Event Notification Report for May 24, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 05/23/2001 - 05/24/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38016 38020 38024 38025 38026 38027 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38016 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/20/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 03:56[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. C. MAURER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | VALID HIGH LEVEL DRAIN SECONDARY ALARM | | | | At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain | | Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave | | Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be | | operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The | | autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the | | alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal. The autoclave was removed | | from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable | | by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Autoclave # 1 was removed from service | | and is inoperable. | | | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate | | holder. | | | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1709 BY BEASLEY TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION | | | | THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. Following the WICS activation, System | | Engineering lead a troubleshooting effort by Instrument and Control | | Maintenance and Operations personnel. This included inspection of the | | drain, testing of the WICS system using the approved autoclave functional | | test procedure, and a review of the recorded system data. This effort | | concluded that the actuation was initiated by an invalid signal from the | | secondary condensate probe. Testing indicated that the sensitivity band of | | the secondary probe had shifted in the conservative direction and alarmed | | without the presence of water. Based on the conclusion that the actuation | | was caused by an invalid signal and not a condition the WICS is designed to | | protect against, the reporting criteria is not met. Therefore the subject | | notification is being retracted. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | | | | Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Essig) were informed. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38020 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/21/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:04[EDT]| | COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 05/21/2001| | COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 07:59[EDT]| | |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001| | CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: RICHLAND STATE: SC |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: SNM-1107 AGREEMENT: Y |LEONARD WERT R2 | | DOCKET: 07001151 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: NEWMYER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FAILURE OF PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER(PLC) CAUSED LOSS OF ACTIVE | | ENGINEERED CONTROLS ON CONVERSION LINE 4 | | | | 24 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN | | | | At approximately 0759 the decanter tripped off line on conversion line 4. | | Subsequently line 4 was shutdown at 0805. An error in the display program | | was initially suspected. | | | | With conversion line 4 shut down, instrument technicians were called. The | | technicians attempted to correct the problem with the display program to no | | avail. An instrumentation and controls (I/C) engineer was called and | | tracked the problem to the line 4 PLC. Since it was determined that the PLC | | processor for line 4 had faulted, the processor was reset and tested. The | | test was satisfactory. | | | | Line 4 was restarted at approximately 1000. At approximately 1030 line 4 | | was shut down due to a plugged duplex valve at the inlet of the calciner. | | During this shutdown, a process engineer was informed about the earlier | | events. The process engineer became concerned about the status of the | | safety significant controls on line 4 and contacted a nuclear criticality | | safety (NCS) engineer at approximately 1130. The NCS engineer was present | | in the control room at approximately 1140. | | | | A time-line of events was reconstructed. The NCS engineer reviewed the | | sequence of events with the I/C engineer. It was determined that an output | | fault in an I/O card caused the processor to go into fault mode but all | | outputs did not go to their correct (OFF) state. | | | | The NCS engineer determined that in the time period from 0759 until line 4 | | was secured at approximately 0805, the active engineered safety significant | | controls (SSCs) on line 4 were unavailable, and less than double contingency | | protection existed in the vaporization system during that time period. The | | SSCs are considered to have been in place for the 1000 startup and remained | | in place until the shutdown at 1030, although the cause of the initial | | failure had not been determined. Conversion operators on line 4 were | | instructed by the NCS engineer to not restart line 4 until the cause of the | | PLC failure was determined and corrected. Line 4 remains shutdown pending | | further investigation. | | | | Justification for Continuing Operations on Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5: | | | | Line 4 utilizes a unique Numalogic PLC system while Lines 1, 2, 3, and 5 | | utilize a different programmable logic system. There is no reason to | | believe the Numalogic error is possible on the other lines. The | | manufacturer of the other programmable logic system (utilized on Lines 1,2,3 | | and 5) was contacted and stated that their cards cannot fail into any state | | other than all OFF. Conversion Lines 1, 2, 3 and 5 remain in operation. | | | | Double Contingency Protection | | | | Double contingency protection for the vaporizer is based upon control of | | mass (prevent/detect a UF6 leak) and geometry (prevent/detect accumulation | | of moderator in a non-favorable configuration in the bottom of the | | vaporizer). Double contingency protection on the cylinder (in vaporizer) is | | based upon moderation control (prevent back-flow of moderator from the | | hydrolysis column into the cylinder). It was determined that less than | | double contingency protection remain for these systems and greater than a | | safe mass was involved. