Event Notification Report for July 20, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/19/2001 - 07/20/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38144 38152 38153 38154 38155
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38144 |
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| FACILITY: VOGTLE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/16/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:51[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/16/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:33[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DORMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAY HENSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PLANT HAD A MAJOR LOSS OF OFFSITE PUBLIC ALERTING SIREN SYSTEM |
| |
| While performing the weekly siren test, 35 of 47 sirens failed to respond. |
| The weekly test was performed at 1033 EDT. Preliminary investigation |
| suggests a problem with the sirens electronic memory chip. Troubleshooting |
| and repairs are in progress. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE FROM JOHN C. WILLIAMS TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1621 ON 07/19/01 |
| ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This is an Information Only follow-up notice to Event Notification #38144, |
| submitted on 7-16-2001, regarding the loss of 35 out of 47 sirens in the |
| Offsite Public Alerting Siren System." |
| |
| "All sirens were tested and returned to service as of 1516 EDT on 7-18-2001. |
| A vendor representative from Whelan Engineering Company has advised that |
| cause of the problem was a software issue with a batch of 2020 logic control |
| boards, revision E or prior, used in the siren controller. He further |
| states that he knows of no other nuclear facilities that have these |
| controller boards at this time." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R2DO (Jay Henson). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38152 |
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| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:16[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RYAN RODE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |90 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO TIME LIMIT ON NON-SAFETY POWER TO |
| INSTRUMENT BUS |
| |
| The licensee entered Technical Specification 15.3.7(b)(1)(j) at 1900 CDT on |
| 7/18/2001, which allowed 8 hours to restore electrical power from a safety |
| powered bus to the Unit 1 instrument bus. Non-safety power was provided |
| when a problem caused an automatic transfer. At 0300 CDT on 7/19/2001, a |
| Technical Specification required shutdown was commenced. The plant has 6 |
| hours to reach Hot Shutdown and another 44 hours to reach Cold Shutdown. |
| The licensee has been and continues to research the problem and does not |
| know when safety power will be restored to the instrument bus. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATED AT 0936 EDT ON 7/19/2001 BY MIKE MEYER TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| The licensee restored power from a safety powered bus to the instrument bus |
| and has exited the Tech Spec required shutdown. Plant is being restored to |
| full power. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Bruce |
| Jorgensen) has been notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38153 |
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| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:34[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 05/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: I. A. ABBASI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |WILLIAM COOK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |VERN HODGE NRR |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| 10 CFR 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR DEGRADATION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT |
| |
| The following is from a faxed report: |
| |
| "Basic component: Safety-related terminal block (symbol #95-10-077) |
| |
| "Supplier: Systems Control of Iron Mountain, Michigan [manufacturer is |
| General Electric, both supplier and manufacturer have been contacted by |
| NMP.] |
| |
| "Nature of defect: While installing a new terminal block in the emergency |
| diesel generator panels, a mounting screw for terminal points was found to |
| be loose. Contrary to general quality requirements stated in the Purchase |
| Order, this screw was not fully threaded during manufacture. As a result, if |
| installed, the screw could potentially have fallen into safety-related |
| equipment located below thereby potentially affecting the function of the |
| emergency diesels. Thus, a major degradation of essential safety-related |
| equipment ,i.e., a substantial safety hazard, could have occurred. |
| |
| "Number of terminal blocks initially estimated to be affected at Nine Mile |
| Point Units 1 and 2: Several hundred (including 169 in stock) |
| |
| "Corrective actions taken: The defective terminal block was discarded, A 20 |
| percent sample inspection of the terminal blocks remaining in stock at NMP |
| was performed. No other loose screws were identified. These terminal blocks |
| were supplied in the 1980s and no plant operational problems due to a loose |
| screw in a terminal block were previously identified. Therefore, it has been |
| concluded that this is an isolated instance. |
| |
| "Date of discovery: May 14, 2001 |
| |
| "Date on which 10CFR21 evaluation completed: July 12, 2001 |
| |
| "Date on which Vice President Nuclear Generation notified: July 17, 2001 |
| |
| "Date by which written 10CFR21 report will be submitted: August 16, 2001 |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38154 |
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| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDY DISMUKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAY HENSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM DEAN NRR |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |DICK WESSMAN IRO |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| SECURITY REPORT |
| |
| Unescorted access granted inappropriately to a NRC employee and 2 NRC |
| contractors. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. |
| |
| Refer to the HOO Log for additional details. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38155 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:57[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/19/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:10[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+NADER MAMISH IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE UNDERWOOD |ROB KRSEK R3RI |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (4-Hour Report) - LOSS OF ALL DOUBLE CONTINGENCY |
| CONTROLS APPLICABLE TO A FISSILE MATERIAL OPERATION DUE TO AN INADEQUATE NCS |
| EVALUATION |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah |
| personnel: |
| |
| "DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:" |
| |
| "Neither NCSA GEN-010 [which deals with equipment removal and replacement] |
| nor NCSA CAS-011 [which deals with cell shutdown and the controls for |
| equipment moderation control] establish necessary moderation controls to |
| ensure double contingency is maintained for the transition between equipment |
| removal and cell shutdown. [Essentially, if a cell is taken out of service |
| and a piece of equipment is removed, there are no controls in place to |
| ensure that the equipment that goes back in has met the requirements of |
| control 3.3.6 of CAS-011, and the purpose of this control is to prevent |
| moderation by heating the equipment up to 140�F for 60 hours.] Control |
| 3.3.6 of NCSA CAS-011 establishes a baseline hydration level for maintaining |
| double contingency on shutdown process equipment." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY:" |
| |
| "NCSE 039 establishes double contingency based on two controls on |
| moderation." |
| |
| "Controls have not been established to ensure moderation control is |
| maintained during the transition from equipment installation activities |
| performed under NCSA GEN-010 and cell shutdown approved under NCSA CAS-011. |
| Therefore, double contingency was not maintained." |
| |
| "Potential Critical Pathways:" |
| |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, an equipment item containing a |
| hydrated UH by mass deposit would have to be installed in the cascade. |
| Following installation, normal equipment treatment activities would have to |
| fail to dehydrate the deposit. Following startup, the equipment would have |
| to fail to operate at or above 140 F for 60 hrs. The deposit would then |
| have to more than double in size and achieve a total of at least 10 kg of |
| water hydration in a geometry favorable to result in a critical |
| configuration." |
| |
| "Safety Significance:" |
| |
| "No NCSA controls have been established to address the currently allowed |
| transition from equipment installation to cell shutdown." |
| |
| "EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:" |
| |
| "None." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:" |
| |
| "1. Areas of the cascade containing equipment that was installed following |
| implementation of NCSA CAS-011 should be reviewed to determine if the drying |
| requirements established in NCSA CAS-011 have been met." |
| |
| "2. Discontinue installation of process gas equipment containing fissile |
| deposits until adequate controls have been established for this |
| transition." |
| |
| "3. Include work packages related to GEN-010 equipment installation on Work |
| Control Functional Directive WC-99-001." |
| |
| Paducah personnel plan to ensure that these requirements are addressed in |
| the procedures in addition to following up on equipment that could |
| potentially have been installed that was not addressed under these |
| requirements. |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector (Rob Krsek). |
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