Event Notification Report for September 5, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/04/2001 - 09/05/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38263 38264 38265 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38263 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: WATTS BAR REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/04/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:54[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/04/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:04[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: RODEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JOHN MONNINGER R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| | |AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REACTOR MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 100% POWER DUE TO STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL | | APPROACHING THE LO-LO LEVEL SETPOINT | | | | While operating at 100% power, the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor was manually | | tripped at approximately 1304 EDT on September 4, 2001 due to steam | | generator (SG) level approaching the Lo-Lo level setpoint. Just prior to | | the manual trip of the reactor, an abnormal voltage alarm was received on | | 125V Vital Battery Board 1-1. The immediate cause of the trip is considered | | to be the loss of the 1-1 Vital AC Inverter which caused a feedwater | | regulating valve to close. Subsequently, the maintenance power supply was | | used to restore power to the 1-1 vital AC bus. | | | | All control rods inserted properly in response to the reactor trip. The | | Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected. However, subsequent | | to the initial actuation signal, additional operator action was required | | to[manually] start 1B motor driven pump. After the 1B pump was | | successfully started, the motor driven AFW pump 1A was secured based on | | instrument indications available to the operating staff. After power was | | restored to the vital AC bus, the 1A pump was subsequently started and | | performed properly. Inspections are currently underway to determine the | | exact cause of the loss of the 1-1 Vital Inverter and basis for the 1B pump | | failing to [auto] start. | | | | No ECCS injection occurred, but the steam generator atmospheric relief | | valves lifted and fully reseated. | | | | The manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is being | | reported as a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv). The actuation | | of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being | | reported as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv). | | | | The plant is stable in mode 3. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38264 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/04/2001| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:00[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/04/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: LAVATE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |HAROLD GRAY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF 17 OUT OF THE 49 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM SIRENS FOR CALVERT | | COUNTY | | | | The licensee reported that 17 out of 49 sirens in Calvert County failed to | | respond to the scheduled county test.. However, all sirens did respond to | | a mobile siren test kit which is used locally at the siren. Calvert County | | Emergency Management was notified to perform route alerting in the affected | | areas in the event of an emergency. The cause is believed to be a | | transmission problem. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The county has been notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38265 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/04/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:09[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/04/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:00[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/04/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MARK RING R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: UNDERWOOD | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN RESPONSE | | | | At 1400, on 9/4/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an | | NCSA violation that had occurred at the C-355 air plant. Immediately after | | switching drying units at the air plant, a high-high moisture alarm was | | received. The alarm indicated air moisture content greater than 1300 ppm | | water, violating NCSA GEN-10-01. NCSA GEN-010 credits the dry air system | | for producing dry air with moisture content of less than 1300 ppm. The | | purpose of this requirement is to prevent exposure of fissile uranium | | deposits to a moderating environment. No equipment containing fissile | | material was exposed to high moisture content plant air at the time of the | | alarm or following receipt of the alarm. | | | | Since one leg of double contingency was lost, this is being reported to the | | NRC as a 24-hr. event report. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | There was no purging of equipment containing fissile material in progress at | | the time of the moisture excursion. Although a parameter was exceeded, the | | proper response to the alarm was taken prior to resuming buffering of | | purging equipment containing fissile material. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED(BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY | | COULD OCCUR: | | In order for a criticality to be possible. Operations personnel would have | | had to fail to respond to the alarm. In addition, a fissile deposit | | containing greater than a critical mass and absorbing greater than 10 kg of | | water would have had to be present. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION. GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION. ETC: | | Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two | | controls on moderation. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): | | n/a | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two | | controls on moderation. | | | | The first leg of double contingency Is based on receiving a high-high | | moisture alarm indicating a moisture content greater than 1300 ppm water and | | ceasing buffering and purging operations in response to the alarm. This | | control was not violated. | | | | The second leg of double contingency is based on the dry air system | | producing plant air with a moisture content less than 1300 ppm water. Since | | the moisture content was confirmed to be greater than 1300 ppm, this process | | condition was exceeded and double contingency was not maintained. | | | | Since double contingency is based on two controls on moderation, double | | contingency was not maintained. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | No corrective actions implemented. Proper procedure response was performed. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021