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License | | (SNM-1107), paragraph 37.3 (c.5), this event meets the criteria for a 24 | | hour notification because it constitutes a "nuclear criticality safety | | incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented | | double contingency protection remains . . and: greater than a safe mass is | | involved, but a sufficient number of the controls that were lost are | | restored within four (4) hours such that double contingency protection is | | restored." | | | | As Found Condition | | | | See "Reason for Notification" above. | | | | Summary of Activity | | | | An unknown PLC failure led to the shutdown of conversion line 4. It was | | determined that less than double contingency protection existed on the line | | 4 from 0759 to 0805. Therefore, the NCS engineer directed that line 4 could | | not be restarted until the cause of the failure was determined and | | corrected. | | | | Conclusions | | | | Loss of double contingency protection occurred. | | At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or | | member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. | | This notification is the result of equipment failure, not a deficient NCS | | analysis. | | | | ***** UPDATE RECEIVED AT 1120 ON 05/23/01 FROM BILL NEWMYER TO LEIGH TROCINE | | ***** | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "Westinghouse has proceeded with investigation of the cause of the Numalogic | | PLC failure on Conversion Line 4. This investigation has discovered that | | the design of the Line 4 - Numalogic 700 PLC may fault to an undesirable | | state. A service bulletin update for the Numalogic PLC describes this | | condition." | | | | "A modification to the PLC (described in the manufacturer's bulletin) is | | necessary to correct this condition. This modification was completed on the | | PLC. The PLC was subsequently tested by faulting the PLC, and the correct | | output condition was achieved." | | | | "Further testing of the control logic was performed to ensure that the | | output from the PLC, when faulted, will produce the correct valve responses | | for Conversion Line 4. This functional test revealed that even though the | | PLC faulted to the correct output values, the valves did not respond | | correctly." | | | | "Discovery of the problem with Conversion Line 4 prompted investigation to | | determine if the other Conversion Lines (1, 2, 3, and 5) would experience a | | similar error (i.e., the PLC faults to the correct output but the valves | | fail to respond correctly). Testing of Conversion Line 5 (which uses a | | different PLC logic system) revealed the same deficiency." | | | | "Based on this information, Conversion Lines 1, 2, 3, and 5 have been | | shutdown pending further evaluation of the correct system response assuming | | a PLC fault condition. Modifications will be made to each Conversion Line | | to correct the PLC system response prior to restarting each Conversion | | line." | | | | The licensee notified onsite NRC headquarters inspectors. The NRC | | operations officer notified the R2DO (Bernhard) and NMSS EO (Hickey and | | Broaddus). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38024 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001| |LICENSEE: TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:45[EDT]| | CITY: FLINT REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 05/22/2001| | COUNTY: GENESEE STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: 11:30[EDT]| |LICENSE#: 37-19640-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |SONIA BURGESS R3 | | |DOUG BROADDUS NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAT DURKIN | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAE1 20.2202(b)(1) PERS OVEREXPOSURE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | APPEARANCE THAT A TRISTATE INSPECTION AND CONSULTANTS RADIOGRAPHER EXCEEDED | | THE 5-REM ANNUAL LIMIT | | | | The licensee is reporting this event due to the appearance that a | | radiographer exceeded the 5-rem limit for the year. The individual's dose | | (year to date) is 5,050 millirem. | | | | The licensee's initial investigation indicates that the individual did not | | actually receive all of the indicated dose. Apparently, the individual | | routinely put his badge in his tool box at the end of the day, and the | | second shift crew used the individual's tool box without realizing that the | | badge was inside. Therefore, the badge received additional exposure during | | the course of the second shift. Apparently, the tool box was located in a | | vehicle which was parked inside the boundary ropes in a refinery lay-down | | area where the crew shoots weld coupons. It was reported that the second | | shift crew did not routinely use the individual's tool box, and there were | | no unusual doses with the individual's partner or with any of the other | | radiographers. | | | | The radiographer whose badge is in question