Event Notification Report for June 27, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/26/2000 - 06/27/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36712 37113 37114 37115 37116 37117 37118 37119
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36712 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:22[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/21/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:00[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/26/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CALVIN PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| Material storage areas transferred from DOE to USEC contain uncharacterized |
| potentially fissile material that does not comply with USEC NCS program |
| requirements. The stored material also does not meet DOE NCS requirements. |
| Responsibility for the storage areas was transferred to USEC for more rapid |
| remediation of the non-conforming conditions, in part to support the Seismic |
| Upgrade Project in C-331 and C-335, and to improve overall site safety. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The DOE material storage areas were located |
| within the boundaries of USEC leased space. Transfer to USEC control allows |
| more timely remediation to establish double contingency controls on the |
| material. Timely remediation will improve overall site safety. The |
| material is in a stable condition and double contingency will be established |
| using USEC procedures. These procedures ensure that safety is not degraded |
| during the remediation actions. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCEANARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: In order for a criticality to be possible, more |
| than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. |
| The stored material is primarily equipment items in which the fissile |
| material is deposited in small quantities widely dispersed over large |
| surface areas. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, etc): |
| Since no NCS controls were applied to the equipment, double contingency can |
| not be demonstrated. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): Unknown due to DOE previously |
| controlling areas. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: No NCS controls (other than providing 10 |
| feet buffer zone) where in place. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Areas are to be remediated in accordance with NCS program requirements. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-OO-1009: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-017. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1232 4/18/2000 FROM PITTMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| An additional area, DMSA 30 in C-337, was transferred from DOE to USEC on |
| 4/18/2000 at 1000 CST. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this |
| update. Notified R3DO (Ring), NMSS (Sturz). |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1640EDT ON 6/26/00 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| Assay results identified three converters each containing >400 grams U-235. |
| This amount of material is beyond the scope of the NCS program. Corrective |
| actions have not been identified. The assay results are as follows: |
| |
| 956 gms U-235 assay 42.65% |
| 973 gms U-235 assay 57.45% |
| 1230 gms U-235 assay 29.75% |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R3DO(Leach) and |
| NMSS(Piccone). |
| |
| The following UPDATE information was received via fax: |
| |
| EVENT DESCRIPTION: |
| |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were discovered that contained greater |
| than 5.5 wt. % enrichment and greater than 400 grams 235U. There are no |
| actions specified in NCSA GEN-20 which will result in the ability to |
| establish double contingency. Three items were discovered in DMSA-331-09 |
| containing 956 grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and |
| 1230 grams 235U at 29.75 wt. %. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items have been identified that contain |
| greater than the minimum critical mass. The minimum critical mass Is based |
| on optimum geometry, moderation, and reflection conditions. The material |
| contained within the subject equipment is expected to be distributed |
| throughout the equipment. Due to process nature and equipment design, there |
| are no credible mechanisms for accumulation of material in an optimum |
| geometrical configuration. The subject equipment openings are covered to |
| preclude intrusion of fire sprinkler water and optimum moderation conditions |
| are not credible. A minimum 10-foot exclusion zone has been established |
| around the three equipment items to preclude Increased reflection effects |
| due to equipment/ personnel in the immediate vicinity. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were identified as containing greater |
| than the minimum critical mass. Since the three items contain approximately |
| 105, 112, and 120% of the estimated minimum critical mass at their |
| respective enrichments, the mass would have to exist in a near optimum |
| geometry, moderation, and reflection before a criticality could occur. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas. |
| |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: The three subject equipment items respectively contained 956 |
| grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and 1230 grams |
| 235U at 29.75 wt. %. Limits as established in NCSA GEN-20 are 400 grams 235U |
| at 5.5 wt. %. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone |
| shall [be] established around the three equipment items located in |
| DMSA-331-09 which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The |
| exclusion zone shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge |
| of the subject equipment. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone |
| shall be established around the three equipment items located in DMSA-331-09 |
| which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The exclusion zone |
| shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge of the subject |
| equipment. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37113 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:28[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 06/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:53[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID HANKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/26/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOE TAPIA R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF POWER TO AT LEAST 13 OF 43 EVACUATION PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SYSTEM |
