This force could not be overcome by |
| the external spring until the inlet pressure was reduced to approximately 40 |
| psig. |
| |
| "It was observed that all parts of the dissected plunger were present and in |
| their proper location. Further, it was noted that the tested leak rates and |
| performance characteristics of the valve prior to the plunger being |
| dissected did not match field reports from Exelon. Consequently, Exelon was |
| contacted and additional samples were requested. |
| |
| "On January 3, 2002 a second U0203FBBR-AA valve was returned to Automatic |
| direct from Exelon - Limerick by [...]. This valve exhibited the same |
| operational characteristics in the normally closed mode as did the valve |
| returned on November 29, 2001. That is, it leaked excessively when |
| energized. And, as with the previous valve examined by Automatic Valve, the |
| inlet pressure at port 1 had to be reduced to approximately 54 psig after |
| the solenoid was de-energized before the valve returned to its normally |
| closed position. |
| |
| "A second test was run on the valve returned on January 3, 2002. Previously |
| both returned valves were tested 'cold.' That is, they had been at room |
| temperature for a number of hours or days. When tested, pressurized air was |
| plumbed to port 1 and the solenoid was energized only long enough to confirm |
| that there was leakage out of port 3. Then the solenoid was de-energized and |
| the inlet pressure reduced to a value that the plunger would return to its |
| normally closed position. With the second valve, the solenoid was left |
| energized with 125 psig of air to port 1. After a period of approximately |
| 60 minutes, the leak at port 3 greatly diminished and, when the solenoid was |
| de-energized, the valve immediately returned to its closed position. This |
| test was repeated three (3) times with the same results. |
| |
| "In summary, evaluation of the (2) valves resulted in the following symptoms |
| and concerns: |
| |
| "1. A faulty valve will leak out of port 3 when the valve is used in its |
| normally closed mode [...] or leak out of port 1 when the valve is used in |
| its normally open mode [...] |
| "2. There is no concern that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally open |
| mode (pressure at port 3) will return to their de-actuated position (port 3 |
| open to port 2 and port 1 blocked) when the solenoid is do-energized. In |
| this mode both the internal spring, the external spring, and inlet pressure |
| at port 1 act to return the plunger to its normal do-actuated position. |
| "3. There does not seem to be a concern, based on field experience, that |
| U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally closed mode (pressure at port 1) |
| will return to their de-actuated position (port 2 open to port 3 and port 1 |
| blocked) when the solenoid is de-energized provided the solenoid has been |
| energized for an extended period of time. Test on the valve returned on |
| January 3rd indicate that this period of time is approximately 15 minutes at |
| 80 psig inlet pressure and approximately 60 minutes at 125 psig. However, |
| the impact of further degradation of the shell relative to the seal, when |
| the valve has been energized over an extended period of time is unknown. |
| "4. There would not seem to be a concern in applications where the |
| U0203FBBR-** valve is used in the normally closed mode (air at port 1) and |
| the valve is normally de-energized provided that, when energized, it is not |
| energized for a total period of time exceeding 6 months. |
| "5. There is a concern that U0203FBBR-** valves used in the normally |
| closed mode will not return to their de-actuated position if the valve has |
| been in its de-energized position for a sufficient amount of time for the |
| valve and the internal top seal to cool down. If the valve is energized then |
| is de-energized, within a period of approximately 60 minutes with 125 psig |
| at port 1, or 15 minutes with 80 psig at port 1 there is a high probability |
| that the valve will not return to its de-energized condition." |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38652 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE:
01/25/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:05[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 01/25/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/25/2002|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM McCLEERY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an employee entering |
| an inadvertent container area with a camera inside a plastic bag. During an |
| investigation requiring pictures, the camera was removed from the plastic |
| bag. When the employee was taking pictures the plastic bag was left |
| unattended. This is a violation of NCSA-705076.A03 control #3 and #5. #3 |
| When unattended, all potential inadvertent containers shall be modified to |
| prevent an unsafe accumulation in the container. #5 If flexible material is |
| utilized, it shall be configured or secured such that it cannot be deformed |
| into an inadvertent container with an unsafe accumulation potential. |
| |
| "The plastic bag was removed from the area. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "LOW, There was no leak of uranium bearing material in the vicinity of the |
| unattended plastic bag. The uranium recovery system was not in operation |
| however solution was in the system. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "The recovery system would have to be in operation bearing solution with an |
| unknown or high quantity of uranium. A leak from the system would occur such |
| that an unsafe amount of liquid would spray into the plastic bag. The liquid |
| would then have to collect 2.5 liters and deform the plastic bag to a depth |
| of greater then 1.5 inches and an unsafe geometry. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION,
ETC.): |
| |
| "Volume 2.5 liters or Geometry 1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "No uranium bearing material was involved in this event |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "An unattended plastic bag in an inadvertent container area was not |
| configured or secured such that it could not be filled or deformed into an |
| inadvertent container with an unsafe accumulation potential. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "The plastic bag was removed from the area." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38653 |
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| REP ORG: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/25/2002|
|LICENSEE: QUALITY INDUSTRIAL X-RAY, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:15[EST]|
| CITY: SEAGRAVES REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 11/07/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: TX |EVENT TIME: [CST]|
|LICENSE#: L04079 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/25/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GREG PICK R4 |
| |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HELEN WATKINS (fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT |
| |
| "A truck caught fire and burned. A S.P.E.C. camera, serial # 98, source |
| serial # HS1210 containing Ir-192 was on board. The source remained intact |
| and was not leaking. The device and source were returned to the |
| manufacturer. |
| |
| "We have no additional information. We have contacted the Licensee to obtain |
| more details." |
| |
| Texas Incident No.: I-7848 |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38654 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/26/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:03[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 01/26/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE FRIED |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/27/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS |
| |
| Unit 2 will be shut down in accordance with plant Technical Specifications |
| because the 2A EDG has been declared inoperable due to worn engine drive |
| gears and repairs cannot be completed within the 72 hour TS LCO time. The |
| worn gears were discovered during a routine maintenance inspection. |
| |
| The licensee will commence the shutdown at 2100 EST. The licensee will |
| inform the NRC resident inspector of this shutdown. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 0120EST ON 1/27/02 FROM DAVE LYNCH TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| An NOED (Notice of Enforcement Discretion) conference call was held |
| following which Unit 2 was granted a six day extension until shutdown is |
| required, i.e., 0300EST on 2/2/02. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021