Event Notification Report for June 1, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 05/31/2001 - 06/01/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38026 38039 38040 38041 38042 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38026 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:19[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/23/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:45[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATZKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/31/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MARK SHAFFER R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY OF CRIMINAL ACT INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL GRANTED ACCESS TO THE SITE. | | | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED | | | | CONTACT NRC HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION | | | | * * * RETRACTED AT 1600 EDT ON 5/31/01 BY ERICK MATZKE TO FANGIE JONES * * | | * | | | | Further investigation of the issue determined that the event notification | | was not reportable and retracts the notification of event #38026. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Dale Powers) was | | notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38039 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/31/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:17[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/30/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:00[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/31/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MARK RING R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. C. PITTMAN | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FIRE PROOF COVER OVER A PROCESS OPENING COULD NOT PERFORM ITS INTENDED | | FUNCTION. | | | | | | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | | | At 1400, 05/30/01 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the | | Zetex material used as a fire proof cover on the # 3 low speed purge and | | evacuation pump has deteriorated to the point of failure such that it could | | not perform its intended function. The material was being used according to | | CP2-CO-CN2030, as a fire proof cover over a process opening. The material | | has become brittle and failed to the point of leaving openings to the | | process system. NCSA GEN-10, Removal and Handling of Contaminated Equipment | | from the Cascade at PGDP, requires fire proof covers to be installed on | | cascade system openings to prevent the introduction of moderation from a | | sprinkler activation, lube oil leak, or RCW leak. Double contingency for | | this scenario is established by implementing two controls on moderation. | | One leg of double contingency is based on the fire proof cover preventing a | | moderator release from entering the open process system. Since the fire | | proof cover deteriorated to the point of leaving openings to the process | | system, the ability to prevent introduction of moderator was lost. This | | control was violated and double contingency was not maintained. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | A material credited to perform a criticality safety related function was not | | able to perform its function. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: | | | | In order for criticality to be possible, greater than 10 kg of a moderator | | would have to enter the open process system and interact with a uranium | | deposit greater than the minimum critical mass in a geometry favorable for a | | criticality. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two | | controls on moderation. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): | | | | Maximum assay of 1.08 wt.% U235. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | The first leg of double contingency is based on the unlikelihood of a | | moderator release (Sprinkler, RCW, oil) into the open process system during | | the time the system is open. Since there was no moderator release into the | | system, this leg of double contingency was maintained. | | | | The second leg of double contingency is based on the fire proof cover | | preventing a moderator release from entering the open process system. Since | | the fire proof cover deteriorated to the point of leaving openings in the | | process system, the ability to prevent introduction of moderator was lost. | | The control was violated and double contingency was not maintained. | | | | Since double contingency is based on two controls on moderation, double | | contingency was not maintained. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | The degraded Zetex fire proof material was replaced with an approved AQ-NCS | | aluminum cover. Other cascade openings using Zetex material are being | | inspected for signs of degradation and will be replaced as necessary. The | | use of Zetex material as a fire proof cover will be re-evaluated. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate | | holder. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Hospital |Event Number: 38040 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH MED. CENT. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/31/2001| |LICENSEE: UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:24[EDT]| | CITY: PITTSBURGH REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 09/03/1996| | COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: 18:00[EDT]| |LICENSE#: 37-00245-02 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/31/2001| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |ERIC REBER R1 | | |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JERRY ROSEN | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |LADM 35.33(a) MED MISADMINISTRATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION | | | | The following is taken from a faxed report: | | | | The following event is being reported as a medical misadministration in | | accordance with the May 22, 2001, directive of NRC Region I | | representatives. | | | | At 6:00 PM on September 3,1996, a patient was implanted with six ribbons, | | each containing four Iridium-192 seeds. The seeds each contained 1.01 | | millicuries (total activity of 24.2 millicuries). The ribbons were placed in | | catheters implanted into the patient's right jaw and secured by crimping a | | metal button around the catheter. The corresponding written directive | | prescribed a treatment time of 47 hours. At 4:45 PM on September 5, 1996, | | the radiation oncologist arrived to remove the sources and determined that | | one ribbon was missing from the treatment site. The Radiation Safety Office | | (RSO) was notified. The five remaining ribbons were removed from the patient | | and a survey was done of the patient, the patient's room and surroundings. | | The missing ribbon was located on the floor in front of a laundry bin. The | | ribbon was secured and returned to storage. | | | | The RSO investigated this event and determined that all six ribbons were in | | place at 8:00 AM on September 5th when the day nurse checked the patient and | | documented the status of the brachytherapy implant in the patient's record. | | (Note: Prior to this event nurses were required to evaluate and document the | | status of brachytherapy implants at the beginning of each work shift.) At | | approximately 9:30 AM the patient complained of discomfort and experienced | | significant vomiting. This condition persisted through the remainder of the | | day. A Patient Service Technician (PST) reported that she changed the | | patient's gown and bed linens at approximately 2:30 PM. Staff physicians, | | nurses and residents evaluated the patient throughout that day as documented | | in the patient's record. However, such documentation does not include an | | indication or the status of the implant. | | | | The licensee concluded that the brachytherapy ribbon likely became dislodged | | from the treatment site due to the patient's vomiting and/or | | self-intervention sometime between 9:30 AM and 2:30 PM on September 5th. The | | ribbon was apparently entangled in the patient's bed linens until the linens | | were changed by the PST at 2:30 PM; whereupon the ribbon dropped from the | | soiled linens