Event Notification Report for December 8, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
12/07/2000 - 12/08/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37574 37575 37576 37577 37578
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37574 |
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| FACILITY: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/07/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:43[EST]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2) |EVENT DATE: 12/06/2000|
| LEU FABRICATION |EVENT TIME: 19:00[EST]|
| LWR COMMERICAL FUEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/07/2000|
| CITY: WILMINGTON REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: NEW HANOVER STATE: NC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1097 AGREEMENT: Y |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001113 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAULSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING LOSS OF MASS AND DENSITY |
| CONTROLS IN TWO CARRYOVER STORAGE TANKS |
| |
| "At approximately 1900 hours on December 6, 2000 GNF-A Operations identified |
| that two tanks, believed to |
| be empty, contained liquid bearing very low concentrations of uranium. The |
| tanks involved are V-109B and V- |
| 113. |
| |
| "The total mass of uranium involved is 282 grams U, well below the |
| established safe mass limit of 22,036 grams U at 5% enrichment. No unsafe |
| condition existed. |
| |
| "The accumulation occurred due to carryover via a common Vent Off-Gas (VOG) |
| system from V-104 to the two tanks found to contain liquid. The independent |
| mass and density controls on V-104 remained fully functional. The potential |
| for carryover via the VOG system was not anticipated and represents an |
| unanalyzed condition. |
| |
| "The solution in both V-109B and V-113 was sampled and pumped back into |
| V-104 under the direction of Nuclear Safety. The total solution volume in |
| V-109B was 2960 gallons with a concentration of 22 ppm U (~247 grams U). The |
| total solution volume in V-113 was 1,507 gallons with a concentration of 6.1 |
| ppm U (~35 grams U). The VOG header has been isolated to prevent |
| reoccurrence. Investigation and additional corrective actions are pending. |
| |
| "This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due |
| to identification of an unanalyzed condition involving less than a safe mass |
| of uranium." |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| Low safety significance - low concentration |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICALITY |
| COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| Multiple failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. |
| Incident involves less than a safe mass of uranium. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S) (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Mass: V-104 process vessel limited to safe mass by upstream active |
| engineered controls on uranium concentration in material feed (independent |
| uranium monitor and pipe detector NDA measurement). |
| Density: independent differential pressure density control tied to |
| particulate removal (centrifugation) and air sparging. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Affected equipment Contained < 300 grams of uranium (total). Established |
| safe heterogeneous mass limit for U02 enriched to 5% is 25 kgs (or 22. 036 |
| grams U). |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The 4-inch overflow line located on tank V-104 beneath the VOG header failed |
| to prevent carryover into the VOG header. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| 1. Solution in V-109B and V-113 sampled for U concentration, results |
| acceptable. |
| |
| 2. Solution in V-109B and V-113 pumped back into V-104; VOG header tie-in |
| blank flanged to prevent reoccurrence. |
| |
| 3. Investigation and additional corrective actions pending. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37575 |
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| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/07/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:29[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 11/07/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: [EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TODD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/07/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |BRIAN SMITHN NMSS |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |0 Refueling |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF A RADIOACTIVE CALIBRATION SOURCE CONTAINING 0.022 MICROCURIES OF |
| AMERICIUM-241 |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "[...] This is a non-emergency event being reported in accordance with 10 |
| CFR 20.2201(a)(2)(i) which references [10 CFR] 50.72. The event did not |
| directly affect operation of Oconee unit(s) 1, 2, or 3." |
| |
| "[...] This report is categorized under 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)." |
| |
| "[...] Description of event:" |
| |
| "On [11/07/00,] a radioactive calibration source, designated as ONS-1075, |
| was recognized as missing inside the Oconee restricted area. Following an |
| unsuccessful search, it was classified as lost. [10 CFR] Part 20 requires a |
| telephone report to the NRC Operations Center within 30 days from the date |
| of loss of this quantity of licensed material. In addition, 10 CFR |
| 20.2201(b) requires a written report within 30 days following the telephone |
