Event Notification Report for December 19, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/18/2000 - 12/19/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37532 37608 37613 37614 37615 37616
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37532 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/17/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:41[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:10[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SCOTT RICHARDSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/18/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 ENTERED TS 3.0.3 AFTER DECLARING BOTH LOOPS ECCS INOPERABLE |
| |
| "Tech Spec 3.5.2 requires two independent Emergency Core Cooling System |
| (ECCS) loops, each capable of taking suction from the Refueling Water |
| Storage Tank (RWST) and being transferred to the containment recirculation |
| sump. This spec applies in modes 1 - 3. Following evaluation of recent |
| modifications to the containment recirc sump ECCS suction isolation valves, |
| it has been determined that neither of the two isolation valves (2-ICM-305 |
| and 2-ICM-306) could be relied upon to open when transfer of ECCS suction is |
| required. This is attributed to a lack of assurance that between seat |
| relief valves on 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 would lift and preclude thermal |
| hydraulic locking of the valves in the closed position. Since neither ECCS |
| loop recirc sump suction is operable, the action statement of TS 3.5.2 is |
| not valid. This led to the Shift Manager declaring entry into TS 3.0.3 with |
| a requirement to place the unit in a mode for which TS 3.5.2 does not apply. |
| A unit shutdown at 2% per hour has been initiated. Plans are to implement |
| compensatory actions or have the unit in hot standby within 6 hours." |
| |
| The licensee anticipates exiting TS 3.0.3 after bleeding the fluid trapped |
| between the double disk valves in approximately two hours. The licensee |
| informed the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 0310 11/18/2000 FROM RICHARDSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The united exited the shutdown LCO at 2315. Reactor power had been reduced |
| from 100% to 90%. The licensee removed approximately 4.5 gallons of water |
| from the body of each valve in order to prevent thermal locking. The NRC |
| resident inspector will be informed. Notified R3DO (Jorgensen). |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 1834 ON 12/18/00 FROM BRENDA L'ROURKE TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ***** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification. The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "The Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant is withdrawing [its] 1-hour Non-Emergency |
| notification made to the NRC at 2041 hours on [11/17/00] (Event # 37532). |
| At that time, it was reported that Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 after declaring |
| both ECCS loops inoperable. Both loops were declared inoperable because |
| neither of the two containment recirculation sump ECCS suction isolation |
| valves (2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306), could be relied upon to open when transfer |
| of ECCS suction is required. This was attributed to a lack of assurance |
| that the thermal relief valves (2-SV-344 East and West) installed between |
| the seats of 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306, would lift at the required 20 psid |
| design pressure to preclude thermal hydraulic locking of the normally closed |
| ECCS suction valves. These relief valves were installed prior to Unit 2 |
| entering Mode 4. On [11/18/00] at 2315 hours, Unit 2 exited the TS-required |
| shutdown after 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 were declared operable after |
| approximately 4.5 gallons of water was drained from each valve." |
| |
| "Further Engineering evaluation concluded that both ECCS loops are and have |
| been operable because 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 were determined not to be in a |
| 'water solid' condition and, therefore, not susceptible to thermal hydraulic |
| locking. This conclusion was confirmed by draining the volume of fluid |
| present between the ECCS suction valve seats and comparing the total amount |
| of fluid drained to the free space available inside each valve. It was |
| determined, by calculation, that of the 30 gallons of free space available |
| inside each valve, only 2 gallons of free space are needed to ensure the |
| valves will open when transfer of ECCS suction is required. Both valves |
| were drained on three separate occasions between 11/17/00 and 11/22/00. A |
| total of 6.74 gallons was drained from 2-ICM-305, and a total of 8.25 |
| gallons was drained from 2-ICM-306. Based on the total amount of fluid |
| drained from each valve, both 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 have been operable |
| during all periods when the ECCS is required to be operable." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R3DO (Kozak). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37608 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/17/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:57[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/16/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES MERTINK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/18/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHUCK CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv) ECCS INJECTION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CLOSURE OF TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVES |
| |
| "Unit 1 manually tripped the reactor at 2300 on 12/16/00. The unit was in |
| the process of performing main turbine valve operability testing when all |
| four Governor Valves went closed. The crew manually tripped the reactor and |
| entered emergency operating procedures. Primary pressure continued to lower |
| to the Safety Injection actuation setpoint. All ESF equipment actuated and |
| performed as expected with the exception of one Source Range Nuclear |
| Instrument. The cause of the Safety Injection actuation is not fully |
| understood at this time." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 2330 EST ON 12/18/00 FROM JOHN PIERCE TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ***** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This is a supplemental notification to EVENT #37608 for a [1-hour] report |
| for any event that results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling |
| System (ECCS) discharge into the RCS as a result of a valid signal |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(1)(iv)(B)) and [for a 4-hour] notification [for] RPS |
| actuation and ESF actuation (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii))." |
| |
| "Unit 1 was preparing to [perform] main turbine valve operability testing |
| when all four governor valves went closed. Unit 1 was manually tripped at |
| 2300 [CST] on 12/16/2000, and emergency operating procedures were entered. |
| Safety injection occurred approximately 1 minute and 25 seconds following |
| the reactor trip. All ESF equipment responded normally during the safety |
| injection including initiation of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow to the |
| steam generators. RCS pressure lowered to approximately 1470 psig within |
| approximately 6 minutes of safety injection actuation prior to recovering |
| and increasing pressure. Taking manual control to close the pressurizer |
| spray valves, after indicating not fully closed, and throttling AFW flow |
