Event Notification Report for December 11, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/10/2001 - 12/11/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38029 38553 38554 38555 38556
.
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38029 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/24/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:50[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/24/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:09[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE HAUNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/10/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 1 Startup |1 Startup |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| "During a reactor startup following a refueling outage, HPCI was declared |
| inoperable and is reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.72(b)(3)(vi) as |
| a single failure. |
| |
| "Upon completion of HPCI system operability testing, it was discovered that |
| the HPCI system flow controller indicated approximately 500 GPM verses an |
| expected 0 GPM. Since the plant is in MODE 2 and reactor pressure is greater |
| than 150 PSIG, HPCI was declared inoperable and a 14-day LCO was entered per |
| TS 3.5.1, condition F. |
| |
| "The preliminary investigation results are that air in the HPCI system flow |
| transmitter sensing lines is causing the erroneous flow indication. |
| Troubleshooting efforts are in progress." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| ***** RETRACTION FROM JOHN KARRICK TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1536 EDT ON 12/10/01
|
| ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This is a retraction of event number 38029 from May 24, 2001. The initial |
| report involved an erroneous reading on the flow-indicating controller |
| (FIC-2309) for the HPCI system. At the time of the discovery, the |
| consequence of FIC-2309 reading high was believed to be a non-conservative |
| speed demand signal to the HPCI turbine such that the actual HPCI injection |
| flow would fall short of that required (assuming an auto start with no |
| operator action). As a result, HPCI was declared inoperable and a report |
| was made. A calculation has since concluded that actual HPCI operability |
| would not have been lost given the as-found condition. Also, the quarterly |
| surveillance test to prove HPCI operability had just been successfully |
| completed. During the time HPCI was considered inoperable, it remained |
| available for use (as documented in Operator logs). Therefore, there was no |
| actual loss of HPCI as a single train safety system and there was no event |
| or condition that could have prevented safety function fulfillment. This |
| event is being retracted. A formal cancellation letter to withdraw the LER |
| (331/2001-002) is also being mailed." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Anne Marie Stone). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38553 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:53[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 12/10/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 03:48[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/10/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |ANNE MARIE STONE R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATT MAURER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2) SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT LOSS OF POWER TO THE C-315 TAILS WITHDRAWAL BUILDING DURING
AN |
| IMPROPERLY PERFORMED POWER SWITCHING EVOLUTION (24-Hour Report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Paducah: |
| |
| "At 0348 CST on 12-10-01, 480-volt power was inadvertently lost to the C-315 |
| tails withdrawal building during an improperly performed power switching |
| evolution. As a result of the power loss, the high voltage UF6 release |
| detection system for the UF6 condensers, accumulators, and heated housings |
| was rendered inoperable for approximately 10 minutes. The high voltage UF6 |
| release detection system is required to be operable per TSR 2.3.4.4. The |
| function of the high voltage UF6 release detection system is to detect UF6 |
| releases and to sound an alarm in the local control room. The power loss |
| also caused the withdrawal systems to shut down and automatically isolate as |
| designed. No UF6 releases occurred as a result of this evolution. Power |
| was restored and the building was returned to normal operation." |
| |
| "This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as |
| designed." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38554 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:58[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 10/29/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:21[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDY HALLIDAY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/10/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 66 Power Operation |66 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INVALID PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION DUE TO LOSS OF
POWER TO |
| A REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM POWER DISTRIBUTION BUS (60-Day Report in |
| Accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1)) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Event Description" |
| |
| "At 0121 hours on October 29, 2001, with the plant operating at 66 percent |
| of rated thermal power, power was lost to Reactor Protection System (RPS) |
| power distribution bus B as a result of an Electrical Protective Assembly |
| (EPA) logic card failure." |
| |
| "The power sources for the RPS provide power to both the RPS and the Primary |
| Containment Isolation System (PCIS) logic circuits. Loss of power to RPS |
| power distribution bus B resulted in invalid actuation of RPS trip system B |
| and [PCIS] trip system B. The RPS trip was a partial actuation (a 'half |
| scram'), and the PCIS trip was also a partial actuation (a 'half |
| isolation')." |
| |
| "The portions of PCIS logic that are designed with separate 'inboard' and |
| 'outboard' logic had the 'outboard' logic de-energized due to the power |
| loss. This resulted in the automatic closure of the outboard primary |
| containment isolation valves [...] for the: drywell pressure sensing line, |
| pressure suppression chamber pressure sensing line, Reactor Water Cleanup |
| system pump suction line, Reactor Water Cleanup system return line, and |
