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Event Notification Report for August 9, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/08/2001 - 08/09/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38189  38190  38191  38192  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38189       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: GRAND GULF               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/07/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:11[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        08/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN BLANCHE                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/08/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CHARLES MARSCHALL    R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A)   POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOR REASONS UNKNOWN            |
|                                                                              |
| "At 2015, Grand Gulf Unit 1 had an automatic RPS actuation.  This is a       |
| 4-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).  All systems performed   |
| as expected, except that Feedwater/Condensate were not available due to      |
| hotwell level problems.  RCIC was manually started for level control.  At    |
| the time of the scram, a local generating station was experiencing           |
| switchyard problems (Baxter Wilson Electric Station).  Also at the time,     |
| significant lightning strikes were noticed in the area.  Scram initiation    |
| event analysis is in progress."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| All rods fully inserted.  The licensee is in the process of restoring the    |
| condensate system.  Offsite power is stable and available.  All safety       |
| equipment is available.  The main condenser is available for decay heat      |
| removal.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1756EDT ON 8/8/01 FROM WALTER CADE TO S. SANDIN * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| "This is supplemental to event number 38189 reported on 8/7/01.              |
|                                                                              |
| " During Post Trip analysis of Reactor Scram, it was determined that the     |
| EOC-RPT circuits required by GGNS Technical Specifications did not function  |
| as expected.  There were no consequences to the failure as a non-tech spec   |
| vendor supplied load reject circuit operated properly.  This is being        |
| reported per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A).  Details will be available in the    |
| LER to follow.  This circuit [is] not required below 40% Reactor Power."     |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently in mode 3 making preparations for restart.  Corrective |
| actions will be determined following completion of a fuels analysis.  This   |
| issue and a possible TS change request has been discussed with NRR.  The     |
| licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.  Notified R4DO(Marschall).     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38190       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/08/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:37[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        08/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBINSON                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/08/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DANIEL HOLODY        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99.8     Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99.8     Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL OPERATION OUTSIDE OF LICENSE LIMITS                                |
|                                                                              |
| On 8/7/2001, with Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating in Mode 1 at 100% power,       |
| during a review of the Core Thermal Power calculation, Engineering           |
| discovered that a constant for the Moisture Fraction input into the          |
| calculation was non-conservative.  Due to the identified non-conservatism in |
| the constant, actual core thermal power could have been as much as 6 MWth    |
| higher than indicated (~0.2% of Rated Thermal Power).  This condition        |
| resulted in both Units having potentially operated above their Maximum Power |
| Level License Limits (Reference NPF-14, 2.C(1) and NPF-22, 2.C(1)).          |
|                                                                              |
| Both Units have been administratively de-rated 7 MWth until this issue is    |
| resolved.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| There is a potential that this condition has existed since the startup of    |
| both Units.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| This event meets the License Conditions requiring a 24 Hour report in        |
| accordance with 10CFR50.72.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38191       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/08/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:20[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/08/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:15[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/08/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |ANNE MARIE STONE     R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  K. A. BEASLEY                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING VIOLATION OF CRITICALITY         |
| CONTROLS                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0915, on 8-8-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of an |
| NCSA violation that had occurred in the C-335 building. While a Waste        |
| Management operator was transporting a potentially fissile 5.5 gallon waste  |
| drum on the ground floor of C-335, the operator momentarily set down the     |
| drum being transported closer than 2 feet from another potentially fissile   |
| drum in violation of the spacing requirements in NCSA GEN-15. The operator   |
| them continued the task, and transported the container to its desired        |
| location. The requirement states that a minimum 2 foot edge-to edge spacing  |
| is required between fissile/potentially fissile waste containers. This       |
| requirement is used as an interaction control.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Since one leg of double contingency was lost this is being reported to the  |
| NRC as a 24-hr. Event  report.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event.             |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "While a control was violated, concurrent violations of the same control     |
| would have to occur for a criticality to be possible. NCSA GEN-15 limits the |
| movement of fissile/potentially fissile waste to one container at a time,    |
| limiting the possibility of concurrent violations of the spacing control.    |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, additional concurrent spacing    |
| violations would have to occur.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by Implementing a       |
| control for geometry and a control for interaction.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND %WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Less than 240 grams U-235                                                   |
| .                                                                            |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing a       |
| control for geometry and a control for interaction.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on geometry. Specific          |
| dimensions for the 5.5 gallon waste drums are used in the calculation        |
| analysis. The drum used was an AQ-NCS approved container. This control was   |
| not violated.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on interaction. NCSA GEN-15   |
| requires fissile/potentially fissile waste container be maintained a minimum |
| of 2 foot edge-to edge from other fissile/potentially fissile material. By   |
| placing the drum less than 2 feet from another fissile/potentially fissile   |
| waste container, the control was violated and the process condition limit    |
| was exceeded.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Since the interaction process condition limit was exceeded, double          |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AN WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "The drum was placed in a safe configuration immediately following the       |
| incident."                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38192       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/08/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [4] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:42[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT GOODIN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/08/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|4     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STARTUP TRANSFORMER (SUT) AND 4A EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) BOTH       |
| INOPERABLE                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 4 Startup Transformer (SUT) and 4A EDG were both inoperable for 3       |
| hours, 40 minutes on 08/08/01.  This was discovered after the fact at 1900   |
| hours on 08/08/01 while investigating a failure of the 4A EDG ventilation    |
| system.  The 4A EDG was restored to operable status at 1920 hours on         |
| 08/08/01.  The Unit 4 SUT was taken out of service at 0800 0n 08/08/01 for   |
| planned maintenance.  The SUT on Unit 4 was returned to operable status at   |
| 1140 hours on 08/08/01.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
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