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Event Notification Report for October 2, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/01/2001 - 10/02/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38316  38333  38334  38335  38336  38337  

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38316       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/25/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/25/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RITCHIE                      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0930, uranium bearing material was observed in the interior spaces of a  |
| block wall in the X-705 recovery area the openings leading to the interior   |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of NCSA |
| 0705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential           |
| collection area is unknown.  This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE 0705_076.E03.  The presence of an unknown (at this time)  |
| amount of uranium bearing material that was spilled (at some time in the     |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature one of   |
| NCSA 0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of X-705 system       |
| piping this would represent a loss of the second leg as defined in NCSE      |
| 0705_076.E03."                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Measurements are being conducted and are ongoing to determine amount of     |
| material, which may affect this report."                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The safety significance of this event is    |
| potentially high (at this time) because the exact amount of Uranium bearing  |
| material that could have entered the opening in the block wall is unknown.   |
| Measurements to quantify the material are in progress.  The apparent block   |
| wall construction (as evidenced by visual inspection of wall openings in the |
| other areas of Recovery) indicates the potential for the presence of         |
| unfavorable geometry voids within and between the blocks compromising the    |
| exterior building wall."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  If 1) a significant amount of uranium bearing     |
| material entered the void spaces of the block wall, 2) the material has      |
| collected in the multiple voids resulting in a single unfavorable geometry   |
| configuration, 3) the material has a high enrichment and uranium             |
| concentration, and 4) the material would become sufficiently moderated, then |
| a potentially critical configuration could result.  Note that no spills or   |
| leaks of uranium bearing material from present X-705 systems has occurred at |
| this time.  The material in question has apparently been there for some      |
| time."                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
| Double contingency for inadvertent containers relies upon the physical       |
| integrity of X-705 piping to prevent a spill of an unsafe amount of          |
| material.  An unsafe amount is defined by the concentration and enrichment   |
| of the material.  Double contingency also relies upon administrative         |
| controls limiting the presence of unfavorable geometry or unsafe volume      |
| containers that could collect a spill or leak."                              |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):  Unknown at this time.  Enrichment |
| could be greater than 90% based upon historical operations.  The form is     |
| most likely uranyl nitrate or UO2F2.  Measurements for determination of mass |
| and assay are currently in progress."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  The openings leading to the interior       |
| spaces of the block wall is a violation of administrative control #3 of      |
| NCSA.705_076.A03 because the exact geometry or volume of the potential       |
| collection area is unknown.  This is a loss of one leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03.  The presence of an unknown (at this time)  |
| amount of uranium bearing material that has spilled (at some time in the     |
| facility's past) is a potential violation of passive design feature 1 of     |
| NCSA-0705_076.A03 which credits the physical integrity of  X-705 system      |
| piping.  This would represent a loss of the second leg of double contingency |
| as defined in NCSE-0705_076.E03."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| Samples of the material have been taken and DNA measurements will be taken   |
| to determine amounts of material and assay."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be   |
| notified.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE FROM JIM McCLEERY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1942 ON 09/27/01 *****    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Conservative NDA analysis of the area near column A-16 indicates a total    |
| maximum mass of 225+/-113 grams 235U with an enrichment of 8.2% is present   |
| (preliminary NDA analysis reported less conservative values), which is less  |
| than the safe mass limit for uranium.  Investigations to determine the       |
| extent of condition have identified three additional areas of potential      |
| concern in X-705 Recovery.  These areas are:  the wall near the A-loop       |
| overflow column, the wall adjacent to the Calciner system, and the wall near |
| the top of the B-38 storage columns.  Each of these areas has received       |
| preliminary scans via NDA analysis to determine the potential for uranium    |
| material holdup in the block walls.  Preliminary results indicate that the   |
| amount of material, if any, in the wall near the A-loop overflow and near    |
| the Calciner are bounded by the amount quantified near column A-6.  More     |
| detailed [quantitative] NDA scans for these two locations (to differentiate  |
| between surface contamination, uranium holdup, and background) are currently |
| in progress and will be reported when available.  Preliminary results        |
| indicate that no material is suspect in the wall near the B-38 storage       |
| column (near background readings).  Additional NDA scans are currently in    |
| progress to locate any other potential areas of concern in the Recovery      |
| Area.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The safety significance of this event is    |
