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Event Notification Report for September 11, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/10/2001 - 09/11/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37999  38247  38272  38273  

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37999       |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:53[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/16/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        19:00[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/10/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MICHAEL PARKER       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN GREEVES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+NADER MAMISH         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN BEASLEY                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE - CRITICALITY CONTROL - (4-Hour Report)          |
|                                                                              |
| During the revision to NCSE 052 and 039, it was discovered that the          |
| condenser could potentially be pressurized greater than 35.5 psia when the   |
| condenser supply and return valve are both closed without a fluorinating     |
| environment in the process gas system.   NCSA CAS-002/011 allow both the     |
| supply and return valves to be closed when draining the condenser without a  |
| fluorinating environment.  NCSEs 052 and 039 rely on the condenser supply    |
| valve to be closed enough to prevent the condenser from being pressurized    |
| above 35.5 psia during the time the return valve is closed and maintenance   |
| personnel relieve the pressure on the condenser.   Based on recent           |
| discussions, it was discovered that closure of the supply valve may not      |
| provide sufficient isolation to prevent the condenser from being pressurized |
| above 35.5 psia with the return valve closed because of potential seat       |
| leakage of the supply valve.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has stopped all maintenance activities which could create this  |
| condition.  Also, samples will be taken where this maintenance has occurred  |
| to check that the freon still complies with the water content limits.        |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.                       |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1500 EDT ON 06/21/01 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO LEIGH   |
| TROCINE *****                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah         |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1900 [CDT] on [05/16/01], the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was       |
| notified of a deficient Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation.  NCSAs CAS    |
| 002 and CAS 011 allow both the Recirculating Cooling Water (RCW) supply and  |
| return valves to be closed when draining the R-114 condenser without a       |
| fluorinating environment.  The NCS evaluations rely on the RCW supply valve  |
| to be closed enough to prevent the condenser from being pressurized above    |
| 35.5 psia during the time the RCW return valve is closed and maintenance     |
| relieves the pressure on the condenser.  Based on recent discussions between |
| NCS and maintenance personnel, it was discovered that closure of the RCW     |
| supply valve might not provide sufficient isolation to prevent the condenser |
| from being pressurized above 35.5 psia with the return valve closed.  The    |
| RCW system provides cooling water to the R-114 condenser, which removes heat |
| from the freon system.  The freon is used to remove the heat of compression  |
| from the process gas system.  The R-114 pressure is maintained above the RCW |
| pressure to form a barrier between the process gas and the RCW cooling       |
| water, thus preventing moderation from occurring should a leak in the        |
| condenser occur.  If the RCW pressure is allowed to rise above 35.5 psia,    |
| the potential exists that the RCW pressure could exceed that of the R-114    |
| pressure.  At this point, an actual condition of RCW pressure greater than   |
| 35.5 psia has not been identified."                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "UPDATE [on 06/20/01] ATRC 01-3248:  During the Engineering review to        |
| determine permanent corrective actions, additional immediate corrective      |
| actions have become necessary.  It has been determined that when the         |
| condenser return valve is open, condenser pressure can also be affected when |
| the return header alignment is changed (i.e., closure of RCW loop isolation  |
| valves, RCW building header valves, cooling tower riser valves, etc.).       |
| Controls have been implemented to ensure that changes to the RCW system do   |
| not impact our ability to maintain R-114 pressure above RCW pressure."       |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The controls credited for the isolation of  |
| the condenser to ensure the pressure at the condenser does not exceed 35.5   |
| psia do not meet the intent of the NCSE for isolation.  Therefore, the NCSE  |
| analysis is deficient and double contingency is not maintained.  However,    |
| the probability for a criticality is unlikely due to the number of           |
| conditions that must be met in order for a criticality to be possible."      |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  In order for a criticality to be possible, the    |
| following conditions must exist.  With the condenser supply and return       |
| valves closed, the supply or return valve must be leaking to allow the       |
| condenser pressure to exceed the minimum coolant pressure of 35.5 psia.      |
| With the configuration of the supply valve closed and the return valve       |
| opened, the RCW return system must be changed (i.e. closure of loop          |
| isolation valves, RCW building header valves, cooling tower riser valves,    |
| etc.) enough that the affected condenser pressure increased greater than     |
| 35.5 psia.  The process gas equipment must be at a UF6 negative and contain  |
| a UO2F2 deposit greater than a critical mass.  The condenser must have a     |
| leak of sufficient rate and duration to allow enough water to overcome the   |
| down comer allowing liquid water to enter the cooler.  The cooler must also  |
| have a simultaneous leak, which would allow wet coolant to leak into the     |
| process gas side of the equipment at a location, which would allow           |
| moderation of the deposit."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two      |
