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Event Notification Report for December 19, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           12/18/2000 - 12/19/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37532  37608  37613  37614  37615  37616  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37532       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/17/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:41[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:10[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCOTT RICHARDSON             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/18/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 ENTERED TS 3.0.3 AFTER DECLARING BOTH LOOPS ECCS INOPERABLE           |
|                                                                              |
| "Tech Spec 3.5.2 requires two independent Emergency Core Cooling System      |
| (ECCS) loops, each capable of taking suction from the Refueling Water        |
| Storage Tank (RWST) and being transferred to the containment recirculation   |
| sump.  This spec applies in modes 1 - 3.  Following evaluation of recent     |
| modifications to the containment recirc sump ECCS suction isolation valves,  |
| it has been determined that neither of the two isolation valves (2-ICM-305   |
| and 2-ICM-306) could be relied upon to open when transfer of ECCS suction is |
| required.  This is attributed to a lack of assurance that between seat       |
| relief valves on 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 would lift and preclude thermal     |
| hydraulic locking of the valves in the closed position.  Since neither ECCS  |
| loop recirc sump suction is operable, the action statement of TS 3.5.2 is    |
| not valid.  This led to the Shift Manager declaring entry into TS 3.0.3 with |
| a requirement to place the unit in a mode for which TS 3.5.2 does not apply. |
| A unit shutdown at 2% per hour has been initiated.  Plans are to implement   |
| compensatory actions or have the unit in hot standby within 6 hours."        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee anticipates exiting TS 3.0.3 after bleeding the fluid trapped   |
| between the double disk valves in approximately two hours. The licensee      |
| informed the NRC resident inspector.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 0310 11/18/2000 FROM RICHARDSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| The united exited the shutdown LCO at 2315. Reactor power had been reduced   |
| from 100% to 90%. The licensee removed approximately 4.5 gallons of water    |
| from the body of each valve in order to prevent thermal locking. The NRC     |
| resident inspector will be informed. Notified R3DO (Jorgensen).              |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE AT 1834 ON 12/18/00 FROM BRENDA L'ROURKE TO LEIGH TROCINE       |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification.  The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant is withdrawing [its] 1-hour Non-Emergency  |
| notification made to the NRC at 2041 hours on [11/17/00] (Event # 37532).    |
| At that time, it was reported that Unit 2 entered TS 3.0.3 after declaring   |
| both ECCS loops inoperable.  Both loops were declared inoperable because     |
| neither of the two containment recirculation sump ECCS suction isolation     |
| valves (2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306), could be relied upon to open when transfer |
| of ECCS suction is required.  This was attributed to a lack of assurance     |
| that the thermal relief valves (2-SV-344 East and West) installed between    |
| the seats of 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306, would lift at the required 20 psid     |
| design pressure to preclude thermal hydraulic locking of the normally closed |
| ECCS suction valves.  These relief valves were installed prior to Unit 2     |
| entering Mode 4.  On [11/18/00] at 2315 hours, Unit 2 exited the TS-required |
| shutdown after 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 were declared operable after          |
| approximately 4.5 gallons of water was drained from each valve."             |
|                                                                              |
| "Further Engineering evaluation concluded that both ECCS loops are and have  |
| been operable because 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 were determined not to be in a |
| 'water solid' condition and, therefore, not susceptible to thermal hydraulic |
| locking.  This conclusion was confirmed by draining the volume of fluid      |
| present between the ECCS suction valve seats and comparing the total amount  |
| of fluid drained to the free space available inside each valve.  It was      |
| determined, by calculation, that of the 30 gallons of free space available   |
| inside each valve, only 2 gallons of free space are needed to ensure the     |
| valves will open when transfer of ECCS suction is required.  Both valves     |
| were drained on three separate occasions between 11/17/00 and 11/22/00.  A   |
| total of 6.74 gallons was drained from 2-ICM-305, and a total of 8.25        |
| gallons was drained from 2-ICM-306.  Based on the total amount of fluid      |
| drained from each valve, both 2-ICM-305 and 2-ICM-306 have been operable     |
| during all periods when the ECCS is required to be operable."                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R3DO (Kozak).                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37608       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/17/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:57[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        12/16/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JAMES MERTINK                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/18/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHUCK CAIN           R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|ACCS 50.72(b)(1)(iv)     ECCS INJECTION         |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO CLOSURE OF TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVES                |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 manually tripped the reactor at 2300 on 12/16/00. The unit was in    |
| the process of performing main turbine valve operability testing when all    |
| four Governor Valves went closed. The crew manually tripped the reactor and  |
| entered emergency operating procedures. Primary pressure continued to lower  |
| to the Safety Injection actuation setpoint. All ESF equipment actuated and   |
| performed as expected with the exception of one Source Range Nuclear         |
| Instrument. The cause of the Safety Injection actuation is not fully         |
| understood at this time."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE AT 2330 EST ON 12/18/00 FROM JOHN PIERCE TO LEIGH TROCINE       |
| *****                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a supplemental notification to EVENT #37608 for a [1-hour] report   |
| for any event that results or should have resulted in Emergency Core Cooling |
| System (ECCS) discharge into the RCS as a result of a valid signal           |
| (10CFR50.72(b)(1)(iv)(B)) and [for a 4-hour] notification [for] RPS          |
| actuation and ESF actuation (10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii))."                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 was preparing to [perform] main turbine valve operability testing    |
| when all four governor valves went closed.  Unit 1 was manually tripped at   |
| 2300 [CST] on 12/16/2000, and emergency operating procedures were entered.   |
| Safety injection occurred approximately 1 minute and 25 seconds following    |
| the reactor trip.  All ESF equipment responded normally during the safety    |
| injection including initiation of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow to the      |
| steam generators.  RCS pressure lowered to approximately 1470 psig within    |
| approximately 6 minutes of safety injection actuation prior to recovering    |
| and increasing pressure.  Taking manual control to close the pressurizer     |
| spray valves, after indicating not fully closed, and throttling AFW flow     |
| appeared to stop the pressure decrease.  Safety injection termination        |
| criteria was met, and the safety injection was terminated by approximately   |
| 2348 hours [CST]."                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The highest RCS pressure was 2303 psig.  An adequate margin of subcooling   |
