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Event Notification Report for July 20, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           07/19/2001 - 07/20/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38144  38152  38153  38154  38155  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38144       |
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| FACILITY: VOGTLE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/16/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:51[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        07/16/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:33[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DORMAN                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/19/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JAY HENSON           R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| PLANT HAD A MAJOR LOSS OF OFFSITE PUBLIC ALERTING SIREN SYSTEM               |
|                                                                              |
| While performing the weekly siren test, 35 of 47 sirens failed to respond.   |
| The weekly test was performed at 1033 EDT.  Preliminary investigation        |
| suggests a problem with the sirens electronic memory chip.  Troubleshooting  |
| and repairs are in progress.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified.                                |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE FROM JOHN C. WILLIAMS TO LEIGH TROCINE AT 1621 ON 07/19/01      |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "This is an Information Only follow-up notice to Event Notification #38144,  |
| submitted on 7-16-2001, regarding the loss of 35 out of 47 sirens in the     |
| Offsite Public Alerting Siren System."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "All sirens were tested and returned to service as of 1516 EDT on 7-18-2001. |
| A vendor representative from Whelan Engineering Company has advised that     |
| cause of the problem was a software issue with a batch of 2020 logic control |
| boards, revision E or prior, used in the siren controller.  He further       |
| states that he knows of no other nuclear facilities that have these          |
| controller boards at this time."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R2DO (Jay Henson).                                      |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38152       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:16[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        07/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RYAN RODE                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/19/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i)      PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |90       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO TIME LIMIT ON NON-SAFETY POWER TO         |
| INSTRUMENT BUS                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee entered Technical Specification 15.3.7(b)(1)(j) at 1900 CDT on  |
| 7/18/2001, which allowed 8 hours to restore electrical power from a safety   |
| powered bus to the Unit 1 instrument bus.  Non-safety power was provided     |
| when a problem caused an automatic transfer.  At 0300 CDT on 7/19/2001, a    |
| Technical Specification required shutdown was commenced.  The plant has 6    |
| hours to reach Hot Shutdown and another 44 hours to reach Cold Shutdown.     |
| The licensee has been and continues to research the problem and does not     |
| know when safety power will be restored to the instrument bus.               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATED AT 0936 EDT ON 7/19/2001 BY MIKE MEYER TO FANGIE JONES * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee restored power from a safety powered bus to the instrument bus  |
| and has exited the Tech Spec required shutdown.  Plant is being restored to  |
| full power.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R3DO (Bruce           |
| Jorgensen) has been notified.                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38153       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:34[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        05/14/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  I. A. ABBASI                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/19/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |WILLIAM COOK         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR 21 REPORT - POTENTIAL FOR MAJOR DEGRADATION OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT       |
|                                                                              |
| The following is from a faxed report:                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Basic component: Safety-related terminal block (symbol #95-10-077)          |
|                                                                              |
| "Supplier: Systems Control of Iron Mountain, Michigan [manufacturer is       |
| General Electric, both supplier and manufacturer have been contacted by      |
| NMP.]                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Nature of defect: While installing a new terminal block in the emergency    |
| diesel generator panels, a mounting screw for terminal points was found to   |
| be loose. Contrary to general quality requirements stated in the Purchase    |
| Order, this screw was not fully threaded during manufacture. As a result, if |
| installed, the screw could potentially have fallen into safety-related       |
| equipment located below thereby potentially affecting the function of the    |
| emergency diesels. Thus, a major degradation of essential safety-related     |
| equipment ,i.e., a substantial safety hazard, could have occurred.           |
|                                                                              |
| "Number of terminal blocks initially estimated to be affected at Nine Mile   |
| Point Units 1 and 2: Several hundred (including 169 in stock)                |
|                                                                              |
| "Corrective actions taken: The defective terminal block was discarded, A 20  |
| percent sample inspection of the terminal blocks remaining in stock at NMP   |
| was performed. No other loose screws were identified. These terminal blocks  |
| were supplied in the 1980s and no plant operational problems due to a loose  |
| screw in a terminal block were previously identified. Therefore, it has been |
| concluded that this is an isolated instance.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Date of discovery: May 14, 2001                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Date on which 10CFR21 evaluation completed: July 12, 2001                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Date on which Vice President Nuclear Generation notified: July 17, 2001     |
|                                                                              |
| "Date by which written 10CFR21 report will be submitted: August 16, 2001     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38154       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        07/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANDY DISMUKE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/19/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JAY HENSON           R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |WILLIAM DEAN         NRR     |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |DICK WESSMAN         IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECURITY REPORT                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Unescorted access granted inappropriately to a NRC employee and 2 NRC        |
| contractors.  Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.          |
|                                                                              |
| Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38155       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/19/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:57[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        07/19/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:10[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/19/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |C.W. (BILL) REAMER   NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+NADER MAMISH         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE UNDERWOOD               |ROB KRSEK            R3RI    |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (4-Hour Report) - LOSS OF ALL DOUBLE CONTINGENCY     |
| CONTROLS APPLICABLE TO A FISSILE MATERIAL OPERATION DUE TO AN INADEQUATE NCS |
| EVALUATION                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah         |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:"                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Neither NCSA GEN-010 [which deals with equipment removal and replacement]   |
| nor NCSA CAS-011 [which deals with cell shutdown and the controls for        |
| equipment moderation control] establish necessary moderation controls to     |
| ensure double contingency is maintained for the transition between equipment |
| removal and cell shutdown.  [Essentially, if a cell is taken out of service  |
| and a piece of equipment is removed, there are no controls in place to       |
| ensure that the equipment that goes back in has met the requirements of      |
| control 3.3.6 of CAS-011, and the purpose of this control is to prevent      |
| moderation by heating the equipment up to 140F for 60 hours.]  Control      |
| 3.3.6 of NCSA CAS-011 establishes a baseline hydration level for maintaining |
| double contingency on shutdown process equipment."                           |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE     |
| CONTINGENCY:"                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "NCSE 039 establishes double contingency based on two controls on            |
| moderation."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Controls have not been established to ensure moderation control is          |
| maintained during the transition from equipment installation activities      |
| performed under NCSA GEN-010 and cell shutdown approved under NCSA CAS-011.  |
| Therefore, double contingency was not maintained."                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Potential Critical Pathways:"                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, an equipment item containing a   |
| hydrated UH by mass deposit would have to be installed in the cascade.       |
| Following installation, normal equipment treatment activities would have to  |
| fail to dehydrate the deposit.  Following startup, the equipment would have  |
| to fail to operate at or above 140 F for 60 hrs.  The deposit would then     |
| have to more than double in size and achieve a total of at least 10 kg of    |
| water hydration in a geometry favorable to result in a critical              |
| configuration."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Safety Significance:"                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "No NCSA controls have been established to address the currently allowed     |
| transition from equipment installation to cell shutdown."                    |
|                                                                              |
| "EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:"                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "None."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:"                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "1.  Areas of the cascade containing equipment that was installed following  |
| implementation of NCSA CAS-011 should be reviewed to determine if the drying |
| requirements established in NCSA CAS-011 have been met."                     |
|                                                                              |
| "2.  Discontinue installation of process gas equipment containing fissile    |
| deposits until adequate controls have been established for this              |
| transition."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "3.  Include work packages related to GEN-010 equipment installation on Work |
| Control Functional Directive WC-99-001."                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel plan to ensure that these requirements are addressed in    |
| the procedures in addition to following up on equipment  that could          |
| potentially have been installed that was not addressed under these           |
| requirements.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector (Rob Krsek).           |
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