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Event Notification Report for September 7, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/06/2001 - 09/07/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38132  38266  38267  38268  38269  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38132       |
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| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/12/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GENE MICHELSON               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/06/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS  R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)   POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| DISCOVERY OF AN EXCESSIVE ACCUMULATION OF WATER IN TWO UNDERGROUND FUEL OIL  |
| STORAGE TANKS                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "[An] excessive accumulation of water [was] discovered in both [the] D11 and |
| D12 underground fuel oil storage tanks.  [There was 33 inches of water in    |
| D11 and 22.5 inches of water in D12.]  This event would prevent both diesel  |
| generators from fulfilling their required safety function.  [Technical       |
| Specification 3.8.1.1, Actions 'b' and 'e,' were] entered, and reportability |
| manual event SAF 1.8 [was also] entered."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Actions Taken:  Water has been removed from both [the] D11 and D12          |
| underground fuel oil storage tanks.  [The licensee is] currently performing  |
| [an] operability determination."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the unit is remains in the 72-hour limiting         |
| condition for operation due to the ongoing operability determination.        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 09/06/01 AT 1407 ET BY STAN GAMBLE TAKEN BY MACKINNON *  |
| *  *                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Subsequent testing verified that the water level in both tanks was below the |
| fuel oil transfer pump suction and that no water was found in the associated |
| Day Tanks.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Since no water had been nor would it have been transferred from the Fuel Oil |
| Storage Tanks to the Day Tanks during operation of the Diesel Generators, a  |
| condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented   |
| the fulfillment of the safety function.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.  |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38266       |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:52[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/06/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        06:00[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/06/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MARK RING            R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+RICHARD WESSMAN      IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M. PITTMAN                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 4 HOUR REPORT - NRC BULLETIN 91-01                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The following is taken from a facsimile report:                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 0600, on 9-06-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that  |
| moisture sampling results on Unit 1 Cell 2 even R-114 system in building     |
| C-337 were above allowable limits of NCSA CAS-011.  NCSA CAS-011 sets the    |
| limit for moisture content in R-114 at 1760 ppm. The sample results showed   |
| that the actual moisture content in C-337 Unit 1 Cell 2 even R-114 system    |
| was 2100 ppm.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Set point calculations for the R-114 moisture meters used by Cascade         |
| personnel to determine the moisture content of R-114 for Cascade coolant     |
| systems was found biased low with respect to moisture content.  The meters   |
| are used to detect high moisture levels in the R-114.  An R-114 system       |
| containing a high moisture content is required to be independently verified  |
| drained prior to removing the fluorinating process environment.  Since the   |
| setpoint calculation was potentially in error, R-114 with a potentially high |
| moisture content was not immediately drained according to NCSA CAS-002.      |
| This control prevents a moderating environment within the process gas system |
| from exceeding 50% relative humidity at 70 degrees F.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event.              |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
| The final determination of whether the moisture content limit has been       |
| exceeded cannot be made until the moisture meter "as-found" calibration data |
| can be reviewed.  This data a not currently available.  However, the plant   |
| is pro-actively taking the compensatory actions as though the moisture meter |
| were in error until such time as the calibration data can be reviewed as a   |
| final determination made.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
| In order for a criticality to be possible a fissile deposit containing       |
| greater than a critical mass would have to absorb greater than 10 kg of      |
| water.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC:       |
| Two controls on moderation.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
| No known deposits of concern at this time.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two      |
| controls on moderation.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on immediately draining the     |
| R-114 upon determination that it contains a high moisture content.  The set  |
| point calculation derived for the R-114 moisture meter was biased low with   |
| respect to moisture content.  Due to the set point calculation error the     |
| R-114 system was not immediately drained as required by the NCSA which may   |
| have allowed an unknown quantity of water to enter the process system.       |
| Since the quantity of water in-leakage to the process system cannot be       |
| quantified the process condition was exceeded and double contingency was not |
| maintained.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independently verifying the |
| immediate draining of the R-114 upon determining that it contains a high     |
| moisture content.  The set point calculation derived for the independent     |
| R-114 moisture meter was biased low with respect to moisture content.  Due   |
| to the set point calculation error the R-114 system was not independently    |
| verified as being immediately drained as required by the NCSA which may have |
| allowed an unknown quantity of water to enter the process system.  Since the |
| quantity of water in-leakage to the process system cannot be quantified the  |
