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Event Notification Report for May 24, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/23/2001 - 05/24/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38016  38020  38024  38025  38026  38027  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38016       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/20/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        03:56[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/23/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN GREEVES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M. C. MAURER                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VALID HIGH LEVEL DRAIN SECONDARY ALARM                                       |
|                                                                              |
| At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain     |
| Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave |
| Water Inventory Control System (WICS).  The WICS system is required to be    |
| operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2.  The  |
| autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the      |
| alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal.  The autoclave was removed |
| from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable  |
| by the Plant Shift Superintendent.  Autoclave # 1 was removed from service   |
| and is inoperable.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1709 BY BEASLEY TO GOULD * * *  RETRACTION         |
|                                                                              |
| THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Following the WICS activation, System         |
| Engineering lead a troubleshooting effort by Instrument and Control          |
| Maintenance and Operations personnel.  This included inspection of the       |
| drain, testing of the WICS system using the approved autoclave functional    |
| test procedure, and a review of the recorded system data.  This effort       |
| concluded that the actuation was initiated by an invalid signal from the     |
| secondary condensate probe.  Testing indicated that the sensitivity band of  |
| the secondary probe had shifted in the conservative direction and alarmed    |
| without the presence of water.   Based on the conclusion that the actuation  |
| was caused by an invalid signal and not a condition the WICS is designed to  |
| protect against, the reporting criteria is not met.  Therefore the subject   |
| notification is being retracted.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Essig) were informed.                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38020       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:04[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        05/21/2001|
|           COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL                  |EVENT TIME:        07:59[EDT]|
|                                                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/23/2001|
|    CITY:  COLUMBIA                 REGION:  2  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  RICHLAND                  STATE:  SC |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  SNM-1107              AGREEMENT:  Y  |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|  DOCKET:  07001151                             |JOHN GREEVES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  NEWMYER                      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER(PLC) CAUSED LOSS OF ACTIVE          |
| ENGINEERED CONTROLS ON CONVERSION LINE 4                                     |
|                                                                              |
| 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 0759 the decanter tripped off line on conversion line 4.    |
| Subsequently line 4 was shutdown at 0805.  An error in the display program   |
| was initially suspected.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| With conversion line 4 shut down, instrument technicians were called.  The   |
| technicians attempted to correct the problem with the display program to no  |
| avail.   An instrumentation and controls (I/C) engineer was called and       |
| tracked the problem to the line 4 PLC.  Since it was determined that the PLC |
| processor for line 4 had faulted, the processor was reset and tested.  The   |
| test was satisfactory.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Line 4 was restarted at approximately 1000.   At approximately 1030 line 4   |
| was shut down due to a plugged duplex valve at the inlet of the calciner.    |
| During this shutdown, a process engineer was informed about the earlier      |
| events.  The process engineer became concerned about the status of the       |
| safety significant controls on line 4 and contacted a nuclear criticality    |
| safety (NCS) engineer at approximately 1130.  The NCS engineer was present   |
| in the control room at approximately 1140.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| A time-line of events was reconstructed.  The NCS engineer reviewed the      |
| sequence of events with the I/C engineer.   It was determined that an output |
| fault in an I/O card caused the processor to go into fault mode but all      |
| outputs did not go to their correct (OFF) state.                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NCS engineer determined that in the time period from 0759 until line 4   |
| was secured at approximately 0805, the active engineered safety significant  |
| controls (SSCs) on line 4 were unavailable, and less than double contingency |
| protection existed in the vaporization system during that time period.  The  |
| SSCs are considered to have been in place for the 1000 startup and remained  |
| in place until the shutdown at 1030, although the cause of the initial       |
| failure had not been determined.  Conversion operators on line 4 were        |
| instructed by the NCS engineer to not restart line 4 until the cause of the  |
| PLC failure was determined and corrected.  Line 4 remains shutdown pending   |
| further investigation.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Justification for Continuing Operations on Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5:              |
|                                                                              |
| Line 4 utilizes a unique Numalogic PLC system while Lines 1, 2, 3, and 5     |
| utilize a different programmable logic system.  There is no reason to        |
| believe the Numalogic error is possible on the other lines.  The             |
| manufacturer of the other programmable logic system (utilized on Lines 1,2,3 |
| and 5) was contacted and stated that their cards cannot fail into any state  |
| other than all OFF.   Conversion Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5 remain in operation.    |
|                                                                              |