when they were placed in the linen storage bin. It is also | | possible that the ribbon may have become dislodged at the time (2:30 PM) the | | patient's gown was being changed. | | | | Assuming the worst case that the brachytherapy ribbon became dislodged at | | 9:30 AM, the deviation from the total prescribed treatment dose due to the | | single ribbon missing for 7.5 hours is 2.7 percent, The possible localized | | radiation dose outside the treatment Site was also evaluated. If it is | | assumed that with patient movement the average location of the ribbon would | | be 10 cm from the patient's body. then the closest area of the body exposed | | would receive a radiation dose of less than one rad. This radiation dose is | | no more than the lower extremities would receive from the prescribed | | brachytherapy implant procedure and substantially less than that which would | | be received by the upper torso and head in areas near the implant site. If | | the ribbon became dislodged when the patient's gown was being changed, there | | would be no significant radiation dose to any portion of the patient's body | | since the source had been removed from the bed at that time. | | | | Based on its review of the circumstances surrounding this event and the | | possible associated radiation exposures, the licensee concluded that the | | event did not constitute a misadministration or recordable event. However, | | in consideration of the possible ramifications of a future such event, the | | licensee implemented a policy requiring that documented checks of the | | implant site be performed at four hour intervals by nursing personnel. | | (Note: The NRC's regulations and guidance are silent on the issue of | | frequency of monitoring implants.) | | | | Elmer Cano, M.D., the Radiation Oncologist, did not feel that this event | | would impact on the well being of the patient. The patient's referring | | physician was verbally notified of this event at the time of its | | occurrence. | | | | Full details of the event were documented and placed in the incident file to | | be reviewed during the next NRC inspection. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38041 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/31/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:52[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/31/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:30[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/31/2001| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MARK RING R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |LARRY CAMPER NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LARSON | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BULLETIN 91-01 - 24 HOUR REPORT | | | | The licensee, during a review of the plant surveillance program, discovered | | a surveillance that was suppose to be done every 6 months was missed the | | last time and is about 6 months overdue. | | | | The following is taken from a faxed report: | | | | At 1330 hrs. the Plant Shift Superintendent was notified that a required | | surveillance for NCSA 705_040 was not performed in the required periodicity. | | This surveillance is necessary to ensure that uranium bearing material is | | not accumulating in the piping due to either precipitating out or through | | bonding with oil-bearing material which then layers out in the piping. By | | not performing this surveillance one of the barriers for maintaining double | | contingency was lost for this operation thus making this a reportable | | event. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | The surveillance required to perform non-destructive analysis (NDA) on | | piping of the 705 geometrically safe overhead storage (GSS) was not | | performed. However, based on the historic evidence as discussed in sections | | 4.3 and 4.5 of analysis performed for this system it is highly unlikely that | | material is accumulating in the piping and thus the safety significance of | | this event is low. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | | | Without measuring a significant amount of material could accumulate in GSS | | piping and result in an unsafe condition. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | The parameter which was violated during this upset was maintaining the | | concentration of material in the GSS piping to a safe level through periodic | | NDA surveillance of various piping in the GSS. It should be noted that the | | physical integrity of the piping in question (i.e., that containing the | | uranium-bearing material) was maintained. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF: | | | | Based on the most recent sampling of solution contained in the GSS the | | amount of uranium involved is small (approximately 0.0002 grams | | uranium/liter) | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | Did not perform the required surveillance within the allotted time period. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | Isolated the GSS from other influents at 1335 hrs. Will commence NDA | | measurements 06/01/01. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local DOE | | representative. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38042 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/31/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:03[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/11/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:05[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN THOMAS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/31/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ERIC REBER R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AINV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | INADVERTENT LOSS OF 'A' RPS BUS | | | | The following is taken from a faxed report: | | | | This 60-day optional report in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(1), is being | | made under the reporting requirement of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe | | an invalid actuation of the Containment Isolation System. | | | | On April 11, 2001, at 0005 hours, the control room received an alarm for | | loss of the 'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS) bus. As a result of the loss | | of the 'A' RPS bus the following actuations occurred: an A1 & A2 RPS half | | scram, a Nuclear Steam Supply System Shutoff (NSSSS) logic A & C trip, | | tripping of the 'A' and 'B' Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) pumps due to | | closure of the inboard isolation valve BG-HV-F001, recirculation sampling | | isolation, and closure of the inboard Main Steam Line Drain valve | | AB-HV-F016 | | | | The 'A' RPS bus was shifted to the alternate feed at 0023 and the RPS A1 & | | A2, the NSSSS, and the primary containment isolation signals (PCIS) were | | reset. At 0036, recirculation sampling was restored. Valve, BG-HV-F001 and | | AB-HV-F016 were reopened at 0039 hours. | | | | The above actuations and isolations were expected as a result of the loss of | | the 'A' RPS bus. These actions and isolations were due to an invalid signal | | resulting from the inadvertent de-energization of the 'A' RPS bus. | | | | Fire Protection Operators were performing testing of the smoke detectors in | | the RPS motor-generator (MG) set room using a test pole. When the Fire | | Protection Operator in the overhead was handing the test pole to the Fire | | Protection Operator on the floor, the pole slipped and struck breaker switch | | for H1SB-1AN410 (A RPS EPA breaker), causing the breaker to open. Opening of | | the breaker lead to the loss of the 'A' RPS bus. | | | | After determining that no damage occurred to breaker H1SB-1AN410, the 'A' | | RPS was restored to the normal power source. | | | | The impact on the plant safety from this event was minimal. The isolations | | and equipment losses during the event caused only a minor plant transient | | and the equipment performed as expected. After the plant was stabilized and | | the cause of the loss of the 'A' RPS was identified, the half scram was | | reset. | | | | This event has been entered into the corrective action program. | | | | | | The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021