Event Notification Report for May 4, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/03/2001 - 05/04/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37962 37963 37964
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37962 |
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| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:54[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/03/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: A. WISNIEWSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*DEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOCAL LEAK RATE FAILED |
| |
| At 0700, on 05/03/01, the Control Room was informed that the HPCI Steam |
| Exhaust Check Valves, V23-3 & V23-4, failed their local leak rate test such |
| that the minimum pathway leakage rate was exceeded, greater than 193.674 |
| scfh which is in excess of 0.6La Tech Spec limit. The valves were declared |
| inoperable and repairs are underway. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37963 |
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| FACILITY: PERRY REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:36[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 03/12/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEN RUSSELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*INV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Startup |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| ACTUATION OF DIVISION 1 BALANCE-OF-PLANT OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES - INVALID |
| SYSTEM ACTUATION |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On March 12, 2001, at approximately 0030 hours, the Perry Nuclear Power |
| Plant experienced an actuation of Division 1 Balance-of-Plant (BOP) outboard |
| isolation valves. At the time of the event, the plant was in Mode 5 |
| (Refueling), and had been subcritical for approximately 23 days. The |
| reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head was removed and the refuel cavity and |
| upper containment pools were flooded; no core alterations were in progress |
| at the time. Shutdown cooling was being provided by the Fuel Pool Cooling |
| and Clean-up system (FPCC), which was aligned to the upper containment pool. |
| The isolation signal closed one or more valves in each of the following |
| Division 1 subsystems: FPCC, Containment Drywell purge, Two-Bed |
| Demineralized Water System, Fire Protection, Liquid Radwaste Sumps, Liquid |
| Radwaste Disposal, Instrument Air, Containment Vessel Chilled Water, |
| Condensate Transfer and Storage. In addition, the isolation signal caused a |
| temporary interruption of shutdown cooling flow through the FPCC system, |
| until it was re-established by on-shift Operations personnel." |
| |
| "The event is considered an invalid system actuation, and is reportable |
| under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The isolation was not initiated in |
| response to actual plant conditions or parameters, and was not a manual |
| initiation. It meets the criteria specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) |
| as a general containment isolation signal affecting containment isolation |
| valves in more than one system. Therefore, notification is being provided |
| via 60-day optional phone call in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). All |
| systems functioned as expected for a partial BOP (outboard) isolation." |
| |
| "The interruption of shutdown cooling lasted for 111 minutes, from 0030 |
| hours to 0221 hours on March 12, 2001. During this time, the reactor water |
| temperature increased approximately 3 degrees, from 99 to 102 degrees. The |
| estimated time to boil was conservatively calculated at 28 hours. The |
| affected Fire Protection (drywell CO2) isolation valve was not required to |
| be open, since the fire-protected equipment was secured during the refueling |
| outage. Repositioning of the other valves did not present operational |
| concerns; they were re-opened per restoration procedures. The cooling flow |
| path was available immediately with manual operator action." |
| |
| "The BOP isolation was attributed to scheduled maintenance activities being |
| conducted in the Control Room. The replacement of a bayonet-socket-style |
| relay caused two fuses to blow in the BOP manual initiation logic circuit. |
| The apparent cause was an inadvertent ground from the seismic strap of the |
| new relay during installation that resulted in the required logic for the |
| isolation." |
| |
| "This event was documented in the Corrective Action Program. Remedial |
| actions include review of the event with instrumentation and control |
| technicians, and evaluation of depowering valves which could interrupt |
| shutdown cooling during maintenance activities." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37964 |
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| REP ORG: 3M COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2001|
|LICENSEE: W. L. GORE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:06[EDT]|
| CITY: EAUCLAIRE REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 10/22/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: WI |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 1429-1811GL AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/03/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+DICK WESSMAN IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE LEWANDOWSKI | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 3M COMPANY REPORT REGARDING A W. L. GORE FACILITY LOSS OF A STATIC |
| ELIMINATOR CONTAINING 10 MILLICURIES OF POLONIUM-210 |
| |
| On 09/12/00, 3M Company (located in St. Paul, Minnesota) announced its |
| intent to purchase W. L. Gore (located in Eauclaire, Wisconsin). The |
| acquisition took place during late October or early November 2000. On |
| 03/14/01, 3M Company representatives visited the newly acquired W. L. Gore |
| facility and discovered the existence of static eliminators. An audit was |
| subsequently performed, and 3M Company was able to account for all but one |
| static eliminator. |
| |
| Apparently, the W. L. Gore facility received the polonium static eliminator |
| in question on 08/10/00. This static eliminator was manufactured by Nuclear |
| Radiation Development (NRD), and it was comprised of an in-line ionizer tube |
| approximately 4 inches long and 1/4 inch in diameter with 10 millicuries of |
| polonium-210 plated on the inside of the device. The static eliminator was |
| installed on a large circuit substrate manufacturing machine for use in the |
| W. L. Gore facility under the NRD general license (1429-1811GL). |
| |
| On 09/06/00, the circuit substrate manufacturing machine was sent back to |
| its manufacturer (Everrett Charles) for an upgrade. The static eliminator |
| was reported to be on the machine when it was shipped to Everrett Charles |
| (location unknown); however, the static eliminator was determined to be |
| missing after Everrett Charles returned the upgraded machine to W. L. Gore |
| on 10/22/00. |
| |
| Everrett Charles was notified of the missing static eliminator during the |
| week of 04/09/01. NRD was also notified during the week of 04/16/01. It |
| was reported that searches were performed, but the missing static eliminator |
| was not found. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a 3M Company contact telephone number.) |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021