| Double Contingency Protection                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Double contingency protection for the vaporizer is based upon control of     |
| mass (prevent/detect a UF6 leak) and geometry (prevent/detect accumulation   |
| of moderator in a non-favorable configuration in the bottom of the           |
| vaporizer).  Double contingency protection on the cylinder (in vaporizer) is |
| based upon moderation control (prevent back-flow of moderator from the       |
| hydrolysis column into the cylinder).  It was determined that less than      |
| double contingency protection remain for these systems and greater than a    |
| safe mass was involved.  In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License   |
| (SNM-1107), paragraph 37.3 (c.5), this event meets the criteria for a 24     |
| hour notification because it constitutes a "nuclear criticality safety       |
| incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented   |
| double contingency protection remains . . and: greater than a safe mass is   |
| involved, but a sufficient number of the controls that were lost are         |
| restored within four (4) hours such that double contingency protection is    |
| restored."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| As Found Condition                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| See "Reason for Notification" above.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Summary of Activity                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| An unknown PLC failure led to the shutdown of conversion line 4.   It was    |
| determined that less than double contingency protection existed on the line  |
| 4 from 0759 to 0805.  Therefore, the NCS engineer directed that line 4 could |
| not be restarted until the cause of the failure was determined and           |
| corrected.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Conclusions                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Loss of double contingency protection occurred.                              |
| At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or     |
| member of the public.  No exposure to hazardous material was involved.       |
| This notification is the result of equipment failure, not a deficient NCS    |
| analysis.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1120 ON 05/23/01 FROM BILL NEWMYER TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "Westinghouse has proceeded with investigation of the cause of the Numalogic |
| PLC failure on Conversion Line 4.  This investigation has discovered that    |
| the design of the Line 4 -  Numalogic 700 PLC may fault to an undesirable    |
| state.  A service bulletin update for the Numalogic PLC describes this       |
| condition."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "A modification to the PLC (described in the manufacturer's bulletin) is     |
| necessary to correct this condition.  This modification was completed on the |
| PLC.  The PLC was subsequently tested by faulting the PLC, and the correct   |
| output condition was achieved."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Further testing of the control logic was performed to ensure that the       |
| output from the PLC, when faulted, will produce the correct valve responses  |
| for Conversion Line 4.  This functional test revealed that even though the   |
| PLC faulted to the correct output values, the valves did not respond         |
| correctly."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Discovery of the problem with Conversion Line 4 prompted investigation to   |
| determine if the other Conversion Lines (1, 2, 3, and 5) would experience a  |
| similar error (i.e., the PLC faults to the correct output but the valves     |
| fail to respond correctly).  Testing of Conversion Line 5 (which uses a      |
| different PLC logic system) revealed the same deficiency."                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on this information, Conversion Lines 1, 2, 3, and 5 have been        |
| shutdown pending further evaluation of the correct system response assuming  |
| a PLC fault condition.  Modifications will be made to each Conversion Line   |
| to correct the PLC system response prior to restarting each Conversion       |
| line."                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified onsite NRC  headquarters inspectors.  The NRC          |
| operations officer notified the R2DO (Bernhard) and NMSS EO (Hickey and      |
| Broaddus).                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   38024       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
|LICENSEE:  TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS  |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EDT]|
|    CITY:  FLINT                    REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        05/22/2001|
|  COUNTY:  GENESEE                   STATE:  MI |EVENT TIME:        11:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  37-19640-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/23/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |SONIA BURGESS        R3      |
|                                                |DOUG BROADDUS        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAT DURKIN                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAE1 20.2202(b)(1)       PERS OVEREXPOSURE      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| APPEARANCE THAT A TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS RADIOGRAPHER EXCEEDED  |
| THE 5-REM ANNUAL LIMIT                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is reporting this event due to the appearance that a            |
| radiographer exceeded the 5-rem limit for the year.  The individual's dose   |
| (year to date) is 5,050 millirem.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee's initial investigation indicates that the individual did not   |
| actually receive all of the indicated dose.  Apparently, the individual      |
| routinely put his badge in his tool box at the end of the day, and the       |
| second shift crew used the individual's tool box without realizing that the  |
| badge was inside.  Therefore, the badge received additional exposure during  |
| the course of the second shift.  Apparently, the tool box was located in a   |
| vehicle which was parked inside the boundary ropes in a refinery lay-down    |
| area where the crew shoots weld coupons.  It was reported that the second    |
| shift crew did not routinely use the individual's tool box, and there were   |
| no unusual doses with the individual's partner or with any of the other      |
| radiographers.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The radiographer whose badge is in question is being restricted from         |
| radiography work until the licensee's investigation has been completed.  The |
| licensee is waiting on letters from the radiographer whose badge is in       |
| question and from the radiographer who used the tool box containing the      |
