Event Notification Report for October 1, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/28/2001 - 10/01/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38183 38326 38328 38329 38330 38332
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38183 |
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/02/2001|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/02/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TIM RIEGER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/28/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |HERB BERKOW NRR |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING SEISMIC EVENT DISCOVERED DURING ENGINEERING |
| REVIEW |
| |
| "On August 2, 2001, at approximately 1500 hours, Engineering notified |
| operations that the Service Water (SW) System may not meet analyzed flow |
| requirements after a seismic event as a result of a system re-alignment |
| change implemented June 4, 2001. The SWS re-alignment change placed an 8 |
| inch non-seismic SW line on the essential SW header. The SWS was originally |
| analyzed for a seismic event with the break of a 10 inch non-seismic SW |
| line. The change evaluation concluded that this configuration was bounding |
| for the alignment. The assessment of the alignment change did not adequately |
| consider the effects of the seismic event. After a review of the change, |
| Engineering judged that the SWS would not meet system design flow |
| requirement after a seismic event with two out of three pumps due to the |
| failure of both non-seismic lines that were aligned as a result of the |
| change. Operations initiated realignment of the 8 inch SW line back to the |
| non-essential header which was completed at 1640 hours. Engineering is |
| performing evaluations but judged that the SWS would have met flow |
| requirements for plant shutdown with three SW pumps operable after a seismic |
| event with no random single failure (three pumps operable)." |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| **** RETRACTION ON 09/28/01 AT 1002 HOURS BY TIM RIEGER TAKEN BY MACKINNON |
| **** |
| |
| Upon further assessment, the re-alignment condition is not considered |
| reportable. Additional engineering reviews showed that the alignment to the |
| non-seismic SW lines to the Essential header was not risk significant. |
| Engineering judgement and analysis concluded that the plant design basis |
| events, including the seismic event, would not cause a consequential loss of |
| the non-seismic lines aligned to the Essential header. Therefore, the |
| condition did not significantly degrade plant safety and although at the |
| time was unanalyzed, the condition does not meet reporting requirements. As |
| part of Indian Point 3's corrective action program, the cause and extent of |
| condition of the event is being evaluated and identified corrective actions |
| will be performed. R3DO (John Kinneman) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38326 |
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| REP ORG: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/28/2001|
|LICENSEE: THOMPSON DREESSEN DORNER INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:43[EDT]|
| CITY: SPRINGFIELD REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/27/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: NE |EVENT TIME: 13:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 01-7001 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/28/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GREG PICK R4 |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN FASSELL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| DENSITY GAUGE SOURCE ROD BROKEN OFF |
| |
| A Humboldt Model # 5001gauge was run over by a 50-ton blader vehicle. The |
| density gauge source rod was broken off, and the gauge itself was flattened. |
| The blader vehicle ran over the density gauge in a landfill while the person |
| who was assigned to guard the gauge had his back turned. The source was in |
| its stored position when it was run over by the blader vehicle. There was |
| no contamination on the blader vehicle and no radioactive release from the |
| gauge. The Humboldt Model # 5001 has 8 mCi of cesium-137 and 40 mCi of |
| americium-241/beryllium. The owner of the gauge is Thompson Dreessen Dorner |
| Inc., which is located in Omaha. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for State contact information.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38328 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/28/2001|
|LICENSEE: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:34[EDT]|
| CITY: ABERDEEN PROVING GROUNDS REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 09/28/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: MD |EVENT TIME: 12:07[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 19-30563-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/28/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
| |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
+------------------------------------------------+FRED BROWN NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOYCE KUYKENDAL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| MISSING CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR CONTAINING 30 MICROCURIES OF AMERICIUM-241 |
| |
| A chemical agent detector (CAD) containing 30 microcuries of americium-241 |
| was discovered to be missing during a physical inventory conducted during |
| 08/01. A search was performed at all units, and the US Army Aberdeen |
| Proving Ground in Maryland was notified of the missing CAD at 1207 on |
| 09/28/01. It is believed that the CAD may have been last used by the |
| Wisconsin Army National Guard located in Black River Falls during nuclear |
| biological chemical (NBC) training. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information.) |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38329 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/28/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:11[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/28/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 15:20[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/28/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING AN OPACITY VIOLATION (4-hour Report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "At 1520 hours [on] 09/28/01, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency |
