Event Notification Report for October 10, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/09/2001 - 10/10/2001
EVENT NUMBERS
383703837138373383753837638377
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38370
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 08:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 02:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 08:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 02:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC RPS ACTUATION ON LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL FOLLOWING UNIT SHUTDOWN
"Following the shutdown of Hope Creek Generating Station at the beginning of the 10th Refueling Outage, a subsequent low reactor water level condition occurred which resulted in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The low level occurred when reactor depressurization was terminated. The unit was in Hot Shutdown at the time of the RPS actuation with all control rods fully inserted.
"Cooldown to Operational Condition 4 is in progress."
The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.
"Following the shutdown of Hope Creek Generating Station at the beginning of the 10th Refueling Outage, a subsequent low reactor water level condition occurred which resulted in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). The low level occurred when reactor depressurization was terminated. The unit was in Hot Shutdown at the time of the RPS actuation with all control rods fully inserted.
"Cooldown to Operational Condition 4 is in progress."
The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38371
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: CHRIS SERATA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 08:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 03:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 08:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 03:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE IDENTIFIED DURING CONTAINMENT WALK DOWN
"During a Primary Containment walk down at the beginning of the Hope Creek 10th Refueling Outage, inspection crews identified a cracked weld on the 'A' Reactor Recirculation Loop elbow tap instrument piping, which is part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. The cracked weld is located where a 1" tap connects to the 28" recirculation loop piping, and constitutes a part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. The unit was in Hot Shutdown Operational Condition 3 at the time of discovery.
"Technical Specification LCO 3.4.3.2.a has been entered due to leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, which requires the unit be in Cold Shutdown by 03:32am on October 11, 2001. Cooldown to Operational Condition 4 is in progress.
"PSEG Nuclear is developing plans to repair the leak."
The licensee described the leak as a fine spray which is much less than the 10gpm averaged over a 10 minute period required to declare an Unusual Event (ECG 2.1.1a, 2.1.1b).
The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.
"During a Primary Containment walk down at the beginning of the Hope Creek 10th Refueling Outage, inspection crews identified a cracked weld on the 'A' Reactor Recirculation Loop elbow tap instrument piping, which is part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. The cracked weld is located where a 1" tap connects to the 28" recirculation loop piping, and constitutes a part of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary. The unit was in Hot Shutdown Operational Condition 3 at the time of discovery.
"Technical Specification LCO 3.4.3.2.a has been entered due to leakage from the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, which requires the unit be in Cold Shutdown by 03:32am on October 11, 2001. Cooldown to Operational Condition 4 is in progress.
"PSEG Nuclear is developing plans to repair the leak."
The licensee described the leak as a fine spray which is much less than the 10gpm averaged over a 10 minute period required to declare an Unusual Event (ECG 2.1.1a, 2.1.1b).
The licensee will inform the Lower Alloways Creek Township and the NRC resident inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38373
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 07:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 11:23 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 07:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 75 | Power Operation |
UNIT 2 COMMENCED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN BASED ON ASSUMED CEA DEGRADATION
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On October 10, 2001, at approximately 07:45 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
"CEA degradation was observed during refueling of PVNGS Unit 3 and is assumed to be transportable to Unit 2. As discussed in the Technical Specification 3.1.5 Bases, mechanical failures may cause a CEA to become inoperable. There were no reactivity anomalies in Unit 2 (or Unit 3) indicating CEA degradation prior to this discovery. The condition is not transportable to PVNGS Unit 1 CEAs because they were replaced during its last refueling outage.
"Preliminary investigation indicates the cause to be aging.
"Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.1 .5 requires 'All full length CEAs shall be OPERABLE..' No associated action in Technical Specification 3.1.5 applies to the CEA degradation, therefore Unit 2 entered LCO 3.0.3.
