Event Notification Report for January 12, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/11/2001 - 01/12/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37613 37627 37659
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37613 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSS GUMBERT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/11/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN WHITE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER UNITS DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| "At 0640 on 12/18/00, '11' service water accumulator was declared inoperable |
| based on water level low out of specification for Technical Specifications. |
| This condition was identified following calibration of the 'B' level device. |
| The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the |
| containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident. |
| Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 were entered for containment |
| integrity and '11' and '12' containment fan coil unit inoperability. Actions |
| were taken within one hour to comply with containment integrity Tech Spec. |
| The service water accumulator was filled to within specification at 0713 at |
| which time Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 was exited. The '11' and '12' containment fan |
| coil units were restored to operable at 0744 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 was |
| exited. Actions are underway to calibrate the 'A' channel of level |
| indication. All power plant parameters remained stable throughout the event |
| and no other safety systems were affected." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1312EST ON 1/11/01 FROM BENSON BINGGELI TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: |
| |
| "On December 18, 2000, a four-hour report was made for Salem Unit 1 in |
| accordance with 10CFR50.72(B) (2) (iii) due to the water level for the 11 |
| Service Water accumulator being out of specification low based on readings |
| from the 'B' level device. The service water accumulators support |
| containment integrity by ensuring the containment fan coils remain properly |
| filled during a design basis accident. |
| |
| "There are two level devices, 'A' and 'B', associated with each SW |
| accumulator. During the time that the 'B' level device indicated that the SW |
| accumulator was out of specification, the 'A' level device continued to show |
| that the accumulator level was within the required level specification. |
| |
| "Following the calibration of the 'B' level device which showed that level |
| on the 'B' channel was reading low out |
| of specification, M&TE equipment (differential pressure gauge) was connected |
| to the 11 SW accumulator to provide an independent reading of the tank |
| level. The M&TE equipment confirmed that the 11 SW accumulator level was |
| within 0.5 inches of the level indicated by the 'A' level device. Based on |
| this confirmation, the 'A' level device on the 11 SW accumulator is |
| providing an accurate indication of level in the tank. |
| |
| "Since the 'A' level device readings were within the required Technical |
| Specification level band for the 11 SW accumulator, the 11 SW accumulator |
| was always operable and capable of performing its design basis function. |
| Based on this information, the 4-hour report is being retracted." |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO(Lew). |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37627 |
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| FACILITY: BRUNSWICK REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/20/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:58[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:08[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: REINSBURROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/11/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MIKE ERNSTES R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FAILURE OF A REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) BYPASS TO CONDENSATE |
| STORAGE TANK VALVE TO FULLY STROKE DURING STROKE TIME TESTING |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "EVENT: At 2008 on 12/20/00 during performance of OPT-10.1.8 (RCIC System |
| Valve Operability Test), the 2-E51-F022 (RCIC bypass to condensate storage |
| tank) failed to fully stroke during stroke timing of the valve. A valve |
| thermal overload annunciator was received. This rendered the Brunswick Unit |
| 2 RCIC system inoperable. RCIC was not in operation at the time of this |
| failure." |
| |
| "INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION: Minimal safety significance. |
| Remaining ECCS systems are operable." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTION(S): Determine the cause of the 2-E51-F022 valve failure. |
| Return the Unit 2 RCIC system to operable following repair of 2-E51-F022." |
| |
| The licensee stated that this event did not result in any radiological |
| release or reactor coolant leaks. The licensee also stated that all systems |
| functioned as required and that there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. |
| This event placed the unit in a 14-day technical specification limiting |
| condition for operation. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION ON 01/11/01 AT 1059ET BY CHARLES ELBERFELD TAKEN BY |
| MACKINNON* * * |
| |
| Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that the conditions |
| resulting in the RCIC system being declared inoperable for Technical |
| Specification LCO 3.5.3 did not result in a loss of the system's function to |
| remove residual heat. The function of the RCIC system is to respond to |
| transient events by providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC |
| system is not an Engineered Safety Feature system, and no credit is taken in |
| the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for RCIC system operation |
| mitigating the consequences of a postulated accident. The RCIC system is |
| designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor |
| pressure vessel (RPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of normal coolant flow |
| from the reactor feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and |
| control of the RPV water level. Its operational purpose is to provide an |
| alternate source of reactor coolant to the vessel and to provide sufficient |
| cooling to remove residual heat following reactor shutdown and loss of |
| feedwater flow without requiring depressurization of the reactor. Neither |
| the 2-E51-F022 being de-energized in the open position, nor the questionable |
| capability of the 2-E51-F029 resulted in the loss of the ability of the |
| RCIC system to remove residual heat. |
| |
| In the case of the RCIC Bypass to Condensate Storage Tank valve 2-E51-F022, |
| with the valve de-energized in the open position, injection flow into the |
| RPV is not diverted to the Condensate Storage Tank, or into the High |
| Pressure Coolant Injection system due to additional closed valves in the |
| test flow path. Therefore, if the RCIC system had been called upon to |
| perform its needed function to remove residual heat, the system would have |
| performed as required. |
| |
| In the case of the RCIC Torus Suction valve 2-E51-F029, although the ability |
| for the RCIC system sump suction to align to the Torus must be available to |
| meet its Technical Specification LCO Operability requirements, the RCIC |
| system has the capacity to meet its function to remove residual heat when |
| aligned to the Condensate Storage Tank. Although the RCIC system is a single |
| train injection system, it has redundant suction flow paths that are fully |
| capable of meeting these injection requirements. Loss of one suction flow |
| path does not prevent the RCIC system from performing its required function |
| to remove residual heat. |
| |
| Subsequently, it has been determined that the malfunction of the RCIC system |
| components did not adversely impact that system function to remove residual |
| heat. Carolina Power and Light Company has determined that this event does |
| not meet 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73 reporting criteria and this |
| notification is being retracted. |
| NRC R2DO (Chuck Ogle) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37659 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/11/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:37[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 01/11/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:15[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC OLSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/11/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: |DAVID LEW R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY OF CONDITION INVOLVING INABILITY OF THE LOW PRESSURE COOLANT |
| INJECTION (LPCI) SYSTEM TO PERFORM DESIGN FUNCTION BETWEEN APRIL 1999 AND |
| JANUARY 2001 |
| |
| "On 1/2/01, discovered incorrect relays (27-B2X2 and 27-B2Z2) had been |
| installed in Bus B6 (480 VAC swing bus) during RFO 12 (April, 1999). The |
| bus transfer logic was declared inoperable at the time and entry was made |
| into a 7-day cold shutdown LCO for LPCI. |
| |
| "Further analysis of the circuit has determined that the B6 Bus would have |
| remained de-energized following a loss of offsite power if the 'A' side |
| power supply became unavailable (i.e., 'A' Emergency Diesel failed or 'A' |
| 125 VDC Battery failed). |
| |
| "This condition is outside the design in accordance with Pilgrim Station |
| FSAR. |
| |
| "The relays were replaced with the correct design and the LPCI LCO cleared |
| at approximately 0745 Sunday, January 7, 2001." |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021