| report. The written report will be submitted within that period." |
| |
| "Description of the lost licensed material[:]" |
| |
| "The lost calibration source was a 47 mm glass fiber filter material |
| impregnated with 0.022 microcurie[s] of [Am]-241, covered with mylar and |
| contained in a stainless steel planchet. This quantity is 22 times the 10 |
| CFR [Part] 20, Appendix C quantity. For comparison, the average home smoke |
| detector contains a source of approximately 1 microcurie." |
| |
| "Circumstances under which the loss occurred[:]" |
| |
| "On 10/30/00[,] an individual used the source used to calibrate a radiation |
| measuring device. Prior to returning the source to its storage location, |
| the individual, who was experiencing elevated blood pressure, was relieved |
| from duty and was referred to his personal physician. On 11/07/00, after |
| being released to return to work by his physician, the individual resumed |
| the calibration process and noted the absence of the calibration source." |
| |
| "Probable disposition of licensed material[:]" |
| |
| "Following a search and investigation associated with the missing |
| calibration source (see below), it was concluded that the most probable |
| disposition of the lost source was inadvertent disposal as dry active |
| waste." |
| |
| "Exposures of individuals to radiation[:]" |
| |
| "No individuals are believed to have been exposed to this material. A dose |
| assessment assuming a hypothetical maximally exposed individual concluded |
| that external exposure would be negligible, and internal dose would be 49 |
| mRem CEDE if ingested or 11.4 Rem CEDE if inhaled. Given the probable |
| disposition and physical characteristics of this source, it is unlikely that |
| this source was ingested or inhaled; therefore, it is not considered |
| credible that any individual could receive the maximum calculable dose from |
| this source." |
| |
| "Action taken to recover the material[:]" |
| |
| "On 11/07/00[,] the individual conducted a search of the source's storage |
| area and all reasonable areas where the source would be used in order to |
| continue the calibration. When the source was not found, the individual |
| notified his supervisor, and the search was expanded to include the |
| individual's office area and some personal effects. Because the calibration |
| source is very similar in appearance to common samples used to quantify |
| removable surface radioactive contamination, it was suspected that the |
| calibration source had been mistakenly discarded as sample waste. No dry |
| active waste shipments had been made during the elapsed time between |
| 10/30/2000, when the source was last known to have been used, and 11/7/00, |
| when the search was conducted. However, a significant amount of waste had |
| accumulated at the collection point. This waste was visually searched, but |
| the source was not located." |
| |
| "Measures that have been, or will be, adopted to ensure against a recurrence |
| of the loss of licensed material[:]" |
| |
| "This type of calibration source is similar in appearance to routine samples |
| prepared for counting in the detector. Oconee will pursue a method for |
| better marking of these sources to minimize the possibility of a source |
| being visually mistaken for a waste sample." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| NOTE: The licensee stated that Oconee Unit 1 was operating at 100% power at |
| the time of the event (on 11/07/00). However, the Unit 1 is currently |
| defueled as part of a planned refueling outage. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37576 |
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| REP ORG: HUNT VALVE COMPANY, INC. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/07/2000|
|LICENSEE: HUNT VALVE COMPANY, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:19[EST]|
| CITY: SALEM REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 12/06/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: OH |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/07/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| |KEVIN RAMSEY (fax) NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+VERN HODGE (fax) NRR |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WAYNE ALDRICH (via fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT OF A DEVIATION - IDENTIFICATION OF A DEFECT WITH A |
| COMPONENT ON VALVE ASSEMBLIES SUPPLIED TO USEC |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Hunt Valve |
| Company, Inc.: |
| |
| "We have discovered a material failure within our manufacturing process for |
| the 1" UF-6 valves manufactured in accordance with ANSI N14.1. During our |
| normal visual inspection[,] a few packing nuts were noted to have cracks |
| located on the hex flats. These cracked packing nuts have been isolated to |
| heat codes AXP and AFD." |
| |
| "These valves were manufactured and shipped against contract No. 566948 for |
| USEC. Our records indicate that we have shipped Lot Serial [Nos.] 200027-36 |
| through 200027-40 containing the heat code AXP packing nuts, and Lot Serial |
| [Nos.] 200027-5 [and] 200027-19 through 200027-35 containing heat code AFD. |
| The total number of valves included in these shipments is 2,300 of which |
| 1,300 are known to be from the affected heat codes (see attached table). |
| All other inventory has been accounted for and isolated. These valves have |
| been located at USEC and are being returned to Hunt Valve for replacement |
| nuts." |
| |
| "We are currently undergoing an investigation to determine the source of the |
