Event Notification Report for January 9, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/08/2001 - 01/09/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37653 37654 37655 37656
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37653 |
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| REP ORG: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2001|
|LICENSEE: FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,|NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:14[EST]|
| CITY: FT. LAUDERDALE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 01/08/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: 0109-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/08/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |STEPHEN CAHILL R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHARLEY ADAMS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE |
| |
| The following is taken from a faxed report: |
| |
| A Troxler gauge containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241:Be was stolen. |
| The Ft. Lauderdale Police case number is 013072. |
| |
| Florida DOT bright orange van parked at owners address was stolen sometime |
| between 6 a.m. Sunday (7th) and 7 a.m. Monday (8th). A Troxler gauge was in |
| a locked box in the van. The keys to the gauge were not in the van. The |
| police have been notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37654 |
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| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:54[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/07/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREGORY CIRAULA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/08/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID LEW R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| CLOSED FIRE DAMPERS WOULD RESULT IN BYPASS OF HEPA FILTERS |
| |
| "On January 6, 2001, during testing of the auxiliary building ventilation |
| system, it was noted that the flow through the HEPA-charcoal train did not |
| meet the Technical Specification acceptance criterion. Upon further |
| investigation by plant personnel on January 7, 2001 at 0930 it was |
| discovered that fire damper ABF13 had closed. Closure of this damper |
| resulted in the closure of damper ABS8 (an excess flow damper). On January |
| 8, 2001, at 1030 following further engineering evaluation, it was determined |
| that with these dampers closed, filtration of the effluents from the pipe |
| chase and RHR areas would not have been processed through the HEPA-charcoal |
| absorber. This condition does not meet the assumptions of the Salem offsite |
| dose analysis, and therefore the condition meets the reporting requirements |
| of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii). As of January 7, 2001 at 1605 dampers ABF13 and |
| ABS8 were open and flow through the HEPA-charcoal train was verified to meet |
| Technical Specification acceptance criterion." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this report by the licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37655 |
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| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:32[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 01/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:50[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEPHEN JOBE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/08/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DALE POWERS R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| HPCI SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| "The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable |
| due to an air line leak. The unplanned loss of a single train system (such |
| as HPCI) is reportable as a loss of safety function. The air line supplies |
| air to air-operated valves for draining the steam supply line to ensure that |
| the HPCI steam supply line does not fill with water. Upon a HPCI initiation |
| signal that would cause the steam supply valve to open or on a loss of air |
| pressure, these air-operated valves automatically shut. With the degraded |
| condition of the air supply line, assurance could not be maintained that the |
| steam lines would be maintained clear of water. HPCI is presently available |
| and capable of injecting if required." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37656 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:27[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 01/08/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:27[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/08/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |PATRICIA HOLAHAN NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "At 1127 hours, 01/08/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent's (PSS) office was |
| notified of a discrepancy in the U-235 Mass log in room 229, X-710 Lab |
| Services Facility. A NCS Anomalous Condition was initiated and NCS Engineer |
| personnel were contacted to investigate the discrepancy. Investigation |
| revealed that two containers were moved from room 229 into room 330 without |
| being logged out of room 229 or logged into room 330. The failure to log the |
| movement of the two containers into and out of the respective mass |
| inventories represents a loss of controls 2a and 2b of NCSA-0710_022.A01. |
| Since the NCSE takes credit for these controls to satisfy both legs of the |
| double contingency principle, this event involves the loss of both controls |
| credited for double contingency. At 1430 hours, 01/08/01, NCS Engineering |
| reported that compliance with NCSA-0710_022.A01 was reestablished This event |
| does not involve greater than a safe mass and moderation is not a control |
| (primary or otherwise) in the affected NCSA/NCSE. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. The U-235 mass inventory in |
| Room 330 is 129.1 grams, which is well below the safe mass limit if 230 |
| grams of U-235 for oily material. The failure to log the container movement |
| at no time challenged the safe mass limit. A minimum of 588 grams U-235 |
| (Reference POEF-LMUS-44) would be needed to support a criticality at the |
| analyzed enrichment limit (100%) under optimum conditions |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "If the safe U-235 mass limit was at the maximum allowable value for |
| operations involving oily material, and these two containers were added to |
| the mass present, there would need to be an additional 347 grams of U-235 |
| present in the room before a critical mass for full reflection, optimum |
| moderation and spherical geometry were exceeded for oily conditions. For |
| this amount of U-235 to be present, multiple errors in the log book would |
| need to occur. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "The control Parameter for this operation is mass. NCSA-0710_022 places two |
| controls on this parameter. The combined mass of all fissile material is |
| limited to 350 grams of U-235 for non-oily/greasy material and 230 grams of |
| U-235 if oily/greasy material is present. The NCSA requires that a log of |
| U-235 mass inventory be maintained to demonstrate that the mass limit is not |
| exceeded. Each log entry consists of the mass value plus analytical |
| uncertainty. A log entry is made by the person responsible for the movement |
| of U-235 into the room and is verified by a second knowledgeable person. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT. FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "There were approximately 100 containers in room 330 that contain 129.1 |
| grams of U-235 in both solid and liquid form. Out of these containers there |
| were approximately 33.7 grams U-235 enriched to greater than 20% in fire |
| room at the time of this event. The NCS analysis assumes 100% enrichment in |
| developing the mass limit and does not control enrichment. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| "Two containers with >500 ppm U-235 concentration and greater than 1.0 |
| weight percent U-235 enrichment were not logged out of room 229 nor were |
| they logged into room 330. Since they were not logged in or out, no |
| verification was performed. The safety significance of this event is low due |
| to the small amount of U-235 involved." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021