Event Notification Report for June 8, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/07/2001 - 06/08/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38008 38055 38057 38058
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38008 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:32[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/18/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:18[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/07/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCCLEARY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
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|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN |
| |
| During normal operations, a concern was identified of a potential fissile |
| material operation in equipment that had been previously identified as an |
| operation that contained material <1 % U-235. Upon investigation of the |
| concern Nuclear Criticality Safety Personnel identified an unanalyzed |
| condition in the X-330/333 "A" booster. Based on the identified condition |
| this is a 4 hour reportable event. Currently the equipment is isolated. A |
| sample shows the equipment contains material at <1% U-235. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| LOW. the equipment is shutdown and has a pressure of 0.8 psia. The maximum |
| mass in the X-330 to X-333 "A" compressor at this pressure is 41 gram U-235 |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| For a criticality to occur, the mass in the compressor would have to |
| increase to greater than 10.35 kg. The material then would have to be |
| moderated and the deposit would have to reflected |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Enrichment and Mass |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Estimated enrichment is 1.5 weight percent U-235, the mass is estimated at |
| 41 grams. The form of the material would be UF6. The optimum safe mass and |
| critical mass at an enrichment of 1.5 % U-235 is 4.5 Kg and 16.502 Kg |
| respectively. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| There were no NCSA controls on the identified equipment because the |
| enrichment in the equipment was to be less than 1 weight percent U-235 in an |
| operating cascade. In the current configuration it is not credible that |
| enrichment would be exceeded. The deficiency was the equipment was not |
| isolated from equipment that is allowed to see enrichment greater than 1 |
| weight percent U-235. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| The Plant Shift Superintendent directed the "A" booster isolated. The |
| equipment was sampled and found below 1% U-235. Engineering continues to |
| investigate the issue. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| informed. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 06/07/01 AT 1313 ET BY RICHIE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| After further review this is not reportable because an additional evaluation |
| determined the enrichment in the affected equipment did not exceed 1 weight |
| percent U235, and the plant condition remained within that assumed by the |
| NCSA and SAR. Therefore no violation occurred. R3DO (B. Clayton) & NMSS EO |
| (John Hickey) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the Certificate |
| Holder. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38055 |
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| REP ORG: NEW YORK CITY BUREAU OF RAD HEALTH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/06/2001|
|LICENSEE: UNKNOWN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:37[EDT]|
| CITY: QUEENS REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 06/04/2001|
| COUNTY: QUEENS STATE: NY |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/07/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MICHELE EVANS R1 |
| |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH HOLONICH IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICHARD BORRI |DOT NATL RESP CTR |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING PACKAGE DAMAGED DURING OVERSEA SHIPMENT |
| |
| The New York City Bureau of Radiological Health was contacted on 6/6/2001 by |
| a Japan Airlines (JAL) representative regarding a damaged shipment of 104 |
| �Ci of I-125 (liquid). The package was being shipped from New England |
| Nuclear in Boston, Massachusetts to China Isotope Corporation in Beijing, |
| China. The package had been transported by truck to JFK Int'l Airport, |
| where it was loaded onto a JAL aircraft. The JAL representative reported |
| that the package was badly damaged and leaking upon arrival in Tokyo, Japan. |
| Representatives of the Bureau of Radiological Health and Radiac (a |
| contractor for JAL) surveyed the building at JFK Int'l Airport where the |
| package had been stored, but found no radioactive contamination. The caller |
| was unsure of actions taken at the airport in Tokyo. |
| |
| HOO NOTE: Provided above information to the DOT National Response Center. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 6/7/01 @ 1132 BY BORRI TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| A JAL representative notified New York City Bureau of Radiological Health |
| that they measured 4000 cpm in the freight container at the Tokyo airport. |
| Also a worker at the JFK airport admitted that he broke the package when |
| loading it on the plane. |
| |
| Notified REG 1 RDO(Evans) and NMSS EO(Hickey) |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1518EDT ON 6/7/01 FROM BOB GALLAGHAR TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| "Date: June 7, 2001 |
| |
| "Update Information from Massachusetts Radiation Control Program |
| "Provided by Robert Gallaghar, Supervisor Inspection & Enforcement, |
| Materials Section |
| |
| |
| "PACKAGE DAMAGED DURING OVERSEA SHIPMENT |
| |
| "The package was being shipped from PerkinElmer Life Sciences in Boston, |
| Massachusetts to China Isotope Corporation in Beijing, China. The package |
| contained 130 mCi (4.8 GBq) iodine-125 as NaI in < 1 ml liquid. External |
| radiation measurement imply that 1 to 30 mCi of I-125 may have been released |
| from the shielded container into the surrounding packaging material. The |
| package was secured in a plastic bag and held in a cordoned off area. |
| |
| "On June 6, 2001 a contamination survey was performed of the JAL facility at |
| JFK and confirmed no contamination. JAL representatives confirmed that the |