| now low because the amount of uranium bearing material that entered the      |
| openings in the block wall is known to be less that 338 grams 235U which is  |
| less than the safe mass limit for uranium."                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC     |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Phillips) and NMSS EO (Holahan).       |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE FROM MIKE RITCHIE TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1626 ON 10/01/01 *****    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "More detailed quantitative NDA scans for the wall near the A-loop overflow  |
| column indicate a total maximum mass of 92+/-46 grams 235U with an           |
| enrichment of 86% is present (less than a safe mass).  Quantitative NDA      |
| scans for the wall adjacent to the Calciner system indicate a total maximum  |
| mass of 201+/-101 grams 235U with an enrichment of 5.3% (also less than a    |
| safe mass).  It should be noted that these results incorporate conservative  |
| assumptions about the distribution of uranium bearing material in the wall   |
| matrix, and total amount of uranium present may be found to be much less     |
| upon final disposition."                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Preliminary results indicate that no material is suspected in the wall near |
| the B-38 storage column (near background readings): therefore,               |
| quantification was not performed in this area."                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Safe mass at 100% enrichment is 350 grams 235U, and safe mass at 10%        |
| enrichment is 600 grams 235U."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel plan to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC     |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Brown).            |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38333       |
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| FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER            REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
|    UNIT:  [3] [] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:41[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP                         |EVENT DATE:        09/28/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HERRIN                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER  R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 INVOLVING UNACCEPTABLE INSPECTION SERVICES                           |
|                                                                              |
| On August 24, 2001, FPC personnel performed a water test on spare            |
| safety-related Decay Heat Raw Water System pump RWP-3A to determine whether  |
| the lip seal was installed correctly.  This test was not part of an FPC      |
| receipt inspection. No bearing flush/lubricating water flow was observed     |
| coming from the pump.  Upon disassembly of the pump bowl, FPC personnel      |
| confirmed that the lip seal was installed incorrectly.                       |
|                                                                              |
| In 1999, spare RWP-3A pump was rebuilt by Tampa Armature Works under         |
| Purchase Order No. F742538K.  FPC contracted Raytheon (Contract Number       |
| NO1067AD) to oversee the RWP-3A rebuilding activities and ensure, through    |
| inspection, that the work was performed in accordance with the Raytheon 10   |
| CFR Part 50, Appendix B, QA Program. The shop traveler provided to Tampa     |
| Armature Works by FPC included a detailed sketch and specific guidance with  |
| respect to the orientation of the pump lip seal.  In February 2000, Tampa    |
| Armature Works signed off on and Raytheon Inspector 21 stamped Shop Traveler |
| Line Item #30A attesting to the correct orientation of the lip seal even     |
| though the lip seal was not installed correctly. The rebuilt pump was        |
| subsequently delivered to FPC.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| FPC considers the above condition to be reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21  |
| as a defect associated with a substantial safety hazard.                     |
|                                                                              |
| 10 CFR 21.3 states, in part, that a defect means a deviation in a basic      |
| component delivered to a purchaser for use in a facility or activity subject |
| to 10 CFR Part 21 if, on the basis of an evaluation, the deviation could     |
| create a substantial safety hazard.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the vendor were notified.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38334       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
|LICENSEE:  TASK LABORATORIES INC                |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:07[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MIAMI                    REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        09/28/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  FL |EVENT TIME:        11:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  0752-1                AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |R2 IRC TEAM MANAGER  R2      |
|                                                |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ADAMS                        |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TROXLER GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM STATE OF FLORIDA LICENSEE                      |
|                                                                              |
| A truck with a Troxler gauge (8mCi Cs-137 and 40mCi Be:Am-241) in a          |
| transport case chained to the bed was left unattended in the parking lot.    |
| When an employee returned at 11:30 a.m., the gauge was missing.  The padlock |
| on the transport case had been cut and the gauge was gone.  The transport    |
| case and the keys were not taken.  Law enforcement and the Florida Bureau of |
| Radiation Control are investigating.  NRC Region II has been notified.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38335       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:59[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/01/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        02:00[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TONY HUDSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ACTIVATION OF THE HIGH VOLTAGE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM DUE TO A UF6     |