| SIRENS FOR APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES FOLLOWED BY SIRENS FALSELY IN ALARM FOR |
| ABOUT 4 MINUTES |
| |
| Tensas Perish in Louisiana reported a loss of power to evacuation public |
| notification system sirens. At least 13 of 43 sirens lost power for |
| approximately 20 minutes, and upon restoration, the sirens were in alarm for |
| approximately 4 minutes. Local public address station KNOE was notified of |
| the false alarm by Tensas Perish. The system has been restored to normal. |
| All systems functioned as required once power was restored. |
| |
| The licensee made applicable local and media notifications and plans to |
| notify the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37114 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WNP-2 REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:05[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:25[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID SWANK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/26/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GAIL GOOD R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ROBERT DENNIG EO |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING A TRIP OF THE MAIN |
| TURBINE |
| |
| "MAIN TURBINE TRIP RESULTING IN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM. ALL RODS INSERTED. |
| TWO MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES AUTOMATICALLY OPENED ON HIGH PRESSURE. |
| EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES WERE ENTERED ON LOW REACTOR LEVEL [+13 |
| INCHES]. BYPASS VALVE #1 OPENED AND STUCK OPEN RESULTING IN REACTOR |
| PRESSURE DECREASE TO APPROXIMATELY 500 PSIG. COOLDOWN RATE WAS NOT |
| EXCEEDED. THE BYPASS VALVE IS CURRENTLY CLOSED. REACTOR WATER LEVEL |
| INCREASED ABOVE LEVEL 8 [+54.5 INCHES]. PRESSURE CONTROL IS CURRENTLY ON |
| SRVs [SAFETY RELIEF VALVES]. LEVEL CONTROL IS CURRENTLY ON CONDENSATE AND |
| BOOSTER PUMPS. ALL SYSTEMS STABLE." |
| |
| ALL SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE, IF NEEDED. ELECTRICAL LOADS ARE |
| CURRENTLY SUPPLIED BY OFFSITE POWER. ONE TRAIN OF SUPPRESSION POOL [SP] |
| COOLING IS IN OPERATION MAINTAINING SP TEMPERATURE AT 86 DEGREES F. THE |
| LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP AND FAILURE OF |
| THE #1 BYPASS VALVE TO CLOSE. THERE WAS NO ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE OR |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING IN PROGRESS PRIOR TO THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37115 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|LICENSEE: WA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:20[EDT]|
| CITY: LYNNWOOD REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 06/13/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: WA |EVENT TIME: 10:30[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: WN-L073-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/26/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GAIL GOOD R4 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY FRAZEE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE |
| |
| The following information was received via fax (event report #WA-00-022): |
| |
| This is notification of an event in Washington state as investigated by the |
| WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection. |
| |
| STATUS: new |
| |
| Licensee: Washington Department of Transportation |
| City and state: Seattle, WA |
| License number: WN-L073-1 |
| Type of license: Portable Gauge |
| |
| Date of event: 6/13/00 |
| Location of Event: Lynnwood, WA |
| |
| ABSTRACT: At approximately, 10:30 AM, a construction contractor working for |
| the Washington Department of Transportation (DOT) drove a bulldozer over a |
| Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge adjacent to the northbound off |
| ramp at exit 186 on Interstate 5. The exact cause of the accident is not |
| known at this time. However, an underlying cause seems to be the constant |
| pressure to keep working. This brings huge machinery and tiny testing |
| equipment into the same area at the same time. The gauge was in use at the |
| time with the 8 millicuries Cs-137 source extended from the gauge body which |
| also contains a 40 millicuries Am-241/Be source. A representative from the |
| Division of Radiation Protection (DRP) was on the scene by 11:30 AM. The |
| local Fire Department, the State Patrol and at least one news crew also |
| responded. The work site was stopped and both off ramps and the overpass |
| were closed by the Fire Department as an additional precaution. The DRP |
| representative determined that the impact demolished the gauge and jammed |
| the extended source so that it could not be returned to the shielding. The |
| DRP representative assisted the licensee in securing the sources in the |
| transport box and filling it with dirt to provide additional shielding. The |
| sources were transported to the Olympia DOT Materials Lab where proper |
| shields were available. The sources will remain there until the |
| manufacturer sends an appropriate shipping container. DOT issued a press |
| release and coverage appeared on television and in local and regional |
| newspapers. |
| |
| What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 46-221-250 |
| (damaged equipment) |
| |
| Activity and isotope(s) involved: 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be |
| |
| Overexposures? none |
| |
| Lost, Stolen or Damaged? Damage to Troxler Model 3430 portable gauge |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37116 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: INGERSOLL-DRESSER PUMP COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|LICENSEE: INGERSOLL-DRESSER PUMP COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
| CITY: HUNTINGTON PARK REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 06/26/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/26/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GAIL GOOD R4 |
| |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL SHAFER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING A DESIGN DEFECT IN A SPLIT RING RETAINER (DRAWING |
| B65573) |
| |
| "This report is written to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 21.21.4. |
| The numbering of the information given here correlates with the numbering in |
| 21.21.4: |
| |
| (i) Bill Shaffer |
| |
| Director of Operations |
| Ingersoll-Dresser Pump |