| (OEPA) was notified per Ohio Administrative Code (OAC) 3745-15-06(B) that an |
| opacity exceedance had occurred at the X-600 Steam Plant. The opacity |
| violation occurred on [the] #2 Boiler when our #2A Precipitator voltages |
| began to fluctuate. Operators adjusted load/air requirements on the #2 |
| Boiler in an effort to prevent further exceedances. [The] cause of the |
| voltage fluctuations has not been determined at this time." |
| |
| "This is reportable as a 4-hour NRC Event due to notification to an outside |
| agency (OEPA) being made per Nuclear Regulatory Reporting Procedure |
| UE2-RA-RE1030, Appendix D, Criteria P (Miscellaneous)." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38330 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/28/2001|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:39[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/28/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:25[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE PHILIPPON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/28/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL MAXIMUM POWER LEVEL VIOLATION |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This report is being made in accordance with Fermi 2 License Condition 2.F, |
| as a potential violation of the Maximum Power Level of 3430 MWth as |
| described in License Condition 2.C(1)." |
| |
| "GE report titled, 'Impact of Steam Carryover Fraction on Process Computer |
| Heat Balance Calculations, September 2001,' documents a non-conservative |
| assumption for moisture [carryover] used in the calculation of core thermal |
| power. The assumed carryover fraction of .1% was discovered to be closer to |
| 0.0% (non-conservative) in later model GE BWRs." |
| |
| "An initial review at Fermi 2 was completed at 1625 on 09/28/01. The |
| initial review indicated that Fermi is susceptible to the non-conservative |
| core thermal power calculation, with an estimated bias of 1.64 MWth. This |
| initial analysis was based on a carryover test performed in 1996 at Fermi |
| 2." |
| |
| "Fermi 2 has an administrative 8-hour average power limit of 3428.8 MWth. |
| Given the 1.64 MWth bias, it is possible that the license limit of 3430 MWth |
| has been exceeded in the past. Fermi 2 took immediate action to reduce the |
| administrative power limit to 3427 MWth. Reactor power was reduced by 3 |
| MWth." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38332 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2001|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:28[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:00[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE BANKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/30/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN ZWOLINSKI NRR |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EVIDENCE OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE DISCOVERED |
| WHILE IN COLD SHUTDOWN. |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "The following event description is based on information currently |
| available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional |
| information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the |
| information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be |
| made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73." |
| |
| "On September 30, 2001, at approximately 1400 MST, Palo Verde Nuclear |
| Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 discovered evidence of reactor coolant |
| system (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. PVNGS Unit 3 was shutdown in Mode 5 |
| conducting cooldown and depressurization in its [ninth] refueling outage at |
| the time of discovery. Current RCS temperature is approximately 135 degrees |
| Fahrenheit and RCS pressure is approximately 20 psia." |
| |
| "The leakage was discovered at two [Inconel] alloy 600 nozzle locations |
| during inservice inspection (ISI); one in a RCS hot leg temperature detector |
| nozzle and another in a pressurizer heater sleeve. The RCS hot leg leakage |
| is located in the RTD nozzle for an inservice temperature [detector] (Loop |
| #1, Equipment ID: 3JRCETW112HD). The pressurizer heater sleeve leakage is |
| located at pressurizer heater B17. The leakage was identified in the form |
| of small deposits of boron accumulation around the circumferences of the hot |
| leg nozzle and that of the pressurizer sleeve. PVNGS has conducted |
| inspections of these nozzles [and] sleeves during each refueling outage |
| since the discovery that Inconel alloy 600 nozzles are susceptible to axial |
| cracking. No evidence of leakage was identified when inspected during the |
| last refueling outage approximately 18 months ago." |
| |
| "The timing of this ENS report was based on the determination at 14:00 MST |
| on September 30, 2001, that the boron accumulation represented a serious of |
| a principle safety barrier. PVNGS Unit 3 Technical Specification Limiting |
| Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.14 (RCS Operational Leakage) permits no |
| reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage. It was therefore |
| conservatively concluded that any evidence of pressure boundary leakage, |
| regardless of magnitude, represents serious degradation of a principle |
| safety barrier. Technical Specification [LCO] 3.4.14 is applicable in Modes |
| 1, 2, 3, and 4. Unit 3 was in Mode 5 in a planned refueling outage at the |
| time of discovery; therefore, LCO 3.4.14 is currently not applicable. |
| The-hot leg nozzle and pressurizer sleeve will be repaired prior to |
| re-entering Mode 4. It is anticipated that the repair will be utilizing the |
| Mechanical Nozzle Seal Assembly (MNSA). No ESF actuations occurred and none |
| were required. No structures systems or components were inoperable that |
| contributed to this event particularly the fuel cladding and the containment |
| fission product barriers. The event did not result in the release of |
| radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the safe |
| operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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