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On October 10, 2001, at approximately 07:45 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
"CEA degradation was observed during refueling of PVNGS Unit 3 and is assumed to be transportable to Unit 2. As discussed in the Technical Specification 3.1.5 Bases, mechanical failures may cause a CEA to become inoperable. There were no reactivity anomalies in Unit 2 (or Unit 3) indicating CEA degradation prior to this discovery. The condition is not transportable to PVNGS Unit 1 CEAs because they were replaced during its last refueling outage.
"Preliminary investigation indicates the cause to be aging.
"Limiting Condition for Operability (LCO) 3.1 .5 requires 'All full length CEAs shall be OPERABLE..' No associated action in Technical Specification 3.1.5 applies to the CEA degradation, therefore Unit 2 entered LCO 3.0.3.
"No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result in the release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 38375
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: J. GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: J. GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2001
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 12:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/20/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
MICHAEL PARKER (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI INOPERABLE
"On 10/10/01 at 12:30, while performing surveillance 24.202.01 'HPCI Pump Time Response and Operability Test at 1025 psi', HPCI pump flow reached 5000 gpm in 35 seconds (<29 seconds is acceptance criteria). HPCI was declared INOPERABLE due to the surveillance failure. Plant personnel are evaluating trend data to determine the cause of the failure.
"All other ECCS systems and RCIC are OPERABLE. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1257 EST ON 11/20/01 BY JERRY FLINT TO ROBERT STRANSKY * * *
"Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the HPCI failure to reach rated flow is not reportable. An extensive investigation was performed to determine the cause of the failure of HPCI to reach rated flow in the required time. The failure was attributed to two root causes: System configuration changes made since 1994 reduced available margin to the 29 second acceptance criteria and a decrease in opening stroke position of the HPCI test line throttle valve resulted in a change to the HPCI system test characteristic.
"Adjustments to the HPCI test line throttle valve opening were performed. A subsequent HPCI surveillance run was performed on 10/18/2001. Rated flow was reached within the surveillance acceptance criteria. No changes were made to the HPCI system acceptance criteria or to HPCI components that would impact actual injection to the reactor pressure vessel. The changes to the testing method remain conservative with respect to an actual vessel injection.
"Therefore, HPCI remained fully capable of reaching rated flow in the required time during the 10/10/2001 surveillance run; and therefore, HPCI was Operable. and this condition is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(d). The original notification. Event Number 38375, is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Christine Lipa) has been notified.
"On 10/10/01 at 12:30, while performing surveillance 24.202.01 'HPCI Pump Time Response and Operability Test at 1025 psi', HPCI pump flow reached 5000 gpm in 35 seconds (<29 seconds is acceptance criteria). HPCI was declared INOPERABLE due to the surveillance failure. Plant personnel are evaluating trend data to determine the cause of the failure.
"All other ECCS systems and RCIC are OPERABLE. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * RETRACTED AT 1257 EST ON 11/20/01 BY JERRY FLINT TO ROBERT STRANSKY * * *
"Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the HPCI failure to reach rated flow is not reportable. An extensive investigation was performed to determine the cause of the failure of HPCI to reach rated flow in the required time. The failure was attributed to two root causes: System configuration changes made since 1994 reduced available margin to the 29 second acceptance criteria and a decrease in opening stroke position of the HPCI test line throttle valve resulted in a change to the HPCI system test characteristic.
"Adjustments to the HPCI test line throttle valve opening were performed. A subsequent HPCI surveillance run was performed on 10/18/2001. Rated flow was reached within the surveillance acceptance criteria. No changes were made to the HPCI system acceptance criteria or to HPCI components that would impact actual injection to the reactor pressure vessel. The changes to the testing method remain conservative with respect to an actual vessel injection.
