Event Notification Report for March 8, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
03/07/2001 - 03/08/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37810 37812 37813
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37810 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/06/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:24[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/05/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:24[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM CROWLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/07/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU |RICHARD CONTE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |BILL BATEMAN NRR |
|*AEC 50.72(a) (1) (i) EMERGENCY DECLARED |CHARLES MILLER IRO |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|CHARLIE BAGWELL FEMA |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCRETIONARY UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A MOMENTARY LOSS OF OFFSITE |
| POWER DURING AN ONGOING SEVERE WINTER STORM AND SUBSEQUENT AUTOMATIC REACTOR |
| TRIP DUE TO GRID INSTABILITY |
| |
| During an ongoing severe winter storm, the 345-kV breakers tripped open and |
| re-closed resulting in a momentary loss of offsite power. An automatic |
| reactor trip also occurred at 2324 on 03/05/01 due to electrical grid |
| instability. (The exact cause of the reactor trip is currently under |
| investigation because there was no first out indication.) All rods fully |
| inserted. The reactor coolant pumps tripped as expected, and one has been |
| placed back in service. Both emergency diesel generators automatically |
| started but did not load. Availability of the condenser was also lost due |
| to the loss of power, and operators closed the main steam isolation valves. |
| There were no radiation releases, and there were no reactor coolant system |
| or steam generator tube leaks. All systems functioned as required with one |
| exception. The steam-driven emergency feedwater pump failed to |
| automatically actuate. |
| |
| At this time, the unit is in Mode 3. Normal charging and letdown, |
| pressurizer heaters and sprays, and one reactor coolant pump are being |
| utilized for primary system level, pressure, and transport control. Water |
| is being supplied to the steam generators via an electric-driven emergency |
| feedwater pump, and the atmospheric dumps are being utilized as the heat |
| sink. Containment parameters are normal. The grid is currently available |
| for offsite power, and the emergency diesel generators are still running. |
| |
| Based on a discretionary shift management call, the licensee declared an |
| Unusual Event at 2336 on 03/05/01. The licensee stated that a |
| "Discretionary Event" under item 18A refers to an event in progress (or has |
| occurred) that indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of |
| the station. The licensee plans to notify the NRC when the Unusual Event |
| has terminated or if conditions degrade. |
| |
| A severe winter storm is currently ongoing. At the time of the event, the |
| unit was experiencing winds at a rate of approximately 50 miles per hour. |
| The licensee reported that these strong winds were ongoing and that only a |
| few inches of snow had fallen (although up to 2 feet is expected). |
| |
| The licensee notified the state at 2347 on 03/05/01 and plans to notify the |
| NRC resident inspector as well as applicable local officials. The licensee |
| also plans to issue a press release. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 0222 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE ***** |
| |
| This update provides both clarifications/corrections to the original event |
| notification and additional information regarding licensee plans. |
| |
| CLARIFICATIONS/CORRECTIONS: Prior to the event, two of three offsite power |
| lines had been lost in close succession. The remaining offsite line was |
| subsequently lost, and its breaker re-closed within a short duration. This |
| resulted in the momentary loss of offsite power and subsequent plant |
| transient. This initial electrical imbalance was sufficient to result in |
| the automatic starting and loading of both emergency diesel generators. |
| |
| CURRENT STATUS: The unit remains in the Unusual Event, and winds are |
| currently sustained at a rate of approximately 40 miles per hour. All three |
| offsite power lines have been restored. Both emergency diesel generators |
| remain in operation and continue to provide power to both vital (emergency) |
| buses. The non-vital buses have been re-energized from offsite power. An |
| additional auxiliary pump (the startup feedwater pump) has also been started |
| to provide additional water to the steam generators. This pump is a |
| non-safety related housekeeping pump. |
| |
| PLANS: Within the next half hour, the licensee plans to commence a |
| discretionary plant cooldown and plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold |
| Shutdown). At some point in time, the licensee also plans to secure the |
| electric-driven emergency feedwater pump and rely on the startup feedwater |
| pump to supply water to the steam generators. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and an onsite member of an |
| NRC residual heat removal inspection team. The NRC operations officer |
| notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO (Miller). |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 0438 ON 03/06/01 FROM JIM HILL TO LEIGH TROCINE ***** |
| |
| The licensee has commenced a plant cooldown and anticipates that it will |
| take approximately 6 hours for the unit to reach Cold Shutdown. Other than |
| commencement of the cooldown, there has been no change in plant conditions |
| or equipment status. |
| |
| The licensee stated that the criteria for exiting the Unusual Event have |
| been met. However, the licensee currently plans to remain in the Unusual |
| Event for a while longer because the high line insulators onsite are still |
| arcing and are suspect and because the in-house vital buses are still being |
| powered by the emergency diesel generators. |
| |
| The licensee notified an onsite member of an NRC residual heat removal |
| inspection team, who in turn notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC |
| operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte), NRR EO (Bateman), and IRO |
| (Miller). |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 0800 ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO LEIGH TROCINE ***** |
| |
| The licensee called to provide the following status update: |
| |
| The unit remains in the Unusual Event. The reactor coolant system is |
| currently at 445 degrees F, and the cooldown is still in progress via |
| utilization of boration and the atmospheric steam dumps. The emergency |
| diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital buses. |
| |
| The licensee currently plans to place the unit in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) and |
| then to restore the secondary side of the plant (assuming that offsite power |
| supplies are stable). |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Conte) and NRR EO (Tappert). |
| |
| *** UPDATE AT 1509 ET ON 03/06/01 FROM JOHN LaVALLEY TO JOHN MACKINNON |