| LEAK TO ATMOSPHERE                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah         |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0200 CDT, on 10-01-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified of an |
| activation of the High Voltage UF6 Release Detection System at the C-315     |
| Tails Withdrawal Building.  Two UF6 detector heads had alarmed due to a UF6  |
| leak to atmosphere from the rupture disc assembly for the 'B' UF6            |
| accumulator.  Operations isolated and pulled down the affected system.  The  |
| Plant Emergency Squad responded and closed the rupture disc isolation        |
| valves.  High volume air samples were taken with negative results.  Health   |
| Physics surveyed the area in C-315 and determined that contamination was     |
| limited to the housing near the accumulator.  The C-315 building was then    |
| released to operations with controls on the area of contamination."          |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is reportable to the NRC per the Safety Analysis Report, section |
| 6.9, table 1, criteria J.2, safety system actuation due to a valid signal as |
| a 24-hour event notification."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."         |
|                                                                              |
| "PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-01-5077; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2001-040;    |
| Event Worksheet: [38335]                                                     |
| Responsible Division; Operation."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 2105 EDT ON 10/01/01     |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah         |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Further investigation determined that the UF6 was released from a tube that |
| connected the rupture disc assembly to a calibration buggy.  The connection  |
| tube had come in contact with a heater that melted a section of the tube     |
| allowing the UF6 release."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (David Hills) and NMSS EO (Patricia Holahan).      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38336       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:14[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        10/01/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT AYER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING OUTFALL STRUCTURE SAMPLES IN EXCESS OF        |
| RELEASE LIMITS                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee.   |
|                                                                              |
| "Injection of [a] microbiological agent commenced at 1140 hours to treat the |
| station raw water systems for Zebra Mussel infestation.  [The] agent used    |
| was Spectrus CT-1300 (Clamtrol).  Injection was being made at the station    |
| intake structure, and [a] detoxification agent was being added at the        |
| outfall structure prior to returning to Lake Erie.  At 1600 hours, it was    |
| discovered that samples taken at the outfall structure indicated             |
| concentration of this chemical of 0.35 ppm which is in excess of the release |
| limit of 0.04 ppm contained in the Chemical Permit.  This event requires     |
| notification of the US EPA.  [The] feed rate of the Clamtrol was decreased,  |
| and [the] feed rate of the detoxification agent was increased.  Injection of |
| the chemical was terminated at approximately 1740 hours.  Sampling is        |
| continuing to determine when compliance with the Chemical Permit is          |
| reestablished."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify the US  |
| EPA.                                                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38337       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PERRY                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:14[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        10/01/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT AYER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/01/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL VIOLATION                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee.   |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made in accordance with Perry Nuclear Power Plant      |
| (PNPP) Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.F, as a potential violation of   |
| the Maximum Power Level of 3758 [MWth] as described in License Condition     |
| 2.C(1)."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "General Electric (GE) report titled, 'Impact of Steam Carryover Fraction on |
| Process Computer Heat Balance Calculations, September 2001,' documents a     |
| non-conservative assumption for moisture (carryover) used in the calculation |
| of core thermal power.  The assumed carryover fraction of 0.1% was           |
| discovered to be closer to 0.0% (non-conservative) in later model GE BWRs."  |
|                                                                              |
| "Following initial review by PNPP staff, moisture carryover has not been     |
| tested at Perry since the initial startup test program, and the plant was    |
| potentially affected by the non-conservative core thermal power calculation  |
| results presented by GE.  The plant is unable to perform carryover testing   |
| at this time to provide a more accurate MWth bias; therefore, until testing  |
| can be accomplished a conservative 3 MWth bias is suspected.  Additionally,  |
| the plant staff continues to investigate the overall effect of the moisture  |
| carryover term within the Heat Balance equation."                            |
|                                                                              |
| "PNPP Unit 1 has an administrative 8-hour average power limit of 3754 MWth   |
| (reactor power reduction of 4 MWth) that was conservatively implemented on   |
| 09/20/01 when the plant initially identified the potential concern in the    |
| corrective action program."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| (Refer to event #38330 for a similar event at Fermi.)                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+