| 5715 Bickett Street |
| Huntington Park, CA 90255 |
| |
| |
| (ii) Split Ring Retainer |
| |
| Drawing B65573 Rev. |
| |
| |
| (iii) Ingersoll-Dresser Pump |
| 5715 Bickett Street |
| Huntington Park, CA 90255 |
| |
| (iv) The Split Ring Retainer (Drawing B65573 Rev. 0) specifies a drilled and |
| counter bored bolt hole diameter too large to allow the bolting to secure |
| this retainer in its intended position. Based on an evaluation of this |
| condition, it has been determined that this design defect could allow the |
| subject Split Ring Retainer and other adjacent parts including the Split |
| Ring Retainer bolting, split ring and pressure reducing sleeve to move out |
| of position. This could result in a seal failure or a catastrophic pump |
| failure. |
| |
| (v) IDP Huntington Park was informed of this defect on 6-22-00. |
| |
| (vi) Three defective split ring retainers were manufactured. The location of |
| all three are known to IDP-HP. Three were shipped to STP Nuclear Operating |
| Co. One of the defective split ring retainers was installed and put into |
| service at STP. |
| |
| (vii) On June 23rd Dennis Stark of STP was notified of the defective split |
| ring retainer and that it could result in a catastrophic failure. |
| Replacement split ring retainers with corrected design will be ship[ed] by |
| June 30, 2000. |
| |
| (viii) IDP-HP advised Dennis Stark of STP that the pump with the installed |
| defective split ring retainer should be taken out of service." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37117 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:23[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:53[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK O'CONNOR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |SCOTT MORRIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING A LOSS OF THE "A" MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP (MFP) |
| |
| AT 1900EDT ON 6/26/00, THE UNIT EXPERIENCED A PLANT SETBACK TO 55% POWER |
| FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF THE "A" MFP. OPERATORS INSERTED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP |
| AS STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS APPROACHED THE LOW LEVEL TRIP SETPOINT. ALL |
| SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED WITH ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTING. |
| EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFW) ACTUATED AS EXPECTED. THE MAIN CONDENSER IS |
| AVAILABLE ACCEPTING DECAY HEAT VIA STEAM BYPASS. NO PRIMARY/SECONDARY |
| SAFETIES/RELIEFS LIFTED DURING THE TRANSIENT. ALL THREE OFFSITE POWER |
| SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND WILL ISSUE A PRESS |
| RELEASE. |
| |
| ********** UPDATE AT 0015 ON 06/27/00 FROM DAMON RITTER TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ********** |
| |
| The licensee updated this event notification to document an abnormal |
| post-trip response and to correct the event time. The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "Subsequent to the trip, one channel of intermediate and source range |
| nuclear instrumentation did not energize. The cause is under investigation. |
| [The licensee stated that this did not place the unit in a limiting |
| condition for operation because there was still one channel in operation.] |
| Additionally, the event time for the event notification is corrected. The |
| reactor trip was initiated at 1853 [on] 26 June 2000 [in lieu of 1900]." |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Morris). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37118 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:58[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: S. SAUER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |SCOTT MORRIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 92 Power Operation |92 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS |
| |
| "NOTIFIED BY EMERGENCY PLANNING PERSONNEL THAT AS OF 2058[EDT] ON 6/26/00, |
| NINETEEN [19] OFFSITE SIRENS HAD BEEN LOST. AS OF 2158[EDT] EFFORTS TO |
| RESTORE ARE STILL IN PROGRESS. OF THE NINETEEN [19], SIXTEEN [16] ARE IN |
| DELAWARE AND THREE [3] ARE IN NEW JERSEY. THE NINETEEN [19] SIRENS |
| REPRESENTS LOSS OF GREATER THAN 25% OF THE TOTAL OF SEVENTY-ONE [71] |
| SIRENS." |
| |
| THE LICENSEE COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE, HOWEVER, THEY ARE CURRENTLY |
| EXPERIENCING ADVERSE WEATHER. THIS REPORT ALSO AFFECTS THE HOPE CREEK |
| STATION. THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| ********** UPDATE AT 0043 ON 06/27/00 FROM STEVE SAUER TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ********** |
| |
| At 2340 on 06/26/00, the licensee was notified that the bulk of the offsite |
| emergency sirens (all but three) had been restored to service. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Morris). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37119 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/27/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:14[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK ABRAMSKI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/27/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |SCOTT MORRIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATIONS DUE TO THE TRIPPING |
| OF ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLIES (EPA) AND SUBSEQUENT HALF SCRAM |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "[The unit experienced a loss] of [the] 'A' [reactor protection system |
| (RPS)] bus[. Output] EPAs tripped causing [this 120-volt AC] bus to |
| de-energize. This caused the reactor building ventilation to isolate[,] |
| both [standby gas treatment systems (SBGT)] to start[, and the] 'A' |
| [hydrogen/oxygen (H2/O2)] monitor to trip (PCIS valves). [The reactor water |
| cleanup (RWCU)] system tripped on low flow due to 12MOV-15 closure (PCIS |
| valve)." |
| |
| The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual or not understood and |
| that all systems functioned as required. The licensee also stated that the |
| cause of this event is currently under investigation. The EPAs tripped |
| under normal supply, and the RPS motor-generator set was functioning |
| properly. There were no maintenance or surveillance activities underway at |
| the time of the event. |
| |
| The reactor building and H2/O2 analyzers have since been un-isolated. SBGT |
| is currently under normal operation and is being used for venting. RWCU has |
| not yet been restored to normal. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021