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Event Notification Report for October 26, 2001

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/25/2001 - 10/26/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38372  38425  38426  38427  38428  
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|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38372       |
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| REP ORG:  CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM    |NOTIFICATION DATE:
10/10/2001|
|LICENSEE:  LEIGHTON AND ASSOCIATES              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:19[EDT]|
|    CITY:  IRVINE                   REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        10/08/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:             [PDT]|
|LICENSE#:  3109-30               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
|                                                |FRED BROWN           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KENT PRENDERGAST             |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Licensee reported that a Troxler 3440 portable gauge containing 10 mCi of   |
| cesium-137 and 50 mCi of americium-241:beryllium, in sealed sources, was     |
| stolen from one of their technician's pick-up while being kept overnight at  |
| the technician's home in Hemet. The gauge was in its transport case, locked  |
| down in the bed of the vehicle with a 'shell.'                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The gauge was stolen sometime after being parked at the technician' s home  |
| on the evening of 10-8-01.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The stolen gauge was a Troxler 3440, S/N 14409."                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/01 AT 1520 ET BY ROBERT GREGER TAKEN BY MACKINNON *  |
| * * *                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The gauge was recovered on 10/23/01 after a reward was offered for the       |
| recovery of the gauge. No damage to the gauge.   R4DO (Bill Johnson) and     |
| NMSS (Brian Smith) notified.                                                 |
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.
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38425       |
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| FACILITY: FARLEY                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:07[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:25[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  FUCICH                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JOHN MONNINGER       R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AMED 50.72(b)(3)(xii)    OFFSITE MEDICAL        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| WORKER OVERCOME BY HEAT TAKEN TO LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITY                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee evacuated a worker who was working in containment and was       |
| overcome by the heat.  The worker was transported using the utility's        |
| emergency vehicle.  There was a small area of contamination on the worker's  |
| neck which was decontaminated during the trip to the hospital.  The worker   |
| was not contaminated when admitted to the hospital.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   38426       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  PRAP ROCK INDUSTRIES                 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
|LICENSEE:  PRAP ROCK INDUSTRIES                 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:16[EDT]|
|    CITY:  EWING                    REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        10/24/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NJ |EVENT TIME:        22:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  29-19707-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER  R1      |
|                                                |BRAIN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WAYNE BYARD                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN TROXLER ASPHALT DENSITY GAUGE  CONTAINING 10 MILLICURIES OF           |
| CESIUM-137                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Prap Industries was performing work on a newly paved road which was closed   |
| to traffic at the intersection of Interstate 95 and Route 31 located in      |
| Ewing, NJ.   A Prap Rock Industries employee placed the Troxler gauge, Model |
| # 4640B, in a cart and moved the cart next to a tree and went off to perform |
| other duties.  When the person returned, time unknown how long the person    |
| was away from the unattained gauge, he discovered that the gauge and cart    |
| were missing.  This individual immediately notified the onsite New Jersey    |
| State Troopers that the gauge was missing.  A search of the area was         |
| conducted with not results in finding either the gauge or the cart.  NRC     |
| Region 1 individual was notified of this event by the licensee.              |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38427       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:19[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:00[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |E. WILLIAM BRACH     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  T. E. WHITE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1000, on 10/25/01, the Plant Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the   |
| independent verification for selecting the correct cylinder for washing was  |
| performed by the same operator, violating NCSA 400-002. This NCSA states     |
| that a second person, independent of the first person, verify that the       |
| correct cylinder is being washed.  The purpose of this requirement is to     |
| preclude washing an unintended cylinder.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The cylinder which was being washed was a non-fissile cylinder.              |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Double contingency for cylinder was operation is based on selecting the      |
| correct cylinder to wash.  A cylinder was on the washstand that was not      |
| verified, by two independent people, to be an approved cylinder.  The        |
| cylinder was subsequently verified independently to be non-fissile.          |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, a cylinder would have to be       |
| washed which contained greater than a critical mass of fissile material.     |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Independent verification of correct cylinder.                                |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| This cylinder contained non-fissile material.                                |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls to ensure the  |
| correct cylinder is washed.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on ensuring that the cylinder   |
| selected for washing has been approved.  The cylinder met the criteria and   |
| was approved for washing.  This control was not violated.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independent verification    |
| that the cylinder, after being put on the washstand but prior to being       |
| washed, is an approved cylinder.  Since the independent verification was     |
| done incorrectly the control was violated and double contingency was not     |
| maintained.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double   |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| Continue processing the cylinder according to CP4-CU-CH2110. (A second       |
| person has independently verified that the cylinder washed was an approved   |
| cylinder according to step 8.4.3, of procedure CP4-CU-CH2110.)               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the          |
| certificate holder.                                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
.
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38428       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:24[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/25/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        15:30[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/25/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |E. WILLIAM BRACH     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  T. E. WHITE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1530, on 10/25/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the 70-foot stack in the C-310 building was discovered to contain a deposit  |
| of fissile material.  There is no NCSE/A which covers operation,             |
| maintenance, storage, etc. of this equipment.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The presence of a deposit in the stack was not expected. A single NDA has    |
| been performed and indicates a deposit of less than 61 lbs.(U).  Assay       |
| smears taken on the stack previously indicated an assay of approximately     |
| 1.6%.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS:                                           |
|                                                                              |
| For the assay of the deposit, the piping geometry and deposit mass are not   |
| sufficient to support a criticality.  However, no NCSA controls have been    |
| established to address this fissile material operation.                      |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Based on the assay and geometry of the piping it is not feasible for a       |
| criticality to occur in the pipe.  Additionally, the pipe located            |
| approximately 8 feet above the floor and is therefore not feasible to have   |
| spacing violations.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled    |
| parameter.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| 61 lbs. U with an enrichment of 1.6% U-235.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTIONS  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The 70-foot discharge stack has been abandoned in place since the 200-foot   |
| stack was placed into service in the early 1980s.  The 70-foot stack was     |
| last used briefly in the 1996 timeframe.  The 70-foot stack has not been     |
| previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has    |
| not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety.  Therefore, double        |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| Characterize the remaining sections of the 70-foot stack system.  Control    |
| the are around the stack and post as required by CP2-EG-NS1031.              |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.                                                                      |
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