| process condition was exceeded and double contingency was not maintained.    |
|                                                                              |
| Since double contingency is based on two controls on moderation, double      |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| The R-114 system is in the process of being drained.  The process system     |
| will then be sampled for R-114 per CP3-CO-C02029 and appropriate actions     |
| contained therein will be performed.                                         |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38267       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| REP ORG:  FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/06/2001|
|LICENSEE:  SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER CORP.        |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:15[EDT]|
|    CITY:  PORT ST. JOE-            REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/29/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  FL |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  0194-1                AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/06/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |JOHN MONNINGER       R2      |
|                                                |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHARLEY ADAMS                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT:  MISSING NDC DENSITY GAUGE                           |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Today Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation faxed a copy of a letter to the    |
| State of Florida Bureau of Radiation Control stating that a device was       |
| missing;  NDC, Mass Monitor, Model # 104.  The former Florida Coast Paper    |
| facility had several fixed radioactive sources when it went bankrupt in      |
| 1998.  It was purchased by Smurfit-Stone and the radioactive sources have    |
| all been removed with the exception of this source.  It was a portable       |
| device that had been kept in a locked steel toolbox within a locked          |
| laboratory.  It was last seen in late June.  Numerous contractors have been  |
| on site engaged in the removal of equipment prior to mill demolition.  Mill  |
| personnel have searched the mill repeatedly and now suspect that the device  |
| was removed by one of the contractors.  All facilities that have received    |
| equipment from the mill have been asked to search for the device.  Florida   |
| is investigating this incident.  Florida incident number for this event is   |
| FL01-095.  The NDC Mass Monitor contained 30 millicuries of americium-241.   |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38268       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATIREGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/07/2001|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-5                             |EVENT DATE:        09/06/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:38[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WILLIAM BAKER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/07/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM MADE INOPERABLE                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Columbia Generating Station Reactor Core Isolation Cooing (RCIC) system has |
| been isolated and made inoperable per Technical Specification 3.5.3 and      |
| unavailable due to manual closure of the RCIC turbine trip valve.  The       |
| manual closure of the RCIC turbine trip valve was required due to the loss   |
| of automatic trip capability of the turbine trip valve [due to a solenoid    |
| failure].  This loss of automatic trip capability under postulated           |
| conditions could cause a water hammer event significant enough to threaten   |
| primary containment.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "The RCIC system is a single train system and is listed in plant procedures  |
| as an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The RCIC system will function automatically or manually to inject water     |
| into the RPV if manually returned to service."                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38269       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/07/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:30[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        09/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:24[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL FITZPATRICK          |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/07/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MARK RING            R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     M/R        Y       72       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO 2 LOW PRESSURE HEATER STRINGS ISOLATING          |
|                                                                              |
| The following is taken from a facsimile report:                              |
|                                                                              |
| This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS actuation (scram)  |
| (4 hour notification for U-2).                                               |
|                                                                              |
| At 12:24 AM CDT, Friday 9/7/01, U-2 was manually scrammed. The initiating    |
| event was a loss of 2 of 3 Low Pressure Feedwater Heater Strings. A high     |
| level condition was initially received in the 21A Low Pressure Heater, which |
| caused the Condensate System inlet and outlet isolation valves to the 2A Low |
| Pressure Heater String to close. Subsequently, a high level condition was    |
| also received in the 21C Low Pressure Heater, which caused the Condensate    |
| System inlet and outlet isolation valves to the 2C Low Pressure Heater       |
| String to close. With a second Low Pressure Heater String isolated, Unit 2   |
| was manually scrammed in accordance with LaSalle Procedure LOA-HD-201,       |
| "Heater Drain System Trouble".                                               |
|                                                                              |
| All systems operated as designed, There were no ECCS actuations or Primary   |
| Containment isolations. The lowest Reactor level reached was minus 20 inches |
| (141 inches above the top of active fuel) and was recovered to normal level  |
| using feedwater. Reactor pressure responded normally. No Safety Relief       |
| Valves actuated. All Control Rods fully inserted.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of the Low Pressure Heater String loss is being investigated at    |
| this time.                                                                   |
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