| controls for moderation."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):  Maximum assay of 5.5 wt. % U235"     |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  The first leg of [the] double contingency  |
| is based on isolation of the RCW condenser by closing the supply valve to    |
| maintain the condenser pressure less than 35.5 psia.  Based on discussions   |
| with maintenance personnel, the current leak rates of the supply valve may   |
| be greater than the amount assumed to ensure the condenser pressure does not |
| exceed 35.5 psia when the return valve is closed.  Also, when the return     |
| valve is open, the RCW return system could be changed (i.e., closure of loop |
| isolation valve, RCW building header valves, cooling tower riser valves,     |
| etc.).  Therefore, the intent of this control has not been met, and this leg |
| of double contingency was not maintained."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of [the] double contingency is based on the independent      |
| verification of the isolation of the supply valve and when the return valve  |
| is required to be open, verification that the return valve is open.  Since   |
| adequate isolation of the supply valve cannot be ensured based on            |
| verification of supply valve closure or return valve open, when required,    |
| the intent of this independent verification control was not met.  Therefore, |
| this leg of double contingency was not maintained."                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Since isolation of the RCW condenser with the supply valve closed and the   |
| return valve closed or opened may not meet the intent of the isolation       |
| requirement to maintain the condenser pressure less than 35.5 psia, these    |
| controls are deficient and double contingency has not been maintained."      |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Until the NCSEs and NCSAs can be revised and additional controls             |
| established:"                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Condenser Return Valve Closed"                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "1.  All maintenance activities related to closing the condenser return      |
| valve on a system, which is at a UF6 negative, have been stopped.  This does |
| not apply to systems that are not connected to the supply line or the C-310  |
| TOPS Boosters."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "2.  The coolant systems for condensers, which had the return valve closed   |
| without a fluorinating environment present, will be sampled in accordance    |
| with NCSA CAS-002 to verify the CFC-114 still complies with the water        |
| content limits."                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "3.  The return [valves] on condensers, which currently have the return      |
| valve closed, fluorinating environment removed (at a UF6 negative), and is   |
| connected to the supply line, will be opened."                               |
|                                                                              |
| "RCW Building Return System (based on ATRC-01-3248)"                         |
|                                                                              |
| "4.  The plant power level will be maintained below 400 MW until NCSE        |
| changes are completed and/or necessary controls are implemented or specific  |
| evolutions are evaluated by NCS and approval is given."                      |
|                                                                              |
| "5.  Both building RCW return header valves to a given header will not be    |
| closed."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "6.  At least 3 cooling tower risers for every large pump and 2 risers for   |
| every small pump will be kept in service."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "7.  Respective building RCW bypasses will be closed before isolating an RCW |
| system loop."                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "8.  For any auxiliary systems not protected by a delta P alarm (i.e., A-310 |
| Booster, A-335 Booster, C-337 B Booster) except the C-310 TOPS Booster, any  |
| activity that requires verification that the condenser return valve is open  |
| will also verify other valves in the return path to the applicable RCW       |
| return header are also open."                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen) and NMSS EO (Patricia            |
| Holahan).]                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1705EDT ON 8/21/01 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The following information was provided as an update:                         |
|                                                                              |
| "The plant has completed and approved a USQD [Unreviewed Safety Question     |
| Determination] to allow the plant power level to be increased to 850 MW."    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed.  Notified R3DO(Gardner) and    |
| NMSS(Essig).                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1300 9/10/2001 FRIN BEASLEY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *             |
|                                                                              |
| "NCSE 039/NCSA CAS-011 and NCSE 052/NCSA CAS-002 have been revised,          |
| approved, and implemented by the plant. These analyses are no longer         |
| considered deficient. The analysis incorporates additional controls          |
| associated with the cascade RCW system that are necessary for double         |
| contingency above a power level of 850 MW."                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Burgess) & NMSS |
| (Wayne Hodges)                                                               |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38247       |
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| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/29/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        08/29/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:04[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE GOBELI                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/10/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID LEW            R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOHN TAPPERT         NRR     |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |RICHARD ROSANO/NRR   IAT     |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |AARON DANIS/NMSS     IAT     |
|                                                |GREG SMITH/REGION 1  IAT     |
