Event Notification Report for September 11, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/10/2001 - 09/11/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 37999 38247 38272 38273 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37999 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/16/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:53[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/16/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 19:00[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/10/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MICHAEL PARKER R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+NADER MAMISH IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BEASLEY | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE - CRITICALITY CONTROL - (4-Hour Report) | | | | During the revision to NCSE 052 and 039, it was discovered that the | | condenser could potentially be pressurized greater than 35.5 psia when the | | condenser supply and return valve are both closed without a fluorinating | | environment in the process gas system. NCSA CAS-002/011 allow both the | | supply and return valves to be closed when draining the condenser without a | | fluorinating environment. NCSEs 052 and 039 rely on the condenser supply | | valve to be closed enough to prevent the condenser from being pressurized | | above 35.5 psia during the time the return valve is closed and maintenance | | personnel relieve the pressure on the condenser. Based on recent | | discussions, it was discovered that closure of the supply valve may not | | provide sufficient isolation to prevent the condenser from being pressurized | | above 35.5 psia with the return valve closed because of potential seat | | leakage of the supply valve. | | | | The licensee has stopped all maintenance activities which could create this | | condition. Also, samples will be taken where this maintenance has occurred | | to check that the freon still complies with the water content limits. | | | | Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1500 EDT ON 06/21/01 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO LEIGH | | TROCINE ***** | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah | | personnel: | | | | "At 1900 [CDT] on [05/16/01], the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was | | notified of a deficient Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. NCSAs CAS | | 002 and CAS 011 allow both the Recirculating Cooling Water (RCW) supply and | | return valves to be closed when draining the R-114 condenser without a | | fluorinating environment. The NCS evaluations rely on the RCW supply valve | | to be closed enough to prevent the condenser from being pressurized above | | 35.5 psia during the time the RCW return valve is closed and maintenance | | relieves the pressure on the condenser. Based on recent discussions between | | NCS and maintenance personnel, it was discovered that closure of the RCW | | supply valve might not provide sufficient isolation to prevent the condenser | | from being pressurized above 35.5 psia with the return valve closed. The | | RCW system provides cooling water to the R-114 condenser, which removes heat | | from the freon system. The freon is used to remove the heat of compression | | from the process gas system. The R-114 pressure is maintained above the RCW | | pressure to form a barrier between the process gas and the RCW cooling | | water, thus preventing moderation from occurring should a leak in the | | condenser occur. If the RCW pressure is allowed to rise above 35.5 psia, | | the potential exists that the RCW pressure could exceed that of the R-114 | | pressure. At this point, an actual condition of RCW pressure greater than | | 35.5 psia has not been identified." | | | | "UPDATE [on 06/20/01] ATRC 01-3248: During the Engineering review to | | determine permanent corrective actions, additional immediate corrective | | actions have become necessary. It has been determined that when the | | condenser return valve is open, condenser pressure can also be affected when | | the return header alignment is changed (i.e., closure of RCW loop isolation | | valves, RCW building header valves, cooling tower riser valves, etc.). | | Controls have been implemented to ensure that changes to the RCW system do | | not impact our ability to maintain R-114 pressure above RCW pressure." | | | | "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The controls credited for the isolation of | | the condenser to ensure the pressure at the condenser does not exceed 35.5 | | psia do not meet the intent of the NCSE for isolation. Therefore, the NCSE | | analysis is deficient and double contingency is not maintained. However, | | the probability for a criticality is unlikely due to the number of | | conditions that must be met in order for a criticality to be possible." | | | | "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): In order for a criticality to be possible, the | | following conditions must exist. With the condenser supply and return | | valves closed, the supply or return valve must be leaking to allow the | | condenser pressure to exceed the minimum coolant pressure of 35.5 psia. | | With the configuration of the supply valve closed and the return valve | | opened, the RCW return system must be changed (i.e. closure of loop | | isolation valves, RCW building header valves, cooling tower riser valves, | | etc.) enough that the affected condenser pressure increased greater than | | 35.5 psia. The process gas equipment must be at a UF6 negative and contain | | a UO2F2 deposit greater than a critical mass. The condenser must have a | | leak of