"Therefore, HPCI remained fully capable of reaching rated flow in the required time during the 10/10/2001 surveillance run; and therefore, HPCI was Operable. and this condition is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(d). The original notification. Event Number 38375, is retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Christine Lipa) has been notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 38376
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: LAW ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: L02453
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR. (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Licensee: LAW ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: L02453
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES H. OGDEN, JR. (fax)
HQ OPS Officer: LEIGH TROCINE
Notification Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Notification Time: 17:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/10/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING DISCOVERY OF A LAW ENGINEERING AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES GAUGE ON A RESIDENTIAL STREET BY AN EMPLOYEE OF ANOTHER COMPANY
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control:
"Texas Incident No.: I-7810"
"License No.: L02453"
"Licensee: Law Engineering and Environmental Services, Houston, Texas (Fort Worth Subsite)"
"Event date and time: 10/10/01 a.m."
"Event location: Dallas, Texas (exact location unknown at this time - gauge was transported to 10722 North Stemmons Freeway, Dallas, Texas 75220[)]"
"Event type: Found Nuclear Density Gauge, Troxler 3411 B, Serial #11251"
"Notifications: Notified Troxler Electronic Labs, TDH Public Health Region 3 to pickup gauge and have leak tested."
"Event description: Gauge found in the middle of a residential street by an employee of Giles Engineering, Texas License L04919-001. Gauge was found to be un-locked - both case and control rod. The gauge was reported to be in the 'On' position. No shipping papers were found in the case. No warning stickers were reported to be on the exterior of the case. Troxler Labs reports that the gauge was last seen by them over 2-years ago and was then owned by Austin Testing Engineers - no evidence of Licensure through this Agency. Gauge was tracked to Law Engineering in Fort Worth. TDH is holding the gauge. Will have leak test performed. Licensee was unaware that the gauge was missing and could not immediately find if the gauge was assigned on a job for 10/10/01."
"Transport vehicle description: None available at this time."
"Media attention: None"
(Contact the NRC operations officer for an agreement state point of contact.)
The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Texas Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control:
"Texas Incident No.: I-7810"
"License No.: L02453"
"Licensee: Law Engineering and Environmental Services, Houston, Texas (Fort Worth Subsite)"
"Event date and time: 10/10/01 a.m."
"Event location: Dallas, Texas (exact location unknown at this time - gauge was transported to 10722 North Stemmons Freeway, Dallas, Texas 75220[)]"
"Event type: Found Nuclear Density Gauge, Troxler 3411 B, Serial #11251"
"Notifications: Notified Troxler Electronic Labs, TDH Public Health Region 3 to pickup gauge and have leak tested."
"Event description: Gauge found in the middle of a residential street by an employee of Giles Engineering, Texas License L04919-001. Gauge was found to be un-locked - both case and control rod. The gauge was reported to be in the 'On' position. No shipping papers were found in the case. No warning stickers were reported to be on the exterior of the case. Troxler Labs reports that the gauge was last seen by them over 2-years ago and was then owned by Austin Testing Engineers - no evidence of Licensure through this Agency. Gauge was tracked to Law Engineering in Fort Worth. TDH is holding the gauge. Will have leak test performed. Licensee was unaware that the gauge was missing and could not immediately find if the gauge was assigned on a job for 10/10/01."
"Transport vehicle description: None available at this time."
"Media attention: None"
(Contact the NRC operations officer for an agreement state point of contact.)
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 38377
Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN State: MD
County:
License #: 19-30563-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KUYKENDALL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 1
City: ABERDEEN State: MD
County:
License #: 19-30563-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KUYKENDALL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 10/11/2001
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 18:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2001
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/10/2001
Event Time: 18:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/11/2001
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(ii) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X
Person (Organization):
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
R1 IRC TEAM MANAGER (R1)
DON COOL (NMSS)
LOST CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR (CAD)
The US Army reported that during inventory check in Vilseck, Germany at the 529th Ordinance, one CAD containing 15 millicuries Ni-63 was not accountable. A search was conducted with no success in finding it, so it was presumed to be lost. This discovery was made on 7/15/01. They are still investigating.
The US Army reported that during inventory check in Vilseck, Germany at the 529th Ordinance, one CAD containing 15 millicuries Ni-63 was not accountable. A search was conducted with no success in finding it, so it was presumed to be lost. This discovery was made on 7/15/01. They are still investigating.