| badge during the second shift.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to submit a written report within 30 days.                |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.)   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1426 BY DURKIN TO GOULD * * *    RETRACTION        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event since the event occurred in the State  |
| of Ohio, an agreement state.  They will report it to that State.             |
|                                                                              |
| Notified Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Hickey)                              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   38025       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  US ARMY                              |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
|LICENSEE:  US ARMY                              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:05[EDT]|
|    CITY:  FT POLK                  REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        05/21/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  LA |EVENT TIME:             [CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  19-30563-01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/23/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK SHAFFER         R4      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KUYKENDALL                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)   LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOST CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR(CAD)                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The US Army in Aberdeen, Md. Reported that the 7th Chemical Co. 83rd         |
| Chemical Battalion at Ft Polk, La. lost a Chemical Agent Detector in the     |
| training area during a training exercise.  The CAD contained 300 microcuries |
| of Am-241.  A 100% inventory and complete search was conducted, but it was   |
| not recovered.                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38026       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:19[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        05/23/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MATZKE                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/23/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MARK SHAFFER         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF CRIMINAL ACT INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL GRANTED ACCESS TO THE SITE.   |
|                                                                              |
| COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED                                  |
|                                                                              |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED                                  |
|                                                                              |
| CONTACT NRC HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38027       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CONVAL INC                           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001|
|LICENSEE:  CONVAL INC                           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:03[EDT]|
|    CITY:  SOMERS                   REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        05/23/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CT |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/23/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE fax       NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CURTIN(via fax)              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NONCOMPLIANCE INVOLVING FLOW COEFFICIENT VALUES OF 366 VALVES OF TWO BODY    |
| STYLES SUPPLIED OVER THE COURSE OF 15 YEARS TO TWO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN   |
| THE US                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The noncompliance involves flow coefficient values (Cv) of 366 valves of'    |
| two body styles supplied over the course of 15 years to two nuclear power    |
| plants in the United States.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The breakdown is as follows:                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| GPU, Oyster Creek;                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| 122 Qty.- 1/2" Angle Body Ball Check Valves used in Charging Water Riser     |
| Isolation                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point Unit 1;                                      |
|                                                                              |
| 114 Qty.-  1/2" Angle Pattern Ball Check Valves used in Charging Water Riser |
| Isolation                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| 130 Qty.- 3/4"  Tee Pattern Ball Check Valves used in  SCRAM Discharge Riser |
| Isolation                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Information was developed that led to an engineering investigation and the   |
| May 21, 2001 report by Conval's Quality Assurance Manager, Howard Smith II   |
| of the potential safety related noncompliance deviation.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The procurement document specifications for Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point  |
| Unit 1 defined a Cv requirement of 3.5 for both the Angle and Tee Pattern    |
| Ball Check Valves.  The procurement document specifications for GPU, Oyster  |
| Creek specified a Cv of 6 for the Angle Pattern Ball Check Valves.           |
|                                                                              |
| Preliminary laboratory test reports generated during Conval's recent         |
| engineering investigation revealed actual Cv values of both valve styles to  |
| be below 1.5, significantly lower than those required by the procurement     |
| documents.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| While there are no indications that the valves will mechanically             |
| malfunction, the fluid flow rates permitted in the forward direction will be |
| below those anticipated in the procurement document specifications and,      |
| therefore, may constitute a safety related issue according to the intended   |
| use of the valves.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| There are no nonconforming parts affecting the operation of the valves. The  |
| lower Cv values are a consequence of the internal geometry of these Conval   |
| valve designs.  If requested, Conval's Engineering Manager, David Boyden,    |
| will propose a retrofit of parts which, upon user acceptance, could be       |
| implemented within 4 weeks following user approval.  The changes would       |
| significantly increase the flow capacity of the affected valves.             |
|                                                                              |
| The two (2) nuclear plants affected have been verbally notified of this      |
| potential safety related noncompliance deviation.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+