| defect but feel compelled to inform you by this communication of our |
| preliminary findings. [...]." |
| |
| "Heat Code Lot Serial |
| [No.] Date Shipped Quantity |
| (Total Supplied) |
| |
| AXP (735 pcs) 200027-36 |
| 11/22/00 97 |
| 200027-37 11/22/00 100 |
| (233 in stock 12/4/00) 200027-38 |
| 11/22/00 100 |
| (100 on a shipment in shipping) 200027-39 |
| 11/22/00 100 |
| 200027-40 11/22/00 100 |
| |
| AFD (972 pcs) 200027-5 |
| 5/31/00 10 |
| 200027-19 8/14/00 9 |
| (294 in stock 12/4/00) 200027-20 |
| 8/14/00 7 |
| 200027-21 8/31/00 30 |
| 200027-22 8/31/00 44 |
| 200027-23 8/31/00 39 |
| 200027-24 8/31/00 33 |
| 200027-25 8/31/00 29 |
| 200027-26 10/5/00 53 |
| 200027-27 10/5/00 52 |
| 200027-28 10/5/00 67 |
| 200027-29 10/5/00 54 |
| 200027-30 10/5/00 62 |
| 200027-31 11/3/00 58 |
| 200027-32 11/3/00 45 |
| 200027-33 11/3/00 23 |
| 200027-34 11/3/00 35 |
| 200027-35 11/3/00 28" |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information). |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37577 |
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| REP ORG: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/07/2000|
|LICENSEE: PACIFIC TECHNICAL INDUSTRIES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:10[EST]|
| CITY: Bellevue REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 12/07/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: WA |EVENT TIME: [PST]|
|LICENSE#: WN-IR053-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/07/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 |
| |THOMAS ESSIG NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY C. FRAZEE (Fax) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING THE DISCOVERY THAT A PACIFIC TECHNICAL |
| INDUSTRIES RADIOGRAPHER'S EXPOSURE EXCEEDED 5 REM ANNUAL LIMIT |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from WA Department |
| of Health (DOH), Division of Radiation Protection: |
| |
| "This is notification of an event in Washington state as reported to the WA |
| Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection." |
| |
| "STATUS: new" |
| |
| "Licensee: Pacific Technical Industries" |
| |
| "City and state: Bellevue, WA" |
| |
| "License number: WN-1R053-1" |
| |
| "Type of license: Industrial radiography" |
| |
| "Date of event: November 2000" |
| |
| "Location of Event: Bellevue, WA" |
| |
| "ABSTRACT (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective |
| actions, consequences, DOH on-site investigation; media attention)[:] An |
| industrial radiographer has exceeded the annual exposure limit of 5 rem. |
| The licensee was notified by the dosimetry service on September 27 that the |
| radiographer had received 4.3 rem through August 2000. The Department |
| mailed a copy of [Information Notice] IN 2000-15 to all radiography |
| licensees on October 26. Upon receipt of the Information Notice, the |
| licensee was prompted to review the radiographer's daily pocket dosimeter |
| records and at that time determined that the total dose was already likely |
| to be 5.1 rem. The radiographer was immediately reassigned to non-radiation |
| work, the dosimeter was sent for processing, and the Department was |
| notified. On December 7, the licensee reported the results of the dosimetry |
| as received from the dosimetry service. The radiographer had received 5.217 |
| rem. The licensee indicated that the radiographer had received more |
| exposure than usual due to a heavy workload in confined spaces such as tanks |
| and other vessels where getting in and out was difficult or even hazardous. |
| The relatively short exposure times involved led the radiographer to remain |
| in the confined space hut as far as practical from the source and crank |
| handle. The licensee is being cited for failure to control the exposure of |
| the radiographer." |
| |
| "What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 246-22l-010 |
| Occupational limits for adults." |
| |
| "Activity and Isotope(s) involved: Curie amounts of Ir-192" |
| |
| "Overexposure? (Number of workers/members of public; dose estimate; body |
| part receiving dose; consequence)[:] One radiographer received 5.217 rem |
| whole body exposure; 5.210 rem to the lens; and 5.248 rem shallow dose." |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37578 |
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| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/07/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:35[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 12/07/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:55[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GUY GRIFFIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 12/07/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PAUL FREDRICKSON R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF THE PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEM |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "A complete loss of the prompt notification system has occurred [at 2255], |
| which [is] considered to be a major loss of offsite notification capability. |
| The prompt notification system is a NOAA weather radio system [out of |
| Jacksonville, Florida]." |
| |
| The licensee stated that people are currently being dispatched to work on |
| the problem and that the system was returned to service at 2335. |
| |
| The licensee notified applicable state and local officials and plans to |
| notify the NRC resident inspector. |
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