Event Notification Report for July 20, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 07/19/2001 - 07/20/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38144 38152 38153 38154 38155 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38144 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: VOGTLE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/16/2001| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:51[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/16/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:33[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DORMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAY HENSON R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE| | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PLANT HAD A MAJOR LOSS OF OFFSITE PUBLIC ALERTING SIREN SYSTEM | | | | While performing the weekly siren test, 35 of 47 sirens failed to respond. | | The weekly test was performed at 1033 EDT. Preliminary investigation | | suggests a problem with the sirens electronic memory chip. Troubleshooting | | and repairs are in progress. | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been notified. | | | | ***** UPDATE FROM JOHN C. WILLIAMS TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1621 ON 07/19/01 | | ***** | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "This is an Information Only follow-up notice to Event Notification #38144, | | submitted on 7-16-2001, regarding the loss of 35 out of 47 sirens in the | | Offsite Public Alerting Siren System." | | | | "All sirens were tested and returned to service as of 1516 EDT on 7-18-2001. | | A vendor representative from Whelan Engineering Company has advised that | | cause of the problem was a software issue with a batch of 2020 logic control | | boards, revision E or prior, used in the siren controller. He further | | states that he knows of no other nuclear facilities that have these | | controller boards at this time." | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations | | officer notified the R2DO (Jay Henson). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38152 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:16[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/19/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:00[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: RYAN RODE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |90 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO TIME LIMIT ON NON-SAFETY POWER TO | | INSTRUMENT BUS | | | | The licensee entered Technical Specification 15.3.7(b)(1)(j) at 1900 CDT on | | 7/18/2001, which allowed 8 hours to restore electrical power from a safety | | powered bus to the Unit 1 instrument bus. Non-safety power was provided | | when a problem caused an automatic transfer. At 0300 CDT on 7/19/2001, a | | Technical Specification required shutdown was commenced. The plant has 6 | | hours to reach Hot Shutdown and another 44 hours to reach Cold Shutdown. | | The licensee has been and continues to research the problem and does not | | know when safety power will be restored to the instrument bus. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | * * * UPDATED AT 0936 EDT ON 7/19/2001 BY MIKE MEYER TO FANGIE JONES * * * | | | | The licensee restored power from a safety powered bus to the instrument bus | | and has exited the Tech Spec required shutdown. Plant is being restored to | | full power. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Bruce | | Jorgensen) has been notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38153 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:34[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 05/14/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: I. A. ABBASI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |WILLIAM COOK R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: |VERN HODGE NRR | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 10 CFR 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR DEGRADATION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT | | | | The following is from a faxed report: | | | | "Basic component: Safety-related terminal block (symbol #95-10-077) | | | | "Supplier: Systems Control of Iron Mountain, Michigan [manufacturer is | | General Electric, both supplier and manufacturer have been contacted by | | NMP.] | | | | "Nature of defect: While installing a new terminal block in the emergency | | diesel generator panels, a mounting screw for terminal points was found to | | be loose. Contrary to general quality requirements stated in the Purchase | | Order, this screw was not fully threaded during manufacture. As a result, if | | installed, the screw could potentially have fallen into safety-related | | equipment located below thereby potentially affecting the function of the | | emergency diesels. Thus, a major degradation of essential safety-related | | equipment ,i.e., a substantial safety hazard, could have occurred. | | | | "Number of terminal blocks initially estimated to be affected at Nine Mile | | Point Units 1 and 2: Several hundred (including 169 in stock) | | | | "Corrective actions taken: The defective terminal block was discarded, A 20 | | percent sample inspection of the terminal blocks remaining in stock at NMP | | was performed. No other loose screws were identified. These terminal blocks | | were supplied in the 1980s and no plant operational problems due to a loose | | screw in a terminal block were previously identified. Therefore, it has been | | concluded that this is an isolated instance. | | | | "Date of discovery: May 14, 2001 | | | | "Date on which 10CFR21 evaluation completed: July 12, 2001 | | | | "Date on which Vice President Nuclear Generation notified: July 17, 2001 | | | | "Date by which written 10CFR21 report will be submitted: August 16, 2001 | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38154 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/19/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:30[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ANDY DISMUKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAY HENSON R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: |WILLIAM DEAN NRR | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |DICK WESSMAN IRO | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SECURITY REPORT | | | | Unescorted access granted inappropriately to a NRC employee and 2 NRC | | contractors. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. | | | | Refer to the HOO Log for additional details. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38155 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:57[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/19/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:10[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/19/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+NADER MAMISH IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE UNDERWOOD |ROB KRSEK R3RI | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (4-Hour Report) - LOSS OF ALL DOUBLE CONTINGENCY | | CONTROLS APPLICABLE TO A FISSILE MATERIAL OPERATION DUE TO AN INADEQUATE NCS | | EVALUATION | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah | | personnel: | | | | "DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:" | | | | "Neither NCSA GEN-010 [which deals with equipment removal and replacement] | | nor NCSA CAS-011 [which deals with cell shutdown and the controls for | | equipment moderation control] establish necessary moderation controls to | | ensure double contingency is maintained for the transition between equipment | | removal and cell shutdown. [Essentially, if a cell is taken out of service | | and a piece of equipment is removed, there are no controls in place to | | ensure that the equipment that goes back in has met the requirements of | | control 3.3.6 of CAS-011, and the purpose of this control is to prevent | | moderation by heating the equipment up to 140�F for 60 hours.] Control | | 3.3.6 of NCSA CAS-011 establishes a baseline hydration level for maintaining | | double contingency on shutdown process equipment." | | | | "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE | | CONTINGENCY:" | | | | "NCSE 039 establishes double contingency based on two controls on | | moderation." | | | | "Controls have not been established to ensure moderation control is | | maintained during the transition from equipment installation activities | | performed under NCSA GEN-010 and cell shutdown approved under NCSA CAS-011. | | Therefore, double contingency was not maintained." | | | | "Potential Critical Pathways:" | | | | "In order for a criticality to be possible, an equipment item containing a | | hydrated UH by mass deposit would have to be installed in the cascade. | | Following installation, normal equipment treatment activities would have to | | fail to dehydrate the deposit. Following startup, the equipment would have | | to fail to operate at or above 140 F for 60 hrs. The deposit would then | | have to more than double in size and achieve a total of at least 10 kg of | | water hydration in a geometry favorable to result in a critical | | configuration." | | | | "Safety Significance:" | | | | "No NCSA controls have been established to address the currently allowed | | transition from equipment installation to cell shutdown." | | | | "EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:" | | | | "None." | | | | "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:" | | | | "1. Areas of the cascade containing equipment that was installed following | | implementation of NCSA CAS-011 should be reviewed to determine if the drying | | requirements established in NCSA CAS-011 have been met." | | | | "2. Discontinue installation of process gas equipment containing fissile | | deposits until adequate controls have been established for this | | transition." | | | | "3. Include work packages related to GEN-010 equipment installation on Work | | Control Functional Directive WC-99-001." | | | | Paducah personnel plan to ensure that these requirements are addressed in | | the procedures in addition to following up on equipment that could | | potentially have been installed that was not addressed under these | | requirements. | | | | Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector (Rob Krsek). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021