Event Notification Report for September 20, 2000

LOST TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE REPORTED TO THE MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT (MDE)

Maryland licensee, D W Kozera Inc. of Baltimore, Md. lost a Troxler moisture density gauge model 3430 serial # 25607 in Adamstown, Md. The gauge was missing from the back of a flat bed truck , which had its tailgate down, that was being driven around the Greenhill Manor Residential subdivision(New Design Rd & Union Ridge Rd in Fredrick City). The gauge, which apparently fell out of the back of the truck, was not in its case and the source rod was not padlocked. The source (7.2 millicuries of cesium 137 and 39.7 millicuries of americium 241), as far as they know, was in the shielded position and has not been found. MDE has conducted an initial investigation and it appears that they may issue a press release.

* * * UPDATE ON 09/22/00 AT 0842 ET BY R. MANLEY TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

The Troxler gauge was picked up from the middle of road (New Design Rd & Union Ridge Rd) by a sub contractor shortly after it fell from the back of the flat bed truck. The casing of the Troxler gauge had minor damage and the source never left its shielded position. After reading the article in the newspaper about the missing Troxler gauge the Sub Contractor contacted the licensee, D W Kozera Inc. The Troxler gauge case had a phone number and address on it but the Sub Contractor was unable to contact the licensee until reading the newspaper article which gave where the licensee could be contacted. The Troxler gauge will be checked over today by Troxler.

NRC R1DO (Bill Ruland) and NMSS EO (Brian Smith) notified.

SECURITY REPORT

Unescorted access granted inappropriately. Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. Contact the NRC Operations Center for additional information. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification.

RWCU ISOLATION VALVE FAILED TO CLOSE DURING TEST

During performance of a reactor water cleanup (RWCU) logic system functional test, RWCU inboard isolation valve 1G31-F001 failed to close when a simulated high area temperature signal was applied. Subsequent testing indicates that a relay failed in the isolation circuitry. The licensee will replace the failed relay. The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.

PLANT OUTSIDE 10 CFR PART 50 APPENDIX R DESIGN BASIS DUE TO PROCEDURAL ISSUES

"During the final review of the new Appendix R rebaselining project, it was discovered that the refueling water storage tank (RWST) inventory could be lost if AOP 10A, 'Safe Shutdown-Local Control' and AOP 10B 'Safe to Cold Shutdown in Local Control' were performed as written. The postulated event occurs during an Appendix R fire where SI-851(RHR pump suction from containment sump B) encounters a spurious open signal, causing the RWST to drain via backflow into containment. The procedures do not address this potential failure early enough into the event to preclude a potential loss of RWST inventory. This puts Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant outside of its design basis because 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.L.2.b performance goals might not be met for the above scenario."

The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the licensee.

* * * UPDATE AT 1424 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY RYAN RODE TO FANGIE JONES * * *

"This is an update to Event Notification 37358. That notification reported a procedural deficiency involving AOP 10A, 'Safe Shutdown - Local Control' and AOP 10B. 'Safe to Cold Shutdown in Local Control,' in the event of a postulated Appendix R fire which results in a spurious open signal to the SI-851A/B valves, 'RHR Pump Suction from Containment Sump B.' This notification discussed the concern with this spurious valve opening occurring during AOP 10A, which was a potential loss of RWST inventory to the containment sump through the SI-856A/B, 'RHR Pump Suctions From RWST,' valves.

"Although appropriately identified in the License's condition report, this notification did not include a discussion of the concern identified during conduct of procedure AOP 10B. Specifically, since no action is specified to verify that the SI-851 A/B valves are closed in either AOP 10A or AOP 10B, in the event of the Appendix R fire which results in the spurious opening of those valves, when the RHR system is aligned for normal recirculation during the cooldown, the RCS inventory could be reduced by leakage through the open SI-851 valve to the containment sump. As mentioned in the original event notification, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.L.2.b requires the performance goal for maintaining RCS level within the level indication in the pressurizer be met. The procedures as written do not assure this performance goal would be met and are reported as a potential condition that is outside the Appendix R design basis."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R3DO (Bruce Burgess) has been notified.