| incident was promptly reported to the Japan Bureau of Radiation Protection. |
| An inspector from the Japan Radioisotope Association has made radiation and |
| contamination surveys. |
| |
| "The package was one of several in a 3.8 cubic meter shipping container. A |
| radiation reading of 3.8 mr/hr at 1 meter was reported outside the lead |
| shielding. JAL representatives have informed PerkinElmer there were two |
| spots of contamination, one on the floor of the container and one on a |
| pallet, both places having been in contact with the package. No other |
| contamination was found in the area or on any persons." |
| |
| The Massachusetts Radiation Control Program informed NRC Region I (Duncan |
| White). Notified R1DO(Evans) and NMSS(Susan Frant). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38057 |
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| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/07/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:53[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: J. GADZALA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/07/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
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|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| POTENTIAL NON-CONSERVATISM IN MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK ACCIDENT IDENTIFIED |
| DURING REACTOR POWER UPDATE ANALYSES |
| |
| "During preparation of a new analyses for reactor power uprate, a potential |
| non-conservatism was discovered regarding the main steam line break accident |
| with an assumed single failure of a main feedwater regulating valve. This |
| non-conservatism could negatively impact the resultant peak containment |
| pressure that would be reached in the event of an accident. The current |
| Point Beach accident analysis does not appear to properly account for the |
| volume of high temperature feedwater that would be released inside |
| containment during a main steam line break accident. It does not appear to |
| correctly model failure of the feedwater regulating valve to close. |
| |
| "Based on the revised analyses performed by the reactor vendor |
| (Westinghouse) at the uprated power conditions, peak containment pressure |
| could reach 64.2 psig. No revised analysis data is yet available for the |
| currently licensed power level; however, the uprated analysis bounds the |
| current plant design. The 64.2 psig value exceeds the containment design |
| pressure of 60 psig. |
| |
| "The Bases for Technical Specification 1 5.3.6.A.1 .a states, The safety |
| design basis for the containment is that the containment must withstand the |
| pressures and temperatures of the design basis LOCA without exceeding the |
| design leakage rate. The design allowable leakage rate La is 0.4% of |
| containment air weight per day at 60 psig . Containment operability is |
| maintained by limiting the overall containment leakage rate to within the |
| design allowable leakage rage (La). |
| |
| "FSAR section 5.1 documents that the containment can withstand pressure |
| loadings at least 50% greater than those calculated for the postulated |
| loss-of-coolant accident alone, and 25% greater than those calculated for |
| the postulated loss-of-coolant accident with a coincident design earthquake |
| (FSAR 14.3.4 states that containment pressure will peak between 52 and 54 |
| psig). |
| |
| "Since the revised analysis is only for uprated power conditions, it does |
| not exactly predict containment pressure results at the current licensed |
| power level. However, the new analysis calls the results of the current |
| analysis into question. Therefore, this report is being conservatively made |
| to document this concern. The containment has been determined to be operable |
| per the guidelines of Generic Letter 91-18. Mitigating circumstances include |
| the fact that calculations in the FSAR document that the containment is |
| capable of withstanding the higher pressure of the revised analysis. |
| |
| "The containment will continue to perform its safety function. Any |
| radiological release during a main steam line break accident is assumed to |
| vent directly to the atmosphere (through the break), independent of |
| containment integrity and is within current analyses." |
| |
| Westinghouse is performing a reanalysis with corrective actions to be |
| determined. The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38058 |
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| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:41[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:33[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBINSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/08/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 47 Power Operation |47 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAULTY FLOW INDICATING SWITCH |
| |
| With DAEC operating in mode 1, at approximately 47% power, HPCI was declared |
| inoperable due to a faulty flow indicating switch which is utilized to |
| position the minimum flow valve. A 14-day LCO was entered per Technical |
| Specification 3.5.1, condition F, at 2133 on 6/7/01. This condition is |
| reportable under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) as a failure of a |
| single train of equipment required to mitigate the consequences of an |
| accident. |
| |
| While an in-plant operator was performing his rounds within the HPCI room, |
| he discovered that flow indicating switch, FS2310, which should indicate |
| total HPCI flow, indicated approximately -170 gpm rather than the expected |
| zero gpm. The HPCI pump was not in operation. This flow switch is |
| interlocked with the HPCI minimum flow valve, allowing it to open with total |
| HPCI flow less than 300 gpm and HPCI discharge pressure greater than 125 |
| psig. The flow switch would close the minimum flow valve once HPCI total |
| flow reached 600 gpm. With the correct operation of the HPCI minimum flow |
| valve in question, HPCI was declared inoperable. |
| |
| It is believed that the cause of the faulty indication is air in the |
| instrument sensing lines feeding the flow switch. Troubleshooting efforts |
| will begin early tomorrow morning. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified |
| |
| |
| HOO NOTE: see event #38029 |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021