is being restricted from | | radiography work until the licensee's investigation has been completed. The | | licensee is waiting on letters from the radiographer whose badge is in | | question and from the radiographer who used the tool box containing the | | badge during the second shift. | | | | The licensee plans to submit a written report within 30 days. | | | | (Call the NRC operations officer for a licensee contact telephone number.) | | | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 5/23/01 @ 1426 BY DURKIN TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION | | | | The licensee is retracting this event since the event occurred in the State | | of Ohio, an agreement state. They will report it to that State. | | | | Notified Reg 3 RDO(Burgess) and NMSS EO(Hickey) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 38025 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001| |LICENSEE: US ARMY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:05[EDT]| | CITY: FT POLK REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/21/2001| | COUNTY: STATE: LA |EVENT TIME: [CDT]| |LICENSE#: 19-30563-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |MARK SHAFFER R4 | | |JOHN HICKEY NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+JOHN KINNEMAN R1 | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KUYKENDALL | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOST CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR(CAD) | | | | The US Army in Aberdeen, Md. Reported that the 7th Chemical Co. 83rd | | Chemical Battalion at Ft Polk, La. lost a Chemical Agent Detector in the | | training area during a training exercise. The CAD contained 300 microcuries | | of Am-241. A 100% inventory and complete search was conducted, but it was | | not recovered. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38026 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: FT CALHOUN REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:19[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/23/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:45[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATZKE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK SHAFFER R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY OF CRIMINAL ACT INVOLVING INDIVIDUAL GRANTED ACCESS TO THE SITE. | | | | COMPENSATORY MEASURES NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED | | | | THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED | | | | CONTACT NRC HEADQUARTERS OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 38027 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: CONVAL INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2001| |LICENSEE: CONVAL INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:03[EDT]| | CITY: SOMERS REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 05/23/2001| | COUNTY: STATE: CT |EVENT TIME: [EDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/23/2001| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 | | |VERN HODGE fax NRR | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: CURTIN(via fax) | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NONCOMPLIANCE INVOLVING FLOW COEFFICIENT VALUES OF 366 VALVES OF TWO BODY | | STYLES SUPPLIED OVER THE COURSE OF 15 YEARS TO TWO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN | | THE US | | | | The noncompliance involves flow coefficient values (Cv) of 366 valves of' | | two body styles supplied over the course of 15 years to two nuclear power | | plants in the United States. | | | | The breakdown is as follows: | | | | GPU, Oyster Creek; | | | | 122 Qty.- 1/2" Angle Body Ball Check Valves used in Charging Water Riser | | Isolation | | | | Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point Unit 1; | | | | 114 Qty.- 1/2" Angle Pattern Ball Check Valves used in Charging Water Riser | | Isolation | | | | 130 Qty.- 3/4" Tee Pattern Ball Check Valves used in SCRAM Discharge Riser | | Isolation | | | | Information was developed that led to an engineering investigation and the | | May 21, 2001 report by Conval's Quality Assurance Manager, Howard Smith II | | of the potential safety related noncompliance deviation. | | | | The procurement document specifications for Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point | | Unit 1 defined a Cv requirement of 3.5 for both the Angle and Tee Pattern | | Ball Check Valves. The procurement document specifications for GPU, Oyster | | Creek specified a Cv of 6 for the Angle Pattern Ball Check Valves. | | | | Preliminary laboratory test reports generated during Conval's recent | | engineering investigation revealed actual Cv values of both valve styles to | | be below 1.5, significantly lower than those required by the procurement | | documents. | | | | While there are no indications that the valves will mechanically | | malfunction, the fluid flow rates permitted in the forward direction will be | | below those anticipated in the procurement document specifications and, | | therefore, may constitute a safety related issue according to the intended | | use of the valves. | | | | There are no nonconforming parts affecting the operation of the valves. The | | lower Cv values are a consequence of the internal geometry of these Conval | | valve designs. If requested, Conval's Engineering Manager, David Boyden, | | will propose a retrofit of parts which, upon user acceptance, could be | | implemented within 4 weeks following user approval. The changes would | | significantly increase the flow capacity of the affected valves. | | | | The two (2) nuclear plants affected have been verbally notified of this | | potential safety related noncompliance deviation. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021