| ***** |
| |
| The licensee called to provide the following status update: |
| |
| The unit remains in the Unusual Event. The reactor coolant system is |
| currently 360 degrees F, and cooldown is still in progress. The licensee |
| will reduce reactor coolant system temperature to approximately 240 degrees |
| F. The emergency diesel generators are still supplying power to the vital |
| buses. The licensee is waiting for Load Dispatcher permission to take down |
| one 345kV line at a time to clean the lines bushing. After the bushings for |
| the 3 345kV lines have been cleaned and the grid is stable, the licensee |
| will make a determination whether to exit the Unusual Event. |
| Additional information: After the reactor trip the Turbine Driven Auxiliary |
| Feedwater pump failed to start. The licensee thinks that the pump tripped |
| on overspeed. Licensee is investigating this problem. |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (C. |
| Grimes) |
| |
| ****UPDATE AT 1619ET ON 03/06/01 FROM M KILEY TO JOHN MACKINNON***** |
| |
| The licensee called to provide the following clarification to event write |
| up: |
| |
| The exact cause of the reactor trip as indicated by the "First Out Light" |
| was "Power Range Negative Flux Rate Hi". Secondly, both Emergency Diesel |
| Generators automatically started and loaded all safety related loads |
| associated with Emergency Electrical Buses 5 and 6. |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R1DO (Bellamy) and NRR EO (Tad |
| Marsh). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1055 EST FROM RON STRICKLAND TAKEN BY BOB STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1040 EST. The offsite |
| electrical grid is stable with two independent sources available. Offsite |
| power has been restored to emergency bus (E-5), and the licensee is |
| preparing to realign the other emergency bus to offsite power as well. The |
| unit remains stable in Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown). The NRC resident inspector has |
| been informed of this update by the licensee. |
| |
| Notified R1DO (Bellamy), NRR EO (Marsh) and FEMA (Steindurf). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37812 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/07/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:11[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DENNIS BEMIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/07/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RONALD BELLAMY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MOTOR DRIVEN EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFW) PUMP STARTED UNEXPECTEDLY |
| |
| While paralleling the DG-1B with offsite power, the "B" Motor Driven EFW |
| pump started . The start occurred as the Bus 6 Unit Auxiliary Transformer |
| breaker was closed. The licensee verified Emergency Feedwater Flow was not |
| required and secured the Motor Driven EFW pump. The pump ran for 2 minutes |
| and 28 seconds. All four (4) Steam Generator Water Levels increased less |
| than 10% narrow range. The licensee is investigating the cause of the pump |
| start. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37813 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/08/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 03/07/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 09:00[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 03/08/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "On 3-7-01 at 0900 hours , in preparation to implement NCSA-PLANT091 it was |
| discovered that PORTS has a plutonium-239 (Pu-239) source that exceeds the |
| mass control limit of the unimplemented NCSA. This new NCSA was Plant |
| Operations Review Committee (PORC) approved but is not activated. |
| NCSA-PLANT091 establishes minimum masses for several fissile isotopes for |
| determining when Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) controls are required. |
| For Pu-239, the control limit is 7.2 grams. The sealed source contains 32 |
| grams of Pu-239. An anomalous condition was entered and a boundary |
| established around the source pending NCS review. Upon further review, NCS |
| determined that there is not an active NCSA/NCSE to control the Pu-239 |
| source. The storage of the Pu-239 source is considered unanalyzed since |
| there is not an active NCSA/NCSE documenting the double contingency of this |
| storage. |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The Pu-239 source is in |
| a storage unit at the X-326 Health Physics (HP) Source Storage Vault. The |
| storage unit provides spacing from other materials and there were no other |
| fissile materials near the storage unit that would require NCSA controls. |
| Spacing from other fissile material is not an issue. NCSA-PLANT021 |
| determined that the safe mass of Pu-239 is 207 grams. The source contains 32 |
| grams Pu-239 and is well below the safe mass value of 207 grams. Double |
| contingency exists, but has not been formally documented in an implemented |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. |
| |
| "The discovery of this source is a legacy issue This source was transported |
| to PORTS in 1961 from offsite. This source has not been used since NRC |
| regulation of PORTS. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The discovery of this |
| source is a legacy issue. This source was transported to PORTS In 1961 from |
| offsite. The subcritical mass limit for Pu-239 per ANSI/ANS-8.15 is 450 |
| grams. |
| |
| "This source has not been used since coming under NRC regulation. There are |
| no Radiation Work permits (RWP) or procedures that use this source. There is |
| no reason to believe that the source has been removed from its storage unit. |
| The storage unit provides some spacing from other materials and there were |
| no other fissile materials in the storage area that would require spacing |
| for NCS. Double contingency exists, but it has not been documented in an |
| Implemented Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "A violation of an NCSA for other fissile materials in conjunction with |
| placement near the Pu-239 source would be required before criticality would |
| be credible or a much larger mass of Pu-239 would be required. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "Although an NCSA was not in place, the mass of Pu-239 was only a fraction |
| of the Pu-239 safe mass and there were no other fissile materials in the |
| storage area that would require spacing for NCS. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "The licensed material was 32 grams of Pu-239 in the form of a sealed |
| source. This is approximately 7% of a subcritical mass (450 grams per |
| ANSI/ANS-8.15). |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| "There were no established controls over this material. However, much less |
| than a safe mass was involved and there were no other fissile materials in |
| the storage area that would require spacing for NCS. Therefore, the |
| significance of this event is very low. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "Upon discovery, a boundary was established and an anomalous condition |
| entered." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021