|                                                |NADER MAMISH         IRO     |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A 30-GALLON DIESEL OIL SPILL FROM A FREIGHT   |
| TRAIN WHICH DERAILED AND BREACHED THE PROTECTED AREA BOUNDARY                |
|                                                                              |
| A freight train derailed and breached the protected area boundary.  There    |
| were no personnel injuries as a result of this event.  However, 30 gallons   |
| of diesel oil spilled from the train.  The oil was contained by trap rocks   |
| and did not reach receiving waters.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Security personnel have been posted as a result of the protected area        |
| boundary breach, and fire protection personnel are currently on scene        |
| cleaning up the diesel oil spill.  The licensee is in the process of         |
| notifying the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection of the oil  |
| spill.  The licensee also requested that local police investigate the cause  |
| of the train derailment.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| In addition to the initial 4-hour event report for the offsite notification, |
| the licensee plans to call back with an update to include the reporting      |
| criterion for the breach in the protected area boundary.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify         |
| applicable state and local officials.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE FROM MIKE GOBELI TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1115 ON 08/29/01 *****     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee provided this update to include an additional 1-hour security   |
| reporting criterion to the initial 4-hour event report for the offsite       |
| notification.  The licensee determined that this event was also reportable   |
| in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1), Appendix G, I(1)(c), for a            |
| degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could    |
| allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, controlled      |
| access area, or vital area.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (David Lew), NRR EO (John       |
| Tappert), IRO (Nader Mamish), NRR IAT (Richard Rosano), NMSS IAT (Aaron      |
| Danis), Region 1 IAT (Greg Smith), Region 1 (Curtis Cowgill), Headquarters   |
| OPA (Beth Hayden), and Region 1 OPA (Neil Sheehan).                          |
|                                                                              |
| * * * PARTIAL RETRACTION 1350 9/10/2001 FROM SMITH TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has determined that this incident is not reportable pursuant to |
| 10 CFR 73.71 (b)(1) as a one hour report.  The NRC resident inspector has    |
| been informed. Notified R1DO (Barr).                                         |
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|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   38272       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| REP ORG:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/10/2001|
|LICENSEE:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:48[EDT]|
|    CITY:  PENDLETON                REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        09/06/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  OR |EVENT TIME:        11:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#:  19-00915-03           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/10/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK SHAFFER         R4      |
|                                                |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JENSEN                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| STUCK SOURCE                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that a 15 mCi Am-241 source, used for soil moisture    |
| measurements, had become stuck within a 6 foot length of tubing. Attempts to |
| retrieve it using the attached cable were unsuccessful. The source was       |
| retrieved by digging up the tubing, cutting off the bottom portion and       |
| pushing the source back up through the tube. The source was returned to its  |
| shipping container. The dosimetry of the individual who performed the        |
| retrieval has been sent to the vendor for analysis.                          |
|                                                                              |
| An inspector from NRC Region I is currently performing a site visit to the   |
| USDA office in Beltsville, MD, from where this report originated.            |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38273       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/10/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        09/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:54[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WILLIAM GREEN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/10/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MARK SHAFFER         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |62       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SOURCES DUE TO LIGHTNING                               |
|                                                                              |
| "On 9/7/01 at 1750 CDT the Startup Transformer was de-energized due to a     |
| lightning strike on the transmission system. This deenergized one of the two |
| off-site circuits. This trip resulted in the trip of 'A' Recirculation M/G   |
| set and subsequent single loop operations. Shortly after this at 1754 CDT    |
| the Emergency Transformer was declared inoperable due to degraded voltage    |
| and the plant entered the Limiting Condition for Operations for loss of both |
| off-site power circuits. Both Emergency Diesels remained available and the   |
| unit remained on line. All plant equipment responded as expected. At 1932    |
| CDT the Emergency Transformer was returned to operable status. Two loop      |
| operations were restored at 0521 CDT on 9/8/01. The Startup Transformer was  |
| restored to operable at 1045 CDT on 9/8/01. Full power operation was         |
| restored at 2100 CDT on 9/8/01. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been   |
| notified. This event is reportable in accordance with NUREG 1022 Rev. 2 and  |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Staff review of the event and NUREG 1022 Rev. 2 on    |
| 9/10/01 identified the need to make a report under 10 CFR 50.72."            |
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