| appeared to stop the pressure decrease. Safety injection termination |
| criteria was met, and the safety injection was terminated by approximately |
| 2348 hours [CST]." |
| |
| "The highest RCS pressure was 2303 psig. An adequate margin of subcooling |
| was maintained, and the reactor head area indicated it remained water solid |
| during the transient. Maximum pressurizer level during the event was |
| approximately 63.8%. Following termination of the transient, it was noted |
| that RCS temperature did not return to the expected no-load temperature |
| value. Plant walk down found 3 of 12 steam dump valves approximately 10% |
| open which contributed to the initial plant cooldown. These valves were |
| isolated." |
| |
| "An STP Event Review Team is analyzing plant data to determine the |
| [detailed] sequence of events and cause of event." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R4DO (Bill Jones). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37613 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSS GUMBERT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/18/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN WHITE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER UNITS DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| "At 0640 on 12/18/00, '11' service water accumulator was declared inoperable |
| based on water level low out of specification for Technical Specifications. |
| This condition was identified following calibration of the 'B' level device. |
| The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the |
| containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident. |
| Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 were entered for containment |
| integrity and '11' and '12' containment fan coil unit inoperability. Actions |
| were taken within one hour to comply with containment integrity Tech Spec. |
| The service water accumulator was filled to within specification at 0713 at |
| which time Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 was exited. The '11' and '12' containment fan |
| coil units were restored to operable at 0744 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 was |
| exited. Actions are underway to calibrate the 'A' channel of level |
| indication. All power plant parameters remained stable throughout the event |
| and no other safety systems were affected." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37614 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:58[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:29[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT POWERS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/18/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS KOZAK R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ISOLATION OF THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES |
| DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE (Refer to event #37616 |
| for details regarding an additional reactor scram.) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "At 1329 CST, the plant experienced an isolation of the 'Main Steam |
| Isolation Valves which subsequently initiated an automatic reactor SCRAM. |
| The Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure was part of a Group I isolation which |
| is believed to be caused by performance of a maintenance surveillance on the |
| Main Steam Line Tunnel Leak Detection System." |
| |
| "The plant is stable, and there were no other abnormal occurrences in |
| conjunction with this event." |
| |
| "Since closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves is an actuation of the |
| Reactor Protection System this condition is being reported pursuant to |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)." |
| |
| The licensee stated that all control rods fully inserted due to the reactor |
| scram and that the reactor core cooling isolation system was manually |
| actuated and secured during this event. There were no emergency core |
| cooling systems actuations, and none were required. The licensee's |
| investigation is currently ongoing. |
| |
| The licensee also stated that water is currently being supplied to the |
| reactor vessel via normal condensate and feedwater and that safety relief |
| valves are being utilized for pressure control. Containment parameters were |
| reported to be normal, and offsite power is available. The emergency core |
| cooling systems are also available if required. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the State. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37615 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:30[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:36[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE WHEELER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/18/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BILL JONES R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |65 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TRIP OF A RECIRCULATION PUMP DUE TO LOSS OF A SUPPORT SYSTEM FOLLOWING LOAD |
| SHEDDING FROM AN ESSENTIAL BUS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "During surveillance testing of the Division I undervoltage logic, a step |
| was performed out of sequence. This resulted in load shedding from the |
| Division I essential bus. Undervoltage actuations occurred as expected |
| including a trip of one reactor [recirculation] pump. Plant operation was |
| stabilized in single loop operation with recovery planning in progress." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the unit was operating at 100% power prior to the |
| event and that it is currently operating at 65% power (in single loop |
| operation). It was reported that the trip of the recirculation pump was not |
| the direct result of the undervoltage condition. It actually occurred due |
| to the loss of a support system because the load shedding resulted in a loss |
| of power to an oil pump that supplied the recirculation pump. All systems |
| functioned as expected, and there was nothing unusual or misunderstood. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37616 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:00[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:45[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MONTY KNAPP |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/18/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS KOZAK R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) LOW LEVEL 3 WHILE |
| THE UNIT WAS IN HOT SHUTDOWN (Refer to event #37614 for details regarding a |
| previous reactor scram.) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "At 1845 CST, the plant was in Mode 3 with the scram reset. Roughly 5 hours |
| earlier the plant had experienced a scram upon a Group 1 isolation. While |
| re-opening the MSIVs to re-establish the main condenser as the heat sink and |
| transfer pressure control, the plant experienced an RPV Low Level 3 and |
| scrammed." |
| |
| "The MSIVs are now open, the scram reset, and level and pressure are |
| stable." |
| |
| The licensee stated that RPV Low Level 3 occurs at +8.9 inches narrow |
| range. |
| |
| It was reported that the unit experienced a problem with the procedure which |
| delayed opening of the MSIVs. As pressure creeped up which caused the pumps |
| that were feeding the vessel to feed less. Therefore, level started |
| creeping down as pressure started creeping up. It is not believed that |
| level went much below RPV Low Level 3 because water would have been injected |
| as a result of the scram. The licensee stated that there were no engineered |
| safety feature actuations or emergency core cooling injections and that none |
| were required. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021