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Event Notification Report for August 8, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/07/2001 - 08/08/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38161  38188  38189  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38161       |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/23/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:27[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        07/23/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        12:55[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/07/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |C.W. (BILL) REAMER   NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+NADER MAMISH         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM WHITE                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 4-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah         |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1255, on 7-23-01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| checks required to meet the requirements of NCSA CAS-011 were not performed  |
| during replacement of the C-337 Unit 5 Cell 10 RCW [recirculating cooling    |
| water] spool piece. NCSA CAS-011 requires a line clarity check on the peak   |
| reading pressure gauges prior to connecting the spool piece. This check was  |
| not performed. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure the RCW pressure |
| in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 PSIA.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event.             |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
| "While a control was violated, insufficient time existed for moisture from   |
| the RCW system to enter the process gas system.                              |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the following conditions must    |
| exist. With the condenser RCW supply and return valves closed, the supply or |
| return valve must be leaking to allow the condenser pressure to exceed the   |
| minimum coolant pressure of 35.5 PSIA. The process gas equipment must        |
| contain a UO2F2 deposit greater than a critical mass. The condenser must     |
| have a leak of sufficient rate and duration to allow enough water to         |
| overcome the down corner allowing liquid water to enter the cooler. The      |
| cooler must also have a simultaneous leak which would allow wet coolant to   |
| leak into the process gas side of the equipment at a location which would    |
| allow a moderation of the deposit.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):     |
| "Two controls on moderation.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
| "No known deposits of concern at this time..                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two     |
| controls on moderation.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing moderation of a  |
| deposit by maintaining the RCW pressure in a condenser below 35.5 PSIA.      |
| Pressure gauges are installed and checked for clarity whenever the RCW       |
| return valve is closed on a cell without a fluorinating environment. Since   |
| clarity of the pressure reading instrument was not verified, the             |
| functionality of the pressure reading instrument cannot be assured,          |
| violating the control.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based upon independent verification |
| that the RCW pressure gauges are reading correctly. Since clarity of the     |
| pressure reading instrument was not independently verified, this control was |
| violated.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS              |
| IMPLEMENTED:                                                                 |
| "Upon discovery of the failure to perform the requirement, the coolant       |
| system was sampled for moisture and verified to be dry."                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1623EDT ON 8/7/01 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| This report is retracted based on the following:                             |
|                                                                              |
| "UPDATE 8-7-01: THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Additional information was    |
| discovered which changes the initial evaluation of the violation. In         |
| preparation for maintenance, the peak reading pressure gauges were           |
| adequately installed on the condenser head and clarity verified prior to     |
| isolating the condenser. Since the maintenance involved the RCW control      |
| valve, it was not necessary to remove the pressure gauges. The normal course |
| of events would be to remove the pressure gauges after the condenser is      |
| drained. However, in this case, the maintenance evolution was limited and    |
| Cascade Operations decided to leave the pressure gauges installed on the     |
| condenser head. If the pressure gauges had been removed while the RCW system |
| was drained the gauges would have been required to be reinstalled and        |
| clarity verified prior to reestablishing system integrity. Once system       |
| integrity is reestablished, the pressure gauges are used to ensure the RCW   |
| pressure in the condenser does not exceed 35.5 psia. The clarity check       |
| supports the double contingency principle by ensuring the common instrument  |
| line to the gauges is not blocked. However, in this case, the gauges were    |
| not removed and the instrument isolation valves were not manipulated.        |
| Therefore, clarity was maintained.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "After the maintenance had been performed, Operations realized the second    |
| clarity check had not been performed. At this point, NCS was contacted and   |
| direction was given to perform the remedial actions as if the pressure limit |
| were exceeded according to NCSA CAS-011. These actions included opening the  |
| RCW return valve and sampling the coolant system for moisture, which was     |
| found to be below the moisture limits, These actions were performed within   |
| the NCSA CAS-011 required inspection frequency of 12 hours.                  |
|                                                                              |
| "After the incident report was competed, it was discovered that the pressure |
| gauges had not been removed from the condenser head. Therefore, the          |
| requirement for the reinstallation and clarity check of the pressure gauges  |
| had already been performed. Since the requirement of NCSA CAS-011 to perform |
| a clarity check was met and the system conditions were clearly bounded by    |
| the analysis of NCSA CAS-011, no violation occurred.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Acting Senior Resident has been notified of this event."            |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO(Stone) and NMSS(Brown).                                        |
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|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38188       |
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| REP ORG:  SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/07/2001|
|LICENSEE:  GME ENGINEERING                      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:53[EDT]|
|    CITY:  GREENVILLE               REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/03/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  SC |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  522                   AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/07/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|                                                |FRED BROWN           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KING                         |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA WAS NOTIFIED BY ONE OF THEIR LICENSEES OF A HIGH     |
| FILM BADGE READING                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| GME Engineering, which uses moisture density gauges, received a second       |
| quarter film badge reading for one of its employees that measured 33.5 Rem.  |
| The employee had been terminated in mid May for vandalizing company          |
| property.  It is believed that the employee intentionally exposed his badge  |
| so that he would not have to work with a moisture density gauge any more.    |
| The licensee has not been able to locate the individual.  The State was      |
| notified on 8/7/01.                                                          |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38189       |
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| FACILITY: GRAND GULF               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/07/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:11[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        08/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN BLANCHE                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/07/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CHARLES MARSCHALL    R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOR REASONS UNKNOWN            |
|                                                                              |
| "At 2015, Grand Gulf Unit 1 had an automatic RPS actuation.  This is a       |
| 4-hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B).  All systems performed   |
| as expected, except that Feedwater/Condensate were not available due to      |
| hotwell level problems.  RCIC was manually started for level control.  At    |
| the time of the scram, a local generating station was experiencing           |
| switchyard problems (Baxter Wilson Electric Station).  Also at the time,     |
| significant lightning strikes were noticed in the area.  Scram initiation    |
| event analysis is in progress."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| All rods fully inserted.  The licensee is in the process of restoring the    |
| condensate system.  Offsite power is stable and available.  All safety       |
| equipment is available.  The main condenser is available for decay heat      |
| removal.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
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