| was maintained, and the reactor head area indicated it remained water solid  |
| during the transient.  Maximum pressurizer level during the event was        |
| approximately 63.8%.  Following termination of the transient, it was noted   |
| that RCS temperature did not return to the expected no-load temperature      |
| value.  Plant walk down found 3 of 12 steam dump valves approximately 10%    |
| open which contributed to the initial plant cooldown.  These valves were     |
| isolated."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "An STP Event Review Team is analyzing plant data to determine the           |
| [detailed] sequence of events and cause of event."                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R4DO (Bill Jones).                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37613       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:40[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RUSS GUMBERT                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/18/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN WHITE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTAINMENT FAN COOLER UNITS DECLARED INOPERABLE                             |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0640 on 12/18/00, '11' service water accumulator was declared inoperable |
| based on water level low out of specification for Technical Specifications.  |
| This condition was identified following calibration of the 'B' level device. |
| The service water accumulators support containment integrity by ensuring the |
| containment fan coils remain properly filled during a design basis accident. |
| Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 were entered for containment         |
| integrity and '11' and '12' containment fan coil unit inoperability. Actions |
| were taken within one hour to comply with containment integrity Tech Spec.   |
| The service water accumulator was filled to within specification at 0713 at  |
| which time Tech Spec 3.6.1.1 was exited. The '11' and '12' containment fan   |
| coil units were restored to operable at 0744 and Tech Spec 3.6.2.3 was       |
| exited. Actions are underway to calibrate the 'A' channel of level           |
| indication. All power plant parameters remained stable throughout the event  |
| and no other safety systems were affected."                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the      |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37614       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:58[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:29[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROBERT POWERS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/18/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS KOZAK         R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ISOLATION OF THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES  |
| DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE  (Refer to event #37616   |
| for details regarding an additional reactor scram.)                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1329 CST, the plant experienced an isolation of the 'Main Steam          |
| Isolation Valves which subsequently initiated an automatic reactor SCRAM.    |
| The Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure was part of a Group I isolation which |
| is believed to be caused by performance of a maintenance surveillance on the |
| Main Steam Line Tunnel Leak Detection System."                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The plant is stable, and there were no other abnormal occurrences in        |
| conjunction with this event."                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Since closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves is an actuation of the     |
| Reactor Protection System this condition is being reported pursuant to       |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that all control rods fully inserted due to the reactor  |
| scram and that the reactor core cooling isolation system was manually        |
| actuated and secured during this event.  There were no emergency core        |
| cooling systems actuations, and none were required.  The licensee's          |
| investigation is currently ongoing.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee also stated that water is currently being supplied to the       |
| reactor vessel via normal condensate and feedwater and that safety relief    |
| valves are being utilized for pressure control.  Containment parameters were |
| reported to be normal, and offsite power is available.  The emergency core   |
| cooling systems are also available if required.                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and the State.              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37615       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:30[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:36[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE WHEELER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/18/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BILL JONES           R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |65       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TRIP OF A RECIRCULATION PUMP DUE TO LOSS OF A SUPPORT SYSTEM FOLLOWING LOAD  |
| SHEDDING FROM AN ESSENTIAL BUS                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "During surveillance testing of the Division I undervoltage logic, a step    |
| was performed out of sequence.  This resulted in load shedding from the      |
| Division I essential bus.  Undervoltage actuations occurred as expected      |
| including a trip of one reactor [recirculation] pump.  Plant operation was   |
| stabilized in single loop operation with recovery planning in progress."     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the unit was operating at 100% power prior to the   |
| event and that it is currently operating at 65% power (in single loop        |
| operation).  It was reported that the trip of the recirculation pump was not |
| the direct result of the undervoltage condition.  It actually occurred due   |
| to the loss of a support system because the load shedding resulted in a loss |
| of power to an oil pump that supplied the recirculation pump.  All systems   |
| functioned as expected, and there was nothing unusual or misunderstood.      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37616       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/18/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:00[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        12/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:45[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MONTY KNAPP                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/18/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS KOZAK         R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) LOW LEVEL 3 WHILE   |
| THE UNIT WAS IN HOT SHUTDOWN  (Refer to event #37614 for details regarding a |
| previous reactor scram.)                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1845 CST, the plant was in Mode 3 with the scram reset.  Roughly 5 hours |
| earlier the plant had experienced a scram upon a Group 1 isolation.  While   |
| re-opening the MSIVs to re-establish the main condenser as the heat sink and |
| transfer pressure control, the plant experienced an RPV Low Level 3 and      |
| scrammed."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The MSIVs are now open, the scram reset, and level and pressure are         |
| stable."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that RPV Low Level 3 occurs at +8.9 inches narrow        |
| range.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| It was reported that the unit experienced a problem with the procedure which |
| delayed opening of the MSIVs.  As pressure creeped up which caused the pumps |
| that were feeding the vessel to feed less.  Therefore, level started         |
| creeping down as pressure started creeping up.  It is not believed that      |
| level went much below RPV Low Level 3 because water would have been injected |
| as a result of the scram.  The licensee stated that there were no engineered |
| safety feature actuations or emergency core cooling injections and that none |
| were required.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+