| reactor water sample line." |
| |
| "The de-energized PCIS logic circuits also initiated automatic closure of |
| Reactor Building (Secondary Containment) ventilation system outboard supply |
| and exhaust isolation valves and automatically started Standby Gas Treatment |
| (SGT) subsystem B, as designed, to maintain the reactor building atmosphere |
| at a slightly negative pressure." |
| |
| "Operating personnel restored power to RPS power distribution bus B by |
| transferring to the alternate power source. The invalid PCIS and RPS trip |
| signals that were caused by the loss of power were reset, systems that |
| isolated were restored to service, reactor building ventilation was restored |
| to normal, and SGT subsystem B was restored to a normal standby status." |
| |
| "Actions Taken" |
| |
| "1. RPS power distribution bus B was energized from the alternate power |
| source." |
| |
| "2. RPS and PCIS logic systems were reset." |
| |
| "3. The affected systems were restored to normal." |
| |
| "4. Troubleshooting of a logic card associated with the tripped EPA circuit |
| breaker revealed a failed capacitor. The failed logic card was replaced |
| with a refurbished logic card from stock." |
| |
| "5. Power to RPS power distribution bus B was transferred back to the |
| normal (motor generator) source." |
| |
| "6. New capacitors will be installed on the logic cards, or refurbished |
| logic cards will be installed, in the subject EPAs during the next available |
| maintenance window." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38555 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:40[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 12/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM OSELAND |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/10/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANNE MARIE STONE R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES MAY |
| INTERMITTENTLY LIFT DURING THE MOST LIMITING ATWS TRANSIENTS (Refer to |
| event #38556 for a similar notification received from Dresden Unit 3.) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "While performing calculations associated with the power uprate project, |
| Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station determined that the Standby Liquid Control |
| (SLC) system relief valves on Unit 1 and Unit 2 may intermittently lift |
| during the most limiting ATWS [transients. (The] specific scenario |
| evaluated is a Main Steam Line isolation at rated power with failure of the |
| normal, backup, and alternate rod insertion (ARI) scram functions.) This |
| issue also applies to the current rated power level during two-pump SLC |
| operation. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, subpart 50.62, |
| requires the SLC system to inject the equivalent of 86 gpm of 13-weight |
| percent sodium pentaborate solution. While the relief valve was lifted, the |
| system flow rate would not meet the required equivalent flow rate into the |
| vessel. Therefore, this condition is not in direct compliance with 10 CFR |
| 50.62. The NRC communicated a similar industry issue in Information Notice |
| 2001-13." |
| |
| "Further plant specific analysis has demonstrated that an adequate volume of |
| boron would be injected to shut down the reactor and meet the appropriate |
| acceptance criteria including reactor pressure, peak cladding temperature, |
| peak suppression pool temperature, and peak containment pressure. For these |
| reasons, the safety significance of this event is minimal." |
| |
| "This phone call is being made as an informational call. Written |
| communications, as appropriate, will be submitted to provide additional |
| detail. The station will continue to communicate additional information |
| with the NRC resident inspectors and with Region Ill as it is identified." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38556 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/10/2001|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:49[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 12/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB SCOTT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/10/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANNE MARIE STONE R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES ON UNIT 3
MAY |
| INTERMITTENTLY LIFT DURING THE MOST LIMITING ATWS TRANSIENTS (Refer to |
| event #38555 for a similar notification received from Quad Cities.) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "While performing calculations associated with the power uprate project, |
| Dresden Nuclear Power Station determined that the Standby Liquid Control |
| (SLC) system relief valves on Unit 3 may intermittently lift during the most |
| limiting ATWS [transients. (The] specific scenario evaluated is a Main |
| Steam Line isolation at rated power with failure of the normal, backup, and |
| alternate rod insertion (ARI) scram functions.) This issue also applies to |
| the current rated power level during two pump SLC operation. Title 10 of |
| the Code of Federal Regulations, subpart 50.62, requires the SLC system to |
| inject the equivalent of 86 gpm of 13-weight percent sodium pentaborate |
| solution. While the relief valve was lifted, the system flow rate would not |
| meet the required equivalent flow rate into the vessel. Therefore, this |
| condition is not in direct compliance with 10 CFR 50.62. The NRC |
| communicated a similar industry issue in Information Notice 2001-13" |
| |
| "Further plant specific analysis has demonstrated that an adequate volume of |
| boron would be injected to shut down the reactor and meet the appropriate |
| acceptance criteria including reactor pressure, peak cladding temperature, |
| peak suppression pool temperature, and peak containment pressure. For these |
| reasons, the safety significance of this event is minimal." |
| |
| "This phone call is being made as an informational call. Written |
| communications, as appropriate, will be submitted to provide additional |
| detail. The station will continue to communicate additional information |
| with the NRC resident inspectors and with [NRC] Region Ill as it is |
| identified." |
| |
| The licensee stated that although Dresden Units 2 and 3 are similar vintage |
| boiling water reactors, this issue does not apply to Dresden Unit 2 because |
| the piping runs are different. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021