Event Notification Report for October 26, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/25/2001 - 10/26/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38372 38425 38426 38427 38428
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38372 |
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| REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE:
10/10/2001|
|LICENSEE: LEIGHTON AND ASSOCIATES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:19[EDT]|
| CITY: IRVINE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/08/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: 3109-30 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KENT PRENDERGAST | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT |
| |
| "Licensee reported that a Troxler 3440 portable gauge containing 10 mCi of |
| cesium-137 and 50 mCi of americium-241:beryllium, in sealed sources, was |
| stolen from one of their technician's pick-up while being kept overnight at |
| the technician's home in Hemet. The gauge was in its transport case, locked |
| down in the bed of the vehicle with a 'shell.' |
| |
| "The gauge was stolen sometime after being parked at the technician' s home |
| on the evening of 10-8-01. |
| |
| "The stolen gauge was a Troxler 3440, S/N 14409." |
| |
| * * * * UPDATE ON 10/25/01 AT 1520 ET BY ROBERT GREGER TAKEN BY MACKINNON * |
| * * * |
| |
| The gauge was recovered on 10/23/01 after a reward was offered for the |
| recovery of the gauge. No damage to the gauge. R4DO (Bill Johnson) and |
| NMSS (Brian Smith) notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38425 |
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| FACILITY: FARLEY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:07[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:25[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: FUCICH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JOHN MONNINGER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AMED 50.72(b)(3)(xii) OFFSITE MEDICAL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| WORKER OVERCOME BY HEAT TAKEN TO LOCAL MEDICAL FACILITY |
| |
| The licensee evacuated a worker who was working in containment and was |
| overcome by the heat. The worker was transported using the utility's |
| emergency vehicle. There was a small area of contamination on the worker's |
| neck which was decontaminated during the trip to the hospital. The worker |
| was not contaminated when admitted to the hospital. |
| |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38426 |
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| REP ORG: PRAP ROCK INDUSTRIES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
|LICENSEE: PRAP ROCK INDUSTRIES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:16[EDT]|
| CITY: EWING REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 10/24/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: NJ |EVENT TIME: 22:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 29-19707-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER R1 |
| |BRAIN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WAYNE BYARD | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| STOLEN TROXLER ASPHALT DENSITY GAUGE CONTAINING 10 MILLICURIES OF |
| CESIUM-137 |
| |
| Prap Industries was performing work on a newly paved road which was closed |
| to traffic at the intersection of Interstate 95 and Route 31 located in |
| Ewing, NJ. A Prap Rock Industries employee placed the Troxler gauge, Model |
| # 4640B, in a cart and moved the cart next to a tree and went off to perform |
| other duties. When the person returned, time unknown how long the person |
| was away from the unattained gauge, he discovered that the gauge and cart |
| were missing. This individual immediately notified the onsite New Jersey |
| State Troopers that the gauge was missing. A search of the area was |
| conducted with not results in finding either the gauge or the cart. NRC |
| Region 1 individual was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38427 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:19[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:00[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: T. E. WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| At 1000, on 10/25/01, the Plant Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the |
| independent verification for selecting the correct cylinder for washing was |
| performed by the same operator, violating NCSA 400-002. This NCSA states |
| that a second person, independent of the first person, verify that the |
| correct cylinder is being washed. The purpose of this requirement is to |
| preclude washing an unintended cylinder. |
| |
| The cylinder which was being washed was a non-fissile cylinder. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| Double contingency for cylinder was operation is based on selecting the |
| correct cylinder to wash. A cylinder was on the washstand that was not |
| verified, by two independent people, to be an approved cylinder. The |
| cylinder was subsequently verified independently to be non-fissile. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, a cylinder would have to be |
| washed which contained greater than a critical mass of fissile material. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.): |
| |
| Independent verification of correct cylinder. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| This cylinder contained non-fissile material. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls to ensure the |
| correct cylinder is washed. |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on ensuring that the cylinder |
| selected for washing has been approved. The cylinder met the criteria and |
| was approved for washing. This control was not violated. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independent verification |
| that the cylinder, after being put on the washstand but prior to being |
| washed, is an approved cylinder. Since the independent verification was |
| done incorrectly the control was violated and double contingency was not |
| maintained. |
| |
| Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Continue processing the cylinder according to CP4-CU-CH2110. (A second |
| person has independently verified that the cylinder washed was an approved |
| cylinder according to step 8.4.3, of procedure CP4-CU-CH2110.) |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the |
| certificate holder. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38428 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/25/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:24[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/25/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:30[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/25/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: T. E. WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| At 1530, on 10/25/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the 70-foot stack in the C-310 building was discovered to contain a deposit |
| of fissile material. There is no NCSE/A which covers operation, |
| maintenance, storage, etc. of this equipment. |
| |
| The presence of a deposit in the stack was not expected. A single NDA has |
| been performed and indicates a deposit of less than 61 lbs.(U). Assay |
| smears taken on the stack previously indicated an assay of approximately |
| 1.6%. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENTS: |
| |
| For the assay of the deposit, the piping geometry and deposit mass are not |
| sufficient to support a criticality. However, no NCSA controls have been |
| established to address this fissile material operation. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| Based on the assay and geometry of the piping it is not feasible for a |
| criticality to occur in the pipe. Additionally, the pipe located |
| approximately 8 feet above the floor and is therefore not feasible to have |
| spacing violations. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC.): |
| |
| Since this equipment does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled |
| parameter. |
| |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| 61 lbs. U with an enrichment of 1.6% U-235. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTIONS |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The 70-foot discharge stack has been abandoned in place since the 200-foot |
| stack was placed into service in the early 1980s. The 70-foot stack was |
| last used briefly in the 1996 timeframe. The 70-foot stack has not been |
| previously identified as a fissile material operation. This operation has |
| not been evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Characterize the remaining sections of the 70-foot stack system. Control |
| the are around the stack and post as required by CP2-EG-NS1031. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021