sufficient rate and duration to allow enough water to overcome the | | down comer allowing liquid water to enter the cooler. The cooler must also | | have a simultaneous leak, which would allow wet coolant to leak into the | | process gas side of the equipment at a location, which would allow | | moderation of the deposit." | | | | "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two | | controls for moderation." | | | | "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Maximum assay of 5.5 wt. % U235" | | | | "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of [the] double contingency | | is based on isolation of the RCW condenser by closing the supply valve to | | maintain the condenser pressure less than 35.5 psia. Based on discussions | | with maintenance personnel, the current leak rates of the supply valve may | | be greater than the amount assumed to ensure the condenser pressure does not | | exceed 35.5 psia when the return valve is closed. Also, when the return | | valve is open, the RCW return system could be changed (i.e., closure of loop | | isolation valve, RCW building header valves, cooling tower riser valves, | | etc.). Therefore, the intent of this control has not been met, and this leg | | of double contingency was not maintained." | | | | "The second leg of [the] double contingency is based on the independent | | verification of the isolation of the supply valve and when the return valve | | is required to be open, verification that the return valve is open. Since | | adequate isolation of the supply valve cannot be ensured based on | | verification of supply valve closure or return valve open, when required, | | the intent of this independent verification control was not met. Therefore, | | this leg of double contingency was not maintained." | | | | "Since isolation of the RCW condenser with the supply valve closed and the | | return valve closed or opened may not meet the intent of the isolation | | requirement to maintain the condenser pressure less than 35.5 psia, these | | controls are deficient and double contingency has not been maintained." | | | | "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | Until the NCSEs and NCSAs can be revised and additional controls | | established:" | | | | "Condenser Return Valve Closed" | | | | "1. All maintenance activities related to closing the condenser return | | valve on a system, which is at a UF6 negative, have been stopped. This does | | not apply to systems that are not connected to the supply line or the C-310 | | TOPS Boosters." | | | | "2. The coolant systems for condensers, which had the return valve closed | | without a fluorinating environment present, will be sampled in accordance | | with NCSA CAS-002 to verify the CFC-114 still complies with the water | | content limits." | | | | "3. The return [valves] on condensers, which currently have the return | | valve closed, fluorinating environment removed (at a UF6 negative), and is | | connected to the supply line, will be opened." | | | | "RCW Building Return System (based on ATRC-01-3248)" | | | | "4. The plant power level will be maintained below 400 MW until NCSE | | changes are completed and/or necessary controls are implemented or specific | | evolutions are evaluated by NCS and approval is given." | | | | "5. Both building RCW return header valves to a given header will not be | | closed." | | | | "6. At least 3 cooling tower risers for every large pump and 2 risers for | | every small pump will be kept in service." | | | | "7. Respective building RCW bypasses will be closed before isolating an RCW | | system loop." | | | | "8. For any auxiliary systems not protected by a delta P alarm (i.e., A-310 | | Booster, A-335 Booster, C-337 B Booster) except the C-310 TOPS Booster, any | | activity that requires verification that the condenser return valve is open | | will also verify other valves in the return path to the applicable RCW | | return header are also open." | | | | Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations | | officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen) and NMSS EO (Patricia | | Holahan).] | | | | * * * UPDATE 1705EDT ON 8/21/01 FROM CALVIN PITTMAN TO S. SANDIN * * * | | | | The following information was provided as an update: | | | | "The plant has completed and approved a USQD [Unreviewed Safety Question | | Determination] to allow the plant power level to be increased to 850 MW." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO(Gardner) and | | NMSS(Essig). | | | | * * * UPDATE 1300 9/10/2001 FRIN BEASLEY TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "NCSE 039/NCSA CAS-011 and NCSE 052/NCSA CAS-002 have been revised, | | approved, and implemented by the plant. These analyses are no longer | | considered deficient. The analysis incorporates additional controls | | associated with the cascade RCW system that are necessary for double | | contingency above a power level of 850 MW." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO (Burgess) & NMSS | | (Wayne Hodges) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38247 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/29/2001| | UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:02[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/29/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:04[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE GOBELI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/10/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |DAVID LEW R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN TAPPERT NRR | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |RICHARD ROSANO/NRR IAT | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |AARON DANIS/NMSS IAT | | |GREG SMITH/REGION 1 IAT | | |NADER MAMISH IRO | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | |3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A 30-GALLON DIESEL OIL SPILL FROM A FREIGHT | | TRAIN WHICH DERAILED AND BREACHED THE PROTECTED AREA BOUNDARY | | | | A freight train derailed and breached the protected area boundary. There | | were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. However, 30 gallons | | of diesel oil spilled from the train. The oil was contained by trap rocks | | and did not reach receiving waters. | | | | Security personnel have been posted as a result of the protected area | | boundary breach, and fire protection personnel are currently on scene | | cleaning up the diesel oil spill. The licensee is in the process of | | notifying the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection of the oil | | spill. The licensee also requested that local police investigate the cause | | of the train derailment. | | | | In addition to the initial 4-hour event report for the offsite notification, | | the licensee plans to call back with an update to include the reporting | | criterion for the breach in the protected area boundary. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to notify | | applicable state and local officials. | | | | ***** UPDATE FROM MIKE GOBELI TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1115 ON 08/29/01 ***** | | | | The licensee provided this update to include an additional 1-hour security | | reporting criterion to the initial 4-hour event report for the offsite | | notification. The licensee determined that this event was also reportable | | in accordance with 10 CFR 73.71(b)(1), Appendix G, I(1)(c), for a | | degradation or discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could | | allow unauthorized or undetected access to a protected area, controlled | | access area, or vital area. | | | | The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (David Lew), NRR EO (John | | Tappert), IRO (Nader Mamish), NRR IAT (Richard Rosano), NMSS IAT (Aaron | | Danis), Region 1 IAT (Greg Smith), Region 1 (Curtis Cowgill), Headquarters | | OPA (Beth Hayden), and Region 1 OPA (Neil Sheehan). | | | | * * * PARTIAL RETRACTION 1350 9/10/2001 FROM SMITH TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | The licensee has determined that this incident is not reportable pursuant to | | 10 CFR 73.71 (b)(1) as a one hour report. The NRC resident inspector has | | been informed. Notified R1DO (Barr). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38272 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/10/2001| |LICENSEE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:48[EDT]| | CITY: PENDLETON REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/06/2001| | COUNTY: STATE: OR |EVENT TIME: 11:00[PDT]| |LICENSE#: 19-00915-03 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/10/2001| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |MARK SHAFFER R4 | | |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JENSEN | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | STUCK SOURCE | | | | The licensee reported that a 15 mCi Am-241 source, used for soil moisture | | measurements, had become stuck within a 6 foot length of tubing. Attempts to | | retrieve it using the attached cable were unsuccessful. The source was | | retrieved by digging up the tubing, cutting off the bottom portion and | | pushing the source back up through the tube. The source was returned to its | | shipping container. The dosimetry of the individual who performed the | | retrieval has been sent to the vendor for analysis. | | | | An inspector from NRC Region I is currently performing a site visit to the | | USDA office in Beltsville, MD, from where this report originated. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38273 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/10/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:13[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/07/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:54[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: WILLIAM GREEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/10/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MARK SHAFFER R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |62 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER SOURCES DUE TO LIGHTNING | | | | "On 9/7/01 at 1750 CDT the Startup Transformer was de-energized due to a | | lightning strike on the transmission system. This deenergized one of the two | | off-site circuits. This trip resulted in the trip of 'A' Recirculation M/G | | set and subsequent single loop operations. Shortly after this at 1754 CDT | | the Emergency Transformer was declared inoperable due to degraded voltage | | and the plant entered the Limiting Condition for Operations for loss of both | | off-site power circuits. Both Emergency Diesels remained available and the | | unit remained on line. All plant equipment responded as expected. At 1932 | | CDT the Emergency Transformer was returned to operable status. Two loop | | operations were restored at 0521 CDT on 9/8/01. The Startup Transformer was | | restored to operable at 1045 CDT on 9/8/01. Full power operation was | | restored at 2100 CDT on 9/8/01. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been | | notified. This event is reportable in accordance with NUREG 1022 Rev. 2 and | | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Staff review of the event and NUREG 1022 Rev. 2 on | | 9/10/01 identified the need